zte's code,first commit
Change-Id: I9a04da59e459a9bc0d67f101f700d9d7dc8d681b
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_srv.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_srv.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e35fc52
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_srv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,310 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#include "ocsp_local.h"
+
+/*
+ * Utility functions related to sending OCSP responses and extracting
+ * relevant information from the request.
+ */
+
+int OCSP_request_onereq_count(OCSP_REQUEST *req)
+{
+ return sk_OCSP_ONEREQ_num(req->tbsRequest.requestList);
+}
+
+OCSP_ONEREQ *OCSP_request_onereq_get0(OCSP_REQUEST *req, int i)
+{
+ return sk_OCSP_ONEREQ_value(req->tbsRequest.requestList, i);
+}
+
+OCSP_CERTID *OCSP_onereq_get0_id(OCSP_ONEREQ *one)
+{
+ return one->reqCert;
+}
+
+int OCSP_id_get0_info(ASN1_OCTET_STRING **piNameHash, ASN1_OBJECT **pmd,
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pikeyHash,
+ ASN1_INTEGER **pserial, OCSP_CERTID *cid)
+{
+ if (!cid)
+ return 0;
+ if (pmd)
+ *pmd = cid->hashAlgorithm.algorithm;
+ if (piNameHash)
+ *piNameHash = &cid->issuerNameHash;
+ if (pikeyHash)
+ *pikeyHash = &cid->issuerKeyHash;
+ if (pserial)
+ *pserial = &cid->serialNumber;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int OCSP_request_is_signed(OCSP_REQUEST *req)
+{
+ if (req->optionalSignature)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Create an OCSP response and encode an optional basic response */
+OCSP_RESPONSE *OCSP_response_create(int status, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs)
+{
+ OCSP_RESPONSE *rsp = NULL;
+
+ if ((rsp = OCSP_RESPONSE_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!(ASN1_ENUMERATED_set(rsp->responseStatus, status)))
+ goto err;
+ if (!bs)
+ return rsp;
+ if ((rsp->responseBytes = OCSP_RESPBYTES_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ rsp->responseBytes->responseType = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_pkix_OCSP_basic);
+ if (!ASN1_item_pack
+ (bs, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OCSP_BASICRESP), &rsp->responseBytes->response))
+ goto err;
+ return rsp;
+ err:
+ OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+OCSP_SINGLERESP *OCSP_basic_add1_status(OCSP_BASICRESP *rsp,
+ OCSP_CERTID *cid,
+ int status, int reason,
+ ASN1_TIME *revtime,
+ ASN1_TIME *thisupd,
+ ASN1_TIME *nextupd)
+{
+ OCSP_SINGLERESP *single = NULL;
+ OCSP_CERTSTATUS *cs;
+ OCSP_REVOKEDINFO *ri;
+
+ if (rsp->tbsResponseData.responses == NULL
+ && (rsp->tbsResponseData.responses
+ = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_new_null()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if ((single = OCSP_SINGLERESP_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!ASN1_TIME_to_generalizedtime(thisupd, &single->thisUpdate))
+ goto err;
+ if (nextupd &&
+ !ASN1_TIME_to_generalizedtime(nextupd, &single->nextUpdate))
+ goto err;
+
+ OCSP_CERTID_free(single->certId);
+
+ if ((single->certId = OCSP_CERTID_dup(cid)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ cs = single->certStatus;
+ switch (cs->type = status) {
+ case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED:
+ if (!revtime) {
+ OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_ADD1_STATUS, OCSP_R_NO_REVOKED_TIME);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((cs->value.revoked = ri = OCSP_REVOKEDINFO_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!ASN1_TIME_to_generalizedtime(revtime, &ri->revocationTime))
+ goto err;
+ if (reason != OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_NOSTATUS) {
+ if ((ri->revocationReason = ASN1_ENUMERATED_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!(ASN1_ENUMERATED_set(ri->revocationReason, reason)))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD:
+ if ((cs->value.good = ASN1_NULL_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ break;
+
+ case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_UNKNOWN:
+ if ((cs->value.unknown = ASN1_NULL_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ goto err;
+
+ }
+ if (!(sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_push(rsp->tbsResponseData.responses, single)))
+ goto err;
+ return single;
+ err:
+ OCSP_SINGLERESP_free(single);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Add a certificate to an OCSP request */
+
+int OCSP_basic_add1_cert(OCSP_BASICRESP *resp, X509 *cert)
+{
+ if (resp->certs == NULL
+ && (resp->certs = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!sk_X509_push(resp->certs, cert))
+ return 0;
+ X509_up_ref(cert);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sign an OCSP response using the parameters contained in the digest context,
+ * set the responderID to the subject name in the signer's certificate, and
+ * include one or more optional certificates in the response.
+ */
+
+int OCSP_basic_sign_ctx(OCSP_BASICRESP *brsp,
+ X509 *signer, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+ STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ int i;
+ OCSP_RESPID *rid;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(ctx) == NULL) {
+ OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_SIGN_CTX, OCSP_R_NO_SIGNER_KEY);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ pkey = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(ctx));
+ if (pkey == NULL || !X509_check_private_key(signer, pkey)) {
+ OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_SIGN_CTX,
+ OCSP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DOES_NOT_MATCH_CERTIFICATE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!(flags & OCSP_NOCERTS)) {
+ if (!OCSP_basic_add1_cert(brsp, signer))
+ goto err;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
+ X509 *tmpcert = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+ if (!OCSP_basic_add1_cert(brsp, tmpcert))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rid = &brsp->tbsResponseData.responderId;
+ if (flags & OCSP_RESPID_KEY) {
+ if (!OCSP_RESPID_set_by_key(rid, signer))
+ goto err;
+ } else if (!OCSP_RESPID_set_by_name(rid, signer)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!(flags & OCSP_NOTIME) &&
+ !X509_gmtime_adj(brsp->tbsResponseData.producedAt, 0))
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * Right now, I think that not doing double hashing is the right thing.
+ * -- Richard Levitte
+ */
+
+ if (!OCSP_BASICRESP_sign_ctx(brsp, ctx, 0))
+ goto err;
+
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int OCSP_basic_sign(OCSP_BASICRESP *brsp,
+ X509 *signer, EVP_PKEY *key, const EVP_MD *dgst,
+ STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = NULL;
+ int i;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx, &pkctx, dgst, NULL, key)) {
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ i = OCSP_basic_sign_ctx(brsp, signer, ctx, certs, flags);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return i;
+}
+
+int OCSP_RESPID_set_by_name(OCSP_RESPID *respid, X509 *cert)
+{
+ if (!X509_NAME_set(&respid->value.byName, X509_get_subject_name(cert)))
+ return 0;
+
+ respid->type = V_OCSP_RESPID_NAME;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int OCSP_RESPID_set_by_key(OCSP_RESPID *respid, X509 *cert)
+{
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *byKey = NULL;
+ unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+ /* RFC2560 requires SHA1 */
+ if (!X509_pubkey_digest(cert, EVP_sha1(), md, NULL))
+ return 0;
+
+ byKey = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+ if (byKey == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!(ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(byKey, md, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))) {
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(byKey);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ respid->type = V_OCSP_RESPID_KEY;
+ respid->value.byKey = byKey;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int OCSP_RESPID_match(OCSP_RESPID *respid, X509 *cert)
+{
+ if (respid->type == V_OCSP_RESPID_KEY) {
+ unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+ if (respid->value.byKey == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* RFC2560 requires SHA1 */
+ if (!X509_pubkey_digest(cert, EVP_sha1(), md, NULL))
+ return 0;
+
+ return (ASN1_STRING_length(respid->value.byKey) == SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+ && (memcmp(ASN1_STRING_get0_data(respid->value.byKey), md,
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) == 0);
+ } else if (respid->type == V_OCSP_RESPID_NAME) {
+ if (respid->value.byName == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ return X509_NAME_cmp(respid->value.byName,
+ X509_get_subject_name(cert)) == 0;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}