zte's code,first commit

Change-Id: I9a04da59e459a9bc0d67f101f700d9d7dc8d681b
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/build.info b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2e75985
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        dsa_gen.c dsa_key.c dsa_lib.c dsa_asn1.c dsa_vrf.c dsa_sign.c \
+        dsa_err.c dsa_ossl.c dsa_depr.c dsa_ameth.c dsa_pmeth.c dsa_prn.c \
+        dsa_meth.c
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2dcaa08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,572 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include "dsa_local.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include "crypto/asn1.h"
+#include "crypto/evp.h"
+
+static int dsa_pub_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey)
+{
+    const unsigned char *p, *pm;
+    int pklen, pmlen;
+    int ptype;
+    const void *pval;
+    const ASN1_STRING *pstr;
+    X509_ALGOR *palg;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *public_key = NULL;
+
+    DSA *dsa = NULL;
+
+    if (!X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, &p, &pklen, &palg, pubkey))
+        return 0;
+    X509_ALGOR_get0(NULL, &ptype, &pval, palg);
+
+    if (ptype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
+        pstr = pval;
+        pm = pstr->data;
+        pmlen = pstr->length;
+
+        if ((dsa = d2i_DSAparams(NULL, &pm, pmlen)) == NULL) {
+            DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_DECODE, DSA_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+    } else if ((ptype == V_ASN1_NULL) || (ptype == V_ASN1_UNDEF)) {
+        if ((dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL) {
+            DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_DECODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_DECODE, DSA_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if ((public_key = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &p, pklen)) == NULL) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_DECODE, DSA_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if ((dsa->pub_key = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(public_key, NULL)) == NULL) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_DECODE, DSA_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(public_key);
+    EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa);
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(public_key);
+    DSA_free(dsa);
+    return 0;
+
+}
+
+static int dsa_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    DSA *dsa;
+    int ptype;
+    unsigned char *penc = NULL;
+    int penclen;
+    ASN1_STRING *str = NULL;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *pubint = NULL;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *aobj;
+
+    dsa = pkey->pkey.dsa;
+    if (pkey->save_parameters && dsa->p && dsa->q && dsa->g) {
+        str = ASN1_STRING_new();
+        if (str == NULL) {
+            DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        str->length = i2d_DSAparams(dsa, &str->data);
+        if (str->length <= 0) {
+            DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        ptype = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
+    } else
+        ptype = V_ASN1_UNDEF;
+
+    pubint = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(dsa->pub_key, NULL);
+
+    if (pubint == NULL) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    penclen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(pubint, &penc);
+    ASN1_INTEGER_free(pubint);
+
+    if (penclen <= 0) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    aobj = OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_DSA);
+    if (aobj == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, aobj, ptype, str, penc, penclen))
+        return 1;
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(penc);
+    ASN1_STRING_free(str);
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * In PKCS#8 DSA: you just get a private key integer and parameters in the
+ * AlgorithmIdentifier the pubkey must be recalculated.
+ */
+
+static int dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
+{
+    const unsigned char *p, *pm;
+    int pklen, pmlen;
+    int ptype;
+    const void *pval;
+    const ASN1_STRING *pstr;
+    const X509_ALGOR *palg;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *privkey = NULL;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+
+    DSA *dsa = NULL;
+
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, &palg, p8))
+        return 0;
+    X509_ALGOR_get0(NULL, &ptype, &pval, palg);
+
+    if ((privkey = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &p, pklen)) == NULL)
+        goto decerr;
+    if (privkey->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER || ptype != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
+        goto decerr;
+
+    pstr = pval;
+    pm = pstr->data;
+    pmlen = pstr->length;
+    if ((dsa = d2i_DSAparams(NULL, &pm, pmlen)) == NULL)
+        goto decerr;
+    /* We have parameters now set private key */
+    if ((dsa->priv_key = BN_secure_new()) == NULL
+        || !ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(privkey, dsa->priv_key)) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, DSA_R_BN_ERROR);
+        goto dsaerr;
+    }
+    /* Calculate public key */
+    if ((dsa->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto dsaerr;
+    }
+    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto dsaerr;
+    }
+
+    BN_set_flags(dsa->priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+    if (!BN_mod_exp(dsa->pub_key, dsa->g, dsa->priv_key, dsa->p, ctx)) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, DSA_R_BN_ERROR);
+        goto dsaerr;
+    }
+
+    EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa);
+
+    ret = 1;
+    goto done;
+
+ decerr:
+    DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, DSA_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ dsaerr:
+    DSA_free(dsa);
+ done:
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int dsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    ASN1_STRING *params = NULL;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *prkey = NULL;
+    unsigned char *dp = NULL;
+    int dplen;
+
+    if (!pkey->pkey.dsa || !pkey->pkey.dsa->priv_key) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_ENCODE, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    params = ASN1_STRING_new();
+
+    if (params == NULL) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    params->length = i2d_DSAparams(pkey->pkey.dsa, &params->data);
+    if (params->length <= 0) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    params->type = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
+
+    /* Get private key into integer */
+    prkey = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(pkey->pkey.dsa->priv_key, NULL);
+
+    if (!prkey) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_ENCODE, DSA_R_BN_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    dplen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(prkey, &dp);
+
+    ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey);
+    prkey = NULL;
+
+    if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_dsa), 0,
+                         V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, params, dp, dplen))
+        goto err;
+
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(dp);
+    ASN1_STRING_free(params);
+    ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int int_dsa_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    return DSA_size(pkey->pkey.dsa);
+}
+
+static int dsa_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    return DSA_bits(pkey->pkey.dsa);
+}
+
+static int dsa_security_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    return DSA_security_bits(pkey->pkey.dsa);
+}
+
+static int dsa_missing_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    DSA *dsa;
+    dsa = pkey->pkey.dsa;
+    if (dsa == NULL || dsa->p == NULL || dsa->q == NULL || dsa->g == NULL)
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int dsa_copy_parameters(EVP_PKEY *to, const EVP_PKEY *from)
+{
+    BIGNUM *a;
+
+    if (to->pkey.dsa == NULL) {
+        to->pkey.dsa = DSA_new();
+        if (to->pkey.dsa == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    if ((a = BN_dup(from->pkey.dsa->p)) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    BN_free(to->pkey.dsa->p);
+    to->pkey.dsa->p = a;
+
+    if ((a = BN_dup(from->pkey.dsa->q)) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    BN_free(to->pkey.dsa->q);
+    to->pkey.dsa->q = a;
+
+    if ((a = BN_dup(from->pkey.dsa->g)) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    BN_free(to->pkey.dsa->g);
+    to->pkey.dsa->g = a;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int dsa_cmp_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
+{
+    if (BN_cmp(a->pkey.dsa->p, b->pkey.dsa->p) ||
+        BN_cmp(a->pkey.dsa->q, b->pkey.dsa->q) ||
+        BN_cmp(a->pkey.dsa->g, b->pkey.dsa->g))
+        return 0;
+    else
+        return 1;
+}
+
+static int dsa_pub_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
+{
+    if (BN_cmp(b->pkey.dsa->pub_key, a->pkey.dsa->pub_key) != 0)
+        return 0;
+    else
+        return 1;
+}
+
+static void int_dsa_free(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    DSA_free(pkey->pkey.dsa);
+}
+
+static int do_dsa_print(BIO *bp, const DSA *x, int off, int ptype)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    const char *ktype = NULL;
+    const BIGNUM *priv_key, *pub_key;
+
+    if (ptype == 2)
+        priv_key = x->priv_key;
+    else
+        priv_key = NULL;
+
+    if (ptype > 0)
+        pub_key = x->pub_key;
+    else
+        pub_key = NULL;
+
+    if (ptype == 2)
+        ktype = "Private-Key";
+    else if (ptype == 1)
+        ktype = "Public-Key";
+    else
+        ktype = "DSA-Parameters";
+
+    if (priv_key) {
+        if (!BIO_indent(bp, off, 128))
+            goto err;
+        if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s: (%d bit)\n", ktype, BN_num_bits(x->p))
+            <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "priv:", priv_key, NULL, off))
+        goto err;
+    if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "pub: ", pub_key, NULL, off))
+        goto err;
+    if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "P:   ", x->p, NULL, off))
+        goto err;
+    if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "Q:   ", x->q, NULL, off))
+        goto err;
+    if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "G:   ", x->g, NULL, off))
+        goto err;
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int dsa_param_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                            const unsigned char **pder, int derlen)
+{
+    DSA *dsa;
+
+    if ((dsa = d2i_DSAparams(NULL, pder, derlen)) == NULL) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PARAM_DECODE, ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int dsa_param_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder)
+{
+    return i2d_DSAparams(pkey->pkey.dsa, pder);
+}
+
+static int dsa_param_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
+                           ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
+{
+    return do_dsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.dsa, indent, 0);
+}
+
+static int dsa_pub_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
+                         ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
+{
+    return do_dsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.dsa, indent, 1);
+}
+
+static int dsa_priv_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
+                          ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
+{
+    return do_dsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.dsa, indent, 2);
+}
+
+static int old_dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                               const unsigned char **pder, int derlen)
+{
+    DSA *dsa;
+
+    if ((dsa = d2i_DSAPrivateKey(NULL, pder, derlen)) == NULL) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_OLD_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int old_dsa_priv_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder)
+{
+    return i2d_DSAPrivateKey(pkey->pkey.dsa, pder);
+}
+
+static int dsa_sig_print(BIO *bp, const X509_ALGOR *sigalg,
+                         const ASN1_STRING *sig, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
+{
+    DSA_SIG *dsa_sig;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+
+    if (!sig) {
+        if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
+            return 0;
+        else
+            return 1;
+    }
+    p = sig->data;
+    dsa_sig = d2i_DSA_SIG(NULL, &p, sig->length);
+    if (dsa_sig) {
+        int rv = 0;
+        const BIGNUM *r, *s;
+
+        DSA_SIG_get0(dsa_sig, &r, &s);
+
+        if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) != 1)
+            goto err;
+
+        if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "r:   ", r, NULL, indent))
+            goto err;
+        if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "s:   ", s, NULL, indent))
+            goto err;
+        rv = 1;
+ err:
+        DSA_SIG_free(dsa_sig);
+        return rv;
+    }
+    return X509_signature_dump(bp, sig, indent);
+}
+
+static int dsa_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2)
+{
+    switch (op) {
+    case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
+        if (arg1 == 0) {
+            int snid, hnid;
+            X509_ALGOR *alg1, *alg2;
+            PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_get0_algs(arg2, NULL, &alg1, &alg2);
+            if (alg1 == NULL || alg1->algorithm == NULL)
+                return -1;
+            hnid = OBJ_obj2nid(alg1->algorithm);
+            if (hnid == NID_undef)
+                return -1;
+            if (!OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&snid, hnid, EVP_PKEY_id(pkey)))
+                return -1;
+            X509_ALGOR_set0(alg2, OBJ_nid2obj(snid), V_ASN1_UNDEF, 0);
+        }
+        return 1;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+    case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN:
+        if (arg1 == 0) {
+            int snid, hnid;
+            X509_ALGOR *alg1, *alg2;
+            CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(arg2, NULL, NULL, &alg1, &alg2);
+            if (alg1 == NULL || alg1->algorithm == NULL)
+                return -1;
+            hnid = OBJ_obj2nid(alg1->algorithm);
+            if (hnid == NID_undef)
+                return -1;
+            if (!OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&snid, hnid, EVP_PKEY_id(pkey)))
+                return -1;
+            X509_ALGOR_set0(alg2, OBJ_nid2obj(snid), V_ASN1_UNDEF, 0);
+        }
+        return 1;
+
+    case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_RI_TYPE:
+        *(int *)arg2 = CMS_RECIPINFO_NONE;
+        return 1;
+#endif
+
+    case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID:
+        *(int *)arg2 = NID_sha256;
+        return 1;
+
+    default:
+        return -2;
+
+    }
+
+}
+
+/* NB these are sorted in pkey_id order, lowest first */
+
+const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD dsa_asn1_meths[5] = {
+
+    {
+     EVP_PKEY_DSA2,
+     EVP_PKEY_DSA,
+     ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS},
+
+    {
+     EVP_PKEY_DSA1,
+     EVP_PKEY_DSA,
+     ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS},
+
+    {
+     EVP_PKEY_DSA4,
+     EVP_PKEY_DSA,
+     ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS},
+
+    {
+     EVP_PKEY_DSA3,
+     EVP_PKEY_DSA,
+     ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS},
+
+    {
+     EVP_PKEY_DSA,
+     EVP_PKEY_DSA,
+     0,
+
+     "DSA",
+     "OpenSSL DSA method",
+
+     dsa_pub_decode,
+     dsa_pub_encode,
+     dsa_pub_cmp,
+     dsa_pub_print,
+
+     dsa_priv_decode,
+     dsa_priv_encode,
+     dsa_priv_print,
+
+     int_dsa_size,
+     dsa_bits,
+     dsa_security_bits,
+
+     dsa_param_decode,
+     dsa_param_encode,
+     dsa_missing_parameters,
+     dsa_copy_parameters,
+     dsa_cmp_parameters,
+     dsa_param_print,
+     dsa_sig_print,
+
+     int_dsa_free,
+     dsa_pkey_ctrl,
+     old_dsa_priv_decode,
+     old_dsa_priv_encode}
+};
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9cafd5c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "dsa_local.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(DSA_SIG) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA_SIG, r, CBIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA_SIG, s, CBIGNUM)
+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(DSA_SIG)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(DSA_SIG, DSA_SIG, DSA_SIG)
+
+DSA_SIG *DSA_SIG_new(void)
+{
+    DSA_SIG *sig = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*sig));
+    if (sig == NULL)
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIG_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return sig;
+}
+
+void DSA_SIG_free(DSA_SIG *sig)
+{
+    if (sig == NULL)
+        return;
+    BN_clear_free(sig->r);
+    BN_clear_free(sig->s);
+    OPENSSL_free(sig);
+}
+
+void DSA_SIG_get0(const DSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps)
+{
+    if (pr != NULL)
+        *pr = sig->r;
+    if (ps != NULL)
+        *ps = sig->s;
+}
+
+int DSA_SIG_set0(DSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s)
+{
+    if (r == NULL || s == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    BN_clear_free(sig->r);
+    BN_clear_free(sig->s);
+    sig->r = r;
+    sig->s = s;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Override the default free and new methods */
+static int dsa_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                  void *exarg)
+{
+    if (operation == ASN1_OP_NEW_PRE) {
+        *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)DSA_new();
+        if (*pval != NULL)
+            return 2;
+        return 0;
+    } else if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE) {
+        DSA_free((DSA *)*pval);
+        *pval = NULL;
+        return 2;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(DSAPrivateKey, dsa_cb) = {
+        ASN1_EMBED(DSA, version, INT32),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, p, BIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, q, BIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, g, BIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, pub_key, BIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, priv_key, CBIGNUM)
+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(DSA, DSAPrivateKey)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(DSA, DSAPrivateKey, DSAPrivateKey)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(DSAparams, dsa_cb) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, p, BIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, q, BIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, g, BIGNUM),
+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(DSA, DSAparams)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(DSA, DSAparams, DSAparams)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(DSAPublicKey, dsa_cb) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, pub_key, BIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, p, BIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, q, BIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, g, BIGNUM)
+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(DSA, DSAPublicKey)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(DSA, DSAPublicKey, DSAPublicKey)
+
+DSA *DSAparams_dup(DSA *dsa)
+{
+    return ASN1_item_dup(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(DSAparams), dsa);
+}
+
+int DSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
+             unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *siglen, DSA *dsa)
+{
+    DSA_SIG *s;
+
+    s = DSA_do_sign(dgst, dlen, dsa);
+    if (s == NULL) {
+        *siglen = 0;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    *siglen = i2d_DSA_SIG(s, &sig);
+    DSA_SIG_free(s);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* data has already been hashed (probably with SHA or SHA-1). */
+/*-
+ * returns
+ *      1: correct signature
+ *      0: incorrect signature
+ *     -1: error
+ */
+int DSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+               const unsigned char *sigbuf, int siglen, DSA *dsa)
+{
+    DSA_SIG *s;
+    const unsigned char *p = sigbuf;
+    unsigned char *der = NULL;
+    int derlen = -1;
+    int ret = -1;
+
+    s = DSA_SIG_new();
+    if (s == NULL)
+        return ret;
+    if (d2i_DSA_SIG(&s, &p, siglen) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    /* Ensure signature uses DER and doesn't have trailing garbage */
+    derlen = i2d_DSA_SIG(s, &der);
+    if (derlen != siglen || memcmp(sigbuf, der, derlen))
+        goto err;
+    ret = DSA_do_verify(dgst, dgst_len, s, dsa);
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(der, derlen);
+    DSA_SIG_free(s);
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_depr.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_depr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f51aea7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_depr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This file contains deprecated function(s) that are now wrappers to the new
+ * version(s).
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Parameter generation follows the updated Appendix 2.2 for FIPS PUB 186,
+ * also Appendix 2.2 of FIPS PUB 186-1 (i.e. use SHA as defined in FIPS PUB
+ * 180-1)
+ */
+#define xxxHASH    EVP_sha1()
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT >= 0x00908000L
+NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
+#else
+
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <time.h>
+# include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/bn.h>
+# include <openssl/dsa.h>
+# include <openssl/sha.h>
+
+DSA *DSA_generate_parameters(int bits,
+                             unsigned char *seed_in, int seed_len,
+                             int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret,
+                             void (*callback) (int, int, void *),
+                             void *cb_arg)
+{
+    BN_GENCB *cb;
+    DSA *ret;
+
+    if ((ret = DSA_new()) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    cb = BN_GENCB_new();
+    if (cb == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    BN_GENCB_set_old(cb, callback, cb_arg);
+
+    if (DSA_generate_parameters_ex(ret, bits, seed_in, seed_len,
+                                   counter_ret, h_ret, cb)) {
+        BN_GENCB_free(cb);
+        return ret;
+    }
+    BN_GENCB_free(cb);
+err:
+    DSA_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_err.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8dcf054
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+/*
+ * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+ * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/dsaerr.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+static const ERR_STRING_DATA DSA_str_functs[] = {
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_F_DSAPARAMS_PRINT, 0), "DSAparams_print"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_F_DSAPARAMS_PRINT_FP, 0), "DSAparams_print_fp"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_F_DSA_BUILTIN_PARAMGEN, 0),
+     "dsa_builtin_paramgen"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_F_DSA_BUILTIN_PARAMGEN2, 0),
+     "dsa_builtin_paramgen2"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_F_DSA_DO_SIGN, 0), "DSA_do_sign"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, 0), "DSA_do_verify"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_F_DSA_METH_DUP, 0), "DSA_meth_dup"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_F_DSA_METH_NEW, 0), "DSA_meth_new"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_F_DSA_METH_SET1_NAME, 0), "DSA_meth_set1_name"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_F_DSA_NEW_METHOD, 0), "DSA_new_method"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_F_DSA_PARAM_DECODE, 0), "dsa_param_decode"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_F_DSA_PRINT_FP, 0), "DSA_print_fp"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, 0), "dsa_priv_decode"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_ENCODE, 0), "dsa_priv_encode"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_F_DSA_PUB_DECODE, 0), "dsa_pub_decode"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_F_DSA_PUB_ENCODE, 0), "dsa_pub_encode"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_F_DSA_SIGN, 0), "DSA_sign"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, 0), "DSA_sign_setup"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_F_DSA_SIG_NEW, 0), "DSA_SIG_new"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_F_OLD_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, 0),
+     "old_dsa_priv_decode"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_CTRL, 0), "pkey_dsa_ctrl"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_CTRL_STR, 0), "pkey_dsa_ctrl_str"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_KEYGEN, 0), "pkey_dsa_keygen"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static const ERR_STRING_DATA DSA_str_reasons[] = {
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA, 0, DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE), "bad q value"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA, 0, DSA_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR), "bn decode error"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA, 0, DSA_R_BN_ERROR), "bn error"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA, 0, DSA_R_DECODE_ERROR), "decode error"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA, 0, DSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_TYPE),
+    "invalid digest type"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA, 0, DSA_R_INVALID_PARAMETERS), "invalid parameters"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA, 0, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS), "missing parameters"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA, 0, DSA_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY),
+    "missing private key"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA, 0, DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE), "modulus too large"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA, 0, DSA_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET), "no parameters set"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA, 0, DSA_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR),
+    "parameter encoding error"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA, 0, DSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME), "q not prime"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA, 0, DSA_R_SEED_LEN_SMALL),
+    "seed_len is less than the length of q"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+int ERR_load_DSA_strings(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+    if (ERR_func_error_string(DSA_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
+        ERR_load_strings_const(DSA_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings_const(DSA_str_reasons);
+    }
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5d066a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
@@ -0,0 +1,614 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Parameter generation follows the updated Appendix 2.2 for FIPS PUB 186,
+ * also Appendix 2.2 of FIPS PUB 186-1 (i.e. use SHA as defined in FIPS PUB
+ * 180-1)
+ */
+#define xxxHASH    EVP_sha1()
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include "dsa_local.h"
+
+int DSA_generate_parameters_ex(DSA *ret, int bits,
+                               const unsigned char *seed_in, int seed_len,
+                               int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret,
+                               BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+    if (ret->meth->dsa_paramgen)
+        return ret->meth->dsa_paramgen(ret, bits, seed_in, seed_len,
+                                       counter_ret, h_ret, cb);
+    else {
+        const EVP_MD *evpmd = bits >= 2048 ? EVP_sha256() : EVP_sha1();
+        size_t qbits = EVP_MD_size(evpmd) * 8;
+
+        return dsa_builtin_paramgen(ret, bits, qbits, evpmd,
+                                    seed_in, seed_len, NULL, counter_ret,
+                                    h_ret, cb);
+    }
+}
+
+int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits,
+                         const EVP_MD *evpmd, const unsigned char *seed_in,
+                         size_t seed_len, unsigned char *seed_out,
+                         int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret, BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+    int ok = 0;
+    unsigned char seed[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    unsigned char md[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    unsigned char buf[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], buf2[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    BIGNUM *r0, *W, *X, *c, *test;
+    BIGNUM *g = NULL, *q = NULL, *p = NULL;
+    BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
+    int i, k, n = 0, m = 0, qsize = qbits >> 3;
+    int counter = 0;
+    int r = 0;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    unsigned int h = 2;
+
+    if (qsize != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH && qsize != SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH &&
+        qsize != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+        /* invalid q size */
+        return 0;
+
+    if (evpmd == NULL) {
+        if (qsize == SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+            evpmd = EVP_sha1();
+        else if (qsize == SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+            evpmd = EVP_sha224();
+        else
+            evpmd = EVP_sha256();
+    } else {
+        qsize = EVP_MD_size(evpmd);
+    }
+
+    if (bits < 512)
+        bits = 512;
+
+    bits = (bits + 63) / 64 * 64;
+
+    if (seed_in != NULL) {
+        if (seed_len < (size_t)qsize) {
+            DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_BUILTIN_PARAMGEN, DSA_R_SEED_LEN_SMALL);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        if (seed_len > (size_t)qsize) {
+            /* Only consume as much seed as is expected. */
+            seed_len = qsize;
+        }
+        memcpy(seed, seed_in, seed_len);
+    }
+
+    if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
+    r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    g = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    W = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    q = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    X = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    c = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    p = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    test = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+
+    if (test == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_lshift(test, BN_value_one(), bits - 1))
+        goto err;
+
+    for (;;) {
+        for (;;) {              /* find q */
+            int use_random_seed = (seed_in == NULL);
+
+            /* step 1 */
+            if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, m++))
+                goto err;
+
+            if (use_random_seed) {
+                if (RAND_bytes(seed, qsize) <= 0)
+                    goto err;
+            } else {
+                /* If we come back through, use random seed next time. */
+                seed_in = NULL;
+            }
+            memcpy(buf, seed, qsize);
+            memcpy(buf2, seed, qsize);
+            /* precompute "SEED + 1" for step 7: */
+            for (i = qsize - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+                buf[i]++;
+                if (buf[i] != 0)
+                    break;
+            }
+
+            /* step 2 */
+            if (!EVP_Digest(seed, qsize, md, NULL, evpmd, NULL))
+                goto err;
+            if (!EVP_Digest(buf, qsize, buf2, NULL, evpmd, NULL))
+                goto err;
+            for (i = 0; i < qsize; i++)
+                md[i] ^= buf2[i];
+
+            /* step 3 */
+            md[0] |= 0x80;
+            md[qsize - 1] |= 0x01;
+            if (!BN_bin2bn(md, qsize, q))
+                goto err;
+
+            /* step 4 */
+            r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(q, DSS_prime_checks, ctx,
+                                        use_random_seed, cb);
+            if (r > 0)
+                break;
+            if (r != 0)
+                goto err;
+
+            /* do a callback call */
+            /* step 5 */
+        }
+
+        if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, 0))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0))
+            goto err;
+
+        /* step 6 */
+        counter = 0;
+        /* "offset = 2" */
+
+        n = (bits - 1) / 160;
+
+        for (;;) {
+            if ((counter != 0) && !BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, counter))
+                goto err;
+
+            /* step 7 */
+            BN_zero(W);
+            /* now 'buf' contains "SEED + offset - 1" */
+            for (k = 0; k <= n; k++) {
+                /*
+                 * obtain "SEED + offset + k" by incrementing:
+                 */
+                for (i = qsize - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+                    buf[i]++;
+                    if (buf[i] != 0)
+                        break;
+                }
+
+                if (!EVP_Digest(buf, qsize, md, NULL, evpmd, NULL))
+                    goto err;
+
+                /* step 8 */
+                if (!BN_bin2bn(md, qsize, r0))
+                    goto err;
+                if (!BN_lshift(r0, r0, (qsize << 3) * k))
+                    goto err;
+                if (!BN_add(W, W, r0))
+                    goto err;
+            }
+
+            /* more of step 8 */
+            if (!BN_mask_bits(W, bits - 1))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_copy(X, W))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_add(X, X, test))
+                goto err;
+
+            /* step 9 */
+            if (!BN_lshift1(r0, q))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_mod(c, X, r0, ctx))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_sub(r0, c, BN_value_one()))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_sub(p, X, r0))
+                goto err;
+
+            /* step 10 */
+            if (BN_cmp(p, test) >= 0) {
+                /* step 11 */
+                r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(p, DSS_prime_checks, ctx, 1, cb);
+                if (r > 0)
+                    goto end;   /* found it */
+                if (r != 0)
+                    goto err;
+            }
+
+            /* step 13 */
+            counter++;
+            /* "offset = offset + n + 1" */
+
+            /* step 14 */
+            if (counter >= 4096)
+                break;
+        }
+    }
+ end:
+    if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, 1))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* We now need to generate g */
+    /* Set r0=(p-1)/q */
+    if (!BN_sub(test, p, BN_value_one()))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_div(r0, NULL, test, q, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_set_word(test, h))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, p, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    for (;;) {
+        /* g=test^r0%p */
+        if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(g, test, r0, p, ctx, mont))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_is_one(g))
+            break;
+        if (!BN_add(test, test, BN_value_one()))
+            goto err;
+        h++;
+    }
+
+    if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1))
+        goto err;
+
+    ok = 1;
+ err:
+    if (ok) {
+        BN_free(ret->p);
+        BN_free(ret->q);
+        BN_free(ret->g);
+        ret->p = BN_dup(p);
+        ret->q = BN_dup(q);
+        ret->g = BN_dup(g);
+        if (ret->p == NULL || ret->q == NULL || ret->g == NULL) {
+            ok = 0;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (counter_ret != NULL)
+            *counter_ret = counter;
+        if (h_ret != NULL)
+            *h_ret = h;
+        if (seed_out)
+            memcpy(seed_out, seed, qsize);
+    }
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
+    return ok;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is a parameter generation algorithm for the DSA2 algorithm as
+ * described in FIPS 186-3.
+ */
+
+int dsa_builtin_paramgen2(DSA *ret, size_t L, size_t N,
+                          const EVP_MD *evpmd, const unsigned char *seed_in,
+                          size_t seed_len, int idx, unsigned char *seed_out,
+                          int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret,
+                          BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+    int ok = -1;
+    unsigned char *seed = NULL, *seed_tmp = NULL;
+    unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    int mdsize;
+    BIGNUM *r0, *W, *X, *c, *test;
+    BIGNUM *g = NULL, *q = NULL, *p = NULL;
+    BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
+    int i, k, n = 0, m = 0, qsize = N >> 3;
+    int counter = 0;
+    int r = 0;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    unsigned int h = 2;
+
+    if (mctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* make sure L > N, otherwise we'll get trapped in an infinite loop */
+    if (L <= N) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_BUILTIN_PARAMGEN2, DSA_R_INVALID_PARAMETERS);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (evpmd == NULL) {
+        if (N == 160)
+            evpmd = EVP_sha1();
+        else if (N == 224)
+            evpmd = EVP_sha224();
+        else
+            evpmd = EVP_sha256();
+    }
+
+    mdsize = EVP_MD_size(evpmd);
+    /* If unverifiable g generation only don't need seed */
+    if (!ret->p || !ret->q || idx >= 0) {
+        if (seed_len == 0)
+            seed_len = mdsize;
+
+        seed = OPENSSL_malloc(seed_len);
+
+        if (seed_out)
+            seed_tmp = seed_out;
+        else
+            seed_tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(seed_len);
+
+        if (seed == NULL || seed_tmp == NULL)
+            goto err;
+
+        if (seed_in)
+            memcpy(seed, seed_in, seed_len);
+
+    }
+
+    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    g = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    W = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    X = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    c = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    test = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (test == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* if p, q already supplied generate g only */
+    if (ret->p && ret->q) {
+        p = ret->p;
+        q = ret->q;
+        if (idx >= 0)
+            memcpy(seed_tmp, seed, seed_len);
+        goto g_only;
+    } else {
+        p = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+        q = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+        if (q == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!BN_lshift(test, BN_value_one(), L - 1))
+        goto err;
+    for (;;) {
+        for (;;) {              /* find q */
+            unsigned char *pmd;
+            /* step 1 */
+            if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, m++))
+                goto err;
+
+            if (!seed_in) {
+                if (RAND_bytes(seed, seed_len) <= 0)
+                    goto err;
+            }
+            /* step 2 */
+            if (!EVP_Digest(seed, seed_len, md, NULL, evpmd, NULL))
+                goto err;
+            /* Take least significant bits of md */
+            if (mdsize > qsize)
+                pmd = md + mdsize - qsize;
+            else
+                pmd = md;
+
+            if (mdsize < qsize)
+                memset(md + mdsize, 0, qsize - mdsize);
+
+            /* step 3 */
+            pmd[0] |= 0x80;
+            pmd[qsize - 1] |= 0x01;
+            if (!BN_bin2bn(pmd, qsize, q))
+                goto err;
+
+            /* step 4 */
+            r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(q, DSS_prime_checks, ctx,
+                                        seed_in ? 1 : 0, cb);
+            if (r > 0)
+                break;
+            if (r != 0)
+                goto err;
+            /* Provided seed didn't produce a prime: error */
+            if (seed_in) {
+                ok = 0;
+                DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_BUILTIN_PARAMGEN2, DSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            /* do a callback call */
+            /* step 5 */
+        }
+        /* Copy seed to seed_out before we mess with it */
+        if (seed_out)
+            memcpy(seed_out, seed, seed_len);
+
+        if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, 0))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0))
+            goto err;
+
+        /* step 6 */
+        counter = 0;
+        /* "offset = 1" */
+
+        n = (L - 1) / (mdsize << 3);
+
+        for (;;) {
+            if ((counter != 0) && !BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, counter))
+                goto err;
+
+            /* step 7 */
+            BN_zero(W);
+            /* now 'buf' contains "SEED + offset - 1" */
+            for (k = 0; k <= n; k++) {
+                /*
+                 * obtain "SEED + offset + k" by incrementing:
+                 */
+                for (i = seed_len - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+                    seed[i]++;
+                    if (seed[i] != 0)
+                        break;
+                }
+
+                if (!EVP_Digest(seed, seed_len, md, NULL, evpmd, NULL))
+                    goto err;
+
+                /* step 8 */
+                if (!BN_bin2bn(md, mdsize, r0))
+                    goto err;
+                if (!BN_lshift(r0, r0, (mdsize << 3) * k))
+                    goto err;
+                if (!BN_add(W, W, r0))
+                    goto err;
+            }
+
+            /* more of step 8 */
+            if (!BN_mask_bits(W, L - 1))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_copy(X, W))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_add(X, X, test))
+                goto err;
+
+            /* step 9 */
+            if (!BN_lshift1(r0, q))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_mod(c, X, r0, ctx))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_sub(r0, c, BN_value_one()))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_sub(p, X, r0))
+                goto err;
+
+            /* step 10 */
+            if (BN_cmp(p, test) >= 0) {
+                /* step 11 */
+                r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(p, DSS_prime_checks, ctx, 1, cb);
+                if (r > 0)
+                    goto end;   /* found it */
+                if (r != 0)
+                    goto err;
+            }
+
+            /* step 13 */
+            counter++;
+            /* "offset = offset + n + 1" */
+
+            /* step 14 */
+            if (counter >= (int)(4 * L))
+                break;
+        }
+        if (seed_in) {
+            ok = 0;
+            DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_BUILTIN_PARAMGEN2, DSA_R_INVALID_PARAMETERS);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+ end:
+    if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, 1))
+        goto err;
+
+ g_only:
+
+    /* We now need to generate g */
+    /* Set r0=(p-1)/q */
+    if (!BN_sub(test, p, BN_value_one()))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_div(r0, NULL, test, q, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (idx < 0) {
+        if (!BN_set_word(test, h))
+            goto err;
+    } else
+        h = 1;
+    if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, p, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    for (;;) {
+        static const unsigned char ggen[4] = { 0x67, 0x67, 0x65, 0x6e };
+        if (idx >= 0) {
+            md[0] = idx & 0xff;
+            md[1] = (h >> 8) & 0xff;
+            md[2] = h & 0xff;
+            if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, evpmd, NULL))
+                goto err;
+            if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, seed_tmp, seed_len))
+                goto err;
+            if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, ggen, sizeof(ggen)))
+                goto err;
+            if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, md, 3))
+                goto err;
+            if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, md, NULL))
+                goto err;
+            if (!BN_bin2bn(md, mdsize, test))
+                goto err;
+        }
+        /* g=test^r0%p */
+        if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(g, test, r0, p, ctx, mont))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_is_one(g))
+            break;
+        if (idx < 0 && !BN_add(test, test, BN_value_one()))
+            goto err;
+        h++;
+        if (idx >= 0 && h > 0xffff)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1))
+        goto err;
+
+    ok = 1;
+ err:
+    if (ok == 1) {
+        if (p != ret->p) {
+            BN_free(ret->p);
+            ret->p = BN_dup(p);
+        }
+        if (q != ret->q) {
+            BN_free(ret->q);
+            ret->q = BN_dup(q);
+        }
+        BN_free(ret->g);
+        ret->g = BN_dup(g);
+        if (ret->p == NULL || ret->q == NULL || ret->g == NULL) {
+            ok = -1;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (counter_ret != NULL)
+            *counter_ret = counter;
+        if (h_ret != NULL)
+            *h_ret = h;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(seed);
+    if (seed_out != seed_tmp)
+        OPENSSL_free(seed_tmp);
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
+    return ok;
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_key.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_key.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bdeddd4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_key.c
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "dsa_local.h"
+
+static int dsa_builtin_keygen(DSA *dsa);
+
+int DSA_generate_key(DSA *dsa)
+{
+    if (dsa->meth->dsa_keygen)
+        return dsa->meth->dsa_keygen(dsa);
+    return dsa_builtin_keygen(dsa);
+}
+
+static int dsa_builtin_keygen(DSA *dsa)
+{
+    int ok = 0;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
+
+    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (dsa->priv_key == NULL) {
+        if ((priv_key = BN_secure_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    } else
+        priv_key = dsa->priv_key;
+
+    do
+        if (!BN_priv_rand_range(priv_key, dsa->q))
+            goto err;
+    while (BN_is_zero(priv_key)) ;
+
+    if (dsa->pub_key == NULL) {
+        if ((pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    } else
+        pub_key = dsa->pub_key;
+
+    {
+        BIGNUM *prk = BN_new();
+
+        if (prk == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        BN_with_flags(prk, priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+        if (!BN_mod_exp(pub_key, dsa->g, prk, dsa->p, ctx)) {
+            BN_free(prk);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* We MUST free prk before any further use of priv_key */
+        BN_free(prk);
+    }
+
+    dsa->priv_key = priv_key;
+    dsa->pub_key = pub_key;
+    ok = 1;
+
+ err:
+    if (pub_key != dsa->pub_key)
+        BN_free(pub_key);
+    if (priv_key != dsa->priv_key)
+        BN_free(priv_key);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return ok;
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_lib.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f98af58
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,358 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/refcount.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "dsa_local.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+DSA *DSA_new(void)
+{
+    return DSA_new_method(NULL);
+}
+
+int DSA_set_method(DSA *dsa, const DSA_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    /*
+     * NB: The caller is specifically setting a method, so it's not up to us
+     * to deal with which ENGINE it comes from.
+     */
+    const DSA_METHOD *mtmp;
+    mtmp = dsa->meth;
+    if (mtmp->finish)
+        mtmp->finish(dsa);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    ENGINE_finish(dsa->engine);
+    dsa->engine = NULL;
+#endif
+    dsa->meth = meth;
+    if (meth->init)
+        meth->init(dsa);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+const DSA_METHOD *DSA_get_method(DSA *d)
+{
+    return d->meth;
+}
+
+DSA *DSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine)
+{
+    DSA *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    ret->references = 1;
+    ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    if (ret->lock == NULL) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        OPENSSL_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    ret->meth = DSA_get_default_method();
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~DSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW; /* early default init */
+    if (engine) {
+        if (!ENGINE_init(engine)) {
+            DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        ret->engine = engine;
+    } else
+        ret->engine = ENGINE_get_default_DSA();
+    if (ret->engine) {
+        ret->meth = ENGINE_get_DSA(ret->engine);
+        if (ret->meth == NULL) {
+            DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+    ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~DSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW;
+
+    if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DSA, ret, &ret->ex_data))
+        goto err;
+
+    if ((ret->meth->init != NULL) && !ret->meth->init(ret)) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_INIT_FAIL);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+
+ err:
+    DSA_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+void DSA_free(DSA *r)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (r == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock);
+    REF_PRINT_COUNT("DSA", r);
+    if (i > 0)
+        return;
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
+
+    if (r->meth != NULL && r->meth->finish != NULL)
+        r->meth->finish(r);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    ENGINE_finish(r->engine);
+#endif
+
+    CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DSA, r, &r->ex_data);
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock);
+
+    BN_clear_free(r->p);
+    BN_clear_free(r->q);
+    BN_clear_free(r->g);
+    BN_clear_free(r->pub_key);
+    BN_clear_free(r->priv_key);
+    OPENSSL_free(r);
+}
+
+int DSA_up_ref(DSA *r)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    REF_PRINT_COUNT("DSA", r);
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
+    return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0);
+}
+
+int DSA_size(const DSA *r)
+{
+    int ret, i;
+    ASN1_INTEGER bs;
+    unsigned char buf[4];       /* 4 bytes looks really small. However,
+                                 * i2d_ASN1_INTEGER() will not look beyond
+                                 * the first byte, as long as the second
+                                 * parameter is NULL. */
+
+    i = BN_num_bits(r->q);
+    bs.length = (i + 7) / 8;
+    bs.data = buf;
+    bs.type = V_ASN1_INTEGER;
+    /* If the top bit is set the asn1 encoding is 1 larger. */
+    buf[0] = 0xff;
+
+    i = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(&bs, NULL);
+    i += i;                     /* r and s */
+    ret = ASN1_object_size(1, i, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int DSA_set_ex_data(DSA *d, int idx, void *arg)
+{
+    return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx, arg);
+}
+
+void *DSA_get_ex_data(DSA *d, int idx)
+{
+    return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx);
+}
+
+int DSA_security_bits(const DSA *d)
+{
+    if (d->p && d->q)
+        return BN_security_bits(BN_num_bits(d->p), BN_num_bits(d->q));
+    return -1;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+DH *DSA_dup_DH(const DSA *r)
+{
+    /*
+     * DSA has p, q, g, optional pub_key, optional priv_key. DH has p,
+     * optional length, g, optional pub_key, optional priv_key, optional q.
+     */
+
+    DH *ret = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL, *g = NULL, *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
+
+    if (r == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    ret = DH_new();
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (r->p != NULL || r->g != NULL || r->q != NULL) {
+        if (r->p == NULL || r->g == NULL || r->q == NULL) {
+            /* Shouldn't happen */
+            goto err;
+        }
+        p = BN_dup(r->p);
+        g = BN_dup(r->g);
+        q = BN_dup(r->q);
+        if (p == NULL || g == NULL || q == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(ret, p, q, g))
+            goto err;
+        p = g = q = NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (r->pub_key != NULL) {
+        pub_key = BN_dup(r->pub_key);
+        if (pub_key == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (r->priv_key != NULL) {
+            priv_key = BN_dup(r->priv_key);
+            if (priv_key == NULL)
+                goto err;
+        }
+        if (!DH_set0_key(ret, pub_key, priv_key))
+            goto err;
+    } else if (r->priv_key != NULL) {
+        /* Shouldn't happen */
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+
+ err:
+    BN_free(p);
+    BN_free(g);
+    BN_free(q);
+    BN_free(pub_key);
+    BN_free(priv_key);
+    DH_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+}
+#endif
+
+void DSA_get0_pqg(const DSA *d,
+                  const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g)
+{
+    if (p != NULL)
+        *p = d->p;
+    if (q != NULL)
+        *q = d->q;
+    if (g != NULL)
+        *g = d->g;
+}
+
+int DSA_set0_pqg(DSA *d, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g)
+{
+    /* If the fields p, q and g in d are NULL, the corresponding input
+     * parameters MUST be non-NULL.
+     */
+    if ((d->p == NULL && p == NULL)
+        || (d->q == NULL && q == NULL)
+        || (d->g == NULL && g == NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (p != NULL) {
+        BN_free(d->p);
+        d->p = p;
+    }
+    if (q != NULL) {
+        BN_free(d->q);
+        d->q = q;
+    }
+    if (g != NULL) {
+        BN_free(d->g);
+        d->g = g;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void DSA_get0_key(const DSA *d,
+                  const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key)
+{
+    if (pub_key != NULL)
+        *pub_key = d->pub_key;
+    if (priv_key != NULL)
+        *priv_key = d->priv_key;
+}
+
+int DSA_set0_key(DSA *d, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key)
+{
+    /* If the field pub_key in d is NULL, the corresponding input
+     * parameters MUST be non-NULL.  The priv_key field may
+     * be left NULL.
+     */
+    if (d->pub_key == NULL && pub_key == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (pub_key != NULL) {
+        BN_free(d->pub_key);
+        d->pub_key = pub_key;
+    }
+    if (priv_key != NULL) {
+        BN_free(d->priv_key);
+        d->priv_key = priv_key;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *DSA_get0_p(const DSA *d)
+{
+    return d->p;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *DSA_get0_q(const DSA *d)
+{
+    return d->q;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *DSA_get0_g(const DSA *d)
+{
+    return d->g;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *DSA_get0_pub_key(const DSA *d)
+{
+    return d->pub_key;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *DSA_get0_priv_key(const DSA *d)
+{
+    return d->priv_key;
+}
+
+void DSA_clear_flags(DSA *d, int flags)
+{
+    d->flags &= ~flags;
+}
+
+int DSA_test_flags(const DSA *d, int flags)
+{
+    return d->flags & flags;
+}
+
+void DSA_set_flags(DSA *d, int flags)
+{
+    d->flags |= flags;
+}
+
+ENGINE *DSA_get0_engine(DSA *d)
+{
+    return d->engine;
+}
+
+int DSA_bits(const DSA *dsa)
+{
+    return BN_num_bits(dsa->p);
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_local.h b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_local.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a81a4b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_local.h
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#include "internal/refcount.h"
+
+struct dsa_st {
+    /*
+     * This first variable is used to pick up errors where a DSA is passed
+     * instead of of a EVP_PKEY
+     */
+    int pad;
+    int32_t version;
+    BIGNUM *p;
+    BIGNUM *q;                  /* == 20 */
+    BIGNUM *g;
+    BIGNUM *pub_key;            /* y public key */
+    BIGNUM *priv_key;           /* x private key */
+    int flags;
+    /* Normally used to cache montgomery values */
+    BN_MONT_CTX *method_mont_p;
+    CRYPTO_REF_COUNT references;
+    CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
+    const DSA_METHOD *meth;
+    /* functional reference if 'meth' is ENGINE-provided */
+    ENGINE *engine;
+    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+};
+
+struct DSA_SIG_st {
+    BIGNUM *r;
+    BIGNUM *s;
+};
+
+struct dsa_method {
+    char *name;
+    DSA_SIG *(*dsa_do_sign) (const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa);
+    int (*dsa_sign_setup) (DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
+                           BIGNUM **rp);
+    int (*dsa_do_verify) (const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+                          DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa);
+    int (*dsa_mod_exp) (DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a1,
+                        const BIGNUM *p1, const BIGNUM *a2, const BIGNUM *p2,
+                        const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont);
+    /* Can be null */
+    int (*bn_mod_exp) (DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+                       const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
+    int (*init) (DSA *dsa);
+    int (*finish) (DSA *dsa);
+    int flags;
+    void *app_data;
+    /* If this is non-NULL, it is used to generate DSA parameters */
+    int (*dsa_paramgen) (DSA *dsa, int bits,
+                         const unsigned char *seed, int seed_len,
+                         int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret,
+                         BN_GENCB *cb);
+    /* If this is non-NULL, it is used to generate DSA keys */
+    int (*dsa_keygen) (DSA *dsa);
+};
+
+int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits,
+                         const EVP_MD *evpmd, const unsigned char *seed_in,
+                         size_t seed_len, unsigned char *seed_out,
+                         int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret,
+                         BN_GENCB *cb);
+
+int dsa_builtin_paramgen2(DSA *ret, size_t L, size_t N,
+                          const EVP_MD *evpmd, const unsigned char *seed_in,
+                          size_t seed_len, int idx, unsigned char *seed_out,
+                          int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret,
+                          BN_GENCB *cb);
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_meth.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_meth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1e6ee2f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_meth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,224 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution.
+ */
+
+#include "dsa_local.h"
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+DSA_METHOD *DSA_meth_new(const char *name, int flags)
+{
+    DSA_METHOD *dsam = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*dsam));
+
+    if (dsam != NULL) {
+        dsam->flags = flags;
+
+        dsam->name = OPENSSL_strdup(name);
+        if (dsam->name != NULL)
+            return dsam;
+
+        OPENSSL_free(dsam);
+    }
+
+    DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_METH_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+void DSA_meth_free(DSA_METHOD *dsam)
+{
+    if (dsam != NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(dsam->name);
+        OPENSSL_free(dsam);
+    }
+}
+
+DSA_METHOD *DSA_meth_dup(const DSA_METHOD *dsam)
+{
+    DSA_METHOD *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret));
+
+    if (ret != NULL) {
+        memcpy(ret, dsam, sizeof(*dsam));
+
+        ret->name = OPENSSL_strdup(dsam->name);
+        if (ret->name != NULL)
+            return ret;
+
+        OPENSSL_free(ret);
+    }
+
+    DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_METH_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *DSA_meth_get0_name(const DSA_METHOD *dsam)
+{
+    return dsam->name;
+}
+
+int DSA_meth_set1_name(DSA_METHOD *dsam, const char *name)
+{
+    char *tmpname = OPENSSL_strdup(name);
+
+    if (tmpname == NULL) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_METH_SET1_NAME, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_free(dsam->name);
+    dsam->name = tmpname;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int DSA_meth_get_flags(const DSA_METHOD *dsam)
+{
+    return dsam->flags;
+}
+
+int DSA_meth_set_flags(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int flags)
+{
+    dsam->flags = flags;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void *DSA_meth_get0_app_data(const DSA_METHOD *dsam)
+{
+    return dsam->app_data;
+}
+
+int DSA_meth_set0_app_data(DSA_METHOD *dsam, void *app_data)
+{
+    dsam->app_data = app_data;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+DSA_SIG *(*DSA_meth_get_sign(const DSA_METHOD *dsam))
+        (const unsigned char *, int, DSA *)
+{
+    return dsam->dsa_do_sign;
+}
+
+int DSA_meth_set_sign(DSA_METHOD *dsam,
+                       DSA_SIG *(*sign) (const unsigned char *, int, DSA *))
+{
+    dsam->dsa_do_sign = sign;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*DSA_meth_get_sign_setup(const DSA_METHOD *dsam))
+        (DSA *, BN_CTX *, BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **)
+{
+    return dsam->dsa_sign_setup;
+}
+
+int DSA_meth_set_sign_setup(DSA_METHOD *dsam,
+        int (*sign_setup) (DSA *, BN_CTX *, BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **))
+{
+    dsam->dsa_sign_setup = sign_setup;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*DSA_meth_get_verify(const DSA_METHOD *dsam))
+        (const unsigned char *, int, DSA_SIG *, DSA *)
+{
+    return dsam->dsa_do_verify;
+}
+
+int DSA_meth_set_verify(DSA_METHOD *dsam,
+    int (*verify) (const unsigned char *, int, DSA_SIG *, DSA *))
+{
+    dsam->dsa_do_verify = verify;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*DSA_meth_get_mod_exp(const DSA_METHOD *dsam))
+        (DSA *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
+         const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *, BN_MONT_CTX *)
+{
+    return dsam->dsa_mod_exp;
+}
+
+int DSA_meth_set_mod_exp(DSA_METHOD *dsam,
+    int (*mod_exp) (DSA *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
+                    const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *,
+                    BN_MONT_CTX *))
+{
+    dsam->dsa_mod_exp = mod_exp;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*DSA_meth_get_bn_mod_exp(const DSA_METHOD *dsam))
+    (DSA *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *,
+     BN_MONT_CTX *)
+{
+    return dsam->bn_mod_exp;
+}
+
+int DSA_meth_set_bn_mod_exp(DSA_METHOD *dsam,
+    int (*bn_mod_exp) (DSA *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
+                       const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *, BN_MONT_CTX *))
+{
+    dsam->bn_mod_exp = bn_mod_exp;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*DSA_meth_get_init(const DSA_METHOD *dsam))(DSA *)
+{
+    return dsam->init;
+}
+
+int DSA_meth_set_init(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int (*init)(DSA *))
+{
+    dsam->init = init;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*DSA_meth_get_finish(const DSA_METHOD *dsam)) (DSA *)
+{
+    return dsam->finish;
+}
+
+int DSA_meth_set_finish(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int (*finish) (DSA *))
+{
+    dsam->finish = finish;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*DSA_meth_get_paramgen(const DSA_METHOD *dsam))
+        (DSA *, int, const unsigned char *, int, int *, unsigned long *,
+         BN_GENCB *)
+{
+    return dsam->dsa_paramgen;
+}
+
+int DSA_meth_set_paramgen(DSA_METHOD *dsam,
+        int (*paramgen) (DSA *, int, const unsigned char *, int, int *,
+                         unsigned long *, BN_GENCB *))
+{
+    dsam->dsa_paramgen = paramgen;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*DSA_meth_get_keygen(const DSA_METHOD *dsam)) (DSA *)
+{
+    return dsam->dsa_keygen;
+}
+
+int DSA_meth_set_keygen(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int (*keygen) (DSA *))
+{
+    dsam->dsa_keygen = keygen;
+    return 1;
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a983def
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,442 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "crypto/bn.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include "dsa_local.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+
+static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa);
+static int dsa_sign_setup_no_digest(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
+                                    BIGNUM **rp);
+static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
+                          BIGNUM **rp, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen);
+static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+                         DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa);
+static int dsa_init(DSA *dsa);
+static int dsa_finish(DSA *dsa);
+static BIGNUM *dsa_mod_inverse_fermat(const BIGNUM *k, const BIGNUM *q,
+                                      BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+static DSA_METHOD openssl_dsa_meth = {
+    "OpenSSL DSA method",
+    dsa_do_sign,
+    dsa_sign_setup_no_digest,
+    dsa_do_verify,
+    NULL,                       /* dsa_mod_exp, */
+    NULL,                       /* dsa_bn_mod_exp, */
+    dsa_init,
+    dsa_finish,
+    DSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    NULL
+};
+
+static const DSA_METHOD *default_DSA_method = &openssl_dsa_meth;
+
+void DSA_set_default_method(const DSA_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    default_DSA_method = meth;
+}
+
+const DSA_METHOD *DSA_get_default_method(void)
+{
+    return default_DSA_method;
+}
+
+const DSA_METHOD *DSA_OpenSSL(void)
+{
+    return &openssl_dsa_meth;
+}
+
+static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
+{
+    BIGNUM *kinv = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *m, *blind, *blindm, *tmp;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    int reason = ERR_R_BN_LIB;
+    DSA_SIG *ret = NULL;
+    int rv = 0;
+
+    if (dsa->p == NULL || dsa->q == NULL || dsa->g == NULL) {
+        reason = DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (dsa->priv_key == NULL) {
+        reason = DSA_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret = DSA_SIG_new();
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    ret->r = BN_new();
+    ret->s = BN_new();
+    if (ret->r == NULL || ret->s == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    m = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    blind = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    blindm = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (tmp == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+ redo:
+    if (!dsa_sign_setup(dsa, ctx, &kinv, &ret->r, dgst, dlen))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (dlen > BN_num_bytes(dsa->q))
+        /*
+         * if the digest length is greater than the size of q use the
+         * BN_num_bits(dsa->q) leftmost bits of the digest, see fips 186-3,
+         * 4.2
+         */
+        dlen = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q);
+    if (BN_bin2bn(dgst, dlen, m) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /*
+     * The normal signature calculation is:
+     *
+     *   s := k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod q
+     *
+     * We will blind this to protect against side channel attacks
+     *
+     *   s := blind^-1 * k^-1 * (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod q
+     */
+
+    /* Generate a blinding value */
+    do {
+        if (!BN_priv_rand(blind, BN_num_bits(dsa->q) - 1,
+                          BN_RAND_TOP_ANY, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY))
+            goto err;
+    } while (BN_is_zero(blind));
+    BN_set_flags(blind, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+    BN_set_flags(blindm, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+    BN_set_flags(tmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+    /* tmp := blind * priv_key * r mod q */
+    if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, blind, dsa->priv_key, dsa->q, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, tmp, ret->r, dsa->q, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* blindm := blind * m mod q */
+    if (!BN_mod_mul(blindm, blind, m, dsa->q, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* s : = (blind * priv_key * r) + (blind * m) mod q */
+    if (!BN_mod_add_quick(ret->s, tmp, blindm, dsa->q))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* s := s * k^-1 mod q */
+    if (!BN_mod_mul(ret->s, ret->s, kinv, dsa->q, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* s:= s * blind^-1 mod q */
+    if (BN_mod_inverse(blind, blind, dsa->q, ctx) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_mod_mul(ret->s, ret->s, blind, dsa->q, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    /*
+     * Redo if r or s is zero as required by FIPS 186-3: this is very
+     * unlikely.
+     */
+    if (BN_is_zero(ret->r) || BN_is_zero(ret->s))
+        goto redo;
+
+    rv = 1;
+
+ err:
+    if (rv == 0) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_SIGN, reason);
+        DSA_SIG_free(ret);
+        ret = NULL;
+    }
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    BN_clear_free(kinv);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int dsa_sign_setup_no_digest(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
+                                    BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp)
+{
+    return dsa_sign_setup(dsa, ctx_in, kinvp, rp, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
+                          BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp,
+                          const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen)
+{
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *k, *kinv = NULL, *r = *rp;
+    BIGNUM *l;
+    int ret = 0;
+    int q_bits, q_words;
+
+    if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Reject obviously invalid parameters */
+    if (BN_is_zero(dsa->p) || BN_is_zero(dsa->q) || BN_is_zero(dsa->g)) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, DSA_R_INVALID_PARAMETERS);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (dsa->priv_key == NULL) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, DSA_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    k = BN_new();
+    l = BN_new();
+    if (k == NULL || l == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (ctx_in == NULL) {
+        if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    } else
+        ctx = ctx_in;
+
+    /* Preallocate space */
+    q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
+    q_words = bn_get_top(dsa->q);
+    if (!bn_wexpand(k, q_words + 2)
+        || !bn_wexpand(l, q_words + 2))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Get random k */
+    do {
+        if (dgst != NULL) {
+            /*
+             * We calculate k from SHA512(private_key + H(message) + random).
+             * This protects the private key from a weak PRNG.
+             */
+            if (!BN_generate_dsa_nonce(k, dsa->q, dsa->priv_key, dgst,
+                                       dlen, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        } else if (!BN_priv_rand_range(k, dsa->q))
+            goto err;
+    } while (BN_is_zero(k));
+
+    BN_set_flags(k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+    BN_set_flags(l, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+    if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
+        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
+                                    dsa->lock, dsa->p, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Compute r = (g^k mod p) mod q */
+
+    /*
+     * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we
+     * compute G^k using an equivalent scalar of fixed bit-length.
+     *
+     * We unconditionally perform both of these additions to prevent a
+     * small timing information leakage.  We then choose the sum that is
+     * one bit longer than the modulus.
+     *
+     * There are some concerns about the efficacy of doing this.  More
+     * specifically refer to the discussion starting with:
+     *     https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7486#discussion_r228323705
+     * The fix is to rework BN so these gymnastics aren't required.
+     */
+    if (!BN_add(l, k, dsa->q)
+        || !BN_add(k, l, dsa->q))
+        goto err;
+
+    BN_consttime_swap(BN_is_bit_set(l, q_bits), k, l, q_words + 2);
+
+    if ((dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp != NULL) {
+            if (!dsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(dsa, r, dsa->g, k, dsa->p, ctx,
+                                       dsa->method_mont_p))
+                goto err;
+    } else {
+            if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(r, dsa->g, k, dsa->p, ctx, dsa->method_mont_p))
+                goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Compute part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */
+    if ((kinv = dsa_mod_inverse_fermat(k, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    BN_clear_free(*kinvp);
+    *kinvp = kinv;
+    kinv = NULL;
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    if (!ret)
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+    if (ctx != ctx_in)
+        BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    BN_clear_free(k);
+    BN_clear_free(l);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+                         DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa)
+{
+    BN_CTX *ctx;
+    BIGNUM *u1, *u2, *t1;
+    BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
+    const BIGNUM *r, *s;
+    int ret = -1, i;
+    if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    i = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
+    /* fips 186-3 allows only different sizes for q */
+    if (i != 160 && i != 224 && i != 256) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) > OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    u1 = BN_new();
+    u2 = BN_new();
+    t1 = BN_new();
+    ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    if (u1 == NULL || u2 == NULL || t1 == NULL || ctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    DSA_SIG_get0(sig, &r, &s);
+
+    if (BN_is_zero(r) || BN_is_negative(r) ||
+        BN_ucmp(r, dsa->q) >= 0) {
+        ret = 0;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (BN_is_zero(s) || BN_is_negative(s) ||
+        BN_ucmp(s, dsa->q) >= 0) {
+        ret = 0;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Calculate W = inv(S) mod Q save W in u2
+     */
+    if ((BN_mod_inverse(u2, s, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* save M in u1 */
+    if (dgst_len > (i >> 3))
+        /*
+         * if the digest length is greater than the size of q use the
+         * BN_num_bits(dsa->q) leftmost bits of the digest, see fips 186-3,
+         * 4.2
+         */
+        dgst_len = (i >> 3);
+    if (BN_bin2bn(dgst, dgst_len, u1) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* u1 = M * w mod q */
+    if (!BN_mod_mul(u1, u1, u2, dsa->q, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* u2 = r * w mod q */
+    if (!BN_mod_mul(u2, r, u2, dsa->q, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
+        mont = BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
+                                      dsa->lock, dsa->p, ctx);
+        if (!mont)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (dsa->meth->dsa_mod_exp != NULL) {
+        if (!dsa->meth->dsa_mod_exp(dsa, t1, dsa->g, u1, dsa->pub_key, u2,
+                                    dsa->p, ctx, mont))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        if (!BN_mod_exp2_mont(t1, dsa->g, u1, dsa->pub_key, u2, dsa->p, ctx,
+                              mont))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* let u1 = u1 mod q */
+    if (!BN_mod(u1, t1, dsa->q, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    /*
+     * V is now in u1.  If the signature is correct, it will be equal to R.
+     */
+    ret = (BN_ucmp(u1, r) == 0);
+
+ err:
+    if (ret < 0)
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    BN_free(u1);
+    BN_free(u2);
+    BN_free(t1);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int dsa_init(DSA *dsa)
+{
+    dsa->flags |= DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int dsa_finish(DSA *dsa)
+{
+    BN_MONT_CTX_free(dsa->method_mont_p);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute the inverse of k modulo q.
+ * Since q is prime, Fermat's Little Theorem applies, which reduces this to
+ * mod-exp operation.  Both the exponent and modulus are public information
+ * so a mod-exp that doesn't leak the base is sufficient.  A newly allocated
+ * BIGNUM is returned which the caller must free.
+ */
+static BIGNUM *dsa_mod_inverse_fermat(const BIGNUM *k, const BIGNUM *q,
+                                      BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *res = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *r, *e;
+
+    if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    if ((e = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) != NULL
+            && BN_set_word(r, 2)
+            && BN_sub(e, q, r)
+            && BN_mod_exp_mont(r, k, e, q, ctx, NULL))
+        res = r;
+    else
+        BN_free(r);
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    return res;
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4ca3747
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,273 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "crypto/evp.h"
+#include "dsa_local.h"
+
+/* DSA pkey context structure */
+
+typedef struct {
+    /* Parameter gen parameters */
+    int nbits;                  /* size of p in bits (default: 2048) */
+    int qbits;                  /* size of q in bits (default: 224) */
+    const EVP_MD *pmd;          /* MD for parameter generation */
+    /* Keygen callback info */
+    int gentmp[2];
+    /* message digest */
+    const EVP_MD *md;           /* MD for the signature */
+} DSA_PKEY_CTX;
+
+static int pkey_dsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    DSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*dctx));
+
+    if (dctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    dctx->nbits = 2048;
+    dctx->qbits = 224;
+    dctx->pmd = NULL;
+    dctx->md = NULL;
+
+    ctx->data = dctx;
+    ctx->keygen_info = dctx->gentmp;
+    ctx->keygen_info_count = 2;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_dsa_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src)
+{
+    DSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *sctx;
+
+    if (!pkey_dsa_init(dst))
+        return 0;
+    sctx = src->data;
+    dctx = dst->data;
+    dctx->nbits = sctx->nbits;
+    dctx->qbits = sctx->qbits;
+    dctx->pmd = sctx->pmd;
+    dctx->md = sctx->md;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void pkey_dsa_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    DSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
+    OPENSSL_free(dctx);
+}
+
+static int pkey_dsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
+                         size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs,
+                         size_t tbslen)
+{
+    int ret;
+    unsigned int sltmp;
+    DSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
+    DSA *dsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.dsa;
+
+    if (dctx->md != NULL && tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(dctx->md))
+        return 0;
+
+    ret = DSA_sign(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, dsa);
+
+    if (ret <= 0)
+        return ret;
+    *siglen = sltmp;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_dsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                           const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
+                           const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
+{
+    int ret;
+    DSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
+    DSA *dsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.dsa;
+
+    if (dctx->md != NULL && tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(dctx->md))
+        return 0;
+
+    ret = DSA_verify(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen, dsa);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int pkey_dsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
+{
+    DSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
+
+    switch (type) {
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DSA_PARAMGEN_BITS:
+        if (p1 < 256)
+            return -2;
+        dctx->nbits = p1;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DSA_PARAMGEN_Q_BITS:
+        if (p1 != 160 && p1 != 224 && p1 && p1 != 256)
+            return -2;
+        dctx->qbits = p1;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DSA_PARAMGEN_MD:
+        if (EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha1 &&
+            EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha224 &&
+            EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha256) {
+            DSAerr(DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_CTRL, DSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_TYPE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        dctx->pmd = p2;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD:
+        if (EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha1 &&
+            EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_dsa &&
+            EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_dsaWithSHA &&
+            EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha224 &&
+            EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha256 &&
+            EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha384 &&
+            EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha512 &&
+            EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha3_224 &&
+            EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha3_256 &&
+            EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha3_384 &&
+            EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha3_512) {
+            DSAerr(DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_CTRL, DSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_TYPE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        dctx->md = p2;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_MD:
+        *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = dctx->md;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT:
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN:
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY:
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_CTRL,
+               EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+        return -2;
+    default:
+        return -2;
+
+    }
+}
+
+static int pkey_dsa_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                             const char *type, const char *value)
+{
+    if (strcmp(type, "dsa_paramgen_bits") == 0) {
+        int nbits;
+        nbits = atoi(value);
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dsa_paramgen_bits(ctx, nbits);
+    }
+    if (strcmp(type, "dsa_paramgen_q_bits") == 0) {
+        int qbits = atoi(value);
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dsa_paramgen_q_bits(ctx, qbits);
+    }
+    if (strcmp(type, "dsa_paramgen_md") == 0) {
+        const EVP_MD *md = EVP_get_digestbyname(value);
+
+        if (md == NULL) {
+            DSAerr(DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_CTRL_STR, DSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_TYPE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dsa_paramgen_md(ctx, md);
+    }
+    return -2;
+}
+
+static int pkey_dsa_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    DSA *dsa = NULL;
+    DSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
+    BN_GENCB *pcb;
+    int ret;
+
+    if (ctx->pkey_gencb) {
+        pcb = BN_GENCB_new();
+        if (pcb == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        evp_pkey_set_cb_translate(pcb, ctx);
+    } else
+        pcb = NULL;
+    dsa = DSA_new();
+    if (dsa == NULL) {
+        BN_GENCB_free(pcb);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ret = dsa_builtin_paramgen(dsa, dctx->nbits, dctx->qbits, dctx->pmd,
+                               NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, pcb);
+    BN_GENCB_free(pcb);
+    if (ret)
+        EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa);
+    else
+        DSA_free(dsa);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int pkey_dsa_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    DSA *dsa = NULL;
+
+    if (ctx->pkey == NULL) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_KEYGEN, DSA_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    dsa = DSA_new();
+    if (dsa == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa);
+    /* Note: if error return, pkey is freed by parent routine */
+    if (!EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ctx->pkey))
+        return 0;
+    return DSA_generate_key(pkey->pkey.dsa);
+}
+
+const EVP_PKEY_METHOD dsa_pkey_meth = {
+    EVP_PKEY_DSA,
+    EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN,
+    pkey_dsa_init,
+    pkey_dsa_copy,
+    pkey_dsa_cleanup,
+
+    0,
+    pkey_dsa_paramgen,
+
+    0,
+    pkey_dsa_keygen,
+
+    0,
+    pkey_dsa_sign,
+
+    0,
+    pkey_dsa_verify,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    pkey_dsa_ctrl,
+    pkey_dsa_ctrl_str
+};
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_prn.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_prn.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..070b881
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_prn.c
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int DSA_print_fp(FILE *fp, const DSA *x, int off)
+{
+    BIO *b;
+    int ret;
+
+    if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRINT_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    ret = DSA_print(b, x, off);
+    BIO_free(b);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int DSAparams_print_fp(FILE *fp, const DSA *x)
+{
+    BIO *b;
+    int ret;
+
+    if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSAPARAMS_PRINT_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    ret = DSAparams_print(b, x);
+    BIO_free(b);
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+int DSA_print(BIO *bp, const DSA *x, int off)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *pk;
+    int ret;
+    pk = EVP_PKEY_new();
+    if (pk == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    ret = EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pk, (DSA *)x);
+    if (ret)
+        ret = EVP_PKEY_print_private(bp, pk, off, NULL);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int DSAparams_print(BIO *bp, const DSA *x)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *pk;
+    int ret;
+    pk = EVP_PKEY_new();
+    if (pk == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    ret = EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pk, (DSA *)x);
+    if (ret)
+        ret = EVP_PKEY_print_params(bp, pk, 4, NULL);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_sign.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_sign.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..51c7754
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_sign.c
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "dsa_local.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+DSA_SIG *DSA_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
+{
+    return dsa->meth->dsa_do_sign(dgst, dlen, dsa);
+}
+
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10200000L
+int DSA_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp)
+{
+    return dsa->meth->dsa_sign_setup(dsa, ctx_in, kinvp, rp);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_vrf.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_vrf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6f80a4a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/dsa/dsa_vrf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "dsa_local.h"
+
+int DSA_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig,
+                  DSA *dsa)
+{
+    return dsa->meth->dsa_do_verify(dgst, dgst_len, sig, dsa);
+}