zte's code,first commit
Change-Id: I9a04da59e459a9bc0d67f101f700d9d7dc8d681b
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/ec/ec_key.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/ec/ec_key.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3017f09
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/ec/ec_key.c
@@ -0,0 +1,694 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <string.h>
+#include "ec_local.h"
+#include "internal/refcount.h"
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include "crypto/bn.h"
+
+EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new(void)
+{
+ return EC_KEY_new_method(NULL);
+}
+
+EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(int nid)
+{
+ EC_KEY *ret = EC_KEY_new();
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ ret->group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid);
+ if (ret->group == NULL) {
+ EC_KEY_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (ret->meth->set_group != NULL
+ && ret->meth->set_group(ret, ret->group) == 0) {
+ EC_KEY_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void EC_KEY_free(EC_KEY *r)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (r == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock);
+ REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_KEY", r);
+ if (i > 0)
+ return;
+ REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
+
+ if (r->meth != NULL && r->meth->finish != NULL)
+ r->meth->finish(r);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ ENGINE_finish(r->engine);
+#endif
+
+ if (r->group && r->group->meth->keyfinish)
+ r->group->meth->keyfinish(r);
+
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EC_KEY, r, &r->ex_data);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock);
+ EC_GROUP_free(r->group);
+ EC_POINT_free(r->pub_key);
+ BN_clear_free(r->priv_key);
+
+ OPENSSL_clear_free((void *)r, sizeof(EC_KEY));
+}
+
+EC_KEY *EC_KEY_copy(EC_KEY *dest, const EC_KEY *src)
+{
+ if (dest == NULL || src == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_COPY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (src->meth != dest->meth) {
+ if (dest->meth->finish != NULL)
+ dest->meth->finish(dest);
+ if (dest->group && dest->group->meth->keyfinish)
+ dest->group->meth->keyfinish(dest);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ if (ENGINE_finish(dest->engine) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ dest->engine = NULL;
+#endif
+ }
+ /* copy the parameters */
+ if (src->group != NULL) {
+ const EC_METHOD *meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(src->group);
+ /* clear the old group */
+ EC_GROUP_free(dest->group);
+ dest->group = EC_GROUP_new(meth);
+ if (dest->group == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ if (!EC_GROUP_copy(dest->group, src->group))
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* copy the public key */
+ if (src->pub_key != NULL) {
+ EC_POINT_free(dest->pub_key);
+ dest->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(src->group);
+ if (dest->pub_key == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ if (!EC_POINT_copy(dest->pub_key, src->pub_key))
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* copy the private key */
+ if (src->priv_key != NULL) {
+ if (dest->priv_key == NULL) {
+ dest->priv_key = BN_new();
+ if (dest->priv_key == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (!BN_copy(dest->priv_key, src->priv_key))
+ return NULL;
+ if (src->group->meth->keycopy
+ && src->group->meth->keycopy(dest, src) == 0)
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ /* copy the rest */
+ dest->enc_flag = src->enc_flag;
+ dest->conv_form = src->conv_form;
+ dest->version = src->version;
+ dest->flags = src->flags;
+ if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EC_KEY,
+ &dest->ex_data, &src->ex_data))
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (src->meth != dest->meth) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ if (src->engine != NULL && ENGINE_init(src->engine) == 0)
+ return NULL;
+ dest->engine = src->engine;
+#endif
+ dest->meth = src->meth;
+ }
+
+ if (src->meth->copy != NULL && src->meth->copy(dest, src) == 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return dest;
+}
+
+EC_KEY *EC_KEY_dup(const EC_KEY *ec_key)
+{
+ EC_KEY *ret = EC_KEY_new_method(ec_key->engine);
+
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (EC_KEY_copy(ret, ec_key) == NULL) {
+ EC_KEY_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_up_ref(EC_KEY *r)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_KEY", r);
+ REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
+ return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0);
+}
+
+ENGINE *EC_KEY_get0_engine(const EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+ return eckey->engine;
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+ if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_GENERATE_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (eckey->meth->keygen != NULL)
+ return eckey->meth->keygen(eckey);
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_GENERATE_KEY, EC_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int ossl_ec_key_gen(EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+ return eckey->group->meth->keygen(eckey);
+}
+
+int ec_key_simple_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+ int ok = 0;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL;
+ const BIGNUM *order = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *pub_key = NULL;
+
+ if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
+ priv_key = BN_new();
+ if (priv_key == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ } else
+ priv_key = eckey->priv_key;
+
+ order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(eckey->group);
+ if (order == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ do
+ if (!BN_priv_rand_range(priv_key, order))
+ goto err;
+ while (BN_is_zero(priv_key)) ;
+
+ if (eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
+ pub_key = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group);
+ if (pub_key == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ } else
+ pub_key = eckey->pub_key;
+
+ if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, pub_key, priv_key, NULL, NULL, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ eckey->priv_key = priv_key;
+ eckey->pub_key = pub_key;
+
+ ok = 1;
+
+ err:
+ if (eckey->pub_key == NULL)
+ EC_POINT_free(pub_key);
+ if (eckey->priv_key != priv_key)
+ BN_free(priv_key);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return ok;
+}
+
+int ec_key_simple_generate_public_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+ return EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, eckey->priv_key, NULL,
+ NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+ if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL || eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (eckey->group->meth->keycheck == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return eckey->group->meth->keycheck(eckey);
+}
+
+int ec_key_simple_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+ int ok = 0;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ const BIGNUM *order = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *point = NULL;
+
+ if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL || eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if ((point = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* testing whether the pub_key is on the elliptic curve */
+ if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, ctx) <= 0) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* testing whether pub_key * order is the point at infinity */
+ order = eckey->group->order;
+ if (BN_is_zero(order)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, NULL, eckey->pub_key, order, ctx)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, point)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /*
+ * in case the priv_key is present : check if generator * priv_key ==
+ * pub_key
+ */
+ if (eckey->priv_key != NULL) {
+ if (BN_cmp(eckey->priv_key, order) >= 0) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, eckey->priv_key,
+ NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EC_POINT_cmp(eckey->group, point, eckey->pub_key, ctx) != 0) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ ok = 1;
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EC_POINT_free(point);
+ return ok;
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x,
+ BIGNUM *y)
+{
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *tx, *ty;
+ EC_POINT *point = NULL;
+ int ok = 0;
+
+ if (key == NULL || key->group == NULL || x == NULL || y == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
+ ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ point = EC_POINT_new(key->group);
+
+ if (point == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ tx = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ ty = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (ty == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates(key->group, point, x, y, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(key->group, point, tx, ty, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * Check if retrieved coordinates match originals and are less than field
+ * order: if not values are out of range.
+ */
+ if (BN_cmp(x, tx) || BN_cmp(y, ty)
+ || (BN_cmp(x, key->group->field) >= 0)
+ || (BN_cmp(y, key->group->field) >= 0)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
+ EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!EC_KEY_set_public_key(key, point))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (EC_KEY_check_key(key) == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ ok = 1;
+
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EC_POINT_free(point);
+ return ok;
+
+}
+
+const EC_GROUP *EC_KEY_get0_group(const EC_KEY *key)
+{
+ return key->group;
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_set_group(EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+ if (key->meth->set_group != NULL && key->meth->set_group(key, group) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ EC_GROUP_free(key->group);
+ key->group = EC_GROUP_dup(group);
+ return (key->group == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *EC_KEY_get0_private_key(const EC_KEY *key)
+{
+ return key->priv_key;
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_set_private_key(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *priv_key)
+{
+ int fixed_top;
+ const BIGNUM *order = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *tmp_key = NULL;
+
+ if (key->group == NULL || key->group->meth == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Not only should key->group be set, but it should also be in a valid
+ * fully initialized state.
+ *
+ * Specifically, to operate in constant time, we need that the group order
+ * is set, as we use its length as the fixed public size of any scalar used
+ * as an EC private key.
+ */
+ order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(key->group);
+ if (order == NULL || BN_is_zero(order))
+ return 0; /* This should never happen */
+
+ if (key->group->meth->set_private != NULL
+ && key->group->meth->set_private(key, priv_key) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (key->meth->set_private != NULL
+ && key->meth->set_private(key, priv_key) == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * We should never leak the bit length of the secret scalar in the key,
+ * so we always set the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag on the internal `BIGNUM`
+ * holding the secret scalar.
+ *
+ * This is important also because `BN_dup()` (and `BN_copy()`) do not
+ * propagate the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag from the source `BIGNUM`, and
+ * this brings an extra risk of inadvertently losing the flag, even when
+ * the caller specifically set it.
+ *
+ * The propagation has been turned on and off a few times in the past
+ * years because in some conditions has shown unintended consequences in
+ * some code paths, so at the moment we can't fix this in the BN layer.
+ *
+ * In `EC_KEY_set_private_key()` we can work around the propagation by
+ * manually setting the flag after `BN_dup()` as we know for sure that
+ * inside the EC module the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` is always treated
+ * correctly and should not generate unintended consequences.
+ *
+ * Setting the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag alone is never enough, we also have
+ * to preallocate the BIGNUM internal buffer to a fixed public size big
+ * enough that operations performed during the processing never trigger
+ * a realloc which would leak the size of the scalar through memory
+ * accesses.
+ *
+ * Fixed Length
+ * ------------
+ *
+ * The order of the large prime subgroup of the curve is our choice for
+ * a fixed public size, as that is generally the upper bound for
+ * generating a private key in EC cryptosystems and should fit all valid
+ * secret scalars.
+ *
+ * For preallocating the BIGNUM storage we look at the number of "words"
+ * required for the internal representation of the order, and we
+ * preallocate 2 extra "words" in case any of the subsequent processing
+ * might temporarily overflow the order length.
+ */
+ tmp_key = BN_dup(priv_key);
+ if (tmp_key == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ BN_set_flags(tmp_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+ fixed_top = bn_get_top(order) + 2;
+ if (bn_wexpand(tmp_key, fixed_top) == NULL) {
+ BN_clear_free(tmp_key);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ BN_clear_free(key->priv_key);
+ key->priv_key = tmp_key;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+const EC_POINT *EC_KEY_get0_public_key(const EC_KEY *key)
+{
+ return key->pub_key;
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_set_public_key(EC_KEY *key, const EC_POINT *pub_key)
+{
+ if (key->meth->set_public != NULL
+ && key->meth->set_public(key, pub_key) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ EC_POINT_free(key->pub_key);
+ key->pub_key = EC_POINT_dup(pub_key, key->group);
+ return (key->pub_key == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
+unsigned int EC_KEY_get_enc_flags(const EC_KEY *key)
+{
+ return key->enc_flag;
+}
+
+void EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(EC_KEY *key, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ key->enc_flag = flags;
+}
+
+point_conversion_form_t EC_KEY_get_conv_form(const EC_KEY *key)
+{
+ return key->conv_form;
+}
+
+void EC_KEY_set_conv_form(EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t cform)
+{
+ key->conv_form = cform;
+ if (key->group != NULL)
+ EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(key->group, cform);
+}
+
+void EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(EC_KEY *key, int flag)
+{
+ if (key->group != NULL)
+ EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(key->group, flag);
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_precompute_mult(EC_KEY *key, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if (key->group == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ return EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(key->group, ctx);
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_get_flags(const EC_KEY *key)
+{
+ return key->flags;
+}
+
+void EC_KEY_set_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags)
+{
+ key->flags |= flags;
+}
+
+void EC_KEY_clear_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags)
+{
+ key->flags &= ~flags;
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params(const EC_KEY *key)
+{
+ if (key == NULL || key->group == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ return key->group->decoded_from_explicit_params;
+}
+
+size_t EC_KEY_key2buf(const EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t form,
+ unsigned char **pbuf, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if (key == NULL || key->pub_key == NULL || key->group == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ return EC_POINT_point2buf(key->group, key->pub_key, form, pbuf, ctx);
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_oct2key(EC_KEY *key, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
+ BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if (key == NULL || key->group == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (key->pub_key == NULL)
+ key->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(key->group);
+ if (key->pub_key == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (EC_POINT_oct2point(key->group, key->pub_key, buf, len, ctx) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ /*
+ * Save the point conversion form.
+ * For non-custom curves the first octet of the buffer (excluding
+ * the last significant bit) contains the point conversion form.
+ * EC_POINT_oct2point() has already performed sanity checking of
+ * the buffer so we know it is valid.
+ */
+ if ((key->group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_CUSTOM_CURVE) == 0)
+ key->conv_form = (point_conversion_form_t)(buf[0] & ~0x01);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+size_t EC_KEY_priv2oct(const EC_KEY *eckey,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ if (eckey->group == NULL || eckey->group->meth == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (eckey->group->meth->priv2oct == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_PRIV2OCT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return eckey->group->meth->priv2oct(eckey, buf, len);
+}
+
+size_t ec_key_simple_priv2oct(const EC_KEY *eckey,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ size_t buf_len;
+
+ buf_len = (EC_GROUP_order_bits(eckey->group) + 7) / 8;
+ if (eckey->priv_key == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (buf == NULL)
+ return buf_len;
+ else if (len < buf_len)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Octetstring may need leading zeros if BN is to short */
+
+ if (BN_bn2binpad(eckey->priv_key, buf, buf_len) == -1) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_PRIV2OCT, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return buf_len;
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_oct2priv(EC_KEY *eckey, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ if (eckey->group == NULL || eckey->group->meth == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (eckey->group->meth->oct2priv == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_OCT2PRIV, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return eckey->group->meth->oct2priv(eckey, buf, len);
+}
+
+int ec_key_simple_oct2priv(EC_KEY *eckey, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ if (eckey->priv_key == NULL)
+ eckey->priv_key = BN_secure_new();
+ if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_OCT2PRIV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (BN_bin2bn(buf, len, eckey->priv_key) == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_OCT2PRIV, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+size_t EC_KEY_priv2buf(const EC_KEY *eckey, unsigned char **pbuf)
+{
+ size_t len;
+ unsigned char *buf;
+
+ len = EC_KEY_priv2oct(eckey, NULL, 0);
+ if (len == 0)
+ return 0;
+ if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_PRIV2BUF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ len = EC_KEY_priv2oct(eckey, buf, len);
+ if (len == 0) {
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *pbuf = buf;
+ return len;
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_can_sign(const EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+ if (eckey->group == NULL || eckey->group->meth == NULL
+ || (eckey->group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_NO_SIGN))
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}