zte's code,first commit
Change-Id: I9a04da59e459a9bc0d67f101f700d9d7dc8d681b
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/ec/curve448/eddsa.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/ec/curve448/eddsa.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..82741f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/ec/curve448/eddsa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,377 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2017-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2015-2016 Cryptography Research, Inc.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ *
+ * Originally written by Mike Hamburg
+ */
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include "curve448_local.h"
+#include "word.h"
+#include "ed448.h"
+#include "internal/numbers.h"
+
+#define COFACTOR 4
+
+static c448_error_t oneshot_hash(uint8_t *out, size_t outlen,
+ const uint8_t *in, size_t inlen)
+{
+ EVP_MD_CTX *hashctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+
+ if (hashctx == NULL)
+ return C448_FAILURE;
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(hashctx, EVP_shake256(), NULL)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, in, inlen)
+ || !EVP_DigestFinalXOF(hashctx, out, outlen)) {
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(hashctx);
+ return C448_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(hashctx);
+ return C448_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+static void clamp(uint8_t secret_scalar_ser[EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES])
+{
+ secret_scalar_ser[0] &= -COFACTOR;
+ secret_scalar_ser[EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES - 1] = 0;
+ secret_scalar_ser[EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES - 2] |= 0x80;
+}
+
+static c448_error_t hash_init_with_dom(EVP_MD_CTX *hashctx, uint8_t prehashed,
+ uint8_t for_prehash,
+ const uint8_t *context,
+ size_t context_len)
+{
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+ const char dom_s[] = {0x53, 0x69, 0x67, 0x45,
+ 0x64, 0x34, 0x34, 0x38, 0x00};
+#else
+ const char dom_s[] = "SigEd448";
+#endif
+ uint8_t dom[2];
+
+ if (context_len > UINT8_MAX)
+ return C448_FAILURE;
+
+ dom[0] = (uint8_t)(2 - (prehashed == 0 ? 1 : 0)
+ - (for_prehash == 0 ? 1 : 0));
+ dom[1] = (uint8_t)context_len;
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(hashctx, EVP_shake256(), NULL)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, dom_s, strlen(dom_s))
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, dom, sizeof(dom))
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, context, context_len))
+ return C448_FAILURE;
+
+ return C448_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/* In this file because it uses the hash */
+c448_error_t c448_ed448_convert_private_key_to_x448(
+ uint8_t x[X448_PRIVATE_BYTES],
+ const uint8_t ed [EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES])
+{
+ /* pass the private key through oneshot_hash function */
+ /* and keep the first X448_PRIVATE_BYTES bytes */
+ return oneshot_hash(x, X448_PRIVATE_BYTES, ed,
+ EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES);
+}
+
+c448_error_t c448_ed448_derive_public_key(
+ uint8_t pubkey[EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES],
+ const uint8_t privkey[EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES])
+{
+ /* only this much used for keygen */
+ uint8_t secret_scalar_ser[EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES];
+ curve448_scalar_t secret_scalar;
+ unsigned int c;
+ curve448_point_t p;
+
+ if (!oneshot_hash(secret_scalar_ser, sizeof(secret_scalar_ser), privkey,
+ EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES))
+ return C448_FAILURE;
+
+ clamp(secret_scalar_ser);
+
+ curve448_scalar_decode_long(secret_scalar, secret_scalar_ser,
+ sizeof(secret_scalar_ser));
+
+ /*
+ * Since we are going to mul_by_cofactor during encoding, divide by it
+ * here. However, the EdDSA base point is not the same as the decaf base
+ * point if the sigma isogeny is in use: the EdDSA base point is on
+ * Etwist_d/(1-d) and the decaf base point is on Etwist_d, and when
+ * converted it effectively picks up a factor of 2 from the isogenies. So
+ * we might start at 2 instead of 1.
+ */
+ for (c = 1; c < C448_EDDSA_ENCODE_RATIO; c <<= 1)
+ curve448_scalar_halve(secret_scalar, secret_scalar);
+
+ curve448_precomputed_scalarmul(p, curve448_precomputed_base, secret_scalar);
+
+ curve448_point_mul_by_ratio_and_encode_like_eddsa(pubkey, p);
+
+ /* Cleanup */
+ curve448_scalar_destroy(secret_scalar);
+ curve448_point_destroy(p);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(secret_scalar_ser, sizeof(secret_scalar_ser));
+
+ return C448_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+c448_error_t c448_ed448_sign(
+ uint8_t signature[EDDSA_448_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+ const uint8_t privkey[EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES],
+ const uint8_t pubkey[EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES],
+ const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+ uint8_t prehashed, const uint8_t *context,
+ size_t context_len)
+{
+ curve448_scalar_t secret_scalar;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *hashctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ c448_error_t ret = C448_FAILURE;
+ curve448_scalar_t nonce_scalar;
+ uint8_t nonce_point[EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES] = { 0 };
+ unsigned int c;
+ curve448_scalar_t challenge_scalar;
+
+ if (hashctx == NULL)
+ return C448_FAILURE;
+
+ {
+ /*
+ * Schedule the secret key, First EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES is serialised
+ * secret scalar,next EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES bytes is the seed.
+ */
+ uint8_t expanded[EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES * 2];
+
+ if (!oneshot_hash(expanded, sizeof(expanded), privkey,
+ EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES))
+ goto err;
+ clamp(expanded);
+ curve448_scalar_decode_long(secret_scalar, expanded,
+ EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES);
+
+ /* Hash to create the nonce */
+ if (!hash_init_with_dom(hashctx, prehashed, 0, context, context_len)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx,
+ expanded + EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES,
+ EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, message, message_len)) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(expanded, sizeof(expanded));
+ goto err;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(expanded, sizeof(expanded));
+ }
+
+ /* Decode the nonce */
+ {
+ uint8_t nonce[2 * EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES];
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinalXOF(hashctx, nonce, sizeof(nonce)))
+ goto err;
+ curve448_scalar_decode_long(nonce_scalar, nonce, sizeof(nonce));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(nonce, sizeof(nonce));
+ }
+
+ {
+ /* Scalarmul to create the nonce-point */
+ curve448_scalar_t nonce_scalar_2;
+ curve448_point_t p;
+
+ curve448_scalar_halve(nonce_scalar_2, nonce_scalar);
+ for (c = 2; c < C448_EDDSA_ENCODE_RATIO; c <<= 1)
+ curve448_scalar_halve(nonce_scalar_2, nonce_scalar_2);
+
+ curve448_precomputed_scalarmul(p, curve448_precomputed_base,
+ nonce_scalar_2);
+ curve448_point_mul_by_ratio_and_encode_like_eddsa(nonce_point, p);
+ curve448_point_destroy(p);
+ curve448_scalar_destroy(nonce_scalar_2);
+ }
+
+ {
+ uint8_t challenge[2 * EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES];
+
+ /* Compute the challenge */
+ if (!hash_init_with_dom(hashctx, prehashed, 0, context, context_len)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, nonce_point, sizeof(nonce_point))
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, pubkey, EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, message, message_len)
+ || !EVP_DigestFinalXOF(hashctx, challenge, sizeof(challenge)))
+ goto err;
+
+ curve448_scalar_decode_long(challenge_scalar, challenge,
+ sizeof(challenge));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(challenge, sizeof(challenge));
+ }
+
+ curve448_scalar_mul(challenge_scalar, challenge_scalar, secret_scalar);
+ curve448_scalar_add(challenge_scalar, challenge_scalar, nonce_scalar);
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(signature, EDDSA_448_SIGNATURE_BYTES);
+ memcpy(signature, nonce_point, sizeof(nonce_point));
+ curve448_scalar_encode(&signature[EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES],
+ challenge_scalar);
+
+ curve448_scalar_destroy(secret_scalar);
+ curve448_scalar_destroy(nonce_scalar);
+ curve448_scalar_destroy(challenge_scalar);
+
+ ret = C448_SUCCESS;
+ err:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(hashctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+c448_error_t c448_ed448_sign_prehash(
+ uint8_t signature[EDDSA_448_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+ const uint8_t privkey[EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES],
+ const uint8_t pubkey[EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES],
+ const uint8_t hash[64], const uint8_t *context,
+ size_t context_len)
+{
+ return c448_ed448_sign(signature, privkey, pubkey, hash, 64, 1, context,
+ context_len);
+}
+
+c448_error_t c448_ed448_verify(
+ const uint8_t signature[EDDSA_448_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+ const uint8_t pubkey[EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES],
+ const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+ uint8_t prehashed, const uint8_t *context,
+ uint8_t context_len)
+{
+ curve448_point_t pk_point, r_point;
+ c448_error_t error;
+ curve448_scalar_t challenge_scalar;
+ curve448_scalar_t response_scalar;
+ /* Order in little endian format */
+ static const uint8_t order[] = {
+ 0xF3, 0x44, 0x58, 0xAB, 0x92, 0xC2, 0x78, 0x23, 0x55, 0x8F, 0xC5, 0x8D,
+ 0x72, 0xC2, 0x6C, 0x21, 0x90, 0x36, 0xD6, 0xAE, 0x49, 0xDB, 0x4E, 0xC4,
+ 0xE9, 0x23, 0xCA, 0x7C, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x3F, 0x00
+ };
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Check that s (second 57 bytes of the sig) is less than the order. Both
+ * s and the order are in little-endian format. This can be done in
+ * variable time, since if this is not the case the signature if publicly
+ * invalid.
+ */
+ for (i = EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ if (signature[i + EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES] > order[i])
+ return C448_FAILURE;
+ if (signature[i + EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES] < order[i])
+ break;
+ }
+ if (i < 0)
+ return C448_FAILURE;
+
+ error =
+ curve448_point_decode_like_eddsa_and_mul_by_ratio(pk_point, pubkey);
+
+ if (C448_SUCCESS != error)
+ return error;
+
+ error =
+ curve448_point_decode_like_eddsa_and_mul_by_ratio(r_point, signature);
+ if (C448_SUCCESS != error)
+ return error;
+
+ {
+ /* Compute the challenge */
+ EVP_MD_CTX *hashctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ uint8_t challenge[2 * EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES];
+
+ if (hashctx == NULL
+ || !hash_init_with_dom(hashctx, prehashed, 0, context,
+ context_len)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, signature, EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, pubkey, EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, message, message_len)
+ || !EVP_DigestFinalXOF(hashctx, challenge, sizeof(challenge))) {
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(hashctx);
+ return C448_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(hashctx);
+ curve448_scalar_decode_long(challenge_scalar, challenge,
+ sizeof(challenge));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(challenge, sizeof(challenge));
+ }
+ curve448_scalar_sub(challenge_scalar, curve448_scalar_zero,
+ challenge_scalar);
+
+ curve448_scalar_decode_long(response_scalar,
+ &signature[EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES],
+ EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES);
+
+ /* pk_point = -c(x(P)) + (cx + k)G = kG */
+ curve448_base_double_scalarmul_non_secret(pk_point,
+ response_scalar,
+ pk_point, challenge_scalar);
+ return c448_succeed_if(curve448_point_eq(pk_point, r_point));
+}
+
+c448_error_t c448_ed448_verify_prehash(
+ const uint8_t signature[EDDSA_448_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+ const uint8_t pubkey[EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES],
+ const uint8_t hash[64], const uint8_t *context,
+ uint8_t context_len)
+{
+ return c448_ed448_verify(signature, pubkey, hash, 64, 1, context,
+ context_len);
+}
+
+int ED448_sign(uint8_t *out_sig, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+ const uint8_t public_key[57], const uint8_t private_key[57],
+ const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len)
+{
+ return c448_ed448_sign(out_sig, private_key, public_key, message,
+ message_len, 0, context, context_len)
+ == C448_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+int ED448_verify(const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+ const uint8_t signature[114], const uint8_t public_key[57],
+ const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len)
+{
+ return c448_ed448_verify(signature, public_key, message, message_len, 0,
+ context, (uint8_t)context_len) == C448_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+int ED448ph_sign(uint8_t *out_sig, const uint8_t hash[64],
+ const uint8_t public_key[57], const uint8_t private_key[57],
+ const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len)
+{
+ return c448_ed448_sign_prehash(out_sig, private_key, public_key, hash,
+ context, context_len) == C448_SUCCESS;
+
+}
+
+int ED448ph_verify(const uint8_t hash[64], const uint8_t signature[114],
+ const uint8_t public_key[57], const uint8_t *context,
+ size_t context_len)
+{
+ return c448_ed448_verify_prehash(signature, public_key, hash, context,
+ (uint8_t)context_len) == C448_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+int ED448_public_from_private(uint8_t out_public_key[57],
+ const uint8_t private_key[57])
+{
+ return c448_ed448_derive_public_key(out_public_key, private_key)
+ == C448_SUCCESS;
+}