[Feature][T106]ZXW P56U09 code
Only Configure: Yes
Affected branch: master
Affected module: unknow
Is it affected on both ZXIC and MTK: only ZXIC
Self-test: No
Doc Update: No
Change-Id: I3cbd8b420271eb20c2b40ebe5c78f83059cd42f3
diff --git a/ap/libc/glibc/glibc-2.23/sunrpc/svcauth_des.c b/ap/libc/glibc/glibc-2.23/sunrpc/svcauth_des.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a0f961d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/libc/glibc/glibc-2.23/sunrpc/svcauth_des.c
@@ -0,0 +1,596 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2010, Oracle America, Inc.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are
+ * met:
+ *
+ * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
+ * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
+ * disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials
+ * provided with the distribution.
+ * * Neither the name of the "Oracle America, Inc." nor the names of its
+ * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
+ * from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS
+ * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+ * COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE
+ * GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
+ * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
+ * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
+ * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
+ * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * svcauth_des.c, server-side des authentication
+ *
+ * We insure for the service the following:
+ * (1) The timestamp microseconds do not exceed 1 million.
+ * (2) The timestamp plus the window is less than the current time.
+ * (3) The timestamp is not less than the one previously
+ * seen in the current session.
+ *
+ * It is up to the server to determine if the window size is
+ * too small .
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <rpc/rpc.h>
+#include <rpc/xdr.h>
+#include <rpc/auth.h>
+#include <rpc/auth_des.h>
+#include <rpc/svc_auth.h>
+#include <rpc/svc.h>
+#include <rpc/des_crypt.h>
+
+#define debug(msg) /*printf("svcauth_des: %s\n", msg) */
+
+#define USEC_PER_SEC ((uint32_t) 1000000L)
+#define BEFORE(t1, t2) timercmp(t1, t2, <)
+
+/*
+ * LRU cache of conversation keys and some other useful items.
+ */
+#define AUTHDES_CACHESZ 64
+struct cache_entry
+ {
+ des_block key; /* conversation key */
+ char *rname; /* client's name */
+ u_int window; /* credential lifetime window */
+ struct rpc_timeval laststamp; /* detect replays of creds */
+ char *localcred; /* generic local credential */
+ };
+#ifdef _RPC_THREAD_SAFE_
+#define authdes_cache RPC_THREAD_VARIABLE(authdes_cache_s)
+#define authdes_lru RPC_THREAD_VARIABLE(authdes_lru_s)
+#else
+static struct cache_entry *authdes_cache;
+static int *authdes_lru;
+#endif
+
+static void cache_init (void) internal_function; /* initialize the cache */
+static short cache_spot (des_block *, char *, struct rpc_timeval *)
+ internal_function; /* find an entry in the cache */
+static void cache_ref (uint32_t sid) internal_function;
+ /* note that sid was ref'd */
+
+static void invalidate (char *cred) internal_function;
+ /* invalidate entry in cache */
+
+/*
+ * cache statistics
+ */
+struct
+ {
+ u_long ncachehits; /* times cache hit, and is not replay */
+ u_long ncachereplays; /* times cache hit, and is replay */
+ u_long ncachemisses; /* times cache missed */
+ }
+svcauthdes_stats;
+
+/*
+ * Service side authenticator for AUTH_DES
+ */
+enum auth_stat
+_svcauth_des (register struct svc_req *rqst, register struct rpc_msg *msg)
+{
+ register uint32_t *ixdr;
+ des_block cryptbuf[2];
+ register struct authdes_cred *cred;
+ struct authdes_verf verf;
+ int status;
+ register struct cache_entry *entry;
+ uint32_t sid = 0;
+ des_block *sessionkey;
+ des_block ivec;
+ u_int window;
+ struct rpc_timeval timestamp;
+ uint32_t namelen;
+ struct area
+ {
+ struct authdes_cred area_cred;
+ char area_netname[MAXNETNAMELEN + 1];
+ }
+ *area;
+
+ if (authdes_cache == NULL)
+ cache_init ();
+ if (authdes_cache == NULL) /* No free memory */
+ return AUTH_FAILED;
+
+ area = (struct area *) rqst->rq_clntcred;
+ cred = (struct authdes_cred *) &area->area_cred;
+
+ /*
+ * Get the credential
+ */
+ if (msg->rm_call.cb_cred.oa_length <= 0 ||
+ msg->rm_call.cb_cred.oa_length > MAX_AUTH_BYTES)
+ return AUTH_BADCRED;
+
+ ixdr = (uint32_t *) msg->rm_call.cb_cred.oa_base;
+ cred->adc_namekind = IXDR_GET_ENUM (ixdr, enum authdes_namekind);
+ switch (cred->adc_namekind)
+ {
+ case ADN_FULLNAME:
+ namelen = IXDR_GET_U_INT32 (ixdr);
+ if (namelen > MAXNETNAMELEN)
+ {
+ return AUTH_BADCRED;
+ }
+ cred->adc_fullname.name = area->area_netname;
+ memcpy (cred->adc_fullname.name, (char *) ixdr, namelen);
+ cred->adc_fullname.name[namelen] = 0;
+ ixdr += (RNDUP (namelen) / BYTES_PER_XDR_UNIT);
+ cred->adc_fullname.key.key.high = *ixdr++;
+ cred->adc_fullname.key.key.low = *ixdr++;
+ cred->adc_fullname.window = *ixdr++;
+ break;
+ case ADN_NICKNAME:
+ cred->adc_nickname = *ixdr++;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return AUTH_BADCRED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Get the verifier
+ */
+ if (msg->rm_call.cb_verf.oa_length <= 0 ||
+ msg->rm_call.cb_verf.oa_length > MAX_AUTH_BYTES)
+ return AUTH_BADCRED;
+
+ ixdr = (uint32_t *) msg->rm_call.cb_verf.oa_base;
+ verf.adv_xtimestamp.key.high = *ixdr++;
+ verf.adv_xtimestamp.key.low = *ixdr++;
+ verf.adv_int_u = *ixdr++;
+
+ /*
+ * Get the conversation key
+ */
+ if (cred->adc_namekind == ADN_FULLNAME)
+ {
+ netobj pkey;
+ char pkey_data[1024];
+
+ sessionkey = &cred->adc_fullname.key;
+ if (!getpublickey (cred->adc_fullname.name, pkey_data))
+ {
+ debug("getpublickey");
+ return AUTH_BADCRED;
+ }
+ pkey.n_bytes = pkey_data;
+ pkey.n_len = strlen (pkey_data) + 1;
+ if (key_decryptsession_pk (cred->adc_fullname.name, &pkey,
+ sessionkey) < 0)
+ {
+ debug ("decryptsessionkey");
+ return AUTH_BADCRED; /* key not found */
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ { /* ADN_NICKNAME */
+ if (cred->adc_nickname >= AUTHDES_CACHESZ)
+ {
+ debug ("bad nickname");
+ return AUTH_BADCRED; /* garbled credential */
+ }
+ else
+ sid = cred->adc_nickname;
+
+ /* XXX This could be wrong, but else we have a
+ security problem */
+ if (authdes_cache[sid].rname == NULL)
+ return AUTH_BADCRED;
+ sessionkey = &authdes_cache[sid].key;
+ }
+
+
+ /*
+ * Decrypt the timestamp
+ */
+ cryptbuf[0] = verf.adv_xtimestamp;
+ if (cred->adc_namekind == ADN_FULLNAME)
+ {
+ cryptbuf[1].key.high = cred->adc_fullname.window;
+ cryptbuf[1].key.low = verf.adv_winverf;
+ ivec.key.high = ivec.key.low = 0;
+ status = cbc_crypt ((char *) sessionkey, (char *) cryptbuf,
+ 2 * sizeof (des_block), DES_DECRYPT | DES_HW,
+ (char *) &ivec);
+ }
+ else
+ status = ecb_crypt ((char *) sessionkey, (char *) cryptbuf,
+ sizeof (des_block), DES_DECRYPT | DES_HW);
+
+ if (DES_FAILED (status))
+ {
+ debug ("decryption failure");
+ return AUTH_FAILED; /* system error */
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * XDR the decrypted timestamp
+ */
+ ixdr = (uint32_t *) cryptbuf;
+ timestamp.tv_sec = IXDR_GET_INT32 (ixdr);
+ timestamp.tv_usec = IXDR_GET_INT32 (ixdr);
+
+ /*
+ * Check for valid credentials and verifiers.
+ * They could be invalid because the key was flushed
+ * out of the cache, and so a new session should begin.
+ * Be sure and send AUTH_REJECTED{CRED, VERF} if this is the case.
+ */
+ {
+ struct timeval current;
+ int nick;
+ u_int winverf;
+
+ if (cred->adc_namekind == ADN_FULLNAME)
+ {
+ short tmp_spot;
+
+ window = IXDR_GET_U_INT32 (ixdr);
+ winverf = IXDR_GET_U_INT32 (ixdr);
+ if (winverf != window - 1)
+ {
+ debug ("window verifier mismatch");
+ return AUTH_BADCRED; /* garbled credential */
+ }
+ tmp_spot = cache_spot (sessionkey, cred->adc_fullname.name,
+ ×tamp);
+ if (tmp_spot < 0 || tmp_spot > AUTHDES_CACHESZ)
+ {
+ debug ("replayed credential");
+ return AUTH_REJECTEDCRED; /* replay */
+ }
+ sid = tmp_spot;
+ nick = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ { /* ADN_NICKNAME */
+ window = authdes_cache[sid].window;
+ nick = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (timestamp.tv_usec >= USEC_PER_SEC)
+ {
+ debug ("invalid usecs");
+ /* cached out (bad key), or garbled verifier */
+ return nick ? AUTH_REJECTEDVERF : AUTH_BADVERF;
+ }
+ if (nick && BEFORE (×tamp, &authdes_cache[sid].laststamp))
+ {
+ debug ("timestamp before last seen");
+ return AUTH_REJECTEDVERF; /* replay */
+ }
+ __gettimeofday (¤t, (struct timezone *) NULL);
+ current.tv_sec -= window; /* allow for expiration */
+ if (!BEFORE (¤t, ×tamp))
+ {
+ debug ("timestamp expired");
+ /* replay, or garbled credential */
+ return nick ? AUTH_REJECTEDVERF : AUTH_BADCRED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the reply verifier
+ */
+ verf.adv_nickname = sid;
+
+ /*
+ * xdr the timestamp before encrypting
+ */
+ ixdr = (uint32_t *) cryptbuf;
+ IXDR_PUT_INT32 (ixdr, timestamp.tv_sec - 1);
+ IXDR_PUT_INT32 (ixdr, timestamp.tv_usec);
+
+ /*
+ * encrypt the timestamp
+ */
+ status = ecb_crypt ((char *) sessionkey, (char *) cryptbuf,
+ sizeof (des_block), DES_ENCRYPT | DES_HW);
+ if (DES_FAILED (status))
+ {
+ debug ("encryption failure");
+ return AUTH_FAILED; /* system error */
+ }
+ verf.adv_xtimestamp = cryptbuf[0];
+
+ /*
+ * Serialize the reply verifier, and update rqst
+ */
+ ixdr = (uint32_t *) msg->rm_call.cb_verf.oa_base;
+ *ixdr++ = verf.adv_xtimestamp.key.high;
+ *ixdr++ = verf.adv_xtimestamp.key.low;
+ *ixdr++ = verf.adv_int_u;
+
+ rqst->rq_xprt->xp_verf.oa_flavor = AUTH_DES;
+ rqst->rq_xprt->xp_verf.oa_base = msg->rm_call.cb_verf.oa_base;
+ rqst->rq_xprt->xp_verf.oa_length =
+ (char *) ixdr - msg->rm_call.cb_verf.oa_base;
+
+ /*
+ * We succeeded, commit the data to the cache now and
+ * finish cooking the credential.
+ */
+ entry = &authdes_cache[sid];
+ entry->laststamp = timestamp;
+ cache_ref (sid);
+ if (cred->adc_namekind == ADN_FULLNAME)
+ {
+ size_t full_len;
+
+ cred->adc_fullname.window = window;
+ cred->adc_nickname = sid; /* save nickname */
+ if (entry->rname != NULL)
+ mem_free (entry->rname, strlen (entry->rname) + 1);
+ full_len = strlen (cred->adc_fullname.name) + 1;
+ entry->rname = mem_alloc ((u_int) full_len);
+ if (entry->rname != NULL)
+ memcpy (entry->rname, cred->adc_fullname.name, full_len);
+ else
+ {
+ debug ("out of memory");
+ return AUTH_FAILED; /* out of memory is bad */
+ }
+ entry->key = *sessionkey;
+ entry->window = window;
+ invalidate (entry->localcred); /* mark any cached cred invalid */
+ }
+ else
+ { /* ADN_NICKNAME */
+ /*
+ * nicknames are cooked into fullnames
+ */
+ cred->adc_namekind = ADN_FULLNAME;
+ cred->adc_fullname.name = entry->rname;
+ cred->adc_fullname.key = entry->key;
+ cred->adc_fullname.window = entry->window;
+ }
+ return AUTH_OK; /* we made it! */
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Initialize the cache
+ */
+static void
+internal_function
+cache_init (void)
+{
+ register int i;
+
+ authdes_cache = (struct cache_entry *)
+ calloc (sizeof (struct cache_entry) * AUTHDES_CACHESZ, 1);
+ if (authdes_cache == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ authdes_lru = (int *) mem_alloc (sizeof (int) * AUTHDES_CACHESZ);
+ /*
+ * Initialize the lru list
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < AUTHDES_CACHESZ; ++i)
+ authdes_lru[i] = i;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Find the lru victim
+ */
+static short
+cache_victim (void)
+{
+ return authdes_lru[AUTHDES_CACHESZ - 1];
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note that sid was referenced
+ */
+static void
+internal_function
+cache_ref (register uint32_t sid)
+{
+ register int i;
+ register int curr;
+ register int prev;
+
+ prev = authdes_lru[0];
+ authdes_lru[0] = sid;
+ for (i = 1; prev != sid; ++i)
+ {
+ curr = authdes_lru[i];
+ authdes_lru[i] = prev;
+ prev = curr;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find a spot in the cache for a credential containing
+ * the items given. Return -1 if a replay is detected, otherwise
+ * return the spot in the cache.
+ */
+static short
+internal_function
+cache_spot (register des_block *key, char *name,
+ struct rpc_timeval *timestamp)
+{
+ register struct cache_entry *cp;
+ register int i;
+ register uint32_t hi;
+
+ hi = key->key.high;
+ for (cp = authdes_cache, i = 0; i < AUTHDES_CACHESZ; ++i, ++cp)
+ {
+ if (cp->key.key.high == hi &&
+ cp->key.key.low == key->key.low &&
+ cp->rname != NULL &&
+ memcmp (cp->rname, name, strlen (name) + 1) == 0)
+ {
+ if (BEFORE (timestamp, &cp->laststamp))
+ {
+ ++svcauthdes_stats.ncachereplays;
+ return -1; /* replay */
+ }
+ ++svcauthdes_stats.ncachehits;
+ return i; /* refresh */
+ }
+ }
+ ++svcauthdes_stats.ncachemisses;
+ return cache_victim (); /* new credential */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Local credential handling stuff.
+ * NOTE: bsd unix dependent.
+ * Other operating systems should put something else here.
+ */
+#define UNKNOWN -2 /* grouplen, if cached cred is unknown user */
+#define INVALID -1 /* grouplen, if cache entry is invalid */
+
+struct bsdcred
+{
+ uid_t uid; /* cached uid */
+ gid_t gid; /* cached gid */
+ int grouplen; /* length of cached groups */
+ int grouplen_max; /* length of allocated cached groups */
+ gid_t groups[0]; /* cached groups */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Map a des credential into a unix cred.
+ * We cache the credential here so the application does
+ * not have to make an rpc call every time to interpret
+ * the credential.
+ */
+int
+authdes_getucred (const struct authdes_cred *adc, uid_t * uid, gid_t * gid,
+ short *grouplen, gid_t * groups)
+{
+ unsigned sid;
+ register int i;
+ uid_t i_uid;
+ gid_t i_gid;
+ int i_grouplen;
+ struct bsdcred *cred;
+
+ sid = adc->adc_nickname;
+ if (sid >= AUTHDES_CACHESZ)
+ {
+ debug ("invalid nickname");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ cred = (struct bsdcred *) authdes_cache[sid].localcred;
+ if (cred == NULL || cred->grouplen == INVALID)
+ {
+ /*
+ * not in cache: lookup
+ */
+ if (!netname2user (adc->adc_fullname.name, &i_uid, &i_gid,
+ &i_grouplen, groups))
+ {
+ debug ("unknown netname");
+ if (cred != NULL)
+ cred->grouplen = UNKNOWN; /* mark as lookup up, but not found */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (cred != NULL && cred->grouplen_max < i_grouplen)
+ {
+ /* We already have an allocated data structure. But it is
+ too small. */
+ free (cred);
+ authdes_cache[sid].localcred = NULL;
+ cred = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (cred == NULL)
+ {
+ /* We should allocate room for at least NGROUPS groups. */
+ int ngroups_max = MAX (i_grouplen, NGROUPS);
+
+ cred = (struct bsdcred *) mem_alloc (sizeof (struct bsdcred)
+ + ngroups_max * sizeof (gid_t));
+ if (cred == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ authdes_cache[sid].localcred = (char *) cred;
+ cred->grouplen = INVALID;
+ cred->grouplen_max = ngroups_max;
+ }
+
+ debug ("missed ucred cache");
+ *uid = cred->uid = i_uid;
+ *gid = cred->gid = i_gid;
+ cred->grouplen = i_grouplen;
+ for (i = i_grouplen - 1; i >= 0; --i)
+ cred->groups[i] = groups[i];
+ /* Make sure no too large values are reported. */
+ *grouplen = MIN (SHRT_MAX, i_grouplen);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ else if (cred->grouplen == UNKNOWN)
+ {
+ /*
+ * Already lookup up, but no match found
+ */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * cached credentials
+ */
+ *uid = cred->uid;
+ *gid = cred->gid;
+
+ /* Another stupidity in the interface: *grouplen is of type short.
+ So we might have to cut the information passed up short. */
+ int grouplen_copy = MIN (SHRT_MAX, cred->grouplen);
+ *grouplen = grouplen_copy;
+ for (i = grouplen_copy - 1; i >= 0; --i)
+ groups[i] = cred->groups[i];
+ return 1;
+}
+libc_hidden_nolink_sunrpc (authdes_getucred, GLIBC_2_1)
+
+static void
+internal_function
+invalidate (char *cred)
+{
+ if (cred == NULL)
+ return;
+ ((struct bsdcred *) cred)->grouplen = INVALID;
+}