zte's code,first commit
Change-Id: I9a04da59e459a9bc0d67f101f700d9d7dc8d681b
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/build.info b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..afd0b61
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+ x509_def.c x509_d2.c x509_r2x.c x509_cmp.c \
+ x509_obj.c x509_req.c x509spki.c x509_vfy.c \
+ x509_set.c x509cset.c x509rset.c x509_err.c \
+ x509name.c x509_v3.c x509_ext.c x509_att.c \
+ x509type.c x509_meth.c x509_lu.c x_all.c x509_txt.c \
+ x509_trs.c by_file.c by_dir.c x509_vpm.c \
+ x_crl.c t_crl.c x_req.c t_req.c x_x509.c t_x509.c \
+ x_pubkey.c x_x509a.c x_attrib.c x_exten.c x_name.c
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/by_dir.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/by_dir.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..238c251
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/by_dir.c
@@ -0,0 +1,390 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "e_os.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "crypto/x509.h"
+#include "x509_local.h"
+
+struct lookup_dir_hashes_st {
+ unsigned long hash;
+ int suffix;
+};
+
+struct lookup_dir_entry_st {
+ char *dir;
+ int dir_type;
+ STACK_OF(BY_DIR_HASH) *hashes;
+};
+
+typedef struct lookup_dir_st {
+ BUF_MEM *buffer;
+ STACK_OF(BY_DIR_ENTRY) *dirs;
+ CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+} BY_DIR;
+
+static int dir_ctrl(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argp, long argl,
+ char **ret);
+static int new_dir(X509_LOOKUP *lu);
+static void free_dir(X509_LOOKUP *lu);
+static int add_cert_dir(BY_DIR *ctx, const char *dir, int type);
+static int get_cert_by_subject(X509_LOOKUP *xl, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type,
+ X509_NAME *name, X509_OBJECT *ret);
+static X509_LOOKUP_METHOD x509_dir_lookup = {
+ "Load certs from files in a directory",
+ new_dir, /* new_item */
+ free_dir, /* free */
+ NULL, /* init */
+ NULL, /* shutdown */
+ dir_ctrl, /* ctrl */
+ get_cert_by_subject, /* get_by_subject */
+ NULL, /* get_by_issuer_serial */
+ NULL, /* get_by_fingerprint */
+ NULL, /* get_by_alias */
+};
+
+X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir(void)
+{
+ return &x509_dir_lookup;
+}
+
+static int dir_ctrl(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argp, long argl,
+ char **retp)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ BY_DIR *ld = (BY_DIR *)ctx->method_data;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case X509_L_ADD_DIR:
+ if (argl == X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT) {
+ const char *dir = ossl_safe_getenv(X509_get_default_cert_dir_env());
+
+ if (dir)
+ ret = add_cert_dir(ld, dir, X509_FILETYPE_PEM);
+ else
+ ret = add_cert_dir(ld, X509_get_default_cert_dir(),
+ X509_FILETYPE_PEM);
+ if (!ret) {
+ X509err(X509_F_DIR_CTRL, X509_R_LOADING_CERT_DIR);
+ }
+ } else
+ ret = add_cert_dir(ld, argp, (int)argl);
+ break;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int new_dir(X509_LOOKUP *lu)
+{
+ BY_DIR *a = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*a));
+
+ if (a == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_NEW_DIR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((a->buffer = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_NEW_DIR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ a->dirs = NULL;
+ a->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+ if (a->lock == NULL) {
+ BUF_MEM_free(a->buffer);
+ X509err(X509_F_NEW_DIR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ lu->method_data = a;
+ return 1;
+
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_free(a);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void by_dir_hash_free(BY_DIR_HASH *hash)
+{
+ OPENSSL_free(hash);
+}
+
+static int by_dir_hash_cmp(const BY_DIR_HASH *const *a,
+ const BY_DIR_HASH *const *b)
+{
+ if ((*a)->hash > (*b)->hash)
+ return 1;
+ if ((*a)->hash < (*b)->hash)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void by_dir_entry_free(BY_DIR_ENTRY *ent)
+{
+ OPENSSL_free(ent->dir);
+ sk_BY_DIR_HASH_pop_free(ent->hashes, by_dir_hash_free);
+ OPENSSL_free(ent);
+}
+
+static void free_dir(X509_LOOKUP *lu)
+{
+ BY_DIR *a = (BY_DIR *)lu->method_data;
+
+ sk_BY_DIR_ENTRY_pop_free(a->dirs, by_dir_entry_free);
+ BUF_MEM_free(a->buffer);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(a->lock);
+ OPENSSL_free(a);
+}
+
+static int add_cert_dir(BY_DIR *ctx, const char *dir, int type)
+{
+ int j;
+ size_t len;
+ const char *s, *ss, *p;
+
+ if (dir == NULL || !*dir) {
+ X509err(X509_F_ADD_CERT_DIR, X509_R_INVALID_DIRECTORY);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ s = dir;
+ p = s;
+ do {
+ if ((*p == LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR) || (*p == '\0')) {
+ BY_DIR_ENTRY *ent;
+
+ ss = s;
+ s = p + 1;
+ len = p - ss;
+ if (len == 0)
+ continue;
+ for (j = 0; j < sk_BY_DIR_ENTRY_num(ctx->dirs); j++) {
+ ent = sk_BY_DIR_ENTRY_value(ctx->dirs, j);
+ if (strlen(ent->dir) == len && strncmp(ent->dir, ss, len) == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (j < sk_BY_DIR_ENTRY_num(ctx->dirs))
+ continue;
+ if (ctx->dirs == NULL) {
+ ctx->dirs = sk_BY_DIR_ENTRY_new_null();
+ if (!ctx->dirs) {
+ X509err(X509_F_ADD_CERT_DIR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ ent = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ent));
+ if (ent == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_ADD_CERT_DIR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ent->dir_type = type;
+ ent->hashes = sk_BY_DIR_HASH_new(by_dir_hash_cmp);
+ ent->dir = OPENSSL_strndup(ss, len);
+ if (ent->dir == NULL || ent->hashes == NULL) {
+ by_dir_entry_free(ent);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!sk_BY_DIR_ENTRY_push(ctx->dirs, ent)) {
+ by_dir_entry_free(ent);
+ X509err(X509_F_ADD_CERT_DIR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ } while (*p++ != '\0');
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int get_cert_by_subject(X509_LOOKUP *xl, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type,
+ X509_NAME *name, X509_OBJECT *ret)
+{
+ BY_DIR *ctx;
+ union {
+ X509 st_x509;
+ X509_CRL crl;
+ } data;
+ int ok = 0;
+ int i, j, k;
+ unsigned long h;
+ BUF_MEM *b = NULL;
+ X509_OBJECT stmp, *tmp;
+ const char *postfix = "";
+
+ if (name == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ stmp.type = type;
+ if (type == X509_LU_X509) {
+ data.st_x509.cert_info.subject = name;
+ stmp.data.x509 = &data.st_x509;
+ postfix = "";
+ } else if (type == X509_LU_CRL) {
+ data.crl.crl.issuer = name;
+ stmp.data.crl = &data.crl;
+ postfix = "r";
+ } else {
+ X509err(X509_F_GET_CERT_BY_SUBJECT, X509_R_WRONG_LOOKUP_TYPE);
+ goto finish;
+ }
+
+ if ((b = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_GET_CERT_BY_SUBJECT, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto finish;
+ }
+
+ ctx = (BY_DIR *)xl->method_data;
+
+ h = X509_NAME_hash(name);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_BY_DIR_ENTRY_num(ctx->dirs); i++) {
+ BY_DIR_ENTRY *ent;
+ int idx;
+ BY_DIR_HASH htmp, *hent;
+
+ ent = sk_BY_DIR_ENTRY_value(ctx->dirs, i);
+ j = strlen(ent->dir) + 1 + 8 + 6 + 1 + 1;
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(b, j)) {
+ X509err(X509_F_GET_CERT_BY_SUBJECT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto finish;
+ }
+ if (type == X509_LU_CRL && ent->hashes) {
+ htmp.hash = h;
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(ctx->lock);
+ idx = sk_BY_DIR_HASH_find(ent->hashes, &htmp);
+ if (idx >= 0) {
+ hent = sk_BY_DIR_HASH_value(ent->hashes, idx);
+ k = hent->suffix;
+ } else {
+ hent = NULL;
+ k = 0;
+ }
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock);
+ } else {
+ k = 0;
+ hent = NULL;
+ }
+ for (;;) {
+ char c = '/';
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+ c = ent->dir[strlen(ent->dir) - 1];
+ if (c != ':' && c != '>' && c != ']') {
+ /*
+ * If no separator is present, we assume the directory
+ * specifier is a logical name, and add a colon. We really
+ * should use better VMS routines for merging things like
+ * this, but this will do for now... -- Richard Levitte
+ */
+ c = ':';
+ } else {
+ c = '\0';
+ }
+#endif
+ if (c == '\0') {
+ /*
+ * This is special. When c == '\0', no directory separator
+ * should be added.
+ */
+ BIO_snprintf(b->data, b->max,
+ "%s%08lx.%s%d", ent->dir, h, postfix, k);
+ } else {
+ BIO_snprintf(b->data, b->max,
+ "%s%c%08lx.%s%d", ent->dir, c, h, postfix, k);
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
+# ifdef _WIN32
+# define stat _stat
+# endif
+ {
+ struct stat st;
+ if (stat(b->data, &st) < 0)
+ break;
+ }
+#endif
+ /* found one. */
+ if (type == X509_LU_X509) {
+ if ((X509_load_cert_file(xl, b->data, ent->dir_type)) == 0)
+ break;
+ } else if (type == X509_LU_CRL) {
+ if ((X509_load_crl_file(xl, b->data, ent->dir_type)) == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ /* else case will caught higher up */
+ k++;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * we have added it to the cache so now pull it out again
+ */
+ X509_STORE_lock(xl->store_ctx);
+ j = sk_X509_OBJECT_find(xl->store_ctx->objs, &stmp);
+ tmp = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(xl->store_ctx->objs, j);
+ X509_STORE_unlock(xl->store_ctx);
+
+ /* If a CRL, update the last file suffix added for this */
+
+ if (type == X509_LU_CRL) {
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->lock);
+ /*
+ * Look for entry again in case another thread added an entry
+ * first.
+ */
+ if (hent == NULL) {
+ htmp.hash = h;
+ idx = sk_BY_DIR_HASH_find(ent->hashes, &htmp);
+ hent = sk_BY_DIR_HASH_value(ent->hashes, idx);
+ }
+ if (hent == NULL) {
+ hent = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*hent));
+ if (hent == NULL) {
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock);
+ X509err(X509_F_GET_CERT_BY_SUBJECT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ok = 0;
+ goto finish;
+ }
+ hent->hash = h;
+ hent->suffix = k;
+ if (!sk_BY_DIR_HASH_push(ent->hashes, hent)) {
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock);
+ OPENSSL_free(hent);
+ X509err(X509_F_GET_CERT_BY_SUBJECT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ok = 0;
+ goto finish;
+ }
+ } else if (hent->suffix < k) {
+ hent->suffix = k;
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock);
+
+ }
+
+ if (tmp != NULL) {
+ ok = 1;
+ ret->type = tmp->type;
+ memcpy(&ret->data, &tmp->data, sizeof(ret->data));
+
+ /*
+ * Clear any errors that might have been raised processing empty
+ * or malformed files.
+ */
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ goto finish;
+ }
+ }
+ finish:
+ BUF_MEM_free(b);
+ return ok;
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/by_file.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/by_file.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..237b362
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/by_file.c
@@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include "x509_local.h"
+
+static int by_file_ctrl(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argc,
+ long argl, char **ret);
+static X509_LOOKUP_METHOD x509_file_lookup = {
+ "Load file into cache",
+ NULL, /* new_item */
+ NULL, /* free */
+ NULL, /* init */
+ NULL, /* shutdown */
+ by_file_ctrl, /* ctrl */
+ NULL, /* get_by_subject */
+ NULL, /* get_by_issuer_serial */
+ NULL, /* get_by_fingerprint */
+ NULL, /* get_by_alias */
+};
+
+X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *X509_LOOKUP_file(void)
+{
+ return &x509_file_lookup;
+}
+
+static int by_file_ctrl(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argp,
+ long argl, char **ret)
+{
+ int ok = 0;
+ const char *file;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case X509_L_FILE_LOAD:
+ if (argl == X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT) {
+ file = ossl_safe_getenv(X509_get_default_cert_file_env());
+ if (file)
+ ok = (X509_load_cert_crl_file(ctx, file,
+ X509_FILETYPE_PEM) != 0);
+
+ else
+ ok = (X509_load_cert_crl_file
+ (ctx, X509_get_default_cert_file(),
+ X509_FILETYPE_PEM) != 0);
+
+ if (!ok) {
+ X509err(X509_F_BY_FILE_CTRL, X509_R_LOADING_DEFAULTS);
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (argl == X509_FILETYPE_PEM)
+ ok = (X509_load_cert_crl_file(ctx, argp,
+ X509_FILETYPE_PEM) != 0);
+ else
+ ok = (X509_load_cert_file(ctx, argp, (int)argl) != 0);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ return ok;
+}
+
+int X509_load_cert_file(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, const char *file, int type)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ BIO *in = NULL;
+ int i, count = 0;
+ X509 *x = NULL;
+
+ in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+
+ if ((in == NULL) || (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0)) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (type == X509_FILETYPE_PEM) {
+ for (;;) {
+ x = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(in, NULL, NULL, "");
+ if (x == NULL) {
+ if ((ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_last_error()) ==
+ PEM_R_NO_START_LINE) && (count > 0)) {
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ break;
+ } else {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_FILE, ERR_R_PEM_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ i = X509_STORE_add_cert(ctx->store_ctx, x);
+ if (!i)
+ goto err;
+ count++;
+ X509_free(x);
+ x = NULL;
+ }
+ ret = count;
+ } else if (type == X509_FILETYPE_ASN1) {
+ x = d2i_X509_bio(in, NULL);
+ if (x == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_FILE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ i = X509_STORE_add_cert(ctx->store_ctx, x);
+ if (!i)
+ goto err;
+ ret = i;
+ } else {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_FILE, X509_R_BAD_X509_FILETYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (ret == 0)
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_FILE, X509_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND);
+ err:
+ X509_free(x);
+ BIO_free(in);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int X509_load_crl_file(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, const char *file, int type)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ BIO *in = NULL;
+ int i, count = 0;
+ X509_CRL *x = NULL;
+
+ in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+
+ if ((in == NULL) || (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0)) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CRL_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (type == X509_FILETYPE_PEM) {
+ for (;;) {
+ x = PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(in, NULL, NULL, "");
+ if (x == NULL) {
+ if ((ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_last_error()) ==
+ PEM_R_NO_START_LINE) && (count > 0)) {
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ break;
+ } else {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CRL_FILE, ERR_R_PEM_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ i = X509_STORE_add_crl(ctx->store_ctx, x);
+ if (!i)
+ goto err;
+ count++;
+ X509_CRL_free(x);
+ x = NULL;
+ }
+ ret = count;
+ } else if (type == X509_FILETYPE_ASN1) {
+ x = d2i_X509_CRL_bio(in, NULL);
+ if (x == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CRL_FILE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ i = X509_STORE_add_crl(ctx->store_ctx, x);
+ if (!i)
+ goto err;
+ ret = i;
+ } else {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CRL_FILE, X509_R_BAD_X509_FILETYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (ret == 0)
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CRL_FILE, X509_R_NO_CRL_FOUND);
+ err:
+ X509_CRL_free(x);
+ BIO_free(in);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int X509_load_cert_crl_file(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, const char *file, int type)
+{
+ STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *inf;
+ X509_INFO *itmp;
+ BIO *in;
+ int i, count = 0;
+
+ if (type != X509_FILETYPE_PEM)
+ return X509_load_cert_file(ctx, file, type);
+ in = BIO_new_file(file, "r");
+ if (!in) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_CRL_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ inf = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(in, NULL, NULL, "");
+ BIO_free(in);
+ if (!inf) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_CRL_FILE, ERR_R_PEM_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_INFO_num(inf); i++) {
+ itmp = sk_X509_INFO_value(inf, i);
+ if (itmp->x509) {
+ if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(ctx->store_ctx, itmp->x509))
+ goto err;
+ count++;
+ }
+ if (itmp->crl) {
+ if (!X509_STORE_add_crl(ctx->store_ctx, itmp->crl))
+ goto err;
+ count++;
+ }
+ }
+ if (count == 0)
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_CRL_FILE,
+ X509_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_OR_CRL_FOUND);
+ err:
+ sk_X509_INFO_pop_free(inf, X509_INFO_free);
+ return count;
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/t_crl.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/t_crl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8e26291
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/t_crl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int X509_CRL_print_fp(FILE *fp, X509_CRL *x)
+{
+ BIO *b;
+ int ret;
+
+ if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_PRINT_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ ret = X509_CRL_print(b, x);
+ BIO_free(b);
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+int X509_CRL_print(BIO *out, X509_CRL *x)
+{
+ return X509_CRL_print_ex(out, x, XN_FLAG_COMPAT);
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_print_ex(BIO *out, X509_CRL *x, unsigned long nmflag)
+{
+ STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *rev;
+ X509_REVOKED *r;
+ const X509_ALGOR *sig_alg;
+ const ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig;
+ long l;
+ int i;
+
+ BIO_printf(out, "Certificate Revocation List (CRL):\n");
+ l = X509_CRL_get_version(x);
+ if (l >= 0 && l <= 1)
+ BIO_printf(out, "%8sVersion %ld (0x%lx)\n", "", l + 1, (unsigned long)l);
+ else
+ BIO_printf(out, "%8sVersion unknown (%ld)\n", "", l);
+ X509_CRL_get0_signature(x, &sig, &sig_alg);
+ BIO_puts(out, " ");
+ X509_signature_print(out, sig_alg, NULL);
+ BIO_printf(out, "%8sIssuer: ", "");
+ X509_NAME_print_ex(out, X509_CRL_get_issuer(x), 0, nmflag);
+ BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+ BIO_printf(out, "%8sLast Update: ", "");
+ ASN1_TIME_print(out, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(x));
+ BIO_printf(out, "\n%8sNext Update: ", "");
+ if (X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(x))
+ ASN1_TIME_print(out, X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(x));
+ else
+ BIO_printf(out, "NONE");
+ BIO_printf(out, "\n");
+
+ X509V3_extensions_print(out, "CRL extensions",
+ X509_CRL_get0_extensions(x), 0, 8);
+
+ rev = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(x);
+
+ if (sk_X509_REVOKED_num(rev) > 0)
+ BIO_printf(out, "Revoked Certificates:\n");
+ else
+ BIO_printf(out, "No Revoked Certificates.\n");
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(rev); i++) {
+ r = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(rev, i);
+ BIO_printf(out, " Serial Number: ");
+ i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(out, X509_REVOKED_get0_serialNumber(r));
+ BIO_printf(out, "\n Revocation Date: ");
+ ASN1_TIME_print(out, X509_REVOKED_get0_revocationDate(r));
+ BIO_printf(out, "\n");
+ X509V3_extensions_print(out, "CRL entry extensions",
+ X509_REVOKED_get0_extensions(r), 0, 8);
+ }
+ X509_signature_print(out, sig_alg, sig);
+
+ return 1;
+
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/t_req.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/t_req.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dc3b4f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/t_req.c
@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int X509_REQ_print_fp(FILE *fp, X509_REQ *x)
+{
+ BIO *b;
+ int ret;
+
+ if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_REQ_PRINT_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ ret = X509_REQ_print(b, x);
+ BIO_free(b);
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+int X509_REQ_print_ex(BIO *bp, X509_REQ *x, unsigned long nmflags,
+ unsigned long cflag)
+{
+ long l;
+ int i;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+ STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts;
+ char mlch = ' ';
+ int nmindent = 0;
+
+ if ((nmflags & XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK) == XN_FLAG_SEP_MULTILINE) {
+ mlch = '\n';
+ nmindent = 12;
+ }
+
+ if (nmflags == X509_FLAG_COMPAT)
+ nmindent = 16;
+
+ if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_HEADER)) {
+ if (BIO_write(bp, "Certificate Request:\n", 21) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (BIO_write(bp, " Data:\n", 10) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_VERSION)) {
+ l = X509_REQ_get_version(x);
+ if (l >= 0 && l <= 2) {
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "%8sVersion: %ld (0x%lx)\n", "", l + 1, (unsigned long)l) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "%8sVersion: Unknown (%ld)\n", "", l) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_SUBJECT)) {
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, " Subject:%c", mlch) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (X509_NAME_print_ex(bp, X509_REQ_get_subject_name(x),
+ nmindent, nmflags) < 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_PUBKEY)) {
+ X509_PUBKEY *xpkey;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *koid;
+ if (BIO_write(bp, " Subject Public Key Info:\n", 33) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "%12sPublic Key Algorithm: ", "") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ xpkey = X509_REQ_get_X509_PUBKEY(x);
+ X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(&koid, NULL, NULL, NULL, xpkey);
+ if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, koid) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ pkey = X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(x);
+ if (pkey == NULL) {
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "%12sUnable to load Public Key\n", "") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ ERR_print_errors(bp);
+ } else {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_print_public(bp, pkey, 16, NULL) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_ATTRIBUTES)) {
+ /* may not be */
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "%8sAttributes:\n", "") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (X509_REQ_get_attr_count(x) == 0) {
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "%12sa0:00\n", "") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ for (i = 0; i < X509_REQ_get_attr_count(x); i++) {
+ ASN1_TYPE *at;
+ X509_ATTRIBUTE *a;
+ ASN1_BIT_STRING *bs = NULL;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *aobj;
+ int j, type = 0, count = 1, ii = 0;
+
+ a = X509_REQ_get_attr(x, i);
+ aobj = X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_object(a);
+ if (X509_REQ_extension_nid(OBJ_obj2nid(aobj)))
+ continue;
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "%12s", "") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if ((j = i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, aobj)) > 0) {
+ ii = 0;
+ count = X509_ATTRIBUTE_count(a);
+ if (count == 0) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_REQ_PRINT_EX, X509_R_INVALID_ATTRIBUTES);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ get_next:
+ at = X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_type(a, ii);
+ type = at->type;
+ bs = at->value.asn1_string;
+ }
+ for (j = 25 - j; j > 0; j--)
+ if (BIO_write(bp, " ", 1) != 1)
+ goto err;
+ if (BIO_puts(bp, ":") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ switch (type) {
+ case V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING:
+ case V_ASN1_T61STRING:
+ case V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING:
+ case V_ASN1_UTF8STRING:
+ case V_ASN1_IA5STRING:
+ if (BIO_write(bp, (char *)bs->data, bs->length)
+ != bs->length)
+ goto err;
+ if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ break;
+ default:
+ if (BIO_puts(bp, "unable to print attribute\n") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (++ii < count)
+ goto get_next;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_EXTENSIONS)) {
+ exts = X509_REQ_get_extensions(x);
+ if (exts) {
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "%8sRequested Extensions:\n", "") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); i++) {
+ ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
+ X509_EXTENSION *ex;
+ int critical;
+ ex = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, i);
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "%12s", "") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ obj = X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex);
+ if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, obj) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ critical = X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex);
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, ": %s\n", critical ? "critical" : "") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (!X509V3_EXT_print(bp, ex, cflag, 16)) {
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "%16s", "") <= 0
+ || ASN1_STRING_print(bp,
+ X509_EXTENSION_get_data(ex)) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(exts, X509_EXTENSION_free);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_SIGDUMP)) {
+ const X509_ALGOR *sig_alg;
+ const ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig;
+ X509_REQ_get0_signature(x, &sig, &sig_alg);
+ if (!X509_signature_print(bp, sig_alg, sig))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_REQ_PRINT_EX, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int X509_REQ_print(BIO *bp, X509_REQ *x)
+{
+ return X509_REQ_print_ex(bp, x, XN_FLAG_COMPAT, X509_FLAG_COMPAT);
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/t_x509.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/t_x509.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ece987a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/t_x509.c
@@ -0,0 +1,379 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "crypto/asn1.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int X509_print_fp(FILE *fp, X509 *x)
+{
+ return X509_print_ex_fp(fp, x, XN_FLAG_COMPAT, X509_FLAG_COMPAT);
+}
+
+int X509_print_ex_fp(FILE *fp, X509 *x, unsigned long nmflag,
+ unsigned long cflag)
+{
+ BIO *b;
+ int ret;
+
+ if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_PRINT_EX_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ ret = X509_print_ex(b, x, nmflag, cflag);
+ BIO_free(b);
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+int X509_print(BIO *bp, X509 *x)
+{
+ return X509_print_ex(bp, x, XN_FLAG_COMPAT, X509_FLAG_COMPAT);
+}
+
+int X509_print_ex(BIO *bp, X509 *x, unsigned long nmflags,
+ unsigned long cflag)
+{
+ long l;
+ int ret = 0, i;
+ char *m = NULL, mlch = ' ';
+ int nmindent = 0;
+ ASN1_INTEGER *bs;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ const char *neg;
+
+ if ((nmflags & XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK) == XN_FLAG_SEP_MULTILINE) {
+ mlch = '\n';
+ nmindent = 12;
+ }
+
+ if (nmflags == X509_FLAG_COMPAT)
+ nmindent = 16;
+
+ if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_HEADER)) {
+ if (BIO_write(bp, "Certificate:\n", 13) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (BIO_write(bp, " Data:\n", 10) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_VERSION)) {
+ l = X509_get_version(x);
+ if (l >= 0 && l <= 2) {
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "%8sVersion: %ld (0x%lx)\n", "", l + 1, (unsigned long)l) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "%8sVersion: Unknown (%ld)\n", "", l) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_SERIAL)) {
+
+ if (BIO_write(bp, " Serial Number:", 22) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ bs = X509_get_serialNumber(x);
+ if (bs->length <= (int)sizeof(long)) {
+ ERR_set_mark();
+ l = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs);
+ ERR_pop_to_mark();
+ } else {
+ l = -1;
+ }
+ if (l != -1) {
+ unsigned long ul;
+ if (bs->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) {
+ ul = 0 - (unsigned long)l;
+ neg = "-";
+ } else {
+ ul = l;
+ neg = "";
+ }
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, " %s%lu (%s0x%lx)\n", neg, ul, neg, ul) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ neg = (bs->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) ? " (Negative)" : "";
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n%12s%s", "", neg) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < bs->length; i++) {
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02x%c", bs->data[i],
+ ((i + 1 == bs->length) ? '\n' : ':')) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_SIGNAME)) {
+ const X509_ALGOR *tsig_alg = X509_get0_tbs_sigalg(x);
+
+ if (BIO_puts(bp, " ") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (X509_signature_print(bp, tsig_alg, NULL) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_ISSUER)) {
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, " Issuer:%c", mlch) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (X509_NAME_print_ex(bp, X509_get_issuer_name(x), nmindent, nmflags)
+ < 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_VALIDITY)) {
+ if (BIO_write(bp, " Validity\n", 17) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (BIO_write(bp, " Not Before: ", 24) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (!ASN1_TIME_print(bp, X509_get0_notBefore(x)))
+ goto err;
+ if (BIO_write(bp, "\n Not After : ", 25) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (!ASN1_TIME_print(bp, X509_get0_notAfter(x)))
+ goto err;
+ if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_SUBJECT)) {
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, " Subject:%c", mlch) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (X509_NAME_print_ex
+ (bp, X509_get_subject_name(x), nmindent, nmflags) < 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_PUBKEY)) {
+ X509_PUBKEY *xpkey = X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(x);
+ ASN1_OBJECT *xpoid;
+ X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(&xpoid, NULL, NULL, NULL, xpkey);
+ if (BIO_write(bp, " Subject Public Key Info:\n", 33) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "%12sPublic Key Algorithm: ", "") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, xpoid) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
+ if (pkey == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bp, "%12sUnable to load Public Key\n", "");
+ ERR_print_errors(bp);
+ } else {
+ EVP_PKEY_print_public(bp, pkey, 16, NULL);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_IDS)) {
+ const ASN1_BIT_STRING *iuid, *suid;
+ X509_get0_uids(x, &iuid, &suid);
+ if (iuid != NULL) {
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "%8sIssuer Unique ID: ", "") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (!X509_signature_dump(bp, iuid, 12))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (suid != NULL) {
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "%8sSubject Unique ID: ", "") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (!X509_signature_dump(bp, suid, 12))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_EXTENSIONS))
+ X509V3_extensions_print(bp, "X509v3 extensions",
+ X509_get0_extensions(x), cflag, 8);
+
+ if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_SIGDUMP)) {
+ const X509_ALGOR *sig_alg;
+ const ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig;
+ X509_get0_signature(&sig, &sig_alg, x);
+ if (X509_signature_print(bp, sig_alg, sig) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_AUX)) {
+ if (!X509_aux_print(bp, x, 0))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_free(m);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int X509_ocspid_print(BIO *bp, X509 *x)
+{
+ unsigned char *der = NULL;
+ unsigned char *dertmp;
+ int derlen;
+ int i;
+ unsigned char SHA1md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ ASN1_BIT_STRING *keybstr;
+ X509_NAME *subj;
+
+ /*
+ * display the hash of the subject as it would appear in OCSP requests
+ */
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, " Subject OCSP hash: ") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ subj = X509_get_subject_name(x);
+ derlen = i2d_X509_NAME(subj, NULL);
+ if ((der = dertmp = OPENSSL_malloc(derlen)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ i2d_X509_NAME(subj, &dertmp);
+
+ if (!EVP_Digest(der, derlen, SHA1md, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL))
+ goto err;
+ for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++) {
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", SHA1md[i]) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(der);
+ der = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * display the hash of the public key as it would appear in OCSP requests
+ */
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n Public key OCSP hash: ") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ keybstr = X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(x);
+
+ if (keybstr == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!EVP_Digest(ASN1_STRING_get0_data(keybstr),
+ ASN1_STRING_length(keybstr), SHA1md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
+ NULL))
+ goto err;
+ for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++) {
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", SHA1md[i]) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ BIO_printf(bp, "\n");
+
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_free(der);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int X509_signature_dump(BIO *bp, const ASN1_STRING *sig, int indent)
+{
+ const unsigned char *s;
+ int i, n;
+
+ n = sig->length;
+ s = sig->data;
+ for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+ if ((i % 18) == 0) {
+ if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (BIO_indent(bp, indent, indent) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02x%s", s[i], ((i + 1) == n) ? "" : ":") <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) != 1)
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_signature_print(BIO *bp, const X509_ALGOR *sigalg,
+ const ASN1_STRING *sig)
+{
+ int sig_nid;
+ if (BIO_puts(bp, " Signature Algorithm: ") <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, sigalg->algorithm) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ sig_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm);
+ if (sig_nid != NID_undef) {
+ int pkey_nid, dig_nid;
+ const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
+ if (OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &dig_nid, &pkey_nid)) {
+ ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find(NULL, pkey_nid);
+ if (ameth && ameth->sig_print)
+ return ameth->sig_print(bp, sigalg, sig, 9, 0);
+ }
+ }
+ if (sig)
+ return X509_signature_dump(bp, sig, 9);
+ else if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_aux_print(BIO *out, X509 *x, int indent)
+{
+ char oidstr[80], first;
+ STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *trust, *reject;
+ const unsigned char *alias, *keyid;
+ int keyidlen;
+ int i;
+ if (X509_trusted(x) == 0)
+ return 1;
+ trust = X509_get0_trust_objects(x);
+ reject = X509_get0_reject_objects(x);
+ if (trust) {
+ first = 1;
+ BIO_printf(out, "%*sTrusted Uses:\n%*s", indent, "", indent + 2, "");
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(trust); i++) {
+ if (!first)
+ BIO_puts(out, ", ");
+ else
+ first = 0;
+ OBJ_obj2txt(oidstr, sizeof(oidstr),
+ sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(trust, i), 0);
+ BIO_puts(out, oidstr);
+ }
+ BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+ } else
+ BIO_printf(out, "%*sNo Trusted Uses.\n", indent, "");
+ if (reject) {
+ first = 1;
+ BIO_printf(out, "%*sRejected Uses:\n%*s", indent, "", indent + 2, "");
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(reject); i++) {
+ if (!first)
+ BIO_puts(out, ", ");
+ else
+ first = 0;
+ OBJ_obj2txt(oidstr, sizeof(oidstr),
+ sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(reject, i), 0);
+ BIO_puts(out, oidstr);
+ }
+ BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+ } else
+ BIO_printf(out, "%*sNo Rejected Uses.\n", indent, "");
+ alias = X509_alias_get0(x, &i);
+ if (alias)
+ BIO_printf(out, "%*sAlias: %.*s\n", indent, "", i, alias);
+ keyid = X509_keyid_get0(x, &keyidlen);
+ if (keyid) {
+ BIO_printf(out, "%*sKey Id: ", indent, "");
+ for (i = 0; i < keyidlen; i++)
+ BIO_printf(out, "%s%02X", i ? ":" : "", keyid[i]);
+ BIO_write(out, "\n", 1);
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_att.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_att.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cc9f9d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_att.c
@@ -0,0 +1,331 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/safestack.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "x509_local.h"
+
+int X509at_get_attr_count(const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *x)
+{
+ return sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(x);
+}
+
+int X509at_get_attr_by_NID(const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *x, int nid,
+ int lastpos)
+{
+ const ASN1_OBJECT *obj = OBJ_nid2obj(nid);
+
+ if (obj == NULL)
+ return -2;
+ return X509at_get_attr_by_OBJ(x, obj, lastpos);
+}
+
+int X509at_get_attr_by_OBJ(const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk,
+ const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos)
+{
+ int n;
+ X509_ATTRIBUTE *ex;
+
+ if (sk == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ lastpos++;
+ if (lastpos < 0)
+ lastpos = 0;
+ n = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(sk);
+ for (; lastpos < n; lastpos++) {
+ ex = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_value(sk, lastpos);
+ if (OBJ_cmp(ex->object, obj) == 0)
+ return lastpos;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509at_get_attr(const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *x, int loc)
+{
+ if (x == NULL || sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(x) <= loc || loc < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_value(x, loc);
+}
+
+X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509at_delete_attr(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *x, int loc)
+{
+ X509_ATTRIBUTE *ret;
+
+ if (x == NULL || sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(x) <= loc || loc < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ ret = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_delete(x, loc);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *X509at_add1_attr(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) **x,
+ X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr)
+{
+ X509_ATTRIBUTE *new_attr = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk = NULL;
+
+ if (x == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509AT_ADD1_ATTR, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+
+ if (*x == NULL) {
+ if ((sk = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_new_null()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ } else
+ sk = *x;
+
+ if ((new_attr = X509_ATTRIBUTE_dup(attr)) == NULL)
+ goto err2;
+ if (!sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_push(sk, new_attr))
+ goto err;
+ if (*x == NULL)
+ *x = sk;
+ return sk;
+ err:
+ X509err(X509_F_X509AT_ADD1_ATTR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ err2:
+ X509_ATTRIBUTE_free(new_attr);
+ sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_free(sk);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *X509at_add1_attr_by_OBJ(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
+ **x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj,
+ int type,
+ const unsigned char *bytes,
+ int len)
+{
+ X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr;
+ STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *ret;
+ attr = X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_OBJ(NULL, obj, type, bytes, len);
+ if (!attr)
+ return 0;
+ ret = X509at_add1_attr(x, attr);
+ X509_ATTRIBUTE_free(attr);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *X509at_add1_attr_by_NID(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
+ **x, int nid, int type,
+ const unsigned char *bytes,
+ int len)
+{
+ X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr;
+ STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *ret;
+ attr = X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_NID(NULL, nid, type, bytes, len);
+ if (!attr)
+ return 0;
+ ret = X509at_add1_attr(x, attr);
+ X509_ATTRIBUTE_free(attr);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *X509at_add1_attr_by_txt(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
+ **x, const char *attrname,
+ int type,
+ const unsigned char *bytes,
+ int len)
+{
+ X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr;
+ STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *ret;
+ attr = X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_txt(NULL, attrname, type, bytes, len);
+ if (!attr)
+ return 0;
+ ret = X509at_add1_attr(x, attr);
+ X509_ATTRIBUTE_free(attr);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void *X509at_get0_data_by_OBJ(const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *x,
+ const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos, int type)
+{
+ int i;
+ X509_ATTRIBUTE *at;
+ i = X509at_get_attr_by_OBJ(x, obj, lastpos);
+ if (i == -1)
+ return NULL;
+ if ((lastpos <= -2) && (X509at_get_attr_by_OBJ(x, obj, i) != -1))
+ return NULL;
+ at = X509at_get_attr(x, i);
+ if (lastpos <= -3 && (X509_ATTRIBUTE_count(at) != 1))
+ return NULL;
+ return X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_data(at, 0, type, NULL);
+}
+
+X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_NID(X509_ATTRIBUTE **attr, int nid,
+ int atrtype, const void *data,
+ int len)
+{
+ ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
+ X509_ATTRIBUTE *ret;
+
+ obj = OBJ_nid2obj(nid);
+ if (obj == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_CREATE_BY_NID, X509_R_UNKNOWN_NID);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ret = X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_OBJ(attr, obj, atrtype, data, len);
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(obj);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_OBJ(X509_ATTRIBUTE **attr,
+ const ASN1_OBJECT *obj,
+ int atrtype, const void *data,
+ int len)
+{
+ X509_ATTRIBUTE *ret;
+
+ if ((attr == NULL) || (*attr == NULL)) {
+ if ((ret = X509_ATTRIBUTE_new()) == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_CREATE_BY_OBJ,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ } else
+ ret = *attr;
+
+ if (!X509_ATTRIBUTE_set1_object(ret, obj))
+ goto err;
+ if (!X509_ATTRIBUTE_set1_data(ret, atrtype, data, len))
+ goto err;
+
+ if ((attr != NULL) && (*attr == NULL))
+ *attr = ret;
+ return ret;
+ err:
+ if ((attr == NULL) || (ret != *attr))
+ X509_ATTRIBUTE_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_txt(X509_ATTRIBUTE **attr,
+ const char *atrname, int type,
+ const unsigned char *bytes,
+ int len)
+{
+ ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
+ X509_ATTRIBUTE *nattr;
+
+ obj = OBJ_txt2obj(atrname, 0);
+ if (obj == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_CREATE_BY_TXT,
+ X509_R_INVALID_FIELD_NAME);
+ ERR_add_error_data(2, "name=", atrname);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ nattr = X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_OBJ(attr, obj, type, bytes, len);
+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(obj);
+ return nattr;
+}
+
+int X509_ATTRIBUTE_set1_object(X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj)
+{
+ if ((attr == NULL) || (obj == NULL))
+ return 0;
+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(attr->object);
+ attr->object = OBJ_dup(obj);
+ return attr->object != NULL;
+}
+
+int X509_ATTRIBUTE_set1_data(X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr, int attrtype,
+ const void *data, int len)
+{
+ ASN1_TYPE *ttmp = NULL;
+ ASN1_STRING *stmp = NULL;
+ int atype = 0;
+ if (!attr)
+ return 0;
+ if (attrtype & MBSTRING_FLAG) {
+ stmp = ASN1_STRING_set_by_NID(NULL, data, len, attrtype,
+ OBJ_obj2nid(attr->object));
+ if (!stmp) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_SET1_DATA, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ atype = stmp->type;
+ } else if (len != -1) {
+ if ((stmp = ASN1_STRING_type_new(attrtype)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!ASN1_STRING_set(stmp, data, len))
+ goto err;
+ atype = attrtype;
+ }
+ /*
+ * This is a bit naughty because the attribute should really have at
+ * least one value but some types use and zero length SET and require
+ * this.
+ */
+ if (attrtype == 0) {
+ ASN1_STRING_free(stmp);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if ((ttmp = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if ((len == -1) && !(attrtype & MBSTRING_FLAG)) {
+ if (!ASN1_TYPE_set1(ttmp, attrtype, data))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ ASN1_TYPE_set(ttmp, atype, stmp);
+ stmp = NULL;
+ }
+ if (!sk_ASN1_TYPE_push(attr->set, ttmp))
+ goto err;
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_SET1_DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ASN1_TYPE_free(ttmp);
+ ASN1_STRING_free(stmp);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int X509_ATTRIBUTE_count(const X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr)
+{
+ if (attr == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ return sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(attr->set);
+}
+
+ASN1_OBJECT *X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_object(X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr)
+{
+ if (attr == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ return attr->object;
+}
+
+void *X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_data(X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr, int idx,
+ int atrtype, void *data)
+{
+ ASN1_TYPE *ttmp;
+ ttmp = X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_type(attr, idx);
+ if (!ttmp)
+ return NULL;
+ if (atrtype == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN
+ || atrtype == V_ASN1_NULL
+ || atrtype != ASN1_TYPE_get(ttmp)) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_GET0_DATA, X509_R_WRONG_TYPE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ttmp->value.ptr;
+}
+
+ASN1_TYPE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_type(X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr, int idx)
+{
+ if (attr == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ return sk_ASN1_TYPE_value(attr->set, idx);
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3724a11
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,475 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "crypto/x509.h"
+
+int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
+{
+ int i;
+ const X509_CINF *ai, *bi;
+
+ ai = &a->cert_info;
+ bi = &b->cert_info;
+ i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(&ai->serialNumber, &bi->serialNumber);
+ if (i)
+ return i;
+ return X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
+{
+ unsigned long ret = 0;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ unsigned char md[16];
+ char *f = NULL;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info.issuer, NULL, 0);
+ if (f == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate
+ (ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info.serialNumber.data,
+ (unsigned long)a->cert_info.serialNumber.length))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
+ goto err;
+ ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
+ ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
+ ) & 0xffffffffL;
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_free(f);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
+{
+ return X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.issuer, b->cert_info.issuer);
+}
+
+int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
+{
+ return X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.subject, b->cert_info.subject);
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
+{
+ return X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl.issuer, b->crl.issuer);
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
+{
+ return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
+}
+
+X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a)
+{
+ return a->cert_info.issuer;
+}
+
+unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
+{
+ return X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.issuer);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
+{
+ return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.issuer);
+}
+#endif
+
+X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a)
+{
+ return a->cert_info.subject;
+}
+
+ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
+{
+ return &a->cert_info.serialNumber;
+}
+
+const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *a)
+{
+ return &a->cert_info.serialNumber;
+}
+
+unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
+{
+ return X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.subject);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
+{
+ return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.subject);
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB:
+ * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const"
+ * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these
+ * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
+ * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the
+ * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast.
+ */
+int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
+{
+ int rv = 0;
+
+ if (a == b) /* for efficiency */
+ return 0;
+
+ /* try to make sure hash is valid */
+ (void)X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
+ (void)X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
+
+ if ((a->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT) == 0
+ && (b->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT) == 0)
+ rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ if (rv != 0)
+ return rv;
+
+ /* Check for match against stored encoding too */
+ if (!a->cert_info.enc.modified && !b->cert_info.enc.modified) {
+ if (a->cert_info.enc.len < b->cert_info.enc.len)
+ return -1;
+ if (a->cert_info.enc.len > b->cert_info.enc.len)
+ return 1;
+ return memcmp(a->cert_info.enc.enc, b->cert_info.enc.enc,
+ a->cert_info.enc.len);
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
+
+ if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) {
+ ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return -2;
+ }
+
+ if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) {
+ ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return -2;
+ }
+
+ ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
+
+ if (ret != 0 || a->canon_enclen == 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
+
+}
+
+unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
+{
+ unsigned long ret = 0;
+ unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+ /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
+ i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
+ if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
+ NULL))
+ return 0;
+
+ ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
+ ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
+ ) & 0xffffffffL;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+/*
+ * I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding,
+ * this is reasonably efficient.
+ */
+
+unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
+{
+ EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ unsigned long ret = 0;
+ unsigned char md[16];
+
+ if (md_ctx == NULL)
+ return ret;
+
+ /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
+ i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+ if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
+ && EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
+ && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL))
+ ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
+ ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
+ ) & 0xffffffffL;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+/* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
+X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name,
+ ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
+{
+ int i;
+ X509 x, *x509 = NULL;
+
+ if (!sk)
+ return NULL;
+
+ x.cert_info.serialNumber = *serial;
+ x.cert_info.issuer = name;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
+ x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
+ if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0)
+ return x509;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name)
+{
+ X509 *x509;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
+ x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0)
+ return x509;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x)
+{
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ return X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info.key);
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
+{
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ return X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info.key);
+}
+
+int X509_check_private_key(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k)
+{
+ const EVP_PKEY *xk;
+ int ret;
+
+ xk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
+
+ if (xk)
+ ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
+ else
+ ret = -2;
+
+ switch (ret) {
+ case 1:
+ break;
+ case 0:
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
+ break;
+ case -1:
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
+ break;
+ case -2:
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
+ }
+ if (ret > 0)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID
+ * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a
+ * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags.
+ */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+
+static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags)
+{
+ const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL;
+ int curve_nid;
+ if (pkey && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+ grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
+ if (!grp)
+ return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
+ curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
+ /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */
+ if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */
+ /*
+ * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve.
+ */
+ if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384)
+ return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
+ if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS))
+ return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
+ /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */
+ *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
+ } else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */
+ if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
+ return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
+ if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY))
+ return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
+ } else
+ return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE;
+
+ return X509_V_OK;
+}
+
+int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ int rv, i, sign_nid;
+ EVP_PKEY *pk;
+ unsigned long tflags = flags;
+
+ if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
+ return X509_V_OK;
+
+ /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
+ if (x == NULL) {
+ x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
+ i = 1;
+ } else
+ i = 0;
+
+ pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
+
+ /*
+ * With DANE-EE(3) success, or DANE-EE(3)/PKIX-EE(1) failure we don't build
+ * a chain all, just report trust success or failure, but must also report
+ * Suite-B errors if applicable. This is indicated via a NULL chain
+ * pointer. All we need to do is check the leaf key algorithm.
+ */
+ if (chain == NULL)
+ return check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
+
+ if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
+ rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
+ /* Correct error depth */
+ i = 0;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* Check EE key only */
+ rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
+ if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
+ /* Correct error depth */
+ i = 0;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
+ sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
+ x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+ if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
+ rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
+ rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags);
+ if (rv != X509_V_OK)
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* Final check: root CA signature */
+ rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags);
+ end:
+ if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
+ /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
+ if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
+ || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i)
+ i--;
+ /*
+ * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384
+ * with P-256. Use more meaningful error.
+ */
+ if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags)
+ rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256;
+ if (perror_depth)
+ *perror_depth = i;
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ int sign_nid;
+ if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
+ return X509_V_OK;
+ sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl.sig_alg.algorithm);
+ return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags);
+}
+
+#else
+int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif
+/*
+ * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
+ * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of
+ * each X509 structure.
+ */
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+{
+ STACK_OF(X509) *ret;
+ int i;
+ ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) {
+ X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i);
+ if (!X509_up_ref(x))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ return ret;
+ err:
+ while (i-- > 0)
+ X509_free (sk_X509_value(ret, i));
+ sk_X509_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_d2.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_d2.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..099ffda
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_d2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+int X509_STORE_set_default_paths(X509_STORE *ctx)
+{
+ X509_LOOKUP *lookup;
+
+ lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(ctx, X509_LOOKUP_file());
+ if (lookup == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, NULL, X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT);
+
+ lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(ctx, X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir());
+ if (lookup == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, NULL, X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT);
+
+ /* clear any errors */
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_load_locations(X509_STORE *ctx, const char *file,
+ const char *path)
+{
+ X509_LOOKUP *lookup;
+
+ if (file != NULL) {
+ lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(ctx, X509_LOOKUP_file());
+ if (lookup == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, file, X509_FILETYPE_PEM) != 1)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (path != NULL) {
+ lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(ctx, X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir());
+ if (lookup == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, path, X509_FILETYPE_PEM) != 1)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((path == NULL) && (file == NULL))
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_def.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_def.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bfa8d7d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_def.c
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+const char *X509_get_default_private_dir(void)
+{
+ return X509_PRIVATE_DIR;
+}
+
+const char *X509_get_default_cert_area(void)
+{
+ return X509_CERT_AREA;
+}
+
+const char *X509_get_default_cert_dir(void)
+{
+ return X509_CERT_DIR;
+}
+
+const char *X509_get_default_cert_file(void)
+{
+ return X509_CERT_FILE;
+}
+
+const char *X509_get_default_cert_dir_env(void)
+{
+ return X509_CERT_DIR_EVP;
+}
+
+const char *X509_get_default_cert_file_env(void)
+{
+ return X509_CERT_FILE_EVP;
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_err.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bdd1e67
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+/*
+ * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+ * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/x509err.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+static const ERR_STRING_DATA X509_str_functs[] = {
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_ADD_CERT_DIR, 0), "add_cert_dir"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, 0), "build_chain"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_BY_FILE_CTRL, 0), "by_file_ctrl"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, 0),
+ "check_name_constraints"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, 0), "check_policy"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_DANE_I2D, 0), "dane_i2d"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_DIR_CTRL, 0), "dir_ctrl"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_GET_CERT_BY_SUBJECT, 0),
+ "get_cert_by_subject"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_I2D_X509_AUX, 0), "i2d_X509_AUX"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_LOOKUP_CERTS_SK, 0), "lookup_certs_sk"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_NETSCAPE_SPKI_B64_DECODE, 0),
+ "NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_decode"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_NETSCAPE_SPKI_B64_ENCODE, 0),
+ "NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_encode"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_NEW_DIR, 0), "new_dir"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509AT_ADD1_ATTR, 0), "X509at_add1_attr"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509V3_ADD_EXT, 0), "X509v3_add_ext"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_CREATE_BY_NID, 0),
+ "X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_NID"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_CREATE_BY_OBJ, 0),
+ "X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_OBJ"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_CREATE_BY_TXT, 0),
+ "X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_txt"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_GET0_DATA, 0),
+ "X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_data"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_SET1_DATA, 0),
+ "X509_ATTRIBUTE_set1_data"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, 0),
+ "X509_check_private_key"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, 0), "X509_CRL_diff"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_CRL_METHOD_NEW, 0),
+ "X509_CRL_METHOD_new"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_CRL_PRINT_FP, 0), "X509_CRL_print_fp"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_EXTENSION_CREATE_BY_NID, 0),
+ "X509_EXTENSION_create_by_NID"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_EXTENSION_CREATE_BY_OBJ, 0),
+ "X509_EXTENSION_create_by_OBJ"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS, 0),
+ "X509_get_pubkey_parameters"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_CRL_FILE, 0),
+ "X509_load_cert_crl_file"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_FILE, 0),
+ "X509_load_cert_file"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_LOAD_CRL_FILE, 0),
+ "X509_load_crl_file"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_LOOKUP_METH_NEW, 0),
+ "X509_LOOKUP_meth_new"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_LOOKUP_NEW, 0), "X509_LOOKUP_new"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_NAME_ADD_ENTRY, 0),
+ "X509_NAME_add_entry"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_NAME_CANON, 0), "x509_name_canon"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_NAME_ENTRY_CREATE_BY_NID, 0),
+ "X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_NAME_ENTRY_CREATE_BY_TXT, 0),
+ "X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_NAME_ENTRY_SET_OBJECT, 0),
+ "X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_object"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_NAME_ONELINE, 0), "X509_NAME_oneline"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_NAME_PRINT, 0), "X509_NAME_print"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_OBJECT_NEW, 0), "X509_OBJECT_new"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_PRINT_EX_FP, 0), "X509_print_ex_fp"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_DECODE, 0),
+ "x509_pubkey_decode"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_GET, 0), "X509_PUBKEY_get"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_GET0, 0), "X509_PUBKEY_get0"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_SET, 0), "X509_PUBKEY_set"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_REQ_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, 0),
+ "X509_REQ_check_private_key"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_REQ_PRINT_EX, 0), "X509_REQ_print_ex"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_REQ_PRINT_FP, 0), "X509_REQ_print_fp"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_REQ_TO_X509, 0), "X509_REQ_to_X509"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CERT, 0),
+ "X509_STORE_add_cert"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CRL, 0),
+ "X509_STORE_add_crl"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_LOOKUP, 0),
+ "X509_STORE_add_lookup"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_GET1_ISSUER, 0),
+ "X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, 0),
+ "X509_STORE_CTX_init"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, 0),
+ "X509_STORE_CTX_new"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, 0),
+ "X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_STORE_NEW, 0), "X509_STORE_new"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_TO_X509_REQ, 0), "X509_to_X509_REQ"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD, 0), "X509_TRUST_add"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_TRUST_SET, 0), "X509_TRUST_set"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, 0), "X509_verify_cert"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_NEW, 0),
+ "X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new"},
+ {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static const ERR_STRING_DATA X509_str_reasons[] = {
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH), "akid mismatch"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR), "bad selector"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, X509_R_BAD_X509_FILETYPE), "bad x509 filetype"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, X509_R_BASE64_DECODE_ERROR),
+ "base64 decode error"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, X509_R_CANT_CHECK_DH_KEY), "cant check dh key"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE),
+ "cert already in hash table"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA), "crl already delta"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE),
+ "crl verify failure"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH), "idp mismatch"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, X509_R_INVALID_ATTRIBUTES),
+ "invalid attributes"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, X509_R_INVALID_DIRECTORY), "invalid directory"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, X509_R_INVALID_FIELD_NAME),
+ "invalid field name"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, X509_R_INVALID_TRUST), "invalid trust"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH), "issuer mismatch"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH), "key type mismatch"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH),
+ "key values mismatch"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, X509_R_LOADING_CERT_DIR), "loading cert dir"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, X509_R_LOADING_DEFAULTS), "loading defaults"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, X509_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED),
+ "method not supported"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, X509_R_NAME_TOO_LONG), "name too long"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER),
+ "newer crl not newer"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, X509_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND),
+ "no certificate found"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, X509_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_OR_CRL_FOUND),
+ "no certificate or crl found"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY),
+ "no cert set for us to verify"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, X509_R_NO_CRL_FOUND), "no crl found"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER), "no crl number"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, X509_R_PUBLIC_KEY_DECODE_ERROR),
+ "public key decode error"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, X509_R_PUBLIC_KEY_ENCODE_ERROR),
+ "public key encode error"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, X509_R_SHOULD_RETRY), "should retry"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN),
+ "unable to find parameters in chain"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY),
+ "unable to get certs public key"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE), "unknown key type"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, X509_R_UNKNOWN_NID), "unknown nid"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID),
+ "unknown purpose id"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID), "unknown trust id"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, X509_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM),
+ "unsupported algorithm"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, X509_R_WRONG_LOOKUP_TYPE), "wrong lookup type"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, X509_R_WRONG_TYPE), "wrong type"},
+ {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+int ERR_load_X509_strings(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+ if (ERR_func_error_string(X509_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
+ ERR_load_strings_const(X509_str_functs);
+ ERR_load_strings_const(X509_str_reasons);
+ }
+#endif
+ return 1;
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_ext.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_ext.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4cdab72
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_ext.c
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "crypto/x509.h"
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+int X509_CRL_get_ext_count(const X509_CRL *x)
+{
+ return X509v3_get_ext_count(x->crl.extensions);
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(const X509_CRL *x, int nid, int lastpos)
+{
+ return X509v3_get_ext_by_NID(x->crl.extensions, nid, lastpos);
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_get_ext_by_OBJ(const X509_CRL *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj,
+ int lastpos)
+{
+ return X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ(x->crl.extensions, obj, lastpos);
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_get_ext_by_critical(const X509_CRL *x, int crit, int lastpos)
+{
+ return X509v3_get_ext_by_critical(x->crl.extensions, crit, lastpos);
+}
+
+X509_EXTENSION *X509_CRL_get_ext(const X509_CRL *x, int loc)
+{
+ return X509v3_get_ext(x->crl.extensions, loc);
+}
+
+X509_EXTENSION *X509_CRL_delete_ext(X509_CRL *x, int loc)
+{
+ return X509v3_delete_ext(x->crl.extensions, loc);
+}
+
+void *X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(const X509_CRL *x, int nid, int *crit, int *idx)
+{
+ return X509V3_get_d2i(x->crl.extensions, nid, crit, idx);
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(X509_CRL *x, int nid, void *value, int crit,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ return X509V3_add1_i2d(&x->crl.extensions, nid, value, crit, flags);
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_add_ext(X509_CRL *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc)
+{
+ return (X509v3_add_ext(&(x->crl.extensions), ex, loc) != NULL);
+}
+
+int X509_get_ext_count(const X509 *x)
+{
+ return X509v3_get_ext_count(x->cert_info.extensions);
+}
+
+int X509_get_ext_by_NID(const X509 *x, int nid, int lastpos)
+{
+ return X509v3_get_ext_by_NID(x->cert_info.extensions, nid, lastpos);
+}
+
+int X509_get_ext_by_OBJ(const X509 *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos)
+{
+ return X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ(x->cert_info.extensions, obj, lastpos);
+}
+
+int X509_get_ext_by_critical(const X509 *x, int crit, int lastpos)
+{
+ return (X509v3_get_ext_by_critical
+ (x->cert_info.extensions, crit, lastpos));
+}
+
+X509_EXTENSION *X509_get_ext(const X509 *x, int loc)
+{
+ return X509v3_get_ext(x->cert_info.extensions, loc);
+}
+
+X509_EXTENSION *X509_delete_ext(X509 *x, int loc)
+{
+ return X509v3_delete_ext(x->cert_info.extensions, loc);
+}
+
+int X509_add_ext(X509 *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc)
+{
+ return (X509v3_add_ext(&(x->cert_info.extensions), ex, loc) != NULL);
+}
+
+void *X509_get_ext_d2i(const X509 *x, int nid, int *crit, int *idx)
+{
+ return X509V3_get_d2i(x->cert_info.extensions, nid, crit, idx);
+}
+
+int X509_add1_ext_i2d(X509 *x, int nid, void *value, int crit,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ return X509V3_add1_i2d(&x->cert_info.extensions, nid, value, crit,
+ flags);
+}
+
+int X509_REVOKED_get_ext_count(const X509_REVOKED *x)
+{
+ return X509v3_get_ext_count(x->extensions);
+}
+
+int X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_NID(const X509_REVOKED *x, int nid, int lastpos)
+{
+ return X509v3_get_ext_by_NID(x->extensions, nid, lastpos);
+}
+
+int X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_OBJ(const X509_REVOKED *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj,
+ int lastpos)
+{
+ return X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ(x->extensions, obj, lastpos);
+}
+
+int X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_critical(const X509_REVOKED *x, int crit, int lastpos)
+{
+ return X509v3_get_ext_by_critical(x->extensions, crit, lastpos);
+}
+
+X509_EXTENSION *X509_REVOKED_get_ext(const X509_REVOKED *x, int loc)
+{
+ return X509v3_get_ext(x->extensions, loc);
+}
+
+X509_EXTENSION *X509_REVOKED_delete_ext(X509_REVOKED *x, int loc)
+{
+ return X509v3_delete_ext(x->extensions, loc);
+}
+
+int X509_REVOKED_add_ext(X509_REVOKED *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc)
+{
+ return (X509v3_add_ext(&(x->extensions), ex, loc) != NULL);
+}
+
+void *X509_REVOKED_get_ext_d2i(const X509_REVOKED *x, int nid, int *crit, int *idx)
+{
+ return X509V3_get_d2i(x->extensions, nid, crit, idx);
+}
+
+int X509_REVOKED_add1_ext_i2d(X509_REVOKED *x, int nid, void *value, int crit,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ return X509V3_add1_i2d(&x->extensions, nid, value, crit, flags);
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_local.h b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_local.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..10807e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_local.h
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2014-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/refcount.h"
+
+/*
+ * This structure holds all parameters associated with a verify operation by
+ * including an X509_VERIFY_PARAM structure in related structures the
+ * parameters used can be customized
+ */
+
+struct X509_VERIFY_PARAM_st {
+ char *name;
+ time_t check_time; /* Time to use */
+ uint32_t inh_flags; /* Inheritance flags */
+ unsigned long flags; /* Various verify flags */
+ int purpose; /* purpose to check untrusted certificates */
+ int trust; /* trust setting to check */
+ int depth; /* Verify depth */
+ int auth_level; /* Security level for chain verification */
+ STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policies; /* Permissible policies */
+ /* Peer identity details */
+ STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *hosts; /* Set of acceptable names */
+ unsigned int hostflags; /* Flags to control matching features */
+ char *peername; /* Matching hostname in peer certificate */
+ char *email; /* If not NULL email address to match */
+ size_t emaillen;
+ unsigned char *ip; /* If not NULL IP address to match */
+ size_t iplen; /* Length of IP address */
+};
+
+/* No error callback if depth < 0 */
+int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth);
+
+/* a sequence of these are used */
+struct x509_attributes_st {
+ ASN1_OBJECT *object;
+ STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE) *set;
+};
+
+struct X509_extension_st {
+ ASN1_OBJECT *object;
+ ASN1_BOOLEAN critical;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING value;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Method to handle CRL access. In general a CRL could be very large (several
+ * Mb) and can consume large amounts of resources if stored in memory by
+ * multiple processes. This method allows general CRL operations to be
+ * redirected to more efficient callbacks: for example a CRL entry database.
+ */
+
+#define X509_CRL_METHOD_DYNAMIC 1
+
+struct x509_crl_method_st {
+ int flags;
+ int (*crl_init) (X509_CRL *crl);
+ int (*crl_free) (X509_CRL *crl);
+ int (*crl_lookup) (X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED **ret,
+ ASN1_INTEGER *ser, X509_NAME *issuer);
+ int (*crl_verify) (X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk);
+};
+
+struct x509_lookup_method_st {
+ char *name;
+ int (*new_item) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx);
+ void (*free) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx);
+ int (*init) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx);
+ int (*shutdown) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx);
+ int (*ctrl) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argc, long argl,
+ char **ret);
+ int (*get_by_subject) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type,
+ X509_NAME *name, X509_OBJECT *ret);
+ int (*get_by_issuer_serial) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type,
+ X509_NAME *name, ASN1_INTEGER *serial,
+ X509_OBJECT *ret);
+ int (*get_by_fingerprint) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type,
+ const unsigned char *bytes, int len,
+ X509_OBJECT *ret);
+ int (*get_by_alias) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type,
+ const char *str, int len, X509_OBJECT *ret);
+};
+
+/* This is the functions plus an instance of the local variables. */
+struct x509_lookup_st {
+ int init; /* have we been started */
+ int skip; /* don't use us. */
+ X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *method; /* the functions */
+ void *method_data; /* method data */
+ X509_STORE *store_ctx; /* who owns us */
+};
+
+/*
+ * This is used to hold everything. It is used for all certificate
+ * validation. Once we have a certificate chain, the 'verify' function is
+ * then called to actually check the cert chain.
+ */
+struct x509_store_st {
+ /* The following is a cache of trusted certs */
+ int cache; /* if true, stash any hits */
+ STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *objs; /* Cache of all objects */
+ /* These are external lookup methods */
+ STACK_OF(X509_LOOKUP) *get_cert_methods;
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
+ /* Callbacks for various operations */
+ /* called to verify a certificate */
+ int (*verify) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+ /* error callback */
+ int (*verify_cb) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+ /* get issuers cert from ctx */
+ int (*get_issuer) (X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
+ /* check issued */
+ int (*check_issued) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
+ /* Check revocation status of chain */
+ int (*check_revocation) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+ /* retrieve CRL */
+ int (*get_crl) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **crl, X509 *x);
+ /* Check CRL validity */
+ int (*check_crl) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl);
+ /* Check certificate against CRL */
+ int (*cert_crl) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
+ /* Check policy status of the chain */
+ int (*check_policy) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+ STACK_OF(X509) *(*lookup_certs) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm);
+ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *(*lookup_crls) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm);
+ int (*cleanup) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+ CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
+ CRYPTO_REF_COUNT references;
+ CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+};
+
+typedef struct lookup_dir_hashes_st BY_DIR_HASH;
+typedef struct lookup_dir_entry_st BY_DIR_ENTRY;
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(BY_DIR_HASH)
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(BY_DIR_ENTRY)
+typedef STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY;
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY)
+
+void x509_set_signature_info(X509_SIG_INFO *siginf, const X509_ALGOR *alg,
+ const ASN1_STRING *sig);
+int x509_likely_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject);
+int x509_signing_allowed(const X509 *issuer, const X509 *subject);
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..641a41c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c
@@ -0,0 +1,922 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/refcount.h"
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "crypto/x509.h"
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "x509_local.h"
+
+X509_LOOKUP *X509_LOOKUP_new(X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *method)
+{
+ X509_LOOKUP *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_LOOKUP_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret->method = method;
+ if (method->new_item != NULL && method->new_item(ret) == 0) {
+ OPENSSL_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void X509_LOOKUP_free(X509_LOOKUP *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return;
+ if ((ctx->method != NULL) && (ctx->method->free != NULL))
+ (*ctx->method->free) (ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_lock(X509_STORE *s)
+{
+ return CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(s->lock);
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_unlock(X509_STORE *s)
+{
+ return CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->lock);
+}
+
+int X509_LOOKUP_init(X509_LOOKUP *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx->method == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (ctx->method->init != NULL)
+ return ctx->method->init(ctx);
+ else
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_LOOKUP_shutdown(X509_LOOKUP *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx->method == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (ctx->method->shutdown != NULL)
+ return ctx->method->shutdown(ctx);
+ else
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_LOOKUP_ctrl(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argc, long argl,
+ char **ret)
+{
+ if (ctx->method == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ if (ctx->method->ctrl != NULL)
+ return ctx->method->ctrl(ctx, cmd, argc, argl, ret);
+ else
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_LOOKUP_by_subject(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type,
+ X509_NAME *name, X509_OBJECT *ret)
+{
+ if ((ctx->method == NULL) || (ctx->method->get_by_subject == NULL))
+ return 0;
+ if (ctx->skip)
+ return 0;
+ return ctx->method->get_by_subject(ctx, type, name, ret);
+}
+
+int X509_LOOKUP_by_issuer_serial(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type,
+ X509_NAME *name, ASN1_INTEGER *serial,
+ X509_OBJECT *ret)
+{
+ if ((ctx->method == NULL) || (ctx->method->get_by_issuer_serial == NULL))
+ return 0;
+ return ctx->method->get_by_issuer_serial(ctx, type, name, serial, ret);
+}
+
+int X509_LOOKUP_by_fingerprint(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type,
+ const unsigned char *bytes, int len,
+ X509_OBJECT *ret)
+{
+ if ((ctx->method == NULL) || (ctx->method->get_by_fingerprint == NULL))
+ return 0;
+ return ctx->method->get_by_fingerprint(ctx, type, bytes, len, ret);
+}
+
+int X509_LOOKUP_by_alias(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type,
+ const char *str, int len, X509_OBJECT *ret)
+{
+ if ((ctx->method == NULL) || (ctx->method->get_by_alias == NULL))
+ return 0;
+ return ctx->method->get_by_alias(ctx, type, str, len, ret);
+}
+
+int X509_LOOKUP_set_method_data(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, void *data)
+{
+ ctx->method_data = data;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void *X509_LOOKUP_get_method_data(const X509_LOOKUP *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->method_data;
+}
+
+X509_STORE *X509_LOOKUP_get_store(const X509_LOOKUP *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->store_ctx;
+}
+
+
+static int x509_object_cmp(const X509_OBJECT *const *a,
+ const X509_OBJECT *const *b)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = ((*a)->type - (*b)->type);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ switch ((*a)->type) {
+ case X509_LU_X509:
+ ret = X509_subject_name_cmp((*a)->data.x509, (*b)->data.x509);
+ break;
+ case X509_LU_CRL:
+ ret = X509_CRL_cmp((*a)->data.crl, (*b)->data.crl);
+ break;
+ case X509_LU_NONE:
+ /* abort(); */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+X509_STORE *X509_STORE_new(void)
+{
+ X509_STORE *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if ((ret->objs = sk_X509_OBJECT_new(x509_object_cmp)) == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret->cache = 1;
+ if ((ret->get_cert_methods = sk_X509_LOOKUP_new_null()) == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new()) == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE, ret, &ret->ex_data)) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+ if (ret->lock == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret->references = 1;
+ return ret;
+
+err:
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ret->param);
+ sk_X509_OBJECT_free(ret->objs);
+ sk_X509_LOOKUP_free(ret->get_cert_methods);
+ OPENSSL_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_free(X509_STORE *vfy)
+{
+ int i;
+ STACK_OF(X509_LOOKUP) *sk;
+ X509_LOOKUP *lu;
+
+ if (vfy == NULL)
+ return;
+ CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&vfy->references, &i, vfy->lock);
+ REF_PRINT_COUNT("X509_STORE", vfy);
+ if (i > 0)
+ return;
+ REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
+
+ sk = vfy->get_cert_methods;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_LOOKUP_num(sk); i++) {
+ lu = sk_X509_LOOKUP_value(sk, i);
+ X509_LOOKUP_shutdown(lu);
+ X509_LOOKUP_free(lu);
+ }
+ sk_X509_LOOKUP_free(sk);
+ sk_X509_OBJECT_pop_free(vfy->objs, X509_OBJECT_free);
+
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE, vfy, &vfy->ex_data);
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vfy->param);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(vfy->lock);
+ OPENSSL_free(vfy);
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_up_ref(X509_STORE *vfy)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&vfy->references, &i, vfy->lock) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ REF_PRINT_COUNT("X509_STORE", a);
+ REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
+ return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0);
+}
+
+X509_LOOKUP *X509_STORE_add_lookup(X509_STORE *v, X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *m)
+{
+ int i;
+ STACK_OF(X509_LOOKUP) *sk;
+ X509_LOOKUP *lu;
+
+ sk = v->get_cert_methods;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_LOOKUP_num(sk); i++) {
+ lu = sk_X509_LOOKUP_value(sk, i);
+ if (m == lu->method) {
+ return lu;
+ }
+ }
+ /* a new one */
+ lu = X509_LOOKUP_new(m);
+ if (lu == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_LOOKUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ lu->store_ctx = v;
+ if (sk_X509_LOOKUP_push(v->get_cert_methods, lu))
+ return lu;
+ /* malloc failed */
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_LOOKUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ X509_LOOKUP_free(lu);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+X509_OBJECT *X509_STORE_CTX_get_obj_by_subject(X509_STORE_CTX *vs,
+ X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type,
+ X509_NAME *name)
+{
+ X509_OBJECT *ret = X509_OBJECT_new();
+
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_get_by_subject(vs, type, name, ret)) {
+ X509_OBJECT_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_by_subject(X509_STORE_CTX *vs, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type,
+ X509_NAME *name, X509_OBJECT *ret)
+{
+ X509_STORE *store = vs->ctx;
+ X509_LOOKUP *lu;
+ X509_OBJECT stmp, *tmp;
+ int i, j;
+
+ if (store == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ stmp.type = X509_LU_NONE;
+ stmp.data.ptr = NULL;
+
+
+ X509_STORE_lock(store);
+ tmp = X509_OBJECT_retrieve_by_subject(store->objs, type, name);
+ X509_STORE_unlock(store);
+
+ if (tmp == NULL || type == X509_LU_CRL) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_LOOKUP_num(store->get_cert_methods); i++) {
+ lu = sk_X509_LOOKUP_value(store->get_cert_methods, i);
+ j = X509_LOOKUP_by_subject(lu, type, name, &stmp);
+ if (j) {
+ tmp = &stmp;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (tmp == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(tmp))
+ return 0;
+
+ ret->type = tmp->type;
+ ret->data.ptr = tmp->data.ptr;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int x509_store_add(X509_STORE *store, void *x, int crl) {
+ X509_OBJECT *obj;
+ int ret = 0, added = 0;
+
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ obj = X509_OBJECT_new();
+ if (obj == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (crl) {
+ obj->type = X509_LU_CRL;
+ obj->data.crl = (X509_CRL *)x;
+ } else {
+ obj->type = X509_LU_X509;
+ obj->data.x509 = (X509 *)x;
+ }
+ if (!X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(obj)) {
+ obj->type = X509_LU_NONE;
+ X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ X509_STORE_lock(store);
+ if (X509_OBJECT_retrieve_match(store->objs, obj)) {
+ ret = 1;
+ } else {
+ added = sk_X509_OBJECT_push(store->objs, obj);
+ ret = added != 0;
+ }
+ X509_STORE_unlock(store);
+
+ if (added == 0) /* obj not pushed */
+ X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_add_cert(X509_STORE *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+ if (!x509_store_add(ctx, x, 0)) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_add_crl(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_CRL *x)
+{
+ if (!x509_store_add(ctx, x, 1)) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(X509_OBJECT *a)
+{
+ switch (a->type) {
+ case X509_LU_NONE:
+ break;
+ case X509_LU_X509:
+ return X509_up_ref(a->data.x509);
+ case X509_LU_CRL:
+ return X509_CRL_up_ref(a->data.crl);
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+X509 *X509_OBJECT_get0_X509(const X509_OBJECT *a)
+{
+ if (a == NULL || a->type != X509_LU_X509)
+ return NULL;
+ return a->data.x509;
+}
+
+X509_CRL *X509_OBJECT_get0_X509_CRL(X509_OBJECT *a)
+{
+ if (a == NULL || a->type != X509_LU_CRL)
+ return NULL;
+ return a->data.crl;
+}
+
+X509_LOOKUP_TYPE X509_OBJECT_get_type(const X509_OBJECT *a)
+{
+ return a->type;
+}
+
+X509_OBJECT *X509_OBJECT_new(void)
+{
+ X509_OBJECT *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_OBJECT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ret->type = X509_LU_NONE;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void x509_object_free_internal(X509_OBJECT *a)
+{
+ if (a == NULL)
+ return;
+ switch (a->type) {
+ case X509_LU_NONE:
+ break;
+ case X509_LU_X509:
+ X509_free(a->data.x509);
+ break;
+ case X509_LU_CRL:
+ X509_CRL_free(a->data.crl);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+int X509_OBJECT_set1_X509(X509_OBJECT *a, X509 *obj)
+{
+ if (a == NULL || !X509_up_ref(obj))
+ return 0;
+
+ x509_object_free_internal(a);
+ a->type = X509_LU_X509;
+ a->data.x509 = obj;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_OBJECT_set1_X509_CRL(X509_OBJECT *a, X509_CRL *obj)
+{
+ if (a == NULL || !X509_CRL_up_ref(obj))
+ return 0;
+
+ x509_object_free_internal(a);
+ a->type = X509_LU_CRL;
+ a->data.crl = obj;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void X509_OBJECT_free(X509_OBJECT *a)
+{
+ x509_object_free_internal(a);
+ OPENSSL_free(a);
+}
+
+static int x509_object_idx_cnt(STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *h, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type,
+ X509_NAME *name, int *pnmatch)
+{
+ X509_OBJECT stmp;
+ X509 x509_s;
+ X509_CRL crl_s;
+ int idx;
+
+ stmp.type = type;
+ switch (type) {
+ case X509_LU_X509:
+ stmp.data.x509 = &x509_s;
+ x509_s.cert_info.subject = name;
+ break;
+ case X509_LU_CRL:
+ stmp.data.crl = &crl_s;
+ crl_s.crl.issuer = name;
+ break;
+ case X509_LU_NONE:
+ /* abort(); */
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ idx = sk_X509_OBJECT_find(h, &stmp);
+ if (idx >= 0 && pnmatch) {
+ int tidx;
+ const X509_OBJECT *tobj, *pstmp;
+ *pnmatch = 1;
+ pstmp = &stmp;
+ for (tidx = idx + 1; tidx < sk_X509_OBJECT_num(h); tidx++) {
+ tobj = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(h, tidx);
+ if (x509_object_cmp(&tobj, &pstmp))
+ break;
+ (*pnmatch)++;
+ }
+ }
+ return idx;
+}
+
+int X509_OBJECT_idx_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *h, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type,
+ X509_NAME *name)
+{
+ return x509_object_idx_cnt(h, type, name, NULL);
+}
+
+X509_OBJECT *X509_OBJECT_retrieve_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *h,
+ X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type,
+ X509_NAME *name)
+{
+ int idx;
+ idx = X509_OBJECT_idx_by_subject(h, type, name);
+ if (idx == -1)
+ return NULL;
+ return sk_X509_OBJECT_value(h, idx);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *X509_STORE_get0_objects(X509_STORE *v)
+{
+ return v->objs;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm)
+{
+ int i, idx, cnt;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
+ X509 *x;
+ X509_OBJECT *obj;
+ X509_STORE *store = ctx->ctx;
+
+ if (store == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ X509_STORE_lock(store);
+ idx = x509_object_idx_cnt(store->objs, X509_LU_X509, nm, &cnt);
+ if (idx < 0) {
+ /*
+ * Nothing found in cache: do lookup to possibly add new objects to
+ * cache
+ */
+ X509_OBJECT *xobj = X509_OBJECT_new();
+
+ X509_STORE_unlock(store);
+
+ if (xobj == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_X509, nm, xobj)) {
+ X509_OBJECT_free(xobj);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ X509_OBJECT_free(xobj);
+ X509_STORE_lock(store);
+ idx = x509_object_idx_cnt(store->objs, X509_LU_X509, nm, &cnt);
+ if (idx < 0) {
+ X509_STORE_unlock(store);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ sk = sk_X509_new_null();
+ for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++, idx++) {
+ obj = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(store->objs, idx);
+ x = obj->data.x509;
+ if (!X509_up_ref(x)) {
+ X509_STORE_unlock(store);
+ sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
+ X509_STORE_unlock(store);
+ X509_free(x);
+ sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ X509_STORE_unlock(store);
+ return sk;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm)
+{
+ int i, idx, cnt;
+ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk = sk_X509_CRL_new_null();
+ X509_CRL *x;
+ X509_OBJECT *obj, *xobj = X509_OBJECT_new();
+ X509_STORE *store = ctx->ctx;
+
+ /* Always do lookup to possibly add new CRLs to cache */
+ if (sk == NULL
+ || xobj == NULL
+ || store == NULL
+ || !X509_STORE_CTX_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_CRL, nm, xobj)) {
+ X509_OBJECT_free(xobj);
+ sk_X509_CRL_free(sk);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ X509_OBJECT_free(xobj);
+ X509_STORE_lock(store);
+ idx = x509_object_idx_cnt(store->objs, X509_LU_CRL, nm, &cnt);
+ if (idx < 0) {
+ X509_STORE_unlock(store);
+ sk_X509_CRL_free(sk);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++, idx++) {
+ obj = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(store->objs, idx);
+ x = obj->data.crl;
+ if (!X509_CRL_up_ref(x)) {
+ X509_STORE_unlock(store);
+ sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(sk, X509_CRL_free);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (!sk_X509_CRL_push(sk, x)) {
+ X509_STORE_unlock(store);
+ X509_CRL_free(x);
+ sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(sk, X509_CRL_free);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ X509_STORE_unlock(store);
+ return sk;
+}
+
+X509_OBJECT *X509_OBJECT_retrieve_match(STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *h,
+ X509_OBJECT *x)
+{
+ int idx, i, num;
+ X509_OBJECT *obj;
+
+ idx = sk_X509_OBJECT_find(h, x);
+ if (idx < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ if ((x->type != X509_LU_X509) && (x->type != X509_LU_CRL))
+ return sk_X509_OBJECT_value(h, idx);
+ for (i = idx, num = sk_X509_OBJECT_num(h); i < num; i++) {
+ obj = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(h, i);
+ if (x509_object_cmp((const X509_OBJECT **)&obj,
+ (const X509_OBJECT **)&x))
+ return NULL;
+ if (x->type == X509_LU_X509) {
+ if (!X509_cmp(obj->data.x509, x->data.x509))
+ return obj;
+ } else if (x->type == X509_LU_CRL) {
+ if (!X509_CRL_match(obj->data.crl, x->data.crl))
+ return obj;
+ } else
+ return obj;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Try to get issuer certificate from store. Due to limitations
+ * of the API this can only retrieve a single certificate matching
+ * a given subject name. However it will fill the cache with all
+ * matching certificates, so we can examine the cache for all
+ * matches.
+ *
+ * Return values are:
+ * 1 lookup successful.
+ * 0 certificate not found.
+ * -1 some other error.
+ */
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+ X509_NAME *xn;
+ X509_OBJECT *obj = X509_OBJECT_new(), *pobj = NULL;
+ X509_STORE *store = ctx->ctx;
+ int i, ok, idx, ret;
+
+ if (obj == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ *issuer = NULL;
+ xn = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+ ok = X509_STORE_CTX_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_X509, xn, obj);
+ if (ok != 1) {
+ X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* If certificate matches all OK */
+ if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, obj->data.x509)) {
+ if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, obj->data.x509, -1)) {
+ *issuer = obj->data.x509;
+ if (!X509_up_ref(*issuer)) {
+ *issuer = NULL;
+ ok = -1;
+ }
+ X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
+ return ok;
+ }
+ }
+ X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
+
+ if (store == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Else find index of first cert accepted by 'check_issued' */
+ ret = 0;
+ X509_STORE_lock(store);
+ idx = X509_OBJECT_idx_by_subject(store->objs, X509_LU_X509, xn);
+ if (idx != -1) { /* should be true as we've had at least one
+ * match */
+ /* Look through all matching certs for suitable issuer */
+ for (i = idx; i < sk_X509_OBJECT_num(store->objs); i++) {
+ pobj = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(store->objs, i);
+ /* See if we've run past the matches */
+ if (pobj->type != X509_LU_X509)
+ break;
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(xn, X509_get_subject_name(pobj->data.x509)))
+ break;
+ if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, pobj->data.x509)) {
+ *issuer = pobj->data.x509;
+ ret = 1;
+ /*
+ * If times check, exit with match,
+ * otherwise keep looking. Leave last
+ * match in issuer so we return nearest
+ * match if no certificate time is OK.
+ */
+
+ if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, *issuer, -1))
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (*issuer && !X509_up_ref(*issuer)) {
+ *issuer = NULL;
+ ret = -1;
+ }
+ X509_STORE_unlock(store);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_set_flags(X509_STORE *ctx, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_set_depth(X509_STORE *ctx, int depth)
+{
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_set_purpose(X509_STORE *ctx, int purpose)
+{
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(ctx->param, purpose);
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_set_trust(X509_STORE *ctx, int trust)
+{
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(ctx->param, trust);
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_set1_param(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
+{
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, param);
+}
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_get0_param(X509_STORE *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->param;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_set_verify(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify)
+{
+ ctx->verify = verify;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn X509_STORE_get_verify(X509_STORE *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->verify;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE *ctx,
+ X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb)
+{
+ ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb X509_STORE_get_verify_cb(X509_STORE *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->verify_cb;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_set_get_issuer(X509_STORE *ctx,
+ X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn get_issuer)
+{
+ ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn X509_STORE_get_get_issuer(X509_STORE *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->get_issuer;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_set_check_issued(X509_STORE *ctx,
+ X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn check_issued)
+{
+ ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn X509_STORE_get_check_issued(X509_STORE *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->check_issued;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_set_check_revocation(X509_STORE *ctx,
+ X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn check_revocation)
+{
+ ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn X509_STORE_get_check_revocation(X509_STORE *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->check_revocation;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_set_get_crl(X509_STORE *ctx,
+ X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn get_crl)
+{
+ ctx->get_crl = get_crl;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn X509_STORE_get_get_crl(X509_STORE *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->get_crl;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_set_check_crl(X509_STORE *ctx,
+ X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn check_crl)
+{
+ ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn X509_STORE_get_check_crl(X509_STORE *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->check_crl;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_set_cert_crl(X509_STORE *ctx,
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn cert_crl)
+{
+ ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn X509_STORE_get_cert_crl(X509_STORE *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->cert_crl;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_set_check_policy(X509_STORE *ctx,
+ X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn check_policy)
+{
+ ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn X509_STORE_get_check_policy(X509_STORE *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->check_policy;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_set_lookup_certs(X509_STORE *ctx,
+ X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn lookup_certs)
+{
+ ctx->lookup_certs = lookup_certs;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn X509_STORE_get_lookup_certs(X509_STORE *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->lookup_certs;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_set_lookup_crls(X509_STORE *ctx,
+ X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn lookup_crls)
+{
+ ctx->lookup_crls = lookup_crls;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn X509_STORE_get_lookup_crls(X509_STORE *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->lookup_crls;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_set_cleanup(X509_STORE *ctx,
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn ctx_cleanup)
+{
+ ctx->cleanup = ctx_cleanup;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn X509_STORE_get_cleanup(X509_STORE *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->cleanup;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_set_ex_data(X509_STORE *ctx, int idx, void *data)
+{
+ return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
+}
+
+void *X509_STORE_get_ex_data(X509_STORE *ctx, int idx)
+{
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
+}
+
+X509_STORE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_store(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->ctx;
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_meth.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_meth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9348cc8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_meth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/ossl_typ.h>
+#include "x509_local.h"
+
+X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *X509_LOOKUP_meth_new(const char *name)
+{
+ X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *method = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(X509_LOOKUP_METHOD));
+
+ if (method != NULL) {
+ method->name = OPENSSL_strdup(name);
+ if (method->name == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_LOOKUP_METH_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return method;
+
+err:
+ OPENSSL_free(method);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void X509_LOOKUP_meth_free(X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *method)
+{
+ if (method != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(method->name);
+ OPENSSL_free(method);
+}
+
+int X509_LOOKUP_meth_set_new_item(X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *method,
+ int (*new_item) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx))
+{
+ method->new_item = new_item;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int (*X509_LOOKUP_meth_get_new_item(const X509_LOOKUP_METHOD* method))
+ (X509_LOOKUP *ctx)
+{
+ return method->new_item;
+}
+
+int X509_LOOKUP_meth_set_free(
+ X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *method,
+ void (*free_fn) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx))
+{
+ method->free = free_fn;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void (*X509_LOOKUP_meth_get_free(const X509_LOOKUP_METHOD* method))
+ (X509_LOOKUP *ctx)
+{
+ return method->free;
+}
+
+int X509_LOOKUP_meth_set_init(X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *method,
+ int (*init) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx))
+{
+ method->init = init;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int (*X509_LOOKUP_meth_get_init(const X509_LOOKUP_METHOD* method))
+ (X509_LOOKUP *ctx)
+{
+ return method->init;
+}
+
+int X509_LOOKUP_meth_set_shutdown(
+ X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *method,
+ int (*shutdown) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx))
+{
+ method->shutdown = shutdown;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int (*X509_LOOKUP_meth_get_shutdown(const X509_LOOKUP_METHOD* method))
+ (X509_LOOKUP *ctx)
+{
+ return method->shutdown;
+}
+
+int X509_LOOKUP_meth_set_ctrl(
+ X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *method,
+ X509_LOOKUP_ctrl_fn ctrl)
+{
+ method->ctrl = ctrl;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+X509_LOOKUP_ctrl_fn X509_LOOKUP_meth_get_ctrl(const X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *method)
+{
+ return method->ctrl;
+}
+
+int X509_LOOKUP_meth_set_get_by_subject(X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *method,
+ X509_LOOKUP_get_by_subject_fn get_by_subject)
+{
+ method->get_by_subject = get_by_subject;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+X509_LOOKUP_get_by_subject_fn X509_LOOKUP_meth_get_get_by_subject(
+ const X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *method)
+{
+ return method->get_by_subject;
+}
+
+
+int X509_LOOKUP_meth_set_get_by_issuer_serial(X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *method,
+ X509_LOOKUP_get_by_issuer_serial_fn get_by_issuer_serial)
+{
+ method->get_by_issuer_serial = get_by_issuer_serial;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+X509_LOOKUP_get_by_issuer_serial_fn
+ X509_LOOKUP_meth_get_get_by_issuer_serial(const X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *method)
+{
+ return method->get_by_issuer_serial;
+}
+
+
+int X509_LOOKUP_meth_set_get_by_fingerprint(X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *method,
+ X509_LOOKUP_get_by_fingerprint_fn get_by_fingerprint)
+{
+ method->get_by_fingerprint = get_by_fingerprint;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+X509_LOOKUP_get_by_fingerprint_fn X509_LOOKUP_meth_get_get_by_fingerprint(
+ const X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *method)
+{
+ return method->get_by_fingerprint;
+}
+
+int X509_LOOKUP_meth_set_get_by_alias(X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *method,
+ X509_LOOKUP_get_by_alias_fn get_by_alias)
+{
+ method->get_by_alias = get_by_alias;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+X509_LOOKUP_get_by_alias_fn X509_LOOKUP_meth_get_get_by_alias(
+ const X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *method)
+{
+ return method->get_by_alias;
+}
+
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_obj.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_obj.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f54d483
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_obj.c
@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include "crypto/x509.h"
+
+/*
+ * Limit to ensure we don't overflow: much greater than
+ * anything encountered in practice.
+ */
+
+#define NAME_ONELINE_MAX (1024 * 1024)
+
+char *X509_NAME_oneline(const X509_NAME *a, char *buf, int len)
+{
+ const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne;
+ int i;
+ int n, lold, l, l1, l2, num, j, type;
+ const char *s;
+ char *p;
+ unsigned char *q;
+ BUF_MEM *b = NULL;
+ static const char hex[17] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
+ int gs_doit[4];
+ char tmp_buf[80];
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+ unsigned char ebcdic_buf[1024];
+#endif
+
+ if (buf == NULL) {
+ if ((b = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(b, 200))
+ goto err;
+ b->data[0] = '\0';
+ len = 200;
+ } else if (len == 0) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (a == NULL) {
+ if (b) {
+ buf = b->data;
+ OPENSSL_free(b);
+ }
+ strncpy(buf, "NO X509_NAME", len);
+ buf[len - 1] = '\0';
+ return buf;
+ }
+
+ len--; /* space for '\0' */
+ l = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(a->entries); i++) {
+ ne = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(a->entries, i);
+ n = OBJ_obj2nid(ne->object);
+ if ((n == NID_undef) || ((s = OBJ_nid2sn(n)) == NULL)) {
+ i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf), ne->object);
+ s = tmp_buf;
+ }
+ l1 = strlen(s);
+
+ type = ne->value->type;
+ num = ne->value->length;
+ if (num > NAME_ONELINE_MAX) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_ONELINE, X509_R_NAME_TOO_LONG);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ q = ne->value->data;
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+ if (type == V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING ||
+ type == V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING ||
+ type == V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING ||
+ type == V_ASN1_TELETEXSTRING ||
+ type == V_ASN1_IA5STRING) {
+ if (num > (int)sizeof(ebcdic_buf))
+ num = sizeof(ebcdic_buf);
+ ascii2ebcdic(ebcdic_buf, q, num);
+ q = ebcdic_buf;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if ((type == V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING) && ((num % 4) == 0)) {
+ gs_doit[0] = gs_doit[1] = gs_doit[2] = gs_doit[3] = 0;
+ for (j = 0; j < num; j++)
+ if (q[j] != 0)
+ gs_doit[j & 3] = 1;
+
+ if (gs_doit[0] | gs_doit[1] | gs_doit[2])
+ gs_doit[0] = gs_doit[1] = gs_doit[2] = gs_doit[3] = 1;
+ else {
+ gs_doit[0] = gs_doit[1] = gs_doit[2] = 0;
+ gs_doit[3] = 1;
+ }
+ } else
+ gs_doit[0] = gs_doit[1] = gs_doit[2] = gs_doit[3] = 1;
+
+ for (l2 = j = 0; j < num; j++) {
+ if (!gs_doit[j & 3])
+ continue;
+ l2++;
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+ if ((q[j] < ' ') || (q[j] > '~'))
+ l2 += 3;
+#else
+ if ((os_toascii[q[j]] < os_toascii[' ']) ||
+ (os_toascii[q[j]] > os_toascii['~']))
+ l2 += 3;
+#endif
+ }
+
+ lold = l;
+ l += 1 + l1 + 1 + l2;
+ if (l > NAME_ONELINE_MAX) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_ONELINE, X509_R_NAME_TOO_LONG);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (b != NULL) {
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(b, l + 1))
+ goto err;
+ p = &(b->data[lold]);
+ } else if (l > len) {
+ break;
+ } else
+ p = &(buf[lold]);
+ *(p++) = '/';
+ memcpy(p, s, (unsigned int)l1);
+ p += l1;
+ *(p++) = '=';
+
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC /* q was assigned above already. */
+ q = ne->value->data;
+#endif
+
+ for (j = 0; j < num; j++) {
+ if (!gs_doit[j & 3])
+ continue;
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+ n = q[j];
+ if ((n < ' ') || (n > '~')) {
+ *(p++) = '\\';
+ *(p++) = 'x';
+ *(p++) = hex[(n >> 4) & 0x0f];
+ *(p++) = hex[n & 0x0f];
+ } else
+ *(p++) = n;
+#else
+ n = os_toascii[q[j]];
+ if ((n < os_toascii[' ']) || (n > os_toascii['~'])) {
+ *(p++) = '\\';
+ *(p++) = 'x';
+ *(p++) = hex[(n >> 4) & 0x0f];
+ *(p++) = hex[n & 0x0f];
+ } else
+ *(p++) = q[j];
+#endif
+ }
+ *p = '\0';
+ }
+ if (b != NULL) {
+ p = b->data;
+ OPENSSL_free(b);
+ } else
+ p = buf;
+ if (i == 0)
+ *p = '\0';
+ return p;
+ err:
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_ONELINE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ end:
+ BUF_MEM_free(b);
+ return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_r2x.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_r2x.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6b1623f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_r2x.c
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "crypto/x509.h"
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+
+X509 *X509_REQ_to_X509(X509_REQ *r, int days, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ X509 *ret = NULL;
+ X509_CINF *xi = NULL;
+ X509_NAME *xn;
+ EVP_PKEY *pubkey = NULL;
+
+ if ((ret = X509_new()) == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_REQ_TO_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* duplicate the request */
+ xi = &ret->cert_info;
+
+ if (sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(r->req_info.attributes) != 0) {
+ if ((xi->version = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(xi->version, 2))
+ goto err;
+/*- xi->extensions=ri->attributes; <- bad, should not ever be done
+ ri->attributes=NULL; */
+ }
+
+ xn = X509_REQ_get_subject_name(r);
+ if (X509_set_subject_name(ret, xn) == 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (X509_set_issuer_name(ret, xn) == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (X509_gmtime_adj(xi->validity.notBefore, 0) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (X509_gmtime_adj(xi->validity.notAfter, (long)60 * 60 * 24 * days) ==
+ NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ pubkey = X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(r);
+ if (pubkey == NULL || !X509_set_pubkey(ret, pubkey))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!X509_sign(ret, pkey, EVP_md5()))
+ goto err;
+ return ret;
+
+ err:
+ X509_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_req.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_req.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dd67492
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_req.c
@@ -0,0 +1,310 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "crypto/x509.h"
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+
+X509_REQ *X509_to_X509_REQ(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+ X509_REQ *ret;
+ X509_REQ_INFO *ri;
+ int i;
+ EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
+
+ ret = X509_REQ_new();
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_TO_X509_REQ, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ri = &ret->req_info;
+
+ ri->version->length = 1;
+ ri->version->data = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
+ if (ri->version->data == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ ri->version->data[0] = 0; /* version == 0 */
+
+ if (!X509_REQ_set_subject_name(ret, X509_get_subject_name(x)))
+ goto err;
+
+ pktmp = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
+ if (pktmp == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ i = X509_REQ_set_pubkey(ret, pktmp);
+ if (!i)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (pkey != NULL) {
+ if (!X509_REQ_sign(ret, pkey, md))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ return ret;
+ err:
+ X509_REQ_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *X509_REQ_get_pubkey(X509_REQ *req)
+{
+ if (req == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ return X509_PUBKEY_get(req->req_info.pubkey);
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(X509_REQ *req)
+{
+ if (req == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ return X509_PUBKEY_get0(req->req_info.pubkey);
+}
+
+X509_PUBKEY *X509_REQ_get_X509_PUBKEY(X509_REQ *req)
+{
+ return req->req_info.pubkey;
+}
+
+int X509_REQ_check_private_key(X509_REQ *x, EVP_PKEY *k)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *xk = NULL;
+ int ok = 0;
+
+ xk = X509_REQ_get_pubkey(x);
+ switch (EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k)) {
+ case 1:
+ ok = 1;
+ break;
+ case 0:
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_REQ_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,
+ X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
+ break;
+ case -1:
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_REQ_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
+ break;
+ case -2:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (EVP_PKEY_id(k) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_REQ_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ break;
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (EVP_PKEY_id(k) == EVP_PKEY_DH) {
+ /* No idea */
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_REQ_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,
+ X509_R_CANT_CHECK_DH_KEY);
+ break;
+ }
+#endif
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_REQ_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
+ }
+
+ EVP_PKEY_free(xk);
+ return ok;
+}
+
+/*
+ * It seems several organisations had the same idea of including a list of
+ * extensions in a certificate request. There are at least two OIDs that are
+ * used and there may be more: so the list is configurable.
+ */
+
+static int ext_nid_list[] = { NID_ext_req, NID_ms_ext_req, NID_undef };
+
+static int *ext_nids = ext_nid_list;
+
+int X509_REQ_extension_nid(int req_nid)
+{
+ int i, nid;
+ for (i = 0;; i++) {
+ nid = ext_nids[i];
+ if (nid == NID_undef)
+ return 0;
+ else if (req_nid == nid)
+ return 1;
+ }
+}
+
+int *X509_REQ_get_extension_nids(void)
+{
+ return ext_nids;
+}
+
+void X509_REQ_set_extension_nids(int *nids)
+{
+ ext_nids = nids;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509_REQ_get_extensions(X509_REQ *req)
+{
+ X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr;
+ ASN1_TYPE *ext = NULL;
+ int idx, *pnid;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+
+ if ((req == NULL) || !ext_nids)
+ return NULL;
+ for (pnid = ext_nids; *pnid != NID_undef; pnid++) {
+ idx = X509_REQ_get_attr_by_NID(req, *pnid, -1);
+ if (idx == -1)
+ continue;
+ attr = X509_REQ_get_attr(req, idx);
+ ext = X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_type(attr, 0);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!ext || (ext->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE))
+ return NULL;
+ p = ext->value.sequence->data;
+ return (STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *)
+ ASN1_item_d2i(NULL, &p, ext->value.sequence->length,
+ ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_EXTENSIONS));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add a STACK_OF extensions to a certificate request: allow alternative OIDs
+ * in case we want to create a non standard one.
+ */
+
+int X509_REQ_add_extensions_nid(X509_REQ *req, STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts,
+ int nid)
+{
+ int extlen;
+ int rv = 0;
+ unsigned char *ext = NULL;
+ /* Generate encoding of extensions */
+ extlen = ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)exts, &ext,
+ ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_EXTENSIONS));
+ if (extlen <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ rv = X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_NID(req, nid, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, ext, extlen);
+ OPENSSL_free(ext);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* This is the normal usage: use the "official" OID */
+int X509_REQ_add_extensions(X509_REQ *req, STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts)
+{
+ return X509_REQ_add_extensions_nid(req, exts, NID_ext_req);
+}
+
+/* Request attribute functions */
+
+int X509_REQ_get_attr_count(const X509_REQ *req)
+{
+ return X509at_get_attr_count(req->req_info.attributes);
+}
+
+int X509_REQ_get_attr_by_NID(const X509_REQ *req, int nid, int lastpos)
+{
+ return X509at_get_attr_by_NID(req->req_info.attributes, nid, lastpos);
+}
+
+int X509_REQ_get_attr_by_OBJ(const X509_REQ *req, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj,
+ int lastpos)
+{
+ return X509at_get_attr_by_OBJ(req->req_info.attributes, obj, lastpos);
+}
+
+X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_REQ_get_attr(const X509_REQ *req, int loc)
+{
+ return X509at_get_attr(req->req_info.attributes, loc);
+}
+
+X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_REQ_delete_attr(X509_REQ *req, int loc)
+{
+ return X509at_delete_attr(req->req_info.attributes, loc);
+}
+
+int X509_REQ_add1_attr(X509_REQ *req, X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr)
+{
+ if (X509at_add1_attr(&req->req_info.attributes, attr))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_OBJ(X509_REQ *req,
+ const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type,
+ const unsigned char *bytes, int len)
+{
+ if (X509at_add1_attr_by_OBJ(&req->req_info.attributes, obj,
+ type, bytes, len))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_NID(X509_REQ *req,
+ int nid, int type,
+ const unsigned char *bytes, int len)
+{
+ if (X509at_add1_attr_by_NID(&req->req_info.attributes, nid,
+ type, bytes, len))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_txt(X509_REQ *req,
+ const char *attrname, int type,
+ const unsigned char *bytes, int len)
+{
+ if (X509at_add1_attr_by_txt(&req->req_info.attributes, attrname,
+ type, bytes, len))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+long X509_REQ_get_version(const X509_REQ *req)
+{
+ return ASN1_INTEGER_get(req->req_info.version);
+}
+
+X509_NAME *X509_REQ_get_subject_name(const X509_REQ *req)
+{
+ return req->req_info.subject;
+}
+
+void X509_REQ_get0_signature(const X509_REQ *req, const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psig,
+ const X509_ALGOR **palg)
+{
+ if (psig != NULL)
+ *psig = req->signature;
+ if (palg != NULL)
+ *palg = &req->sig_alg;
+}
+
+void X509_REQ_set0_signature(X509_REQ *req, ASN1_BIT_STRING *psig)
+{
+ if (req->signature)
+ ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(req->signature);
+ req->signature = psig;
+}
+
+int X509_REQ_set1_signature_algo(X509_REQ *req, X509_ALGOR *palg)
+{
+ return X509_ALGOR_copy(&req->sig_alg, palg);
+}
+
+int X509_REQ_get_signature_nid(const X509_REQ *req)
+{
+ return OBJ_obj2nid(req->sig_alg.algorithm);
+}
+
+int i2d_re_X509_REQ_tbs(X509_REQ *req, unsigned char **pp)
+{
+ req->req_info.enc.modified = 1;
+ return i2d_X509_REQ_INFO(&req->req_info, pp);
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_set.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_set.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..164b4e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_set.c
@@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/refcount.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "crypto/asn1.h"
+#include "crypto/x509.h"
+#include "x509_local.h"
+
+int X509_set_version(X509 *x, long version)
+{
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (version == 0) {
+ ASN1_INTEGER_free(x->cert_info.version);
+ x->cert_info.version = NULL;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (x->cert_info.version == NULL) {
+ if ((x->cert_info.version = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return ASN1_INTEGER_set(x->cert_info.version, version);
+}
+
+int X509_set_serialNumber(X509 *x, ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
+{
+ ASN1_INTEGER *in;
+
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ in = &x->cert_info.serialNumber;
+ if (in != serial)
+ return ASN1_STRING_copy(in, serial);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_set_issuer_name(X509 *x, X509_NAME *name)
+{
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ return X509_NAME_set(&x->cert_info.issuer, name);
+}
+
+int X509_set_subject_name(X509 *x, X509_NAME *name)
+{
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ return X509_NAME_set(&x->cert_info.subject, name);
+}
+
+int x509_set1_time(ASN1_TIME **ptm, const ASN1_TIME *tm)
+{
+ ASN1_TIME *in;
+ in = *ptm;
+ if (in != tm) {
+ in = ASN1_STRING_dup(tm);
+ if (in != NULL) {
+ ASN1_TIME_free(*ptm);
+ *ptm = in;
+ }
+ }
+ return (in != NULL);
+}
+
+int X509_set1_notBefore(X509 *x, const ASN1_TIME *tm)
+{
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ return x509_set1_time(&x->cert_info.validity.notBefore, tm);
+}
+
+int X509_set1_notAfter(X509 *x, const ASN1_TIME *tm)
+{
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ return x509_set1_time(&x->cert_info.validity.notAfter, tm);
+}
+
+int X509_set_pubkey(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ return X509_PUBKEY_set(&(x->cert_info.key), pkey);
+}
+
+int X509_up_ref(X509 *x)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&x->references, &i, x->lock) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ REF_PRINT_COUNT("X509", x);
+ REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
+ return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0);
+}
+
+long X509_get_version(const X509 *x)
+{
+ return ASN1_INTEGER_get(x->cert_info.version);
+}
+
+const ASN1_TIME *X509_get0_notBefore(const X509 *x)
+{
+ return x->cert_info.validity.notBefore;
+}
+
+const ASN1_TIME *X509_get0_notAfter(const X509 *x)
+{
+ return x->cert_info.validity.notAfter;
+}
+
+ASN1_TIME *X509_getm_notBefore(const X509 *x)
+{
+ return x->cert_info.validity.notBefore;
+}
+
+ASN1_TIME *X509_getm_notAfter(const X509 *x)
+{
+ return x->cert_info.validity.notAfter;
+}
+
+int X509_get_signature_type(const X509 *x)
+{
+ return EVP_PKEY_type(OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg.algorithm));
+}
+
+X509_PUBKEY *X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(const X509 *x)
+{
+ return x->cert_info.key;
+}
+
+const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509_get0_extensions(const X509 *x)
+{
+ return x->cert_info.extensions;
+}
+
+void X509_get0_uids(const X509 *x, const ASN1_BIT_STRING **piuid,
+ const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psuid)
+{
+ if (piuid != NULL)
+ *piuid = x->cert_info.issuerUID;
+ if (psuid != NULL)
+ *psuid = x->cert_info.subjectUID;
+}
+
+const X509_ALGOR *X509_get0_tbs_sigalg(const X509 *x)
+{
+ return &x->cert_info.signature;
+}
+
+int X509_SIG_INFO_get(const X509_SIG_INFO *siginf, int *mdnid, int *pknid,
+ int *secbits, uint32_t *flags)
+{
+ if (mdnid != NULL)
+ *mdnid = siginf->mdnid;
+ if (pknid != NULL)
+ *pknid = siginf->pknid;
+ if (secbits != NULL)
+ *secbits = siginf->secbits;
+ if (flags != NULL)
+ *flags = siginf->flags;
+ return (siginf->flags & X509_SIG_INFO_VALID) != 0;
+}
+
+void X509_SIG_INFO_set(X509_SIG_INFO *siginf, int mdnid, int pknid,
+ int secbits, uint32_t flags)
+{
+ siginf->mdnid = mdnid;
+ siginf->pknid = pknid;
+ siginf->secbits = secbits;
+ siginf->flags = flags;
+}
+
+int X509_get_signature_info(X509 *x, int *mdnid, int *pknid, int *secbits,
+ uint32_t *flags)
+{
+ X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1);
+ return X509_SIG_INFO_get(&x->siginf, mdnid, pknid, secbits, flags);
+}
+
+static void x509_sig_info_init(X509_SIG_INFO *siginf, const X509_ALGOR *alg,
+ const ASN1_STRING *sig)
+{
+ int pknid, mdnid;
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+
+ siginf->mdnid = NID_undef;
+ siginf->pknid = NID_undef;
+ siginf->secbits = -1;
+ siginf->flags = 0;
+ if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm), &mdnid, &pknid)
+ || pknid == NID_undef)
+ return;
+ siginf->pknid = pknid;
+ if (mdnid == NID_undef) {
+ /* If we have one, use a custom handler for this algorithm */
+ const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find(NULL, pknid);
+ if (ameth == NULL || ameth->siginf_set == NULL
+ || ameth->siginf_set(siginf, alg, sig) == 0)
+ return;
+ siginf->flags |= X509_SIG_INFO_VALID;
+ return;
+ }
+ siginf->flags |= X509_SIG_INFO_VALID;
+ siginf->mdnid = mdnid;
+ md = EVP_get_digestbynid(mdnid);
+ if (md == NULL)
+ return;
+ /* Security bits: half number of bits in digest */
+ siginf->secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
+ switch (mdnid) {
+ case NID_sha1:
+ case NID_sha256:
+ case NID_sha384:
+ case NID_sha512:
+ siginf->flags |= X509_SIG_INFO_TLS;
+ }
+}
+
+void x509_init_sig_info(X509 *x)
+{
+ x509_sig_info_init(&x->siginf, &x->sig_alg, &x->signature);
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a10d437
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,300 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "crypto/x509.h"
+
+static int tr_cmp(const X509_TRUST *const *a, const X509_TRUST *const *b);
+static void trtable_free(X509_TRUST *p);
+
+static int trust_1oidany(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags);
+static int trust_1oid(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags);
+static int trust_compat(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags);
+
+static int obj_trust(int id, X509 *x, int flags);
+static int (*default_trust) (int id, X509 *x, int flags) = obj_trust;
+
+/*
+ * WARNING: the following table should be kept in order of trust and without
+ * any gaps so we can just subtract the minimum trust value to get an index
+ * into the table
+ */
+
+static X509_TRUST trstandard[] = {
+ {X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, trust_compat, "compatible", 0, NULL},
+ {X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0, trust_1oidany, "SSL Client", NID_client_auth,
+ NULL},
+ {X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, trust_1oidany, "SSL Server", NID_server_auth,
+ NULL},
+ {X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, trust_1oidany, "S/MIME email", NID_email_protect,
+ NULL},
+ {X509_TRUST_OBJECT_SIGN, 0, trust_1oidany, "Object Signer", NID_code_sign,
+ NULL},
+ {X509_TRUST_OCSP_SIGN, 0, trust_1oid, "OCSP responder", NID_OCSP_sign,
+ NULL},
+ {X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST, 0, trust_1oid, "OCSP request", NID_ad_OCSP,
+ NULL},
+ {X509_TRUST_TSA, 0, trust_1oidany, "TSA server", NID_time_stamp, NULL}
+};
+
+#define X509_TRUST_COUNT OSSL_NELEM(trstandard)
+
+static STACK_OF(X509_TRUST) *trtable = NULL;
+
+static int tr_cmp(const X509_TRUST *const *a, const X509_TRUST *const *b)
+{
+ return (*a)->trust - (*b)->trust;
+}
+
+int (*X509_TRUST_set_default(int (*trust) (int, X509 *, int))) (int, X509 *,
+ int) {
+ int (*oldtrust) (int, X509 *, int);
+ oldtrust = default_trust;
+ default_trust = trust;
+ return oldtrust;
+}
+
+int X509_check_trust(X509 *x, int id, int flags)
+{
+ X509_TRUST *pt;
+ int idx;
+
+ /* We get this as a default value */
+ if (id == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
+ return obj_trust(NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage, x,
+ flags | X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT);
+ idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(id);
+ if (idx == -1)
+ return default_trust(id, x, flags);
+ pt = X509_TRUST_get0(idx);
+ return pt->check_trust(pt, x, flags);
+}
+
+int X509_TRUST_get_count(void)
+{
+ if (!trtable)
+ return X509_TRUST_COUNT;
+ return sk_X509_TRUST_num(trtable) + X509_TRUST_COUNT;
+}
+
+X509_TRUST *X509_TRUST_get0(int idx)
+{
+ if (idx < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ if (idx < (int)X509_TRUST_COUNT)
+ return trstandard + idx;
+ return sk_X509_TRUST_value(trtable, idx - X509_TRUST_COUNT);
+}
+
+int X509_TRUST_get_by_id(int id)
+{
+ X509_TRUST tmp;
+ int idx;
+
+ if ((id >= X509_TRUST_MIN) && (id <= X509_TRUST_MAX))
+ return id - X509_TRUST_MIN;
+ if (trtable == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ tmp.trust = id;
+ idx = sk_X509_TRUST_find(trtable, &tmp);
+ if (idx < 0)
+ return -1;
+ return idx + X509_TRUST_COUNT;
+}
+
+int X509_TRUST_set(int *t, int trust)
+{
+ if (X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust) == -1) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_SET, X509_R_INVALID_TRUST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *t = trust;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_TRUST_add(int id, int flags, int (*ck) (X509_TRUST *, X509 *, int),
+ const char *name, int arg1, void *arg2)
+{
+ int idx;
+ X509_TRUST *trtmp;
+ /*
+ * This is set according to what we change: application can't set it
+ */
+ flags &= ~X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC;
+ /* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */
+ flags |= X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC_NAME;
+ /* Get existing entry if any */
+ idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(id);
+ /* Need a new entry */
+ if (idx == -1) {
+ if ((trtmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*trtmp))) == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ trtmp->flags = X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC;
+ } else
+ trtmp = X509_TRUST_get0(idx);
+
+ /* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */
+ if (trtmp->flags & X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC_NAME)
+ OPENSSL_free(trtmp->name);
+ /* dup supplied name */
+ if ((trtmp->name = OPENSSL_strdup(name)) == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */
+ trtmp->flags &= X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC;
+ /* Set all other flags */
+ trtmp->flags |= flags;
+
+ trtmp->trust = id;
+ trtmp->check_trust = ck;
+ trtmp->arg1 = arg1;
+ trtmp->arg2 = arg2;
+
+ /* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */
+ if (idx == -1) {
+ if (trtable == NULL
+ && (trtable = sk_X509_TRUST_new(tr_cmp)) == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;;
+ }
+ if (!sk_X509_TRUST_push(trtable, trtmp)) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ if (idx == -1) {
+ OPENSSL_free(trtmp->name);
+ OPENSSL_free(trtmp);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void trtable_free(X509_TRUST *p)
+{
+ if (!p)
+ return;
+ if (p->flags & X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC) {
+ if (p->flags & X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC_NAME)
+ OPENSSL_free(p->name);
+ OPENSSL_free(p);
+ }
+}
+
+void X509_TRUST_cleanup(void)
+{
+ sk_X509_TRUST_pop_free(trtable, trtable_free);
+ trtable = NULL;
+}
+
+int X509_TRUST_get_flags(const X509_TRUST *xp)
+{
+ return xp->flags;
+}
+
+char *X509_TRUST_get0_name(const X509_TRUST *xp)
+{
+ return xp->name;
+}
+
+int X509_TRUST_get_trust(const X509_TRUST *xp)
+{
+ return xp->trust;
+}
+
+static int trust_1oidany(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags)
+{
+ /*
+ * Declare the chain verified if the desired trust OID is not rejected in
+ * any auxiliary trust info for this certificate, and the OID is either
+ * expressly trusted, or else either "anyEKU" is trusted, or the
+ * certificate is self-signed.
+ */
+ flags |= X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT | X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU;
+ return obj_trust(trust->arg1, x, flags);
+}
+
+static int trust_1oid(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags)
+{
+ /*
+ * Declare the chain verified only if the desired trust OID is not
+ * rejected and is expressly trusted. Neither "anyEKU" nor "compat"
+ * trust in self-signed certificates apply.
+ */
+ flags &= ~(X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT | X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU);
+ return obj_trust(trust->arg1, x, flags);
+}
+
+static int trust_compat(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags)
+{
+ /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
+ if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1)
+ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+ if ((flags & X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT) == 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS))
+ return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+ else
+ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+}
+
+static int obj_trust(int id, X509 *x, int flags)
+{
+ X509_CERT_AUX *ax = x->aux;
+ int i;
+
+ if (ax && ax->reject) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(ax->reject); i++) {
+ ASN1_OBJECT *obj = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(ax->reject, i);
+ int nid = OBJ_obj2nid(obj);
+
+ if (nid == id || (nid == NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage &&
+ (flags & X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU)))
+ return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ax && ax->trust) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(ax->trust); i++) {
+ ASN1_OBJECT *obj = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(ax->trust, i);
+ int nid = OBJ_obj2nid(obj);
+
+ if (nid == id || (nid == NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage &&
+ (flags & X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU)))
+ return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Reject when explicit trust EKU are set and none match.
+ *
+ * Returning untrusted is enough for for full chains that end in
+ * self-signed roots, because when explicit trust is specified it
+ * suppresses the default blanket trust of self-signed objects.
+ *
+ * But for partial chains, this is not enough, because absent a similar
+ * trust-self-signed policy, non matching EKUs are indistinguishable
+ * from lack of EKU constraints.
+ *
+ * Therefore, failure to match any trusted purpose must trigger an
+ * explicit reject.
+ */
+ return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
+ }
+
+ if ((flags & X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT) == 0)
+ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+
+ /*
+ * Not rejected, and there is no list of accepted uses, try compat.
+ */
+ return trust_compat(NULL, x, flags);
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..02bde64
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+
+const char *X509_verify_cert_error_string(long n)
+{
+ switch ((int)n) {
+ case X509_V_OK:
+ return "ok";
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED:
+ return "unspecified certificate verification error";
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
+ return "unable to get issuer certificate";
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
+ return "unable to get certificate CRL";
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
+ return "unable to decrypt certificate's signature";
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
+ return "unable to decrypt CRL's signature";
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
+ return "unable to decode issuer public key";
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
+ return "certificate signature failure";
+ case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
+ return "CRL signature failure";
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
+ return "certificate is not yet valid";
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
+ return "certificate has expired";
+ case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
+ return "CRL is not yet valid";
+ case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
+ return "CRL has expired";
+ case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
+ return "format error in certificate's notBefore field";
+ case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
+ return "format error in certificate's notAfter field";
+ case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
+ return "format error in CRL's lastUpdate field";
+ case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
+ return "format error in CRL's nextUpdate field";
+ case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
+ return "out of memory";
+ case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
+ return "self signed certificate";
+ case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
+ return "self signed certificate in certificate chain";
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
+ return "unable to get local issuer certificate";
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
+ return "unable to verify the first certificate";
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
+ return "certificate chain too long";
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
+ return "certificate revoked";
+ case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
+ return "invalid CA certificate";
+ case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
+ return "path length constraint exceeded";
+ case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
+ return "unsupported certificate purpose";
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
+ return "certificate not trusted";
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
+ return "certificate rejected";
+ case X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH:
+ return "subject issuer mismatch";
+ case X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH:
+ return "authority and subject key identifier mismatch";
+ case X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH:
+ return "authority and issuer serial number mismatch";
+ case X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN:
+ return "key usage does not include certificate signing";
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
+ return "unable to get CRL issuer certificate";
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION:
+ return "unhandled critical extension";
+ case X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN:
+ return "key usage does not include CRL signing";
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION:
+ return "unhandled critical CRL extension";
+ case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA:
+ return "invalid non-CA certificate (has CA markings)";
+ case X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
+ return "proxy path length constraint exceeded";
+ case X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE:
+ return "key usage does not include digital signature";
+ case X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED:
+ return
+ "proxy certificates not allowed, please set the appropriate flag";
+ case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION:
+ return "invalid or inconsistent certificate extension";
+ case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION:
+ return "invalid or inconsistent certificate policy extension";
+ case X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY:
+ return "no explicit policy";
+ case X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE:
+ return "Different CRL scope";
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION_FEATURE:
+ return "Unsupported extension feature";
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE:
+ return "RFC 3779 resource not subset of parent's resources";
+ case X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION:
+ return "permitted subtree violation";
+ case X509_V_ERR_EXCLUDED_VIOLATION:
+ return "excluded subtree violation";
+ case X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX:
+ return "name constraints minimum and maximum not supported";
+ case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
+ return "application verification failure";
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_TYPE:
+ return "unsupported name constraint type";
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_SYNTAX:
+ return "unsupported or invalid name constraint syntax";
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX:
+ return "unsupported or invalid name syntax";
+ case X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR:
+ return "CRL path validation error";
+ case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP:
+ return "Path Loop";
+ case X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION:
+ return "Suite B: certificate version invalid";
+ case X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM:
+ return "Suite B: invalid public key algorithm";
+ case X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE:
+ return "Suite B: invalid ECC curve";
+ case X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM:
+ return "Suite B: invalid signature algorithm";
+ case X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED:
+ return "Suite B: curve not allowed for this LOS";
+ case X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256:
+ return "Suite B: cannot sign P-384 with P-256";
+ case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH:
+ return "Hostname mismatch";
+ case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH:
+ return "Email address mismatch";
+ case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH:
+ return "IP address mismatch";
+ case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH:
+ return "No matching DANE TLSA records";
+ case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
+ return "EE certificate key too weak";
+ case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
+ return "CA certificate key too weak";
+ case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK:
+ return "CA signature digest algorithm too weak";
+ case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL:
+ return "Invalid certificate verification context";
+ case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP:
+ return "Issuer certificate lookup error";
+ case X509_V_ERR_NO_VALID_SCTS:
+ return "Certificate Transparency required, but no valid SCTs found";
+ case X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION:
+ return "proxy subject name violation";
+ case X509_V_ERR_OCSP_VERIFY_NEEDED:
+ return "OCSP verification needed";
+ case X509_V_ERR_OCSP_VERIFY_FAILED:
+ return "OCSP verification failed";
+ case X509_V_ERR_OCSP_CERT_UNKNOWN:
+ return "OCSP unknown cert";
+ case X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS:
+ return "Certificate public key has explicit ECC parameters";
+
+ default:
+ /* Printing an error number into a static buffer is not thread-safe */
+ return "unknown certificate verification error";
+ }
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_v3.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_v3.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c787602
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_v3.c
@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/safestack.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "x509_local.h"
+
+int X509v3_get_ext_count(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x)
+{
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ return sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(x);
+}
+
+int X509v3_get_ext_by_NID(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x, int nid,
+ int lastpos)
+{
+ ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
+
+ obj = OBJ_nid2obj(nid);
+ if (obj == NULL)
+ return -2;
+ return X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ(x, obj, lastpos);
+}
+
+int X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *sk,
+ const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos)
+{
+ int n;
+ X509_EXTENSION *ex;
+
+ if (sk == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ lastpos++;
+ if (lastpos < 0)
+ lastpos = 0;
+ n = sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(sk);
+ for (; lastpos < n; lastpos++) {
+ ex = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(sk, lastpos);
+ if (OBJ_cmp(ex->object, obj) == 0)
+ return lastpos;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int X509v3_get_ext_by_critical(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *sk, int crit,
+ int lastpos)
+{
+ int n;
+ X509_EXTENSION *ex;
+
+ if (sk == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ lastpos++;
+ if (lastpos < 0)
+ lastpos = 0;
+ n = sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(sk);
+ for (; lastpos < n; lastpos++) {
+ ex = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(sk, lastpos);
+ if (((ex->critical > 0) && crit) || ((ex->critical <= 0) && !crit))
+ return lastpos;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+X509_EXTENSION *X509v3_get_ext(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x, int loc)
+{
+ if (x == NULL || sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(x) <= loc || loc < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ else
+ return sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(x, loc);
+}
+
+X509_EXTENSION *X509v3_delete_ext(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x, int loc)
+{
+ X509_EXTENSION *ret;
+
+ if (x == NULL || sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(x) <= loc || loc < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ ret = sk_X509_EXTENSION_delete(x, loc);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509v3_add_ext(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **x,
+ X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc)
+{
+ X509_EXTENSION *new_ex = NULL;
+ int n;
+ STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *sk = NULL;
+
+ if (x == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509V3_ADD_EXT, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+
+ if (*x == NULL) {
+ if ((sk = sk_X509_EXTENSION_new_null()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ } else
+ sk = *x;
+
+ n = sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(sk);
+ if (loc > n)
+ loc = n;
+ else if (loc < 0)
+ loc = n;
+
+ if ((new_ex = X509_EXTENSION_dup(ex)) == NULL)
+ goto err2;
+ if (!sk_X509_EXTENSION_insert(sk, new_ex, loc))
+ goto err;
+ if (*x == NULL)
+ *x = sk;
+ return sk;
+ err:
+ X509err(X509_F_X509V3_ADD_EXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ err2:
+ X509_EXTENSION_free(new_ex);
+ if (x != NULL && *x == NULL)
+ sk_X509_EXTENSION_free(sk);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+X509_EXTENSION *X509_EXTENSION_create_by_NID(X509_EXTENSION **ex, int nid,
+ int crit,
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data)
+{
+ ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
+ X509_EXTENSION *ret;
+
+ obj = OBJ_nid2obj(nid);
+ if (obj == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_EXTENSION_CREATE_BY_NID, X509_R_UNKNOWN_NID);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ret = X509_EXTENSION_create_by_OBJ(ex, obj, crit, data);
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(obj);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+X509_EXTENSION *X509_EXTENSION_create_by_OBJ(X509_EXTENSION **ex,
+ const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int crit,
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data)
+{
+ X509_EXTENSION *ret;
+
+ if ((ex == NULL) || (*ex == NULL)) {
+ if ((ret = X509_EXTENSION_new()) == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_EXTENSION_CREATE_BY_OBJ,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ } else
+ ret = *ex;
+
+ if (!X509_EXTENSION_set_object(ret, obj))
+ goto err;
+ if (!X509_EXTENSION_set_critical(ret, crit))
+ goto err;
+ if (!X509_EXTENSION_set_data(ret, data))
+ goto err;
+
+ if ((ex != NULL) && (*ex == NULL))
+ *ex = ret;
+ return ret;
+ err:
+ if ((ex == NULL) || (ret != *ex))
+ X509_EXTENSION_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int X509_EXTENSION_set_object(X509_EXTENSION *ex, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj)
+{
+ if ((ex == NULL) || (obj == NULL))
+ return 0;
+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(ex->object);
+ ex->object = OBJ_dup(obj);
+ return ex->object != NULL;
+}
+
+int X509_EXTENSION_set_critical(X509_EXTENSION *ex, int crit)
+{
+ if (ex == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ ex->critical = (crit) ? 0xFF : -1;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_EXTENSION_set_data(X509_EXTENSION *ex, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (ex == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ i = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(&ex->value, data->data, data->length);
+ if (!i)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+ASN1_OBJECT *X509_EXTENSION_get_object(X509_EXTENSION *ex)
+{
+ if (ex == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ return ex->object;
+}
+
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_EXTENSION *ex)
+{
+ if (ex == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ return &ex->value;
+}
+
+int X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(const X509_EXTENSION *ex)
+{
+ if (ex == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (ex->critical > 0)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b18489f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3390 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "crypto/ctype.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include "internal/dane.h"
+#include "crypto/x509.h"
+#include "x509_local.h"
+
+/* CRL score values */
+
+/* No unhandled critical extensions */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
+
+/* certificate is within CRL scope */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
+
+/* CRL times valid */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
+
+/* Issuer name matches certificate */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
+
+/* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
+
+/* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
+
+/* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
+
+/* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
+
+/* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
+
+static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
+static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
+static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
+static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted);
+static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
+static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth);
+static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert);
+static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert);
+static int check_curve(X509 *cert);
+
+static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
+ unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
+static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+ X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
+static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
+ int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
+ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
+static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
+ int *pcrl_score);
+static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
+ unsigned int *preasons);
+static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
+static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+ STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
+ STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
+
+static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
+{
+ return ok;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return 1 if given cert is considered self-signed, 0 if not or on error.
+ * This does not verify self-signedness but relies on x509v3_cache_extensions()
+ * matching issuer and subject names (i.e., the cert being self-issued) and any
+ * present authority key identifier matching the subject key identifier, etc.
+ */
+static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
+{
+ if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1)
+ return 0;
+ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
+ return 1;
+ else
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
+
+static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+ STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
+ X509 *xtmp = NULL;
+ int i;
+ /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
+ certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
+ if (certs == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ /* Look for exact match */
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
+ xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+ if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
+ break;
+ xtmp = NULL;
+ }
+ if (xtmp != NULL && !X509_up_ref(xtmp))
+ xtmp = NULL;
+ sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
+ return xtmp;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Inform the verify callback of an error.
+ * If B<x> is not NULL it is the error cert, otherwise use the chain cert at
+ * B<depth>.
+ * If B<err> is not X509_V_OK, that's the error value, otherwise leave
+ * unchanged (presumably set by the caller).
+ *
+ * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
+ */
+static int verify_cb_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth, int err)
+{
+ ctx->error_depth = depth;
+ ctx->current_cert = (x != NULL) ? x : sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth);
+ if (err != X509_V_OK)
+ ctx->error = err;
+ return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Inform the verify callback of an error, CRL-specific variant. Here, the
+ * error depth and certificate are already set, we just specify the error
+ * number.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
+ */
+static int verify_cb_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
+{
+ ctx->error = err;
+ return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+}
+
+static int check_auth_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int i;
+ int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+
+ if (ctx->param->auth_level <= 0)
+ return 1;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
+ X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+
+ /*
+ * We've already checked the security of the leaf key, so here we only
+ * check the security of issuer keys.
+ */
+ if (i > 0 && !check_key_level(ctx, cert) &&
+ verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ /*
+ * We also check the signature algorithm security of all certificates
+ * except those of the trust anchor at index num-1.
+ */
+ if (i < num - 1 && !check_sig_level(ctx, cert) &&
+ verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int err;
+ int ok;
+
+ /*
+ * Before either returning with an error, or continuing with CRL checks,
+ * instantiate chain public key parameters.
+ */
+ if ((ok = build_chain(ctx)) == 0 ||
+ (ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx)) == 0 ||
+ (ok = check_auth_level(ctx)) == 0 ||
+ (ok = check_id(ctx)) == 0 || 1)
+ X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
+ if (ok == 0 || (ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx)) == 0)
+ return ok;
+
+ err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
+ ctx->param->flags);
+ if (err != X509_V_OK) {
+ if ((ok = verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, ctx->error_depth, err)) == 0)
+ return ok;
+ }
+
+ /* Verify chain signatures and expiration times */
+ ok = (ctx->verify != NULL) ? ctx->verify(ctx) : internal_verify(ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ return ok;
+
+ if ((ok = check_name_constraints(ctx)) == 0)
+ return ok;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
+ /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
+ if ((ok = X509v3_asid_validate_path(ctx)) == 0)
+ return ok;
+ if ((ok = X509v3_addr_validate_path(ctx)) == 0)
+ return ok;
+#endif
+
+ /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
+ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)
+ ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
+ return ok;
+}
+
+int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
+ * cannot do another one.
+ */
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!X509_up_ref(ctx->cert)) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
+ * the first entry is in place
+ */
+ if ((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
+ || !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert)) {
+ X509_free(ctx->cert);
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ctx->num_untrusted = 1;
+
+ /* If the peer's public key is too weak, we can stop early. */
+ if (!check_key_level(ctx, ctx->cert) &&
+ !verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
+ ret = dane_verify(ctx);
+ else
+ ret = verify_chain(ctx);
+
+ /*
+ * Safety-net. If we are returning an error, we must also set ctx->error,
+ * so that the chain is not considered verified should the error be ignored
+ * (e.g. TLS with SSL_VERIFY_NONE).
+ */
+ if (ret <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK)
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int sk_X509_contains(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *cert)
+{
+ int i, n = sk_X509_num(sk);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
+ if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(sk, i), cert) == 0)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find in given STACK_OF(X509) sk an issuer cert of given cert x.
+ * The issuer must not yet be in ctx->chain, where the exceptional case
+ * that x is self-issued and ctx->chain has just one element is allowed.
+ * Prefer the first one that is not expired, else take the last expired one.
+ */
+static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
+{
+ int i;
+ X509 *issuer, *rv = NULL;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
+ issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
+ if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)
+ && (((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) != 0 && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
+ || !sk_X509_contains(ctx->chain, issuer))) {
+ rv = issuer;
+ if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, rv, -1))
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Check that the given certificate 'x' is issued by the certificate 'issuer' */
+static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
+{
+ return x509_likely_issued(issuer, x) == X509_V_OK;
+}
+
+/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
+static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+ *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
+
+ if (*issuer == NULL || !X509_up_ref(*issuer))
+ goto err;
+
+ return 1;
+
+ err:
+ *issuer = NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static STACK_OF(X509) *lookup_certs_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm)
+{
+ STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
+ X509 *x;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->other_ctx); i++) {
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->other_ctx, i);
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0) {
+ if (!X509_up_ref(x)) {
+ sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
+ X509err(X509_F_LOOKUP_CERTS_SK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (sk == NULL)
+ sk = sk_X509_new_null();
+ if (sk == NULL || !sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
+ X509_free(x);
+ sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
+ X509err(X509_F_LOOKUP_CERTS_SK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return sk;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check EE or CA certificate purpose. For trusted certificates explicit local
+ * auxiliary trust can be used to override EKU-restrictions.
+ */
+static int check_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int purpose, int depth,
+ int must_be_ca)
+{
+ int tr_ok = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+
+ /*
+ * For trusted certificates we want to see whether any auxiliary trust
+ * settings trump the purpose constraints.
+ *
+ * This is complicated by the fact that the trust ordinals in
+ * ctx->param->trust are entirely independent of the purpose ordinals in
+ * ctx->param->purpose!
+ *
+ * What connects them is their mutual initialization via calls from
+ * X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() into X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup() which sets
+ * related values of both param->trust and param->purpose. It is however
+ * typically possible to infer associated trust values from a purpose value
+ * via the X509_PURPOSE API.
+ *
+ * Therefore, we can only check for trust overrides when the purpose we're
+ * checking is the same as ctx->param->purpose and ctx->param->trust is
+ * also set.
+ */
+ if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted && purpose == ctx->param->purpose)
+ tr_ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT);
+
+ switch (tr_ok) {
+ case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
+ return 1;
+ case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
+ break;
+ default:
+ switch (X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0)) {
+ case 1:
+ return 1;
+ case 0:
+ break;
+ default:
+ if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) == 0)
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
+ * purpose
+ */
+
+static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int i, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
+ X509 *x;
+ int proxy_path_length = 0;
+ int purpose;
+ int allow_proxy_certs;
+ int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+
+ /*-
+ * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
+ * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
+ * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
+ * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
+ * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
+ * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
+ * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
+ */
+ must_be_ca = -1;
+
+ /* CRL path validation */
+ if (ctx->parent) {
+ allow_proxy_certs = 0;
+ purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
+ } else {
+ allow_proxy_certs =
+ ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
+ purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+ int ret;
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
+ && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
+ if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
+ X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
+ if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
+ X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ret = X509_check_ca(x);
+ switch (must_be_ca) {
+ case -1:
+ if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
+ && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) {
+ ret = 0;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
+ } else
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ case 0:
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ ret = 0;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
+ } else
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT is implicit for intermediate CAs */
+ if ((ret == 0)
+ || ((i + 1 < num || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
+ && (ret != 1))) {
+ ret = 0;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
+ } else
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (ret > 0
+ && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) && num > 1) {
+ /* Check for presence of explicit elliptic curve parameters */
+ ret = check_curve(x);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
+ ret = 0;
+ } else if (ret == 0) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS;
+ }
+ }
+ if (ret > 0
+ && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0
+ && x->ex_pathlen != -1
+ && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ if (ret == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_OK))
+ return 0;
+ /* check_purpose() makes the callback as needed */
+ if (purpose > 0 && !check_purpose(ctx, x, purpose, i, must_be_ca))
+ return 0;
+ /* Check pathlen */
+ if ((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
+ && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length))) {
+ if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Increment path length if not a self issued intermediate CA */
+ if (i > 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) == 0)
+ plen++;
+ /*
+ * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
+ * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
+ * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
+ */
+ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
+ /*
+ * RFC3820, 4.1.3 (b)(1) stipulates that if pCPathLengthConstraint
+ * is less than max_path_length, the former should be copied to
+ * the latter, and 4.1.4 (a) stipulates that max_path_length
+ * should be verified to be larger than zero and decrement it.
+ *
+ * Because we're checking the certs in the reverse order, we start
+ * with verifying that proxy_path_length isn't larger than pcPLC,
+ * and copy the latter to the former if it is, and finally,
+ * increment proxy_path_length.
+ */
+ if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1) {
+ if (proxy_path_length > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
+ if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
+ X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ proxy_path_length = x->ex_pcpathlen;
+ }
+ proxy_path_length++;
+ must_be_ca = 0;
+ } else
+ must_be_ca = 1;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int has_san_id(X509 *x, int gtype)
+{
+ int i;
+ int ret = 0;
+ GENERAL_NAMES *gs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
+
+ if (gs == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gs); i++) {
+ GENERAL_NAME *g = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gs, i);
+
+ if (g->type == gtype) {
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ GENERAL_NAMES_free(gs);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
+ for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+ int j;
+
+ /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
+ if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * Proxy certificates policy has an extra constraint, where the
+ * certificate subject MUST be the issuer with a single CN entry
+ * added.
+ * (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4))
+ */
+ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
+ X509_NAME *tmpsubject = X509_get_subject_name(x);
+ X509_NAME *tmpissuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpentry = NULL;
+ int last_object_nid = 0;
+ int err = X509_V_OK;
+ int last_object_loc = X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) - 1;
+
+ /* Check that there are at least two RDNs */
+ if (last_object_loc < 1) {
+ err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
+ goto proxy_name_done;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check that there is exactly one more RDN in subject as
+ * there is in issuer.
+ */
+ if (X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject)
+ != X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpissuer) + 1) {
+ err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
+ goto proxy_name_done;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check that the last subject component isn't part of a
+ * multivalued RDN
+ */
+ if (X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject,
+ last_object_loc))
+ == X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject,
+ last_object_loc - 1))) {
+ err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
+ goto proxy_name_done;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check that the last subject RDN is a commonName, and that
+ * all the previous RDNs match the issuer exactly
+ */
+ tmpsubject = X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject);
+ if (tmpsubject == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ tmpentry =
+ X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc);
+ last_object_nid =
+ OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry));
+
+ if (last_object_nid != NID_commonName
+ || X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject, tmpissuer) != 0) {
+ err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
+ }
+
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry);
+ X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject);
+
+ proxy_name_done:
+ if (err != X509_V_OK
+ && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, err))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
+ * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
+ * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
+ * to be obeyed.
+ */
+ for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
+ NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
+
+ if (nc) {
+ int rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
+
+ /* If EE certificate check commonName too */
+ if (rv == X509_V_OK && i == 0
+ && (ctx->param->hostflags
+ & X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT) == 0
+ && ((ctx->param->hostflags
+ & X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT) != 0
+ || !has_san_id(x, GEN_DNS)))
+ rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN(x, nc);
+
+ switch (rv) {
+ case X509_V_OK:
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
+ return 0;
+ default:
+ if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, rv))
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
+{
+ return verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, errcode);
+}
+
+static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
+{
+ int i;
+ int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(vpm->hosts);
+ char *name;
+
+ if (vpm->peername != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(vpm->peername);
+ vpm->peername = NULL;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
+ name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(vpm->hosts, i);
+ if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, vpm->hostflags, &vpm->peername) > 0)
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return n == 0;
+}
+
+static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
+ X509 *x = ctx->cert;
+ if (vpm->hosts && check_hosts(x, vpm) <= 0) {
+ if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (vpm->email && X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
+ if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (vpm->ip && X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
+ if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted)
+{
+ int i;
+ X509 *x = NULL;
+ X509 *mx;
+ SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
+ int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+ int trust;
+
+ /*
+ * Check for a DANE issuer at depth 1 or greater, if it is a DANE-TA(2)
+ * match, we're done, otherwise we'll merely record the match depth.
+ */
+ if (DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && num_untrusted > 0 && num_untrusted < num) {
+ switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, num_untrusted)) {
+ case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
+ case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
+ return trust;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check trusted certificates in chain at depth num_untrusted and up.
+ * Note, that depths 0..num_untrusted-1 may also contain trusted
+ * certificates, but the caller is expected to have already checked those,
+ * and wants to incrementally check just any added since.
+ */
+ for (i = num_untrusted; i < num; i++) {
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+ trust = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
+ /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
+ if (trust == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
+ goto trusted;
+ if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
+ goto rejected;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we are looking at a trusted certificate, and accept partial chains,
+ * the chain is PKIX trusted.
+ */
+ if (num_untrusted < num) {
+ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
+ goto trusted;
+ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+ }
+
+ if (num_untrusted == num && ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
+ /*
+ * Last-resort call with no new trusted certificates, check the leaf
+ * for a direct trust store match.
+ */
+ i = 0;
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+ mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
+ if (!mx)
+ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+
+ /*
+ * Check explicit auxiliary trust/reject settings. If none are set,
+ * we'll accept X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED when not self-signed.
+ */
+ trust = X509_check_trust(mx, ctx->param->trust, 0);
+ if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
+ X509_free(mx);
+ goto rejected;
+ }
+
+ /* Replace leaf with trusted match */
+ (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
+ X509_free(x);
+ ctx->num_untrusted = 0;
+ goto trusted;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
+ * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
+ */
+ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+
+ rejected:
+ if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED))
+ return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
+ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+
+ trusted:
+ if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
+ return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+ if (dane->pdpth < 0)
+ dane->pdpth = num_untrusted;
+ /* With DANE, PKIX alone is not trusted until we have both */
+ if (dane->mdpth >= 0)
+ return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+}
+
+static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int i = 0, last = 0, ok = 0;
+ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
+ return 1;
+ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
+ last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+ else {
+ /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
+ if (ctx->parent)
+ return 1;
+ last = 0;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
+ ok = check_cert(ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ return ok;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
+ int ok = 0;
+ int cnum = ctx->error_depth;
+ X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
+
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
+ ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
+ ctx->current_reasons = 0;
+
+ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
+ return 1;
+
+ while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
+ unsigned int last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
+
+ /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
+ if (ctx->get_crl)
+ ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
+ else
+ ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
+ /*
+ * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
+ */
+ if (!ok) {
+ ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ ctx->current_crl = crl;
+ ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto done;
+
+ if (dcrl) {
+ ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto done;
+ ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto done;
+ } else
+ ok = 1;
+
+ /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
+ if (ok != 2) {
+ ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ X509_CRL_free(crl);
+ X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
+ crl = NULL;
+ dcrl = NULL;
+ /*
+ * If reasons not updated we won't get anywhere by another iteration,
+ * so exit loop.
+ */
+ if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
+ ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+ done:
+ X509_CRL_free(crl);
+ X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
+
+ ctx->current_crl = NULL;
+ return ok;
+}
+
+/* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
+
+static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
+{
+ time_t *ptime;
+ int i;
+
+ if (notify)
+ ctx->current_crl = crl;
+ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
+ ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
+ else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME)
+ return 1;
+ else
+ ptime = NULL;
+
+ i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
+ if (i == 0) {
+ if (!notify)
+ return 0;
+ if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (i > 0) {
+ if (!notify)
+ return 0;
+ if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl)) {
+ i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
+
+ if (i == 0) {
+ if (!notify)
+ return 0;
+ if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
+ if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
+ if (!notify)
+ return 0;
+ if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (notify)
+ ctx->current_crl = NULL;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
+ X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
+ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
+{
+ int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
+ unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
+ X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
+ X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
+ X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
+ crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
+ reasons = *preasons;
+ crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
+ if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0)
+ continue;
+ /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */
+ if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) {
+ int day, sec;
+ if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(best_crl),
+ X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0)
+ continue;
+ /*
+ * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
+ * and |sec|.
+ */
+ if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0)
+ continue;
+ }
+ best_crl = crl;
+ best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
+ best_score = crl_score;
+ best_reasons = reasons;
+ }
+
+ if (best_crl) {
+ X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
+ *pcrl = best_crl;
+ *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
+ *pscore = best_score;
+ *preasons = best_reasons;
+ X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl);
+ X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
+ *pdcrl = NULL;
+ get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
+ }
+
+ if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
+ * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
+ */
+
+static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
+{
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
+ int i;
+ i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
+ if (i >= 0) {
+ /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
+ if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
+ return 0;
+ exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
+ } else
+ exta = NULL;
+
+ i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
+
+ if (i >= 0) {
+
+ if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
+ return 0;
+ extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
+ } else
+ extb = NULL;
+
+ if (!exta && !extb)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (!exta || !extb)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* See if a base and delta are compatible */
+
+static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
+{
+ /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
+ if (!delta->base_crl_number)
+ return 0;
+ /* Base must have a CRL number */
+ if (!base->crl_number)
+ return 0;
+ /* Issuer names must match */
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
+ return 0;
+ /* AKID and IDP must match */
+ if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
+ return 0;
+ if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
+ return 0;
+ /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
+ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
+ return 0;
+ /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
+ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
+ * retrieve a chain of deltas...
+ */
+
+static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
+ X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
+{
+ X509_CRL *delta;
+ int i;
+ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
+ return;
+ if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
+ return;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
+ delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
+ if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
+ if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
+ *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
+ X509_CRL_up_ref(delta);
+ *dcrl = delta;
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ *dcrl = NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
+ * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
+ * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
+ * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
+ * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
+ */
+
+static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
+ unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
+{
+
+ int crl_score = 0;
+ unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
+
+ /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
+
+ /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
+ return 0;
+ /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
+ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
+ if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
+ return 0;
+ } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
+ /* If no new reasons reject */
+ if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
+ else if (crl->base_crl_number)
+ return 0;
+ /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
+ if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
+ return 0;
+ } else
+ crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
+
+ if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
+ crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
+
+ /* Check expiry */
+ if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
+ crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
+
+ /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
+ crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
+
+ /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
+
+ if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
+
+ if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
+ /* If no new reasons reject */
+ if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
+ return 0;
+ tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
+ crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
+ }
+
+ *preasons = tmp_reasons;
+
+ return crl_score;
+
+}
+
+static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
+ X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
+{
+ X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
+ X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
+ int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
+ int i;
+
+ if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
+ cidx++;
+
+ crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
+
+ if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
+ if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
+ *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
+ *pissuer = crl_issuer;
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
+ crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
+ continue;
+ if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
+ *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
+ *pissuer = crl_issuer;
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
+
+ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
+ * untrusted certificates.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
+ crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
+ continue;
+ if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
+ *pissuer = crl_issuer;
+ *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
+ * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
+ * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
+ * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
+ */
+
+static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+ X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
+ if (ctx->parent)
+ return 0;
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
+ return -1;
+
+ crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
+ /* Copy verify params across */
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
+
+ crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
+ crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
+
+ /* Verify CRL issuer */
+ ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Check chain is acceptable */
+ ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
+ err:
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
+ * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
+ * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
+ * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
+ * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
+ * RFC5280 version
+ */
+
+static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+ STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
+ STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
+{
+ X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
+ cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
+ crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
+ if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
+ * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
+ * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
+ * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
+ * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
+ */
+
+static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
+{
+ X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
+ GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
+ GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
+ int i, j;
+ if (!a || !b)
+ return 1;
+ if (a->type == 1) {
+ if (!a->dpname)
+ return 0;
+ /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
+ if (b->type == 1) {
+ if (!b->dpname)
+ return 0;
+ if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
+ return 1;
+ else
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
+ nm = a->dpname;
+ gens = b->name.fullname;
+ } else if (b->type == 1) {
+ if (!b->dpname)
+ return 0;
+ /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
+ gens = a->name.fullname;
+ nm = b->dpname;
+ }
+
+ /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
+ if (nm) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
+ gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
+ if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
+ continue;
+ if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
+ gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
+ for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
+ genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
+ if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+}
+
+static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
+{
+ int i;
+ X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
+ /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
+ if (!dp->CRLissuer)
+ return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
+ GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
+ if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
+ continue;
+ if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check CRLDP and IDP */
+
+static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
+ unsigned int *preasons)
+{
+ int i;
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
+ return 0;
+ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
+ DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
+ if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
+ if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
+ *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
+ && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
+ * to find a delta CRL too
+ */
+
+static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+ X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
+{
+ int ok;
+ X509 *issuer = NULL;
+ int crl_score = 0;
+ unsigned int reasons;
+ X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
+ X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+
+ reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
+ ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
+ &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
+ if (ok)
+ goto done;
+
+ /* Lookup CRLs from store */
+
+ skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
+
+ /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
+ if (!skcrl && crl)
+ goto done;
+
+ get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
+
+ sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
+
+ done:
+ /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
+ if (crl) {
+ ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
+ ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
+ ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
+ *pcrl = crl;
+ *pdcrl = dcrl;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check CRL validity */
+static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+ X509 *issuer = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
+ int cnum = ctx->error_depth;
+ int chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+
+ /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
+ if (ctx->current_issuer)
+ issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
+ /*
+ * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
+ * certificate in chain.
+ */
+ else if (cnum < chnum)
+ issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
+ else {
+ issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
+ /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
+ if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer) &&
+ !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (issuer == NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
+ */
+ if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
+ /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
+ if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
+ !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN) &&
+ !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) &&
+ !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH) &&
+ check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0 &&
+ !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR))
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) &&
+ !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME) &&
+ !check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
+ ikey = X509_get0_pubkey(issuer);
+
+ if (!ikey &&
+ !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (ikey) {
+ int rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
+
+ if (rv != X509_V_OK && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, rv))
+ return 0;
+ /* Verify CRL signature */
+ if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0 &&
+ !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Check certificate against CRL */
+static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
+{
+ X509_REVOKED *rev;
+
+ /*
+ * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
+ * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
+ * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extensions can
+ * change the meaning of CRL entries.
+ */
+ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
+ && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) &&
+ !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION))
+ return 0;
+ /*
+ * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL. If found, make sure
+ * reason is not removeFromCRL.
+ */
+ if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
+ if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
+ return 2;
+ if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if (ctx->parent)
+ return 1;
+ /*
+ * With DANE, the trust anchor might be a bare public key, not a
+ * certificate! In that case our chain does not have the trust anchor
+ * certificate as a top-most element. This comports well with RFC5280
+ * chain verification, since there too, the trust anchor is not part of the
+ * chain to be verified. In particular, X509_policy_check() does not look
+ * at the TA cert, but assumes that it is present as the top-most chain
+ * element. We therefore temporarily push a NULL cert onto the chain if it
+ * was verified via a bare public key, and pop it off right after the
+ * X509_policy_check() call.
+ */
+ if (ctx->bare_ta_signed && !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, NULL)) {
+ X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
+ ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
+ if (ctx->bare_ta_signed)
+ sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
+
+ if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
+ if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) {
+ int i;
+
+ /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */
+ for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
+ X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+
+ if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
+ continue;
+ if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
+ X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) {
+ ctx->current_cert = NULL;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
+ return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ }
+ if (ret != X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) {
+ X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
+ ctx->current_cert = NULL;
+ /*
+ * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed
+ * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then
+ * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier
+ * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK.
+ */
+ if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Check certificate validity times.
+ * If depth >= 0, invoke verification callbacks on error, otherwise just return
+ * the validation status.
+ *
+ * Return 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth)
+{
+ time_t *ptime;
+ int i;
+
+ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
+ ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
+ else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME)
+ return 1;
+ else
+ ptime = NULL;
+
+ i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notBefore(x), ptime);
+ if (i >= 0 && depth < 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (i == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth,
+ X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD))
+ return 0;
+ if (i > 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID))
+ return 0;
+
+ i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notAfter(x), ptime);
+ if (i <= 0 && depth < 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (i == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth,
+ X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD))
+ return 0;
+ if (i < 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED))
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* verify the issuer signatures and cert times of ctx->chain */
+static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+ X509 *xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
+ X509 *xs;
+
+ /*
+ * With DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures, it remains only to
+ * check the timestamps of the top certificate. We report the issuer as
+ * NULL, since all we have is a bare key.
+ */
+ if (ctx->bare_ta_signed) {
+ xs = xi;
+ xi = NULL;
+ goto check_cert_time;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
+ xs = xi; /* the typical case: last cert in the chain is self-issued */
+ else {
+ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
+ xs = xi;
+ goto check_cert_time;
+ }
+ if (n <= 0) {
+ if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, 0,
+ X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE))
+ return 0;
+
+ xs = xi;
+ goto check_cert_time;
+ }
+
+ n--;
+ ctx->error_depth = n;
+ xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Do not clear ctx->error=0, it must be "sticky", only the user's callback
+ * is allowed to reset errors (at its own peril).
+ */
+ while (n >= 0) {
+ /*
+ * For each iteration of this loop:
+ * n is the subject depth
+ * xs is the subject cert, for which the signature is to be checked
+ * xi is the supposed issuer cert containing the public key to use
+ * Initially xs == xi if the last cert in the chain is self-issued.
+ *
+ * Skip signature check for self-signed certificates unless explicitly
+ * asked for because it does not add any security and just wastes time.
+ */
+ if (xs != xi || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)
+ && (xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)) {
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+ /*
+ * If the issuer's public key is not available or its key usage
+ * does not support issuing the subject cert, report the issuer
+ * cert and its depth (rather than n, the depth of the subject).
+ */
+ int issuer_depth = n + (xs == xi ? 0 : 1);
+ /*
+ * According to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.4
+ * step (n) we must check any given key usage extension in a CA cert
+ * when preparing the verification of a certificate issued by it.
+ * According to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.3
+ * we must not verify a certifiate signature if the key usage of the
+ * CA certificate that issued the certificate prohibits signing.
+ * In case the 'issuing' certificate is the last in the chain and is
+ * not a CA certificate but a 'self-issued' end-entity cert (i.e.,
+ * xs == xi && !(xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)) RFC 5280 does not apply
+ * (see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6818#section-2) and thus
+ * we are free to ignore any key usage restrictions on such certs.
+ */
+ int ret = xs == xi && (xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0
+ ? X509_V_OK : x509_signing_allowed(xi, xs);
+
+ if (ret != X509_V_OK && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, issuer_depth, ret))
+ return 0;
+ if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
+ ret = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
+ if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, issuer_depth, ret))
+ return 0;
+ } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
+ ret = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
+ if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xs, n, ret))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ check_cert_time: /* in addition to RFC 5280, do also for trusted (root) cert */
+ /* Calls verify callback as needed */
+ if (!x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, n))
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Signal success at this depth. However, the previous error (if any)
+ * is retained.
+ */
+ ctx->current_issuer = xi;
+ ctx->current_cert = xs;
+ ctx->error_depth = n;
+ if (!ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (--n >= 0) {
+ xi = xs;
+ xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
+{
+ return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
+}
+
+int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
+{
+ static const size_t utctime_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
+ static const size_t generalizedtime_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
+ ASN1_TIME *asn1_cmp_time = NULL;
+ int i, day, sec, ret = 0;
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+ const char upper_z = 0x5A;
+#else
+ const char upper_z = 'Z';
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Note that ASN.1 allows much more slack in the time format than RFC5280.
+ * In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
+ * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
+ * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
+ *
+ * We do NOT currently enforce the following RFC 5280 requirement:
+ * "CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate
+ * validity dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity
+ * dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime."
+ */
+ switch (ctm->type) {
+ case V_ASN1_UTCTIME:
+ if (ctm->length != (int)(utctime_length))
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
+ if (ctm->length != (int)(generalizedtime_length))
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Verify the format: the ASN.1 functions we use below allow a more
+ * flexible format than what's mandated by RFC 5280.
+ * Digit and date ranges will be verified in the conversion methods.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < ctm->length - 1; i++) {
+ if (!ascii_isdigit(ctm->data[i]))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ctm->data[ctm->length - 1] != upper_z)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * There is ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t but no
+ * ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_cmp_time_t or ASN1_TIME_cmp_time_t,
+ * so we go through ASN.1
+ */
+ asn1_cmp_time = X509_time_adj(NULL, 0, cmp_time);
+ if (asn1_cmp_time == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, ctm, asn1_cmp_time))
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * X509_cmp_time comparison is <=.
+ * The return value 0 is reserved for errors.
+ */
+ ret = (day >= 0 && sec >= 0) ? -1 : 1;
+
+ err:
+ ASN1_TIME_free(asn1_cmp_time);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
+{
+ return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
+}
+
+ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
+{
+ return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
+}
+
+ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
+ int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
+{
+ time_t t;
+
+ if (in_tm)
+ t = *in_tm;
+ else
+ time(&t);
+
+ if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) {
+ if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
+ return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
+ if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
+ return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
+ }
+ return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
+}
+
+int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2;
+ int i, j;
+
+ if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
+ return 1;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
+ ktmp = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i));
+ if (ktmp == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
+ X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
+ break;
+ }
+ if (ktmp == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
+ X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* first, populate the other certs */
+ for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
+ ktmp2 = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j));
+ EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp);
+ }
+
+ if (pkey != NULL)
+ EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
+
+X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
+ EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
+ int i;
+ STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
+ /* CRLs can't be delta already */
+ if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
+ if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* Issuer names must match */
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* AKID and IDP must match */
+ if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
+ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* CRLs must verify */
+ if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
+ X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* Create new CRL */
+ crl = X509_CRL_new();
+ if (crl == NULL || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
+ goto memerr;
+ /* Set issuer name */
+ if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
+ goto memerr;
+
+ if (!X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(newer)))
+ goto memerr;
+ if (!X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(newer)))
+ goto memerr;
+
+ /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
+
+ if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
+ goto memerr;
+
+ /*
+ * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
+ * number to correct value too.
+ */
+
+ for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
+ X509_EXTENSION *ext;
+ ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
+ if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
+ goto memerr;
+ }
+
+ /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
+
+ revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) {
+ X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
+ rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
+ /*
+ * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
+ * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
+ */
+ if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, &rvn->serialNumber)) {
+ rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
+ if (!rvtmp)
+ goto memerr;
+ if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) {
+ X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
+ goto memerr;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
+
+ if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
+ goto memerr;
+
+ return crl;
+
+ memerr:
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ X509_CRL_free(crl);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
+{
+ return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
+}
+
+void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
+{
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->error;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
+{
+ ctx->error = err;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->error_depth;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
+{
+ ctx->error_depth = depth;
+}
+
+X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->current_cert;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->chain;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if (!ctx->chain)
+ return NULL;
+ return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
+}
+
+X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->current_issuer;
+}
+
+X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->current_crl;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->parent;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+ ctx->cert = x;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
+{
+ ctx->crls = sk;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
+{
+ /*
+ * XXX: Why isn't this function always used to set the associated trust?
+ * Should there even be a VPM->trust field at all? Or should the trust
+ * always be inferred from the purpose by X509_STORE_CTX_init().
+ */
+ return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
+{
+ /*
+ * XXX: See above, this function would only be needed when the default
+ * trust for the purpose needs an override in a corner case.
+ */
+ return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
+ * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
+ * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
+ * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
+ * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
+ * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
+ * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
+ * client/server.
+ */
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
+ int purpose, int trust)
+{
+ int idx;
+ /* If purpose not set use default */
+ if (!purpose)
+ purpose = def_purpose;
+ /*
+ * If purpose is set but we don't have a default then set the default to
+ * the current purpose
+ */
+ else if (def_purpose == 0)
+ def_purpose = purpose;
+ /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
+ if (purpose) {
+ X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
+ idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
+ if (idx == -1) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
+ X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
+ if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
+ idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
+ if (idx == -1) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
+ X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
+ }
+ /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
+ if (!trust)
+ trust = ptmp->trust;
+ }
+ if (trust) {
+ idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
+ if (idx == -1) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
+ X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
+ ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
+ if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
+ ctx->param->trust = trust;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
+{
+ X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
+
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
+ STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+{
+ int ret = 1;
+
+ ctx->ctx = store;
+ ctx->cert = x509;
+ ctx->untrusted = chain;
+ ctx->crls = NULL;
+ ctx->num_untrusted = 0;
+ ctx->other_ctx = NULL;
+ ctx->valid = 0;
+ ctx->chain = NULL;
+ ctx->error = 0;
+ ctx->explicit_policy = 0;
+ ctx->error_depth = 0;
+ ctx->current_cert = NULL;
+ ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
+ ctx->current_crl = NULL;
+ ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
+ ctx->current_reasons = 0;
+ ctx->tree = NULL;
+ ctx->parent = NULL;
+ ctx->dane = NULL;
+ ctx->bare_ta_signed = 0;
+ /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */
+ memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
+
+ /* store->cleanup is always 0 in OpenSSL, if set must be idempotent */
+ if (store)
+ ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
+ else
+ ctx->cleanup = 0;
+
+ if (store && store->check_issued)
+ ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
+ else
+ ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
+
+ if (store && store->get_issuer)
+ ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
+ else
+ ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
+
+ if (store && store->verify_cb)
+ ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
+ else
+ ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
+
+ if (store && store->verify)
+ ctx->verify = store->verify;
+ else
+ ctx->verify = internal_verify;
+
+ if (store && store->check_revocation)
+ ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
+ else
+ ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
+
+ if (store && store->get_crl)
+ ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
+ else
+ ctx->get_crl = NULL;
+
+ if (store && store->check_crl)
+ ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
+ else
+ ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
+
+ if (store && store->cert_crl)
+ ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
+ else
+ ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
+
+ if (store && store->check_policy)
+ ctx->check_policy = store->check_policy;
+ else
+ ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
+
+ if (store && store->lookup_certs)
+ ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
+ else
+ ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs;
+
+ if (store && store->lookup_crls)
+ ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
+ else
+ ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls;
+
+ ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
+ if (ctx->param == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
+ */
+ if (store)
+ ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
+ else
+ ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
+
+ if (ret)
+ ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
+
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * XXX: For now, continue to inherit trust from VPM, but infer from the
+ * purpose if this still yields the default value.
+ */
+ if (ctx->param->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
+ int idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(ctx->param->purpose);
+ X509_PURPOSE *xp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
+
+ if (xp != NULL)
+ ctx->param->trust = X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(xp);
+ }
+
+ if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
+ &ctx->ex_data))
+ return 1;
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+
+ err:
+ /*
+ * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not
+ * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so.
+ */
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
+ * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
+ */
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
+{
+ ctx->other_ctx = sk;
+ ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
+ ctx->lookup_certs = lookup_certs_sk;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ /*
+ * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls
+ * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free()
+ * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the
+ * pointers below after they're freed!
+ */
+ /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */
+ if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) {
+ ctx->cleanup(ctx);
+ ctx->cleanup = NULL;
+ }
+ if (ctx->param != NULL) {
+ if (ctx->parent == NULL)
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
+ ctx->param = NULL;
+ }
+ X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
+ ctx->tree = NULL;
+ sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
+ ctx->chain = NULL;
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
+ memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
+{
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
+ time_t t)
+{
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
+}
+
+X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->cert;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->untrusted;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
+{
+ ctx->untrusted = sk;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
+{
+ sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
+ ctx->chain = sk;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+ X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb)
+{
+ ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->verify_cb;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+ X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify)
+{
+ ctx->verify = verify;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->verify;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->get_issuer;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->check_issued;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->check_revocation;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->get_crl;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->check_crl;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->cert_crl;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->check_policy;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->lookup_certs;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->lookup_crls;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->cleanup;
+}
+
+X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->tree;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->explicit_policy;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->num_untrusted;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
+{
+ const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
+ param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
+ if (!param)
+ return 0;
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
+}
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->param;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
+{
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
+ ctx->param = param;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, SSL_DANE *dane)
+{
+ ctx->dane = dane;
+}
+
+static unsigned char *dane_i2d(
+ X509 *cert,
+ uint8_t selector,
+ unsigned int *i2dlen)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+ int len;
+
+ /*
+ * Extract ASN.1 DER form of certificate or public key.
+ */
+ switch (selector) {
+ case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT:
+ len = i2d_X509(cert, &buf);
+ break;
+ case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI:
+ len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), &buf);
+ break;
+ default:
+ X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (len < 0 || buf == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ *i2dlen = (unsigned int)len;
+ return buf;
+}
+
+#define DANETLS_NONE 256 /* impossible uint8_t */
+
+static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, int depth)
+{
+ SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
+ unsigned usage = DANETLS_NONE;
+ unsigned selector = DANETLS_NONE;
+ unsigned ordinal = DANETLS_NONE;
+ unsigned mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
+ unsigned char *i2dbuf = NULL;
+ unsigned int i2dlen = 0;
+ unsigned char mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned char *cmpbuf = NULL;
+ unsigned int cmplen = 0;
+ int i;
+ int recnum;
+ int matched = 0;
+ danetls_record *t = NULL;
+ uint32_t mask;
+
+ mask = (depth == 0) ? DANETLS_EE_MASK : DANETLS_TA_MASK;
+
+ /*
+ * The trust store is not applicable with DANE-TA(2)
+ */
+ if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted)
+ mask &= DANETLS_PKIX_MASK;
+
+ /*
+ * If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any
+ * further PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain.
+ * Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already.
+ */
+ if (dane->mdpth >= 0)
+ mask &= ~DANETLS_PKIX_MASK;
+
+ /*-
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.1
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.2
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.3
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.4
+ *
+ * We handle DANE-EE(3) records first as they require no chain building
+ * and no expiration or hostname checks. We also process digests with
+ * higher ordinals first and ignore lower priorities except Full(0) which
+ * is always processed (last). If none match, we then process PKIX-EE(1).
+ *
+ * NOTE: This relies on DANE usages sorting before the corresponding PKIX
+ * usages in SSL_dane_tlsa_add(), and also on descending sorting of digest
+ * priorities. See twin comment in ssl/ssl_lib.c.
+ *
+ * We expect that most TLSA RRsets will have just a single usage, so we
+ * don't go out of our way to cache multiple selector-specific i2d buffers
+ * across usages, but if the selector happens to remain the same as switch
+ * usages, that's OK. Thus, a set of "3 1 1", "3 0 1", "1 1 1", "1 0 1",
+ * records would result in us generating each of the certificate and public
+ * key DER forms twice, but more typically we'd just see multiple "3 1 1"
+ * or multiple "3 0 1" records.
+ *
+ * As soon as we find a match at any given depth, we stop, because either
+ * we've matched a DANE-?? record and the peer is authenticated, or, after
+ * exhausting all DANE-?? records, we've matched a PKIX-?? record, which is
+ * sufficient for DANE, and what remains to do is ordinary PKIX validation.
+ */
+ recnum = (dane->umask & mask) ? sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs) : 0;
+ for (i = 0; matched == 0 && i < recnum; ++i) {
+ t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i);
+ if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(t->usage) & mask) == 0)
+ continue;
+ if (t->usage != usage) {
+ usage = t->usage;
+
+ /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
+ mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
+ ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype];
+ }
+ if (t->selector != selector) {
+ selector = t->selector;
+
+ /* Update per-selector state */
+ OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf);
+ i2dbuf = dane_i2d(cert, selector, &i2dlen);
+ if (i2dbuf == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
+ mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
+ ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype];
+ } else if (t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL) {
+ /*-
+ * Digest agility:
+ *
+ * <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-9>
+ *
+ * For a fixed selector, after processing all records with the
+ * highest mtype ordinal, ignore all mtypes with lower ordinals
+ * other than "Full".
+ */
+ if (dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype] < ordinal)
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Each time we hit a (new selector or) mtype, re-compute the relevant
+ * digest, more complex caching is not worth the code space.
+ */
+ if (t->mtype != mtype) {
+ const EVP_MD *md = dane->dctx->mdevp[mtype = t->mtype];
+ cmpbuf = i2dbuf;
+ cmplen = i2dlen;
+
+ if (md != NULL) {
+ cmpbuf = mdbuf;
+ if (!EVP_Digest(i2dbuf, i2dlen, cmpbuf, &cmplen, md, 0)) {
+ matched = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Squirrel away the certificate and depth if we have a match. Any
+ * DANE match is dispositive, but with PKIX we still need to build a
+ * full chain.
+ */
+ if (cmplen == t->dlen &&
+ memcmp(cmpbuf, t->data, cmplen) == 0) {
+ if (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage) & DANETLS_DANE_MASK)
+ matched = 1;
+ if (matched || dane->mdpth < 0) {
+ dane->mdpth = depth;
+ dane->mtlsa = t;
+ OPENSSL_free(dane->mcert);
+ dane->mcert = cert;
+ X509_up_ref(cert);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Clear the one-element DER cache */
+ OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf);
+ return matched;
+}
+
+static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
+{
+ SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
+ int matched = 0;
+ X509 *cert;
+
+ if (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) || depth == 0)
+ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+
+ /*
+ * Record any DANE trust-anchor matches, for the first depth to test, if
+ * there's one at that depth. (This'll be false for length 1 chains looking
+ * for an exact match for the leaf certificate).
+ */
+ cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth);
+ if (cert != NULL && (matched = dane_match(ctx, cert, depth)) < 0)
+ return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
+ if (matched > 0) {
+ ctx->num_untrusted = depth - 1;
+ return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+ }
+
+ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+}
+
+static int check_dane_pkeys(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
+ danetls_record *t;
+ int num = ctx->num_untrusted;
+ X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
+ int recnum = sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs);
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < recnum; ++i) {
+ t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i);
+ if (t->usage != DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA ||
+ t->selector != DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI ||
+ t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL ||
+ X509_verify(cert, t->spki) <= 0)
+ continue;
+
+ /* Clear any PKIX-?? matches that failed to extend to a full chain */
+ X509_free(dane->mcert);
+ dane->mcert = NULL;
+
+ /* Record match via a bare TA public key */
+ ctx->bare_ta_signed = 1;
+ dane->mdpth = num - 1;
+ dane->mtlsa = t;
+
+ /* Prune any excess chain certificates */
+ num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+ for (; num > ctx->num_untrusted; --num)
+ X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain));
+
+ return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+ }
+
+ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+}
+
+static void dane_reset(SSL_DANE *dane)
+{
+ /*
+ * Reset state to verify another chain, or clear after failure.
+ */
+ X509_free(dane->mcert);
+ dane->mcert = NULL;
+ dane->mtlsa = NULL;
+ dane->mdpth = -1;
+ dane->pdpth = -1;
+}
+
+static int check_leaf_suiteb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
+{
+ int err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, cert, NULL, ctx->param->flags);
+
+ if (err == X509_V_OK)
+ return 1;
+ return verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, 0, err);
+}
+
+static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ X509 *cert = ctx->cert;
+ SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
+ int matched;
+ int done;
+
+ dane_reset(dane);
+
+ /*-
+ * When testing the leaf certificate, if we match a DANE-EE(3) record,
+ * dane_match() returns 1 and we're done. If however we match a PKIX-EE(1)
+ * record, the match depth and matching TLSA record are recorded, but the
+ * return value is 0, because we still need to find a PKIX trust-anchor.
+ * Therefore, when DANE authentication is enabled (required), we're done
+ * if:
+ * + matched < 0, internal error.
+ * + matched == 1, we matched a DANE-EE(3) record
+ * + matched == 0, mdepth < 0 (no PKIX-EE match) and there are no
+ * DANE-TA(2) or PKIX-TA(0) to test.
+ */
+ matched = dane_match(ctx, ctx->cert, 0);
+ done = matched != 0 || (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && dane->mdpth < 0);
+
+ if (done)
+ X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
+
+ if (matched > 0) {
+ /* Callback invoked as needed */
+ if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert))
+ return 0;
+ /* Callback invoked as needed */
+ if ((dane->flags & DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS) == 0 &&
+ !check_id(ctx))
+ return 0;
+ /* Bypass internal_verify(), issue depth 0 success callback */
+ ctx->error_depth = 0;
+ ctx->current_cert = cert;
+ return ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx);
+ }
+
+ if (matched < 0) {
+ ctx->error_depth = 0;
+ ctx->current_cert = cert;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (done) {
+ /* Fail early, TA-based success is not possible */
+ if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert))
+ return 0;
+ return verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Chain verification for usages 0/1/2. TLSA record matching of depth > 0
+ * certificates happens in-line with building the rest of the chain.
+ */
+ return verify_chain(ctx);
+}
+
+/* Get issuer, without duplicate suppression */
+static int get_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
+{
+ STACK_OF(X509) *saved_chain = ctx->chain;
+ int ok;
+
+ ctx->chain = NULL;
+ ok = ctx->get_issuer(issuer, ctx, cert);
+ ctx->chain = saved_chain;
+
+ return ok;
+}
+
+static int augment_stack(STACK_OF(X509) *src, STACK_OF(X509) **dstPtr)
+{
+ if (src) {
+ STACK_OF(X509) *dst;
+ int i;
+
+ if (*dstPtr == NULL)
+ return ((*dstPtr = sk_X509_dup(src)) != NULL);
+
+ for (dst = *dstPtr, i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(src); ++i) {
+ if (!sk_X509_push(dst, sk_X509_value(src, i))) {
+ sk_X509_free(dst);
+ *dstPtr = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
+ int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+ X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
+ int ss = cert_self_signed(cert);
+ STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
+ unsigned int search;
+ int may_trusted = 0;
+ int may_alternate = 0;
+ int trust = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+ int alt_untrusted = 0;
+ int depth;
+ int ok = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ /* Our chain starts with a single untrusted element. */
+ if (!ossl_assert(num == 1 && ctx->num_untrusted == num)) {
+ X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+#define S_DOUNTRUSTED (1 << 0) /* Search untrusted chain */
+#define S_DOTRUSTED (1 << 1) /* Search trusted store */
+#define S_DOALTERNATE (1 << 2) /* Retry with pruned alternate chain */
+ /*
+ * Set up search policy, untrusted if possible, trusted-first if enabled.
+ * If we're doing DANE and not doing PKIX-TA/PKIX-EE, we never look in the
+ * trust_store, otherwise we might look there first. If not trusted-first,
+ * and alternate chains are not disabled, try building an alternate chain
+ * if no luck with untrusted first.
+ */
+ search = (ctx->untrusted != NULL) ? S_DOUNTRUSTED : 0;
+ if (DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || !DANETLS_HAS_DANE(dane)) {
+ if (search == 0 || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
+ search |= S_DOTRUSTED;
+ else if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS))
+ may_alternate = 1;
+ may_trusted = 1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we got any "Cert(0) Full(0)" issuer certificates from DNS, *prepend*
+ * them to our working copy of the untrusted certificate stack. Since the
+ * caller of X509_STORE_CTX_init() may have provided only a leaf cert with
+ * no corresponding stack of untrusted certificates, we may need to create
+ * an empty stack first. [ At present only the ssl library provides DANE
+ * support, and ssl_verify_cert_chain() always provides a non-null stack
+ * containing at least the leaf certificate, but we must be prepared for
+ * this to change. ]
+ */
+ if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && !augment_stack(dane->certs, &sktmp)) {
+ X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Shallow-copy the stack of untrusted certificates (with TLS, this is
+ * typically the content of the peer's certificate message) so can make
+ * multiple passes over it, while free to remove elements as we go.
+ */
+ if (!augment_stack(ctx->untrusted, &sktmp)) {
+ X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Still absurdly large, but arithmetically safe, a lower hard upper bound
+ * might be reasonable.
+ */
+ if (ctx->param->depth > INT_MAX/2)
+ ctx->param->depth = INT_MAX/2;
+
+ /*
+ * Try to Extend the chain until we reach an ultimately trusted issuer.
+ * Build chains up to one longer the limit, later fail if we hit the limit,
+ * with an X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code.
+ */
+ depth = ctx->param->depth + 1;
+
+ while (search != 0) {
+ X509 *x;
+ X509 *xtmp = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Look in the trust store if enabled for first lookup, or we've run
+ * out of untrusted issuers and search here is not disabled. When we
+ * reach the depth limit, we stop extending the chain, if by that point
+ * we've not found a trust-anchor, any trusted chain would be too long.
+ *
+ * The error reported to the application verify callback is at the
+ * maximal valid depth with the current certificate equal to the last
+ * not ultimately-trusted issuer. For example, with verify_depth = 0,
+ * the callback will report errors at depth=1 when the immediate issuer
+ * of the leaf certificate is not a trust anchor. No attempt will be
+ * made to locate an issuer for that certificate, since such a chain
+ * would be a-priori too long.
+ */
+ if ((search & S_DOTRUSTED) != 0) {
+ i = num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+ if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) {
+ /*
+ * As high up the chain as we can, look for an alternative
+ * trusted issuer of an untrusted certificate that currently
+ * has an untrusted issuer. We use the alt_untrusted variable
+ * to track how far up the chain we find the first match. It
+ * is only if and when we find a match, that we prune the chain
+ * and reset ctx->num_untrusted to the reduced count of
+ * untrusted certificates. While we're searching for such a
+ * match (which may never be found), it is neither safe nor
+ * wise to preemptively modify either the chain or
+ * ctx->num_untrusted.
+ *
+ * Note, like ctx->num_untrusted, alt_untrusted is a count of
+ * untrusted certificates, not a "depth".
+ */
+ i = alt_untrusted;
+ }
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i-1);
+
+ ok = (depth < num) ? 0 : get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
+
+ if (ok < 0) {
+ trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
+ search = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (ok > 0) {
+ /*
+ * Alternative trusted issuer for a mid-chain untrusted cert?
+ * Pop the untrusted cert's successors and retry. We might now
+ * be able to complete a valid chain via the trust store. Note
+ * that despite the current trust-store match we might still
+ * fail complete the chain to a suitable trust-anchor, in which
+ * case we may prune some more untrusted certificates and try
+ * again. Thus the S_DOALTERNATE bit may yet be turned on
+ * again with an even shorter untrusted chain!
+ *
+ * If in the process we threw away our matching PKIX-TA trust
+ * anchor, reset DANE trust. We might find a suitable trusted
+ * certificate among the ones from the trust store.
+ */
+ if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) {
+ if (!ossl_assert(num > i && i > 0 && ss == 0)) {
+ X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ X509_free(xtmp);
+ trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
+ search = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ search &= ~S_DOALTERNATE;
+ for (; num > i; --num)
+ X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain));
+ ctx->num_untrusted = num;
+
+ if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
+ dane->mdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted) {
+ dane->mdpth = -1;
+ X509_free(dane->mcert);
+ dane->mcert = NULL;
+ }
+ if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
+ dane->pdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted)
+ dane->pdpth = -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Self-signed untrusted certificates get replaced by their
+ * trusted matching issuer. Otherwise, grow the chain.
+ */
+ if (ss == 0) {
+ if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x = xtmp)) {
+ X509_free(xtmp);
+ X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+ search = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ ss = cert_self_signed(x);
+ } else if (num == ctx->num_untrusted) {
+ /*
+ * We have a self-signed certificate that has the same
+ * subject name (and perhaps keyid and/or serial number) as
+ * a trust-anchor. We must have an exact match to avoid
+ * possible impersonation via key substitution etc.
+ */
+ if (X509_cmp(x, xtmp) != 0) {
+ /* Self-signed untrusted mimic. */
+ X509_free(xtmp);
+ ok = 0;
+ } else {
+ X509_free(x);
+ ctx->num_untrusted = --num;
+ (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, num, x = xtmp);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We've added a new trusted certificate to the chain, recheck
+ * trust. If not done, and not self-signed look deeper.
+ * Whether or not we're doing "trusted first", we no longer
+ * look for untrusted certificates from the peer's chain.
+ *
+ * At this point ctx->num_trusted and num must reflect the
+ * correct number of untrusted certificates, since the DANE
+ * logic in check_trust() depends on distinguishing CAs from
+ * "the wire" from CAs from the trust store. In particular, the
+ * certificate at depth "num" should be the new trusted
+ * certificate with ctx->num_untrusted <= num.
+ */
+ if (ok) {
+ if (!ossl_assert(ctx->num_untrusted <= num)) {
+ X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
+ search = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED;
+ switch (trust = check_trust(ctx, num)) {
+ case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
+ case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
+ search = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (ss == 0)
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * No dispositive decision, and either self-signed or no match, if
+ * we were doing untrusted-first, and alt-chains are not disabled,
+ * do that, by repeatedly losing one untrusted element at a time,
+ * and trying to extend the shorted chain.
+ */
+ if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) == 0) {
+ /* Continue search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain? */
+ if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 && --alt_untrusted > 0)
+ continue;
+ /* Still no luck and no fallbacks left? */
+ if (!may_alternate || (search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 ||
+ ctx->num_untrusted < 2)
+ break;
+ /* Search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain */
+ search |= S_DOALTERNATE;
+ alt_untrusted = ctx->num_untrusted - 1;
+ ss = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Extend chain with peer-provided certificates
+ */
+ if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) != 0) {
+ num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+ if (!ossl_assert(num == ctx->num_untrusted)) {
+ X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
+ search = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num-1);
+
+ /*
+ * Once we run out of untrusted issuers, we stop looking for more
+ * and start looking only in the trust store if enabled.
+ */
+ xtmp = (ss || depth < num) ? NULL : find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
+ if (xtmp == NULL) {
+ search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED;
+ if (may_trusted)
+ search |= S_DOTRUSTED;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Drop this issuer from future consideration */
+ (void) sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
+
+ if (!X509_up_ref(xtmp)) {
+ X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
+ search = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
+ X509_free(xtmp);
+ X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+ search = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ x = xtmp;
+ ++ctx->num_untrusted;
+ ss = cert_self_signed(xtmp);
+
+ /*
+ * Check for DANE-TA trust of the topmost untrusted certificate.
+ */
+ switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, ctx->num_untrusted - 1)) {
+ case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
+ case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
+ search = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ sk_X509_free(sktmp);
+
+ /*
+ * Last chance to make a trusted chain, either bare DANE-TA public-key
+ * signers, or else direct leaf PKIX trust.
+ */
+ num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+ if (num <= depth) {
+ if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && DANETLS_HAS_DANE_TA(dane))
+ trust = check_dane_pkeys(ctx);
+ if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && num == ctx->num_untrusted)
+ trust = check_trust(ctx, num);
+ }
+
+ switch (trust) {
+ case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
+ return 1;
+ case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
+ /* Callback already issued */
+ return 0;
+ case X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED:
+ default:
+ num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+ if (num > depth)
+ return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
+ X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG);
+ if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
+ (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || dane->pdpth >= 0))
+ return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH);
+ if (ss && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
+ return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
+ X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT);
+ if (ss)
+ return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
+ X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN);
+ if (ctx->num_untrusted < num)
+ return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
+ X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT);
+ return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
+ X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY);
+ }
+}
+
+static const int minbits_table[] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 };
+static const int NUM_AUTH_LEVELS = OSSL_NELEM(minbits_table);
+
+/*
+ * Check whether the public key of ``cert`` meets the security level of
+ * ``ctx``.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert);
+ int level = ctx->param->auth_level;
+
+ /*
+ * At security level zero, return without checking for a supported public
+ * key type. Some engines support key types not understood outside the
+ * engine, and we only need to understand the key when enforcing a security
+ * floor.
+ */
+ if (level <= 0)
+ return 1;
+
+ /* Unsupported or malformed keys are not secure */
+ if (pkey == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS)
+ level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS;
+
+ return EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey) >= minbits_table[level - 1];
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether the public key of ``cert`` does not use explicit params
+ * for an elliptic curve.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 if check fails, -1 for other errors.
+ */
+static int check_curve(X509 *cert)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert);
+
+ /* Unsupported or malformed key */
+ if (pkey == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
+ return ret < 0 ? ret : !ret;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether the signature digest algorithm of ``cert`` meets the security
+ * level of ``ctx``. Should not be checked for trust anchors (whether
+ * self-signed or otherwise).
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
+{
+ int secbits = -1;
+ int level = ctx->param->auth_level;
+
+ if (level <= 0)
+ return 1;
+ if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS)
+ level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS;
+
+ if (!X509_get_signature_info(cert, NULL, NULL, &secbits, NULL))
+ return 0;
+
+ return secbits >= minbits_table[level - 1];
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..535f169
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,602 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2004-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "crypto/x509.h"
+
+#include "x509_local.h"
+
+/* X509_VERIFY_PARAM functions */
+
+#define SET_HOST 0
+#define ADD_HOST 1
+
+static char *str_copy(const char *s)
+{
+ return OPENSSL_strdup(s);
+}
+
+static void str_free(char *s)
+{
+ OPENSSL_free(s);
+}
+
+static int int_x509_param_set_hosts(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm, int mode,
+ const char *name, size_t namelen)
+{
+ char *copy;
+
+ /*
+ * Refuse names with embedded NUL bytes, except perhaps as final byte.
+ * XXX: Do we need to push an error onto the error stack?
+ */
+ if (namelen == 0 || name == NULL)
+ namelen = name ? strlen(name) : 0;
+ else if (name && memchr(name, '\0', namelen > 1 ? namelen - 1 : namelen))
+ return 0;
+ if (namelen > 0 && name[namelen - 1] == '\0')
+ --namelen;
+
+ if (mode == SET_HOST) {
+ sk_OPENSSL_STRING_pop_free(vpm->hosts, str_free);
+ vpm->hosts = NULL;
+ }
+ if (name == NULL || namelen == 0)
+ return 1;
+
+ copy = OPENSSL_strndup(name, namelen);
+ if (copy == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (vpm->hosts == NULL &&
+ (vpm->hosts = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(copy);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(vpm->hosts, copy)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(copy);
+ if (sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(vpm->hosts) == 0) {
+ sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(vpm->hosts);
+ vpm->hosts = NULL;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(void)
+{
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
+
+ param = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*param));
+ if (param == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ param->trust = X509_TRUST_DEFAULT;
+ /* param->inh_flags = X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT; */
+ param->depth = -1;
+ param->auth_level = -1; /* -1 means unset, 0 is explicit */
+ return param;
+}
+
+void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
+{
+ if (param == NULL)
+ return;
+ sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(param->policies, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
+ sk_OPENSSL_STRING_pop_free(param->hosts, str_free);
+ OPENSSL_free(param->peername);
+ OPENSSL_free(param->email);
+ OPENSSL_free(param->ip);
+ OPENSSL_free(param);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * This function determines how parameters are "inherited" from one structure
+ * to another. There are several different ways this can happen.
+ *
+ * 1. If a child structure needs to have its values initialized from a parent
+ * they are simply copied across. For example SSL_CTX copied to SSL.
+ * 2. If the structure should take on values only if they are currently unset.
+ * For example the values in an SSL structure will take appropriate value
+ * for SSL servers or clients but only if the application has not set new
+ * ones.
+ *
+ * The "inh_flags" field determines how this function behaves.
+ *
+ * Normally any values which are set in the default are not copied from the
+ * destination and verify flags are ORed together.
+ *
+ * If X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT is set then anything set in the source is copied
+ * to the destination. Effectively the values in "to" become default values
+ * which will be used only if nothing new is set in "from".
+ *
+ * If X509_VP_FLAG_OVERWRITE is set then all value are copied across whether
+ * they are set or not. Flags is still Ored though.
+ *
+ * If X509_VP_FLAG_RESET_FLAGS is set then the flags value is copied instead
+ * of ORed.
+ *
+ * If X509_VP_FLAG_LOCKED is set then no values are copied.
+ *
+ * If X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE is set then the current inh_flags setting is zeroed
+ * after the next call.
+ */
+
+/* Macro to test if a field should be copied from src to dest */
+
+#define test_x509_verify_param_copy(field, def) \
+ (to_overwrite || \
+ ((src->field != def) && (to_default || (dest->field == def))))
+
+/* Macro to test and copy a field if necessary */
+
+#define x509_verify_param_copy(field, def) \
+ if (test_x509_verify_param_copy(field, def)) \
+ dest->field = src->field
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *dest,
+ const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *src)
+{
+ unsigned long inh_flags;
+ int to_default, to_overwrite;
+ if (!src)
+ return 1;
+ inh_flags = dest->inh_flags | src->inh_flags;
+
+ if (inh_flags & X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE)
+ dest->inh_flags = 0;
+
+ if (inh_flags & X509_VP_FLAG_LOCKED)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (inh_flags & X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT)
+ to_default = 1;
+ else
+ to_default = 0;
+
+ if (inh_flags & X509_VP_FLAG_OVERWRITE)
+ to_overwrite = 1;
+ else
+ to_overwrite = 0;
+
+ x509_verify_param_copy(purpose, 0);
+ x509_verify_param_copy(trust, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT);
+ x509_verify_param_copy(depth, -1);
+ x509_verify_param_copy(auth_level, -1);
+
+ /* If overwrite or check time not set, copy across */
+
+ if (to_overwrite || !(dest->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)) {
+ dest->check_time = src->check_time;
+ dest->flags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME;
+ /* Don't need to copy flag: that is done below */
+ }
+
+ if (inh_flags & X509_VP_FLAG_RESET_FLAGS)
+ dest->flags = 0;
+
+ dest->flags |= src->flags;
+
+ if (test_x509_verify_param_copy(policies, NULL)) {
+ if (!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies(dest, src->policies))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ x509_verify_param_copy(hostflags, 0);
+
+ if (test_x509_verify_param_copy(hosts, NULL)) {
+ sk_OPENSSL_STRING_pop_free(dest->hosts, str_free);
+ dest->hosts = NULL;
+ if (src->hosts) {
+ dest->hosts =
+ sk_OPENSSL_STRING_deep_copy(src->hosts, str_copy, str_free);
+ if (dest->hosts == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (test_x509_verify_param_copy(email, NULL)) {
+ if (!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email(dest, src->email, src->emaillen))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (test_x509_verify_param_copy(ip, NULL)) {
+ if (!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip(dest, src->ip, src->iplen))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *to,
+ const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *from)
+{
+ unsigned long save_flags = to->inh_flags;
+ int ret;
+ to->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT;
+ ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(to, from);
+ to->inh_flags = save_flags;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int int_x509_param_set1(char **pdest, size_t *pdestlen,
+ const char *src, size_t srclen)
+{
+ void *tmp;
+ if (src) {
+ if (srclen == 0)
+ srclen = strlen(src);
+
+ tmp = OPENSSL_memdup(src, srclen);
+ if (tmp == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ tmp = NULL;
+ srclen = 0;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
+ *pdest = tmp;
+ if (pdestlen != NULL)
+ *pdestlen = srclen;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_name(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, const char *name)
+{
+ OPENSSL_free(param->name);
+ param->name = OPENSSL_strdup(name);
+ if (param->name)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ param->flags |= flags;
+ if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_MASK)
+ param->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ param->flags &= ~flags;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+unsigned long X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
+{
+ return param->flags;
+}
+
+uint32_t X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_inh_flags(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
+{
+ return param->inh_flags;
+}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_inh_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, uint32_t flags)
+{
+ param->inh_flags = flags;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int purpose)
+{
+ return X509_PURPOSE_set(¶m->purpose, purpose);
+}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int trust)
+{
+ return X509_TRUST_set(¶m->trust, trust);
+}
+
+void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int depth)
+{
+ param->depth = depth;
+}
+
+void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int auth_level)
+{
+ param->auth_level = auth_level;
+}
+
+time_t X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_time(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
+{
+ return param->check_time;
+}
+
+void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, time_t t)
+{
+ param->check_time = t;
+ param->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME;
+}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+ ASN1_OBJECT *policy)
+{
+ if (!param->policies) {
+ param->policies = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_new_null();
+ if (!param->policies)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(param->policies, policy))
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+ STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policies)
+{
+ int i;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *oid, *doid;
+
+ if (!param)
+ return 0;
+ sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(param->policies, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
+
+ if (!policies) {
+ param->policies = NULL;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ param->policies = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_new_null();
+ if (!param->policies)
+ return 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policies); i++) {
+ oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policies, i);
+ doid = OBJ_dup(oid);
+ if (!doid)
+ return 0;
+ if (!sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(param->policies, doid)) {
+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(doid);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ param->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+ const char *name, size_t namelen)
+{
+ return int_x509_param_set_hosts(param, SET_HOST, name, namelen);
+}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+ const char *name, size_t namelen)
+{
+ return int_x509_param_set_hosts(param, ADD_HOST, name, namelen);
+}
+
+void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+ unsigned int flags)
+{
+ param->hostflags = flags;
+}
+
+unsigned int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_hostflags(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
+{
+ return param->hostflags;
+}
+
+char *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
+{
+ return param->peername;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Move peername from one param structure to another, freeing any name present
+ * at the target. If the source is a NULL parameter structure, free and zero
+ * the target peername.
+ */
+void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_move_peername(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *to,
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *from)
+{
+ char *peername = (from != NULL) ? from->peername : NULL;
+
+ if (to->peername != peername) {
+ OPENSSL_free(to->peername);
+ to->peername = peername;
+ }
+ if (from)
+ from->peername = NULL;
+}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+ const char *email, size_t emaillen)
+{
+ return int_x509_param_set1(¶m->email, ¶m->emaillen,
+ email, emaillen);
+}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+ const unsigned char *ip, size_t iplen)
+{
+ if (iplen != 0 && iplen != 4 && iplen != 16)
+ return 0;
+ return int_x509_param_set1((char **)¶m->ip, ¶m->iplen,
+ (char *)ip, iplen);
+}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, const char *ipasc)
+{
+ unsigned char ipout[16];
+ size_t iplen;
+
+ iplen = (size_t)a2i_ipadd(ipout, ipasc);
+ if (iplen == 0)
+ return 0;
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip(param, ipout, iplen);
+}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
+{
+ return param->depth;
+}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_auth_level(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
+{
+ return param->auth_level;
+}
+
+const char *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_name(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
+{
+ return param->name;
+}
+
+#define vpm_empty_id NULL, 0U, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, 0
+
+/*
+ * Default verify parameters: these are used for various applications and can
+ * be overridden by the user specified table. NB: the 'name' field *must* be
+ * in alphabetical order because it will be searched using OBJ_search.
+ */
+
+static const X509_VERIFY_PARAM default_table[] = {
+ {
+ "default", /* X509 default parameters */
+ 0, /* Check time */
+ 0, /* internal flags */
+ X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST, /* flags */
+ 0, /* purpose */
+ 0, /* trust */
+ 100, /* depth */
+ -1, /* auth_level */
+ NULL, /* policies */
+ vpm_empty_id},
+ {
+ "pkcs7", /* S/MIME sign parameters */
+ 0, /* Check time */
+ 0, /* internal flags */
+ 0, /* flags */
+ X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, /* purpose */
+ X509_TRUST_EMAIL, /* trust */
+ -1, /* depth */
+ -1, /* auth_level */
+ NULL, /* policies */
+ vpm_empty_id},
+ {
+ "smime_sign", /* S/MIME sign parameters */
+ 0, /* Check time */
+ 0, /* internal flags */
+ 0, /* flags */
+ X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, /* purpose */
+ X509_TRUST_EMAIL, /* trust */
+ -1, /* depth */
+ -1, /* auth_level */
+ NULL, /* policies */
+ vpm_empty_id},
+ {
+ "ssl_client", /* SSL/TLS client parameters */
+ 0, /* Check time */
+ 0, /* internal flags */
+ 0, /* flags */
+ X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, /* purpose */
+ X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, /* trust */
+ -1, /* depth */
+ -1, /* auth_level */
+ NULL, /* policies */
+ vpm_empty_id},
+ {
+ "ssl_server", /* SSL/TLS server parameters */
+ 0, /* Check time */
+ 0, /* internal flags */
+ 0, /* flags */
+ X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, /* purpose */
+ X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, /* trust */
+ -1, /* depth */
+ -1, /* auth_level */
+ NULL, /* policies */
+ vpm_empty_id}
+};
+
+static STACK_OF(X509_VERIFY_PARAM) *param_table = NULL;
+
+static int table_cmp(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *a, const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *b)
+{
+ return strcmp(a->name, b->name);
+}
+
+DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(X509_VERIFY_PARAM, X509_VERIFY_PARAM, table);
+IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(X509_VERIFY_PARAM, X509_VERIFY_PARAM, table);
+
+static int param_cmp(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *const *a,
+ const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *const *b)
+{
+ return strcmp((*a)->name, (*b)->name);
+}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_table(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
+{
+ int idx;
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *ptmp;
+ if (param_table == NULL) {
+ param_table = sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(param_cmp);
+ if (param_table == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ idx = sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_find(param_table, param);
+ if (idx >= 0) {
+ ptmp = sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_delete(param_table, idx);
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ptmp);
+ }
+ }
+ if (!sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_push(param_table, param))
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_count(void)
+{
+ int num = OSSL_NELEM(default_table);
+ if (param_table)
+ num += sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_num(param_table);
+ return num;
+}
+
+const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0(int id)
+{
+ int num = OSSL_NELEM(default_table);
+ if (id < num)
+ return default_table + id;
+ return sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_value(param_table, id - num);
+}
+
+const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(const char *name)
+{
+ int idx;
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM pm;
+
+ pm.name = (char *)name;
+ if (param_table != NULL) {
+ idx = sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_find(param_table, &pm);
+ if (idx >= 0)
+ return sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_value(param_table, idx);
+ }
+ return OBJ_bsearch_table(&pm, default_table, OSSL_NELEM(default_table));
+}
+
+void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_table_cleanup(void)
+{
+ sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_pop_free(param_table, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free);
+ param_table = NULL;
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509cset.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509cset.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6c08509
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509cset.c
@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/refcount.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "crypto/x509.h"
+
+int X509_CRL_set_version(X509_CRL *x, long version)
+{
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (x->crl.version == NULL) {
+ if ((x->crl.version = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return ASN1_INTEGER_set(x->crl.version, version);
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(X509_CRL *x, X509_NAME *name)
+{
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ return X509_NAME_set(&x->crl.issuer, name);
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(X509_CRL *x, const ASN1_TIME *tm)
+{
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ return x509_set1_time(&x->crl.lastUpdate, tm);
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(X509_CRL *x, const ASN1_TIME *tm)
+{
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ return x509_set1_time(&x->crl.nextUpdate, tm);
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_sort(X509_CRL *c)
+{
+ int i;
+ X509_REVOKED *r;
+ /*
+ * sort the data so it will be written in serial number order
+ */
+ sk_X509_REVOKED_sort(c->crl.revoked);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(c->crl.revoked); i++) {
+ r = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(c->crl.revoked, i);
+ r->sequence = i;
+ }
+ c->crl.enc.modified = 1;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_up_ref(X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&crl->references, &i, crl->lock) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ REF_PRINT_COUNT("X509_CRL", crl);
+ REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
+ return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0);
+}
+
+long X509_CRL_get_version(const X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+ return ASN1_INTEGER_get(crl->crl.version);
+}
+
+const ASN1_TIME *X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(const X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+ return crl->crl.lastUpdate;
+}
+
+const ASN1_TIME *X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(const X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+ return crl->crl.nextUpdate;
+}
+
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+ASN1_TIME *X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+ return crl->crl.lastUpdate;
+}
+
+ASN1_TIME *X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+ return crl->crl.nextUpdate;
+}
+#endif
+
+X509_NAME *X509_CRL_get_issuer(const X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+ return crl->crl.issuer;
+}
+
+const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509_CRL_get0_extensions(const X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+ return crl->crl.extensions;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+ return crl->crl.revoked;
+}
+
+void X509_CRL_get0_signature(const X509_CRL *crl, const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psig,
+ const X509_ALGOR **palg)
+{
+ if (psig != NULL)
+ *psig = &crl->signature;
+ if (palg != NULL)
+ *palg = &crl->sig_alg;
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_get_signature_nid(const X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+ return OBJ_obj2nid(crl->sig_alg.algorithm);
+}
+
+const ASN1_TIME *X509_REVOKED_get0_revocationDate(const X509_REVOKED *x)
+{
+ return x->revocationDate;
+}
+
+int X509_REVOKED_set_revocationDate(X509_REVOKED *x, ASN1_TIME *tm)
+{
+ ASN1_TIME *in;
+
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ in = x->revocationDate;
+ if (in != tm) {
+ in = ASN1_STRING_dup(tm);
+ if (in != NULL) {
+ ASN1_TIME_free(x->revocationDate);
+ x->revocationDate = in;
+ }
+ }
+ return (in != NULL);
+}
+
+const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_REVOKED_get0_serialNumber(const X509_REVOKED *x)
+{
+ return &x->serialNumber;
+}
+
+int X509_REVOKED_set_serialNumber(X509_REVOKED *x, ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
+{
+ ASN1_INTEGER *in;
+
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ in = &x->serialNumber;
+ if (in != serial)
+ return ASN1_STRING_copy(in, serial);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509_REVOKED_get0_extensions(const X509_REVOKED *r)
+{
+ return r->extensions;
+}
+
+int i2d_re_X509_CRL_tbs(X509_CRL *crl, unsigned char **pp)
+{
+ crl->crl.enc.modified = 1;
+ return i2d_X509_CRL_INFO(&crl->crl, pp);
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509name.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509name.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c86d8e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509name.c
@@ -0,0 +1,360 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/safestack.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "crypto/x509.h"
+
+int X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_NAME *name, int nid, char *buf, int len)
+{
+ ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
+
+ obj = OBJ_nid2obj(nid);
+ if (obj == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ return X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ(name, obj, buf, len);
+}
+
+int X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ(X509_NAME *name, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj,
+ char *buf, int len)
+{
+ int i;
+ const ASN1_STRING *data;
+
+ i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ(name, obj, -1);
+ if (i < 0)
+ return -1;
+ data = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i));
+ if (buf == NULL)
+ return data->length;
+ if (len <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ i = (data->length > (len - 1)) ? (len - 1) : data->length;
+ memcpy(buf, data->data, i);
+ buf[i] = '\0';
+ return i;
+}
+
+int X509_NAME_entry_count(const X509_NAME *name)
+{
+ if (name == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ return sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(name->entries);
+}
+
+int X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(X509_NAME *name, int nid, int lastpos)
+{
+ ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
+
+ obj = OBJ_nid2obj(nid);
+ if (obj == NULL)
+ return -2;
+ return X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ(name, obj, lastpos);
+}
+
+/* NOTE: you should be passing -1, not 0 as lastpos */
+int X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ(X509_NAME *name, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos)
+{
+ int n;
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne;
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *sk;
+
+ if (name == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ if (lastpos < 0)
+ lastpos = -1;
+ sk = name->entries;
+ n = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(sk);
+ for (lastpos++; lastpos < n; lastpos++) {
+ ne = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(sk, lastpos);
+ if (OBJ_cmp(ne->object, obj) == 0)
+ return lastpos;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_get_entry(const X509_NAME *name, int loc)
+{
+ if (name == NULL || sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(name->entries) <= loc
+ || loc < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(name->entries, loc);
+}
+
+X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_delete_entry(X509_NAME *name, int loc)
+{
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY *ret;
+ int i, n, set_prev, set_next;
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *sk;
+
+ if (name == NULL || sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(name->entries) <= loc
+ || loc < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ sk = name->entries;
+ ret = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_delete(sk, loc);
+ n = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(sk);
+ name->modified = 1;
+ if (loc == n)
+ return ret;
+
+ /* else we need to fixup the set field */
+ if (loc != 0)
+ set_prev = (sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(sk, loc - 1))->set;
+ else
+ set_prev = ret->set - 1;
+ set_next = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(sk, loc)->set;
+
+ /*-
+ * set_prev is the previous set
+ * set is the current set
+ * set_next is the following
+ * prev 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
+ * set 1 1 2 2
+ * next 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 2
+ * so basically only if prev and next differ by 2, then
+ * re-number down by 1
+ */
+ if (set_prev + 1 < set_next)
+ for (i = loc; i < n; i++)
+ sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(sk, i)->set--;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int X509_NAME_add_entry_by_OBJ(X509_NAME *name, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type,
+ const unsigned char *bytes, int len, int loc,
+ int set)
+{
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne;
+ int ret;
+
+ ne = X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ(NULL, obj, type, bytes, len);
+ if (!ne)
+ return 0;
+ ret = X509_NAME_add_entry(name, ne, loc, set);
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(ne);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(X509_NAME *name, int nid, int type,
+ const unsigned char *bytes, int len, int loc,
+ int set)
+{
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne;
+ int ret;
+ ne = X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID(NULL, nid, type, bytes, len);
+ if (!ne)
+ return 0;
+ ret = X509_NAME_add_entry(name, ne, loc, set);
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(ne);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(X509_NAME *name, const char *field, int type,
+ const unsigned char *bytes, int len, int loc,
+ int set)
+{
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne;
+ int ret;
+ ne = X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt(NULL, field, type, bytes, len);
+ if (!ne)
+ return 0;
+ ret = X509_NAME_add_entry(name, ne, loc, set);
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(ne);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * if set is -1, append to previous set, 0 'a new one', and 1, prepend to the
+ * guy we are about to stomp on.
+ */
+int X509_NAME_add_entry(X509_NAME *name, const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne, int loc,
+ int set)
+{
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY *new_name = NULL;
+ int n, i, inc;
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *sk;
+
+ if (name == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ sk = name->entries;
+ n = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(sk);
+ if (loc > n)
+ loc = n;
+ else if (loc < 0)
+ loc = n;
+ inc = (set == 0);
+ name->modified = 1;
+
+ if (set == -1) {
+ if (loc == 0) {
+ set = 0;
+ inc = 1;
+ } else {
+ set = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(sk, loc - 1)->set;
+ }
+ } else { /* if (set >= 0) */
+
+ if (loc >= n) {
+ if (loc != 0)
+ set = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(sk, loc - 1)->set + 1;
+ else
+ set = 0;
+ } else
+ set = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(sk, loc)->set;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * X509_NAME_ENTRY_dup is ASN1 generated code, that can't be easily
+ * const'ified; harmless cast since dup() don't modify its input.
+ */
+ if ((new_name = X509_NAME_ENTRY_dup((X509_NAME_ENTRY *)ne)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ new_name->set = set;
+ if (!sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_insert(sk, new_name, loc)) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_ADD_ENTRY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (inc) {
+ n = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(sk);
+ for (i = loc + 1; i < n; i++)
+ sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(sk, i)->set += 1;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(new_name);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt(X509_NAME_ENTRY **ne,
+ const char *field, int type,
+ const unsigned char *bytes,
+ int len)
+{
+ ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY *nentry;
+
+ obj = OBJ_txt2obj(field, 0);
+ if (obj == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_ENTRY_CREATE_BY_TXT,
+ X509_R_INVALID_FIELD_NAME);
+ ERR_add_error_data(2, "name=", field);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ nentry = X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ(ne, obj, type, bytes, len);
+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(obj);
+ return nentry;
+}
+
+X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID(X509_NAME_ENTRY **ne, int nid,
+ int type,
+ const unsigned char *bytes,
+ int len)
+{
+ ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY *nentry;
+
+ obj = OBJ_nid2obj(nid);
+ if (obj == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_ENTRY_CREATE_BY_NID, X509_R_UNKNOWN_NID);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ nentry = X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ(ne, obj, type, bytes, len);
+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(obj);
+ return nentry;
+}
+
+X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ(X509_NAME_ENTRY **ne,
+ const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type,
+ const unsigned char *bytes,
+ int len)
+{
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY *ret;
+
+ if ((ne == NULL) || (*ne == NULL)) {
+ if ((ret = X509_NAME_ENTRY_new()) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ } else
+ ret = *ne;
+
+ if (!X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_object(ret, obj))
+ goto err;
+ if (!X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_data(ret, type, bytes, len))
+ goto err;
+
+ if ((ne != NULL) && (*ne == NULL))
+ *ne = ret;
+ return ret;
+ err:
+ if ((ne == NULL) || (ret != *ne))
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_object(X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj)
+{
+ if ((ne == NULL) || (obj == NULL)) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_ENTRY_SET_OBJECT,
+ ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(ne->object);
+ ne->object = OBJ_dup(obj);
+ return ((ne->object == NULL) ? 0 : 1);
+}
+
+int X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_data(X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne, int type,
+ const unsigned char *bytes, int len)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if ((ne == NULL) || ((bytes == NULL) && (len != 0)))
+ return 0;
+ if ((type > 0) && (type & MBSTRING_FLAG))
+ return ASN1_STRING_set_by_NID(&ne->value, bytes,
+ len, type,
+ OBJ_obj2nid(ne->object)) ? 1 : 0;
+ if (len < 0)
+ len = strlen((const char *)bytes);
+ i = ASN1_STRING_set(ne->value, bytes, len);
+ if (!i)
+ return 0;
+ if (type != V_ASN1_UNDEF) {
+ if (type == V_ASN1_APP_CHOOSE)
+ ne->value->type = ASN1_PRINTABLE_type(bytes, len);
+ else
+ ne->value->type = type;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+ASN1_OBJECT *X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne)
+{
+ if (ne == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ return ne->object;
+}
+
+ASN1_STRING *X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne)
+{
+ if (ne == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ return ne->value;
+}
+
+int X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne)
+{
+ return ne->set;
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509rset.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509rset.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9da3f2e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509rset.c
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "crypto/x509.h"
+
+int X509_REQ_set_version(X509_REQ *x, long version)
+{
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ x->req_info.enc.modified = 1;
+ return ASN1_INTEGER_set(x->req_info.version, version);
+}
+
+int X509_REQ_set_subject_name(X509_REQ *x, X509_NAME *name)
+{
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ x->req_info.enc.modified = 1;
+ return X509_NAME_set(&x->req_info.subject, name);
+}
+
+int X509_REQ_set_pubkey(X509_REQ *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ x->req_info.enc.modified = 1;
+ return X509_PUBKEY_set(&x->req_info.pubkey, pkey);
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509spki.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509spki.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fd8162a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509spki.c
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+int NETSCAPE_SPKI_set_pubkey(NETSCAPE_SPKI *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ if ((x == NULL) || (x->spkac == NULL))
+ return 0;
+ return X509_PUBKEY_set(&(x->spkac->pubkey), pkey);
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *NETSCAPE_SPKI_get_pubkey(NETSCAPE_SPKI *x)
+{
+ if ((x == NULL) || (x->spkac == NULL))
+ return NULL;
+ return X509_PUBKEY_get(x->spkac->pubkey);
+}
+
+/* Load a Netscape SPKI from a base64 encoded string */
+
+NETSCAPE_SPKI *NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_decode(const char *str, int len)
+{
+ unsigned char *spki_der;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ int spki_len;
+ NETSCAPE_SPKI *spki;
+ if (len <= 0)
+ len = strlen(str);
+ if ((spki_der = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_NETSCAPE_SPKI_B64_DECODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ spki_len = EVP_DecodeBlock(spki_der, (const unsigned char *)str, len);
+ if (spki_len < 0) {
+ X509err(X509_F_NETSCAPE_SPKI_B64_DECODE, X509_R_BASE64_DECODE_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_free(spki_der);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ p = spki_der;
+ spki = d2i_NETSCAPE_SPKI(NULL, &p, spki_len);
+ OPENSSL_free(spki_der);
+ return spki;
+}
+
+/* Generate a base64 encoded string from an SPKI */
+
+char *NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_encode(NETSCAPE_SPKI *spki)
+{
+ unsigned char *der_spki, *p;
+ char *b64_str;
+ int der_len;
+ der_len = i2d_NETSCAPE_SPKI(spki, NULL);
+ der_spki = OPENSSL_malloc(der_len);
+ b64_str = OPENSSL_malloc(der_len * 2);
+ if (der_spki == NULL || b64_str == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_NETSCAPE_SPKI_B64_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ OPENSSL_free(der_spki);
+ OPENSSL_free(b64_str);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ p = der_spki;
+ i2d_NETSCAPE_SPKI(spki, &p);
+ EVP_EncodeBlock((unsigned char *)b64_str, der_spki, der_len);
+ OPENSSL_free(der_spki);
+ return b64_str;
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509type.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509type.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0e33b42
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509type.c
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+int X509_certificate_type(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ const EVP_PKEY *pk;
+ int ret = 0, i;
+
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (pkey == NULL)
+ pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
+ else
+ pk = pkey;
+
+ if (pk == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
+ case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+ ret = EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN;
+/* if (!sign only extension) */
+ ret |= EVP_PKT_ENC;
+ break;
+ case EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS:
+ ret = EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN;
+ break;
+ case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
+ ret = EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN;
+ break;
+ case EVP_PKEY_EC:
+ ret = EVP_PK_EC | EVP_PKT_SIGN | EVP_PKT_EXCH;
+ break;
+ case EVP_PKEY_ED448:
+ case EVP_PKEY_ED25519:
+ ret = EVP_PKT_SIGN;
+ break;
+ case EVP_PKEY_DH:
+ ret = EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKT_EXCH;
+ break;
+ case NID_id_GostR3410_2001:
+ case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256:
+ case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512:
+ ret = EVP_PKT_EXCH | EVP_PKT_SIGN;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ i = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
+ if (i && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(i, NULL, &i)) {
+
+ switch (i) {
+ case NID_rsaEncryption:
+ case NID_rsa:
+ ret |= EVP_PKS_RSA;
+ break;
+ case NID_dsa:
+ case NID_dsa_2:
+ ret |= EVP_PKS_DSA;
+ break;
+ case NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey:
+ ret |= EVP_PKS_EC;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x_all.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x_all.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a4e9cda
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x_all.c
@@ -0,0 +1,527 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "crypto/x509.h"
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+int X509_verify(X509 *a, EVP_PKEY *r)
+{
+ if (X509_ALGOR_cmp(&a->sig_alg, &a->cert_info.signature))
+ return 0;
+ return (ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CINF), &a->sig_alg,
+ &a->signature, &a->cert_info, r));
+}
+
+int X509_REQ_verify(X509_REQ *a, EVP_PKEY *r)
+{
+ return (ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_REQ_INFO),
+ &a->sig_alg, a->signature, &a->req_info, r));
+}
+
+int NETSCAPE_SPKI_verify(NETSCAPE_SPKI *a, EVP_PKEY *r)
+{
+ return (ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(NETSCAPE_SPKAC),
+ &a->sig_algor, a->signature, a->spkac, r));
+}
+
+int X509_sign(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+ x->cert_info.enc.modified = 1;
+ return (ASN1_item_sign(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CINF), &x->cert_info.signature,
+ &x->sig_alg, &x->signature, &x->cert_info, pkey,
+ md));
+}
+
+int X509_sign_ctx(X509 *x, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ x->cert_info.enc.modified = 1;
+ return ASN1_item_sign_ctx(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CINF),
+ &x->cert_info.signature,
+ &x->sig_alg, &x->signature, &x->cert_info, ctx);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+int X509_http_nbio(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, X509 **pcert)
+{
+ return OCSP_REQ_CTX_nbio_d2i(rctx,
+ (ASN1_VALUE **)pcert, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509));
+}
+#endif
+
+int X509_REQ_sign(X509_REQ *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+ return (ASN1_item_sign(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_REQ_INFO), &x->sig_alg, NULL,
+ x->signature, &x->req_info, pkey, md));
+}
+
+int X509_REQ_sign_ctx(X509_REQ *x, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ASN1_item_sign_ctx(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_REQ_INFO),
+ &x->sig_alg, NULL, x->signature, &x->req_info,
+ ctx);
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_sign(X509_CRL *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+ x->crl.enc.modified = 1;
+ return (ASN1_item_sign(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL_INFO), &x->crl.sig_alg,
+ &x->sig_alg, &x->signature, &x->crl, pkey, md));
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_sign_ctx(X509_CRL *x, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ x->crl.enc.modified = 1;
+ return ASN1_item_sign_ctx(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL_INFO),
+ &x->crl.sig_alg, &x->sig_alg, &x->signature,
+ &x->crl, ctx);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+int X509_CRL_http_nbio(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, X509_CRL **pcrl)
+{
+ return OCSP_REQ_CTX_nbio_d2i(rctx,
+ (ASN1_VALUE **)pcrl,
+ ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL));
+}
+#endif
+
+int NETSCAPE_SPKI_sign(NETSCAPE_SPKI *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+ return (ASN1_item_sign(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(NETSCAPE_SPKAC), &x->sig_algor, NULL,
+ x->signature, x->spkac, pkey, md));
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+X509 *d2i_X509_fp(FILE *fp, X509 **x509)
+{
+ return ASN1_item_d2i_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509), fp, x509);
+}
+
+int i2d_X509_fp(FILE *fp, X509 *x509)
+{
+ return ASN1_item_i2d_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509), fp, x509);
+}
+#endif
+
+X509 *d2i_X509_bio(BIO *bp, X509 **x509)
+{
+ return ASN1_item_d2i_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509), bp, x509);
+}
+
+int i2d_X509_bio(BIO *bp, X509 *x509)
+{
+ return ASN1_item_i2d_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509), bp, x509);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+X509_CRL *d2i_X509_CRL_fp(FILE *fp, X509_CRL **crl)
+{
+ return ASN1_item_d2i_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL), fp, crl);
+}
+
+int i2d_X509_CRL_fp(FILE *fp, X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+ return ASN1_item_i2d_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL), fp, crl);
+}
+#endif
+
+X509_CRL *d2i_X509_CRL_bio(BIO *bp, X509_CRL **crl)
+{
+ return ASN1_item_d2i_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL), bp, crl);
+}
+
+int i2d_X509_CRL_bio(BIO *bp, X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+ return ASN1_item_i2d_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL), bp, crl);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+PKCS7 *d2i_PKCS7_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS7 **p7)
+{
+ return ASN1_item_d2i_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7), fp, p7);
+}
+
+int i2d_PKCS7_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS7 *p7)
+{
+ return ASN1_item_i2d_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7), fp, p7);
+}
+#endif
+
+PKCS7 *d2i_PKCS7_bio(BIO *bp, PKCS7 **p7)
+{
+ return ASN1_item_d2i_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7), bp, p7);
+}
+
+int i2d_PKCS7_bio(BIO *bp, PKCS7 *p7)
+{
+ return ASN1_item_i2d_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7), bp, p7);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+X509_REQ *d2i_X509_REQ_fp(FILE *fp, X509_REQ **req)
+{
+ return ASN1_item_d2i_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_REQ), fp, req);
+}
+
+int i2d_X509_REQ_fp(FILE *fp, X509_REQ *req)
+{
+ return ASN1_item_i2d_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_REQ), fp, req);
+}
+#endif
+
+X509_REQ *d2i_X509_REQ_bio(BIO *bp, X509_REQ **req)
+{
+ return ASN1_item_d2i_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_REQ), bp, req);
+}
+
+int i2d_X509_REQ_bio(BIO *bp, X509_REQ *req)
+{
+ return ASN1_item_i2d_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_REQ), bp, req);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+RSA *d2i_RSAPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, RSA **rsa)
+{
+ return ASN1_item_d2i_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPrivateKey), fp, rsa);
+}
+
+int i2d_RSAPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, RSA *rsa)
+{
+ return ASN1_item_i2d_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPrivateKey), fp, rsa);
+}
+
+RSA *d2i_RSAPublicKey_fp(FILE *fp, RSA **rsa)
+{
+ return ASN1_item_d2i_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPublicKey), fp, rsa);
+}
+
+RSA *d2i_RSA_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, RSA **rsa)
+{
+ return ASN1_d2i_fp((void *(*)(void))
+ RSA_new, (D2I_OF(void)) d2i_RSA_PUBKEY, fp,
+ (void **)rsa);
+}
+
+int i2d_RSAPublicKey_fp(FILE *fp, RSA *rsa)
+{
+ return ASN1_item_i2d_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPublicKey), fp, rsa);
+}
+
+int i2d_RSA_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, RSA *rsa)
+{
+ return ASN1_i2d_fp((I2D_OF(void))i2d_RSA_PUBKEY, fp, rsa);
+}
+# endif
+
+RSA *d2i_RSAPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, RSA **rsa)
+{
+ return ASN1_item_d2i_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPrivateKey), bp, rsa);
+}
+
+int i2d_RSAPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, RSA *rsa)
+{
+ return ASN1_item_i2d_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPrivateKey), bp, rsa);
+}
+
+RSA *d2i_RSAPublicKey_bio(BIO *bp, RSA **rsa)
+{
+ return ASN1_item_d2i_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPublicKey), bp, rsa);
+}
+
+RSA *d2i_RSA_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, RSA **rsa)
+{
+ return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(RSA, RSA_new, d2i_RSA_PUBKEY, bp, rsa);
+}
+
+int i2d_RSAPublicKey_bio(BIO *bp, RSA *rsa)
+{
+ return ASN1_item_i2d_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPublicKey), bp, rsa);
+}
+
+int i2d_RSA_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, RSA *rsa)
+{
+ return ASN1_i2d_bio_of(RSA, i2d_RSA_PUBKEY, bp, rsa);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+DSA *d2i_DSAPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, DSA **dsa)
+{
+ return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(DSA, DSA_new, d2i_DSAPrivateKey, fp, dsa);
+}
+
+int i2d_DSAPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, DSA *dsa)
+{
+ return ASN1_i2d_fp_of_const(DSA, i2d_DSAPrivateKey, fp, dsa);
+}
+
+DSA *d2i_DSA_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, DSA **dsa)
+{
+ return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(DSA, DSA_new, d2i_DSA_PUBKEY, fp, dsa);
+}
+
+int i2d_DSA_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, DSA *dsa)
+{
+ return ASN1_i2d_fp_of(DSA, i2d_DSA_PUBKEY, fp, dsa);
+}
+# endif
+
+DSA *d2i_DSAPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, DSA **dsa)
+{
+ return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(DSA, DSA_new, d2i_DSAPrivateKey, bp, dsa);
+}
+
+int i2d_DSAPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, DSA *dsa)
+{
+ return ASN1_i2d_bio_of_const(DSA, i2d_DSAPrivateKey, bp, dsa);
+}
+
+DSA *d2i_DSA_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, DSA **dsa)
+{
+ return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(DSA, DSA_new, d2i_DSA_PUBKEY, bp, dsa);
+}
+
+int i2d_DSA_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, DSA *dsa)
+{
+ return ASN1_i2d_bio_of(DSA, i2d_DSA_PUBKEY, bp, dsa);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+EC_KEY *d2i_EC_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, EC_KEY **eckey)
+{
+ return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(EC_KEY, EC_KEY_new, d2i_EC_PUBKEY, fp, eckey);
+}
+
+int i2d_EC_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+ return ASN1_i2d_fp_of(EC_KEY, i2d_EC_PUBKEY, fp, eckey);
+}
+
+EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EC_KEY **eckey)
+{
+ return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(EC_KEY, EC_KEY_new, d2i_ECPrivateKey, fp, eckey);
+}
+
+int i2d_ECPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+ return ASN1_i2d_fp_of(EC_KEY, i2d_ECPrivateKey, fp, eckey);
+}
+# endif
+EC_KEY *d2i_EC_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, EC_KEY **eckey)
+{
+ return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(EC_KEY, EC_KEY_new, d2i_EC_PUBKEY, bp, eckey);
+}
+
+int i2d_EC_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, EC_KEY *ecdsa)
+{
+ return ASN1_i2d_bio_of(EC_KEY, i2d_EC_PUBKEY, bp, ecdsa);
+}
+
+EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EC_KEY **eckey)
+{
+ return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(EC_KEY, EC_KEY_new, d2i_ECPrivateKey, bp, eckey);
+}
+
+int i2d_ECPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+ return ASN1_i2d_bio_of(EC_KEY, i2d_ECPrivateKey, bp, eckey);
+}
+#endif
+
+int X509_pubkey_digest(const X509 *data, const EVP_MD *type,
+ unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len)
+{
+ ASN1_BIT_STRING *key;
+ key = X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(data);
+ if (!key)
+ return 0;
+ return EVP_Digest(key->data, key->length, md, len, type, NULL);
+}
+
+int X509_digest(const X509 *data, const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md,
+ unsigned int *len)
+{
+ if (type == EVP_sha1() && (data->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) != 0
+ && (data->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT) == 0) {
+ /* Asking for SHA1 and we already computed it. */
+ if (len != NULL)
+ *len = sizeof(data->sha1_hash);
+ memcpy(md, data->sha1_hash, sizeof(data->sha1_hash));
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return (ASN1_item_digest
+ (ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509), type, (char *)data, md, len));
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_digest(const X509_CRL *data, const EVP_MD *type,
+ unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len)
+{
+ if (type == EVP_sha1() && (data->flags & EXFLAG_SET) != 0
+ && (data->flags & EXFLAG_INVALID) == 0) {
+ /* Asking for SHA1; always computed in CRL d2i. */
+ if (len != NULL)
+ *len = sizeof(data->sha1_hash);
+ memcpy(md, data->sha1_hash, sizeof(data->sha1_hash));
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return (ASN1_item_digest
+ (ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL), type, (char *)data, md, len));
+}
+
+int X509_REQ_digest(const X509_REQ *data, const EVP_MD *type,
+ unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len)
+{
+ return (ASN1_item_digest
+ (ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_REQ), type, (char *)data, md, len));
+}
+
+int X509_NAME_digest(const X509_NAME *data, const EVP_MD *type,
+ unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len)
+{
+ return (ASN1_item_digest
+ (ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_NAME), type, (char *)data, md, len));
+}
+
+int PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_digest(PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *data,
+ const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md,
+ unsigned int *len)
+{
+ return (ASN1_item_digest(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL), type,
+ (char *)data, md, len));
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+X509_SIG *d2i_PKCS8_fp(FILE *fp, X509_SIG **p8)
+{
+ return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(X509_SIG, X509_SIG_new, d2i_X509_SIG, fp, p8);
+}
+
+int i2d_PKCS8_fp(FILE *fp, X509_SIG *p8)
+{
+ return ASN1_i2d_fp_of(X509_SIG, i2d_X509_SIG, fp, p8);
+}
+#endif
+
+X509_SIG *d2i_PKCS8_bio(BIO *bp, X509_SIG **p8)
+{
+ return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(X509_SIG, X509_SIG_new, d2i_X509_SIG, bp, p8);
+}
+
+int i2d_PKCS8_bio(BIO *bp, X509_SIG *p8)
+{
+ return ASN1_i2d_bio_of(X509_SIG, i2d_X509_SIG, bp, p8);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_fp(FILE *fp,
+ PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO **p8inf)
+{
+ return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_new,
+ d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, fp, p8inf);
+}
+
+int i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf)
+{
+ return ASN1_i2d_fp_of(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, fp,
+ p8inf);
+}
+
+int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKeyInfo_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *key)
+{
+ PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf;
+ int ret;
+ p8inf = EVP_PKEY2PKCS8(key);
+ if (!p8inf)
+ return 0;
+ ret = i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_fp(fp, p8inf);
+ PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8inf);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int i2d_PrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ return ASN1_i2d_fp_of(EVP_PKEY, i2d_PrivateKey, fp, pkey);
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY **a)
+{
+ return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(EVP_PKEY, EVP_PKEY_new, d2i_AutoPrivateKey, fp, a);
+}
+
+int i2d_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ return ASN1_i2d_fp_of(EVP_PKEY, i2d_PUBKEY, fp, pkey);
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *d2i_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY **a)
+{
+ return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(EVP_PKEY, EVP_PKEY_new, d2i_PUBKEY, fp, a);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_bio(BIO *bp,
+ PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO **p8inf)
+{
+ return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_new,
+ d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, bp, p8inf);
+}
+
+int i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_bio(BIO *bp, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf)
+{
+ return ASN1_i2d_bio_of(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, bp,
+ p8inf);
+}
+
+int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKeyInfo_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *key)
+{
+ PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf;
+ int ret;
+ p8inf = EVP_PKEY2PKCS8(key);
+ if (!p8inf)
+ return 0;
+ ret = i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_bio(bp, p8inf);
+ PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8inf);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int i2d_PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ return ASN1_i2d_bio_of(EVP_PKEY, i2d_PrivateKey, bp, pkey);
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **a)
+{
+ return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(EVP_PKEY, EVP_PKEY_new, d2i_AutoPrivateKey, bp, a);
+}
+
+int i2d_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ return ASN1_i2d_bio_of(EVP_PKEY, i2d_PUBKEY, bp, pkey);
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *d2i_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **a)
+{
+ return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(EVP_PKEY, EVP_PKEY_new, d2i_PUBKEY, bp, a);
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x_attrib.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x_attrib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7342c4f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x_attrib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "x509_local.h"
+
+/*-
+ * X509_ATTRIBUTE: this has the following form:
+ *
+ * typedef struct x509_attributes_st
+ * {
+ * ASN1_OBJECT *object;
+ * STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE) *set;
+ * } X509_ATTRIBUTE;
+ *
+ */
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(X509_ATTRIBUTE) = {
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_ATTRIBUTE, object, ASN1_OBJECT),
+ ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE, set, ASN1_ANY)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
+
+X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_create(int nid, int atrtype, void *value)
+{
+ X509_ATTRIBUTE *ret = NULL;
+ ASN1_TYPE *val = NULL;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *oid;
+
+ if ((oid = OBJ_nid2obj(nid)) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ if ((ret = X509_ATTRIBUTE_new()) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ ret->object = oid;
+ if ((val = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!sk_ASN1_TYPE_push(ret->set, val))
+ goto err;
+
+ ASN1_TYPE_set(val, atrtype, value);
+ return ret;
+ err:
+ X509_ATTRIBUTE_free(ret);
+ ASN1_TYPE_free(val);
+ return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x_crl.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x_crl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..df0041c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x_crl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,495 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "crypto/x509.h"
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "x509_local.h"
+
+static int X509_REVOKED_cmp(const X509_REVOKED *const *a,
+ const X509_REVOKED *const *b);
+static int setup_idp(X509_CRL *crl, ISSUING_DIST_POINT *idp);
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(X509_REVOKED) = {
+ ASN1_EMBED(X509_REVOKED,serialNumber, ASN1_INTEGER),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REVOKED,revocationDate, ASN1_TIME),
+ ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_REVOKED,extensions, X509_EXTENSION)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X509_REVOKED)
+
+static int def_crl_verify(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *r);
+static int def_crl_lookup(X509_CRL *crl,
+ X509_REVOKED **ret, ASN1_INTEGER *serial,
+ X509_NAME *issuer);
+
+static X509_CRL_METHOD int_crl_meth = {
+ 0,
+ 0, 0,
+ def_crl_lookup,
+ def_crl_verify
+};
+
+static const X509_CRL_METHOD *default_crl_method = &int_crl_meth;
+
+/*
+ * The X509_CRL_INFO structure needs a bit of customisation. Since we cache
+ * the original encoding the signature won't be affected by reordering of the
+ * revoked field.
+ */
+static int crl_inf_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+ void *exarg)
+{
+ X509_CRL_INFO *a = (X509_CRL_INFO *)*pval;
+
+ if (!a || !a->revoked)
+ return 1;
+ switch (operation) {
+ /*
+ * Just set cmp function here. We don't sort because that would
+ * affect the output of X509_CRL_print().
+ */
+ case ASN1_OP_D2I_POST:
+ (void)sk_X509_REVOKED_set_cmp_func(a->revoked, X509_REVOKED_cmp);
+ break;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_enc(X509_CRL_INFO, enc, crl_inf_cb) = {
+ ASN1_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, version, ASN1_INTEGER),
+ ASN1_EMBED(X509_CRL_INFO, sig_alg, X509_ALGOR),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL_INFO, issuer, X509_NAME),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL_INFO, lastUpdate, ASN1_TIME),
+ ASN1_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, nextUpdate, ASN1_TIME),
+ ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, revoked, X509_REVOKED),
+ ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, extensions, X509_EXTENSION, 0)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_enc(X509_CRL_INFO, X509_CRL_INFO)
+
+/*
+ * Set CRL entry issuer according to CRL certificate issuer extension. Check
+ * for unhandled critical CRL entry extensions.
+ */
+
+static int crl_set_issuers(X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+
+ int i, j;
+ GENERAL_NAMES *gens, *gtmp;
+ STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revoked;
+
+ revoked = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(crl);
+
+ gens = NULL;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revoked); i++) {
+ X509_REVOKED *rev = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revoked, i);
+ STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts;
+ ASN1_ENUMERATED *reason;
+ X509_EXTENSION *ext;
+ gtmp = X509_REVOKED_get_ext_d2i(rev,
+ NID_certificate_issuer, &j, NULL);
+ if (!gtmp && (j != -1)) {
+ crl->flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (gtmp) {
+ gens = gtmp;
+ if (crl->issuers == NULL) {
+ crl->issuers = sk_GENERAL_NAMES_new_null();
+ if (crl->issuers == NULL) {
+ GENERAL_NAMES_free(gtmp);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!sk_GENERAL_NAMES_push(crl->issuers, gtmp)) {
+ GENERAL_NAMES_free(gtmp);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ rev->issuer = gens;
+
+ reason = X509_REVOKED_get_ext_d2i(rev, NID_crl_reason, &j, NULL);
+ if (!reason && (j != -1)) {
+ crl->flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (reason) {
+ rev->reason = ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(reason);
+ ASN1_ENUMERATED_free(reason);
+ } else
+ rev->reason = CRL_REASON_NONE;
+
+ /* Check for critical CRL entry extensions */
+
+ exts = rev->extensions;
+
+ for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); j++) {
+ ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, j);
+ if (X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)) {
+ if (OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ext)) == NID_certificate_issuer)
+ continue;
+ crl->flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+
+}
+
+/*
+ * The X509_CRL structure needs a bit of customisation. Cache some extensions
+ * and hash of the whole CRL.
+ */
+static int crl_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+ void *exarg)
+{
+ X509_CRL *crl = (X509_CRL *)*pval;
+ STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts;
+ X509_EXTENSION *ext;
+ int idx, i;
+
+ switch (operation) {
+ case ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE:
+ if (crl->meth->crl_free) {
+ if (!crl->meth->crl_free(crl))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(crl->akid);
+ ISSUING_DIST_POINT_free(crl->idp);
+ ASN1_INTEGER_free(crl->crl_number);
+ ASN1_INTEGER_free(crl->base_crl_number);
+ sk_GENERAL_NAMES_pop_free(crl->issuers, GENERAL_NAMES_free);
+ /* fall thru */
+
+ case ASN1_OP_NEW_POST:
+ crl->idp = NULL;
+ crl->akid = NULL;
+ crl->flags = 0;
+ crl->idp_flags = 0;
+ crl->idp_reasons = CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
+ crl->meth = default_crl_method;
+ crl->meth_data = NULL;
+ crl->issuers = NULL;
+ crl->crl_number = NULL;
+ crl->base_crl_number = NULL;
+ break;
+
+ case ASN1_OP_D2I_POST:
+ if (!X509_CRL_digest(crl, EVP_sha1(), crl->sha1_hash, NULL))
+ crl->flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+ crl->idp = X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(crl,
+ NID_issuing_distribution_point, &i,
+ NULL);
+ if (crl->idp != NULL) {
+ if (!setup_idp(crl, crl->idp))
+ crl->flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+ }
+ else if (i != -1) {
+ crl->flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+ }
+
+ crl->akid = X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(crl,
+ NID_authority_key_identifier, &i,
+ NULL);
+ if (crl->akid == NULL && i != -1)
+ crl->flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+
+ crl->crl_number = X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(crl,
+ NID_crl_number, &i, NULL);
+ if (crl->crl_number == NULL && i != -1)
+ crl->flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+
+ crl->base_crl_number = X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(crl,
+ NID_delta_crl, &i,
+ NULL);
+ if (crl->base_crl_number == NULL && i != -1)
+ crl->flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+ /* Delta CRLs must have CRL number */
+ if (crl->base_crl_number && !crl->crl_number)
+ crl->flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+
+ /*
+ * See if we have any unhandled critical CRL extensions and indicate
+ * this in a flag. We only currently handle IDP so anything else
+ * critical sets the flag. This code accesses the X509_CRL structure
+ * directly: applications shouldn't do this.
+ */
+
+ exts = crl->crl.extensions;
+
+ for (idx = 0; idx < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); idx++) {
+ int nid;
+ ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, idx);
+ nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ext));
+ if (nid == NID_freshest_crl)
+ crl->flags |= EXFLAG_FRESHEST;
+ if (X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)) {
+ /* We handle IDP and deltas */
+ if ((nid == NID_issuing_distribution_point)
+ || (nid == NID_authority_key_identifier)
+ || (nid == NID_delta_crl))
+ continue;
+ crl->flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!crl_set_issuers(crl))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (crl->meth->crl_init) {
+ if (crl->meth->crl_init(crl) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ crl->flags |= EXFLAG_SET;
+ break;
+
+ case ASN1_OP_FREE_POST:
+ if (crl->meth != NULL && crl->meth->crl_free != NULL) {
+ if (!crl->meth->crl_free(crl))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(crl->akid);
+ ISSUING_DIST_POINT_free(crl->idp);
+ ASN1_INTEGER_free(crl->crl_number);
+ ASN1_INTEGER_free(crl->base_crl_number);
+ sk_GENERAL_NAMES_pop_free(crl->issuers, GENERAL_NAMES_free);
+ break;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Convert IDP into a more convenient form */
+
+static int setup_idp(X509_CRL *crl, ISSUING_DIST_POINT *idp)
+{
+ int idp_only = 0;
+
+ /* Set various flags according to IDP */
+ crl->idp_flags |= IDP_PRESENT;
+ if (idp->onlyuser > 0) {
+ idp_only++;
+ crl->idp_flags |= IDP_ONLYUSER;
+ }
+ if (idp->onlyCA > 0) {
+ idp_only++;
+ crl->idp_flags |= IDP_ONLYCA;
+ }
+ if (idp->onlyattr > 0) {
+ idp_only++;
+ crl->idp_flags |= IDP_ONLYATTR;
+ }
+
+ if (idp_only > 1)
+ crl->idp_flags |= IDP_INVALID;
+
+ if (idp->indirectCRL > 0)
+ crl->idp_flags |= IDP_INDIRECT;
+
+ if (idp->onlysomereasons) {
+ crl->idp_flags |= IDP_REASONS;
+ if (idp->onlysomereasons->length > 0)
+ crl->idp_reasons = idp->onlysomereasons->data[0];
+ if (idp->onlysomereasons->length > 1)
+ crl->idp_reasons |= (idp->onlysomereasons->data[1] << 8);
+ crl->idp_reasons &= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
+ }
+
+ return DIST_POINT_set_dpname(idp->distpoint, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl));
+}
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_ref(X509_CRL, crl_cb) = {
+ ASN1_EMBED(X509_CRL, crl, X509_CRL_INFO),
+ ASN1_EMBED(X509_CRL, sig_alg, X509_ALGOR),
+ ASN1_EMBED(X509_CRL, signature, ASN1_BIT_STRING)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(X509_CRL, X509_CRL)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_REVOKED)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_REVOKED)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CRL_INFO)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CRL)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_CRL)
+
+static int X509_REVOKED_cmp(const X509_REVOKED *const *a,
+ const X509_REVOKED *const *b)
+{
+ return (ASN1_STRING_cmp((ASN1_STRING *)&(*a)->serialNumber,
+ (ASN1_STRING *)&(*b)->serialNumber));
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_add0_revoked(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED *rev)
+{
+ X509_CRL_INFO *inf;
+
+ inf = &crl->crl;
+ if (inf->revoked == NULL)
+ inf->revoked = sk_X509_REVOKED_new(X509_REVOKED_cmp);
+ if (inf->revoked == NULL || !sk_X509_REVOKED_push(inf->revoked, rev)) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_X509_CRL_ADD0_REVOKED, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ inf->enc.modified = 1;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_verify(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *r)
+{
+ if (crl->meth->crl_verify)
+ return crl->meth->crl_verify(crl, r);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(X509_CRL *crl,
+ X509_REVOKED **ret, ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
+{
+ if (crl->meth->crl_lookup)
+ return crl->meth->crl_lookup(crl, ret, serial, NULL);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED **ret, X509 *x)
+{
+ if (crl->meth->crl_lookup)
+ return crl->meth->crl_lookup(crl, ret,
+ X509_get_serialNumber(x),
+ X509_get_issuer_name(x));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int def_crl_verify(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *r)
+{
+ return (ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL_INFO),
+ &crl->sig_alg, &crl->signature, &crl->crl, r));
+}
+
+static int crl_revoked_issuer_match(X509_CRL *crl, X509_NAME *nm,
+ X509_REVOKED *rev)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (!rev->issuer) {
+ if (!nm)
+ return 1;
+ if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!nm)
+ nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(rev->issuer); i++) {
+ GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(rev->issuer, i);
+ if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
+ continue;
+ if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gen->d.directoryName))
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+}
+
+static int def_crl_lookup(X509_CRL *crl,
+ X509_REVOKED **ret, ASN1_INTEGER *serial,
+ X509_NAME *issuer)
+{
+ X509_REVOKED rtmp, *rev;
+ int idx, num;
+
+ if (crl->crl.revoked == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Sort revoked into serial number order if not already sorted. Do this
+ * under a lock to avoid race condition.
+ */
+ if (!sk_X509_REVOKED_is_sorted(crl->crl.revoked)) {
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(crl->lock);
+ sk_X509_REVOKED_sort(crl->crl.revoked);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(crl->lock);
+ }
+ rtmp.serialNumber = *serial;
+ idx = sk_X509_REVOKED_find(crl->crl.revoked, &rtmp);
+ if (idx < 0)
+ return 0;
+ /* Need to look for matching name */
+ for (num = sk_X509_REVOKED_num(crl->crl.revoked); idx < num; idx++) {
+ rev = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(crl->crl.revoked, idx);
+ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(&rev->serialNumber, serial))
+ return 0;
+ if (crl_revoked_issuer_match(crl, issuer, rev)) {
+ if (ret)
+ *ret = rev;
+ if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
+ return 2;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void X509_CRL_set_default_method(const X509_CRL_METHOD *meth)
+{
+ if (meth == NULL)
+ default_crl_method = &int_crl_meth;
+ else
+ default_crl_method = meth;
+}
+
+X509_CRL_METHOD *X509_CRL_METHOD_new(int (*crl_init) (X509_CRL *crl),
+ int (*crl_free) (X509_CRL *crl),
+ int (*crl_lookup) (X509_CRL *crl,
+ X509_REVOKED **ret,
+ ASN1_INTEGER *ser,
+ X509_NAME *issuer),
+ int (*crl_verify) (X509_CRL *crl,
+ EVP_PKEY *pk))
+{
+ X509_CRL_METHOD *m = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*m));
+
+ if (m == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_METHOD_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ m->crl_init = crl_init;
+ m->crl_free = crl_free;
+ m->crl_lookup = crl_lookup;
+ m->crl_verify = crl_verify;
+ m->flags = X509_CRL_METHOD_DYNAMIC;
+ return m;
+}
+
+void X509_CRL_METHOD_free(X509_CRL_METHOD *m)
+{
+ if (m == NULL || !(m->flags & X509_CRL_METHOD_DYNAMIC))
+ return;
+ OPENSSL_free(m);
+}
+
+void X509_CRL_set_meth_data(X509_CRL *crl, void *dat)
+{
+ crl->meth_data = dat;
+}
+
+void *X509_CRL_get_meth_data(X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+ return crl->meth_data;
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x_exten.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x_exten.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bd7518e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x_exten.c
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include "x509_local.h"
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(X509_EXTENSION) = {
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_EXTENSION, object, ASN1_OBJECT),
+ ASN1_OPT(X509_EXTENSION, critical, ASN1_BOOLEAN),
+ ASN1_EMBED(X509_EXTENSION, value, ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X509_EXTENSION)
+
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(X509_EXTENSIONS) =
+ ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, Extension, X509_EXTENSION)
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(X509_EXTENSIONS)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_EXTENSION)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_fname(X509_EXTENSIONS, X509_EXTENSIONS, X509_EXTENSIONS)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_EXTENSION)
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x_name.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x_name.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..59ac689
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x_name.c
@@ -0,0 +1,551 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "crypto/ctype.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "crypto/x509.h"
+#include "crypto/asn1.h"
+#include "x509_local.h"
+
+/*
+ * Maximum length of X509_NAME: much larger than anything we should
+ * ever see in practice.
+ */
+
+#define X509_NAME_MAX (1024 * 1024)
+
+static int x509_name_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
+ const unsigned char **in, long len,
+ const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+ int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx);
+
+static int x509_name_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **val, unsigned char **out,
+ const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass);
+static int x509_name_ex_new(ASN1_VALUE **val, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+static void x509_name_ex_free(ASN1_VALUE **val, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+
+static int x509_name_encode(X509_NAME *a);
+static int x509_name_canon(X509_NAME *a);
+static int asn1_string_canon(ASN1_STRING *out, const ASN1_STRING *in);
+static int i2d_name_canon(STACK_OF(STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY) * intname,
+ unsigned char **in);
+
+static int x509_name_ex_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **pval,
+ int indent,
+ const char *fname, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx);
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(X509_NAME_ENTRY) = {
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_NAME_ENTRY, object, ASN1_OBJECT),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_NAME_ENTRY, value, ASN1_PRINTABLE)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X509_NAME_ENTRY)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_NAME_ENTRY)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_NAME_ENTRY)
+
+/*
+ * For the "Name" type we need a SEQUENCE OF { SET OF X509_NAME_ENTRY } so
+ * declare two template wrappers for this
+ */
+
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(X509_NAME_ENTRIES) =
+ ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SET_OF, 0, RDNS, X509_NAME_ENTRY)
+static_ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(X509_NAME_ENTRIES)
+
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(X509_NAME_INTERNAL) =
+ ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, Name, X509_NAME_ENTRIES)
+static_ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(X509_NAME_INTERNAL)
+
+/*
+ * Normally that's where it would end: we'd have two nested STACK structures
+ * representing the ASN1. Unfortunately X509_NAME uses a completely different
+ * form and caches encodings so we have to process the internal form and
+ * convert to the external form.
+ */
+
+static const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS x509_name_ff = {
+ NULL,
+ x509_name_ex_new,
+ x509_name_ex_free,
+ 0, /* Default clear behaviour is OK */
+ x509_name_ex_d2i,
+ x509_name_ex_i2d,
+ x509_name_ex_print
+};
+
+IMPLEMENT_EXTERN_ASN1(X509_NAME, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, x509_name_ff)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_NAME)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_NAME)
+
+static int x509_name_ex_new(ASN1_VALUE **val, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+ X509_NAME *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ goto memerr;
+ if ((ret->entries = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_new_null()) == NULL)
+ goto memerr;
+ if ((ret->bytes = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
+ goto memerr;
+ ret->modified = 1;
+ *val = (ASN1_VALUE *)ret;
+ return 1;
+
+ memerr:
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_X509_NAME_EX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (ret) {
+ sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(ret->entries);
+ OPENSSL_free(ret);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void x509_name_ex_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+ X509_NAME *a;
+
+ if (!pval || !*pval)
+ return;
+ a = (X509_NAME *)*pval;
+
+ BUF_MEM_free(a->bytes);
+ sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free(a->entries, X509_NAME_ENTRY_free);
+ OPENSSL_free(a->canon_enc);
+ OPENSSL_free(a);
+ *pval = NULL;
+}
+
+static void local_sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *ne)
+{
+ sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(ne);
+}
+
+static void local_sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free(STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *ne)
+{
+ sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free(ne, X509_NAME_ENTRY_free);
+}
+
+static int x509_name_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
+ const unsigned char **in, long len,
+ const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass,
+ char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx)
+{
+ const unsigned char *p = *in, *q;
+ union {
+ STACK_OF(STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY) *s;
+ ASN1_VALUE *a;
+ } intname = {
+ NULL
+ };
+ union {
+ X509_NAME *x;
+ ASN1_VALUE *a;
+ } nm = {
+ NULL
+ };
+ int i, j, ret;
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *entries;
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry;
+ if (len > X509_NAME_MAX)
+ len = X509_NAME_MAX;
+ q = p;
+
+ /* Get internal representation of Name */
+ ret = ASN1_item_ex_d2i(&intname.a,
+ &p, len, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_NAME_INTERNAL),
+ tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
+
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (*val)
+ x509_name_ex_free(val, NULL);
+ if (!x509_name_ex_new(&nm.a, NULL))
+ goto err;
+ /* We've decoded it: now cache encoding */
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(nm.x->bytes, p - q))
+ goto err;
+ memcpy(nm.x->bytes->data, q, p - q);
+
+ /* Convert internal representation to X509_NAME structure */
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(intname.s); i++) {
+ entries = sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(intname.s, i);
+ for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(entries); j++) {
+ entry = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(entries, j);
+ entry->set = i;
+ if (!sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_push(nm.x->entries, entry))
+ goto err;
+ sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(entries, j, NULL);
+ }
+ }
+ ret = x509_name_canon(nm.x);
+ if (!ret)
+ goto err;
+ sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free(intname.s,
+ local_sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_free);
+ nm.x->modified = 0;
+ *val = nm.a;
+ *in = p;
+ return ret;
+
+ err:
+ if (nm.x != NULL)
+ X509_NAME_free(nm.x);
+ sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free(intname.s,
+ local_sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free);
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_X509_NAME_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int x509_name_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **val, unsigned char **out,
+ const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass)
+{
+ int ret;
+ X509_NAME *a = (X509_NAME *)*val;
+ if (a->modified) {
+ ret = x509_name_encode(a);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ ret = x509_name_canon(a);
+ if (!ret)
+ return -1;
+ }
+ ret = a->bytes->length;
+ if (out != NULL) {
+ memcpy(*out, a->bytes->data, ret);
+ *out += ret;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int x509_name_encode(X509_NAME *a)
+{
+ union {
+ STACK_OF(STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY) *s;
+ ASN1_VALUE *a;
+ } intname = {
+ NULL
+ };
+ int len;
+ unsigned char *p;
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *entries = NULL;
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry;
+ int i, set = -1;
+ intname.s = sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_new_null();
+ if (!intname.s)
+ goto memerr;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(a->entries); i++) {
+ entry = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(a->entries, i);
+ if (entry->set != set) {
+ entries = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_new_null();
+ if (!entries)
+ goto memerr;
+ if (!sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_push(intname.s, entries)) {
+ sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(entries);
+ goto memerr;
+ }
+ set = entry->set;
+ }
+ if (!sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_push(entries, entry))
+ goto memerr;
+ }
+ len = ASN1_item_ex_i2d(&intname.a, NULL,
+ ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_NAME_INTERNAL), -1, -1);
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(a->bytes, len))
+ goto memerr;
+ p = (unsigned char *)a->bytes->data;
+ ASN1_item_ex_i2d(&intname.a,
+ &p, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_NAME_INTERNAL), -1, -1);
+ sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free(intname.s,
+ local_sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_free);
+ a->modified = 0;
+ return len;
+ memerr:
+ sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free(intname.s,
+ local_sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_free);
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_X509_NAME_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int x509_name_ex_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **pval,
+ int indent,
+ const char *fname, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
+{
+ if (X509_NAME_print_ex(out, (const X509_NAME *)*pval,
+ indent, pctx->nm_flags) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ return 2;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function generates the canonical encoding of the Name structure. In
+ * it all strings are converted to UTF8, leading, trailing and multiple
+ * spaces collapsed, converted to lower case and the leading SEQUENCE header
+ * removed. In future we could also normalize the UTF8 too. By doing this
+ * comparison of Name structures can be rapidly performed by just using
+ * memcmp() of the canonical encoding. By omitting the leading SEQUENCE name
+ * constraints of type dirName can also be checked with a simple memcmp().
+ */
+
+static int x509_name_canon(X509_NAME *a)
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+ STACK_OF(STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY) *intname;
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *entries = NULL;
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry, *tmpentry = NULL;
+ int i, set = -1, ret = 0, len;
+
+ OPENSSL_free(a->canon_enc);
+ a->canon_enc = NULL;
+ /* Special case: empty X509_NAME => null encoding */
+ if (sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(a->entries) == 0) {
+ a->canon_enclen = 0;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ intname = sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_new_null();
+ if (intname == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_CANON, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(a->entries); i++) {
+ entry = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(a->entries, i);
+ if (entry->set != set) {
+ entries = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_new_null();
+ if (entries == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_push(intname, entries)) {
+ sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(entries);
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_CANON, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ set = entry->set;
+ }
+ tmpentry = X509_NAME_ENTRY_new();
+ if (tmpentry == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_CANON, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ tmpentry->object = OBJ_dup(entry->object);
+ if (tmpentry->object == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_CANON, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!asn1_string_canon(tmpentry->value, entry->value))
+ goto err;
+ if (!sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_push(entries, tmpentry)) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_CANON, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ tmpentry = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Finally generate encoding */
+ len = i2d_name_canon(intname, NULL);
+ if (len < 0)
+ goto err;
+ a->canon_enclen = len;
+
+ p = OPENSSL_malloc(a->canon_enclen);
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_CANON, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ a->canon_enc = p;
+
+ i2d_name_canon(intname, &p);
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry);
+ sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free(intname,
+ local_sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Bitmap of all the types of string that will be canonicalized. */
+
+#define ASN1_MASK_CANON \
+ (B_ASN1_UTF8STRING | B_ASN1_BMPSTRING | B_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING \
+ | B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING | B_ASN1_T61STRING | B_ASN1_IA5STRING \
+ | B_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING)
+
+static int asn1_string_canon(ASN1_STRING *out, const ASN1_STRING *in)
+{
+ unsigned char *to, *from;
+ int len, i;
+
+ /* If type not in bitmask just copy string across */
+ if (!(ASN1_tag2bit(in->type) & ASN1_MASK_CANON)) {
+ if (!ASN1_STRING_copy(out, in))
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ out->type = V_ASN1_UTF8STRING;
+ out->length = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&out->data, in);
+ if (out->length == -1)
+ return 0;
+
+ to = out->data;
+ from = to;
+
+ len = out->length;
+
+ /*
+ * Convert string in place to canonical form. Ultimately we may need to
+ * handle a wider range of characters but for now ignore anything with
+ * MSB set and rely on the ossl_isspace() to fail on bad characters without
+ * needing isascii or range checks as well.
+ */
+
+ /* Ignore leading spaces */
+ while (len > 0 && ossl_isspace(*from)) {
+ from++;
+ len--;
+ }
+
+ to = from + len;
+
+ /* Ignore trailing spaces */
+ while (len > 0 && ossl_isspace(to[-1])) {
+ to--;
+ len--;
+ }
+
+ to = out->data;
+
+ i = 0;
+ while (i < len) {
+ /* If not ASCII set just copy across */
+ if (!ossl_isascii(*from)) {
+ *to++ = *from++;
+ i++;
+ }
+ /* Collapse multiple spaces */
+ else if (ossl_isspace(*from)) {
+ /* Copy one space across */
+ *to++ = ' ';
+ /*
+ * Ignore subsequent spaces. Note: don't need to check len here
+ * because we know the last character is a non-space so we can't
+ * overflow.
+ */
+ do {
+ from++;
+ i++;
+ }
+ while (ossl_isspace(*from));
+ } else {
+ *to++ = ossl_tolower(*from);
+ from++;
+ i++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ out->length = to - out->data;
+
+ return 1;
+
+}
+
+static int i2d_name_canon(STACK_OF(STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY) * _intname,
+ unsigned char **in)
+{
+ int i, len, ltmp;
+ ASN1_VALUE *v;
+ STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *intname = (STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *)_intname;
+
+ len = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(intname); i++) {
+ v = sk_ASN1_VALUE_value(intname, i);
+ ltmp = ASN1_item_ex_i2d(&v, in,
+ ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_NAME_ENTRIES), -1, -1);
+ if (ltmp < 0)
+ return ltmp;
+ len += ltmp;
+ }
+ return len;
+}
+
+int X509_NAME_set(X509_NAME **xn, X509_NAME *name)
+{
+ if (*xn == name)
+ return *xn != NULL;
+ if ((name = X509_NAME_dup(name)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ X509_NAME_free(*xn);
+ *xn = name;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_NAME_print(BIO *bp, const X509_NAME *name, int obase)
+{
+ char *s, *c, *b;
+ int l, i;
+
+ l = 80 - 2 - obase;
+
+ b = X509_NAME_oneline(name, NULL, 0);
+ if (!b)
+ return 0;
+ if (!*b) {
+ OPENSSL_free(b);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ s = b + 1; /* skip the first slash */
+
+ c = s;
+ for (;;) {
+ if (((*s == '/') &&
+ (ossl_isupper(s[1]) && ((s[2] == '=') ||
+ (ossl_isupper(s[2]) && (s[3] == '='))
+ ))) || (*s == '\0'))
+ {
+ i = s - c;
+ if (BIO_write(bp, c, i) != i)
+ goto err;
+ c = s + 1; /* skip following slash */
+ if (*s != '\0') {
+ if (BIO_write(bp, ", ", 2) != 2)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ l--;
+ }
+ if (*s == '\0')
+ break;
+ s++;
+ l--;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_free(b);
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_PRINT, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ OPENSSL_free(b);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int X509_NAME_get0_der(X509_NAME *nm, const unsigned char **pder,
+ size_t *pderlen)
+{
+ /* Make sure encoding is valid */
+ if (i2d_X509_NAME(nm, NULL) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (pder != NULL)
+ *pder = (unsigned char *)nm->bytes->data;
+ if (pderlen != NULL)
+ *pderlen = nm->bytes->length;
+ return 1;
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9be7e92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,378 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "crypto/asn1.h"
+#include "crypto/evp.h"
+#include "crypto/x509.h"
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+
+struct X509_pubkey_st {
+ X509_ALGOR *algor;
+ ASN1_BIT_STRING *public_key;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+};
+
+static int x509_pubkey_decode(EVP_PKEY **pk, X509_PUBKEY *key);
+
+/* Minor tweak to operation: free up EVP_PKEY */
+static int pubkey_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+ void *exarg)
+{
+ if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_POST) {
+ X509_PUBKEY *pubkey = (X509_PUBKEY *)*pval;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey->pkey);
+ } else if (operation == ASN1_OP_D2I_POST) {
+ /* Attempt to decode public key and cache in pubkey structure. */
+ X509_PUBKEY *pubkey = (X509_PUBKEY *)*pval;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey->pkey);
+ pubkey->pkey = NULL;
+ /*
+ * Opportunistically decode the key but remove any non fatal errors
+ * from the queue. Subsequent explicit attempts to decode/use the key
+ * will return an appropriate error.
+ */
+ ERR_set_mark();
+ if (x509_pubkey_decode(&pubkey->pkey, pubkey) == -1)
+ return 0;
+ ERR_pop_to_mark();
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(X509_PUBKEY, pubkey_cb) = {
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_PUBKEY, algor, X509_ALGOR),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_PUBKEY, public_key, ASN1_BIT_STRING)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(X509_PUBKEY, X509_PUBKEY)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_PUBKEY)
+
+int X509_PUBKEY_set(X509_PUBKEY **x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ X509_PUBKEY *pk = NULL;
+
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((pk = X509_PUBKEY_new()) == NULL)
+ goto error;
+
+ if (pkey->ameth) {
+ if (pkey->ameth->pub_encode) {
+ if (!pkey->ameth->pub_encode(pk, pkey)) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_SET,
+ X509_R_PUBLIC_KEY_ENCODE_ERROR);
+ goto error;
+ }
+ } else {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_SET, X509_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ goto error;
+ }
+ } else {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_SET, X509_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ X509_PUBKEY_free(*x);
+ *x = pk;
+ pk->pkey = pkey;
+ EVP_PKEY_up_ref(pkey);
+ return 1;
+
+ error:
+ X509_PUBKEY_free(pk);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Attempt to decode a public key.
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 for a decode failure and -1 for a fatal
+ * error e.g. malloc failure.
+ */
+
+
+static int x509_pubkey_decode(EVP_PKEY **ppkey, X509_PUBKEY *key)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
+
+ if (pkey == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_DECODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(pkey, OBJ_obj2nid(key->algor->algorithm))) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_DECODE, X509_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ if (pkey->ameth->pub_decode) {
+ /*
+ * Treat any failure of pub_decode as a decode error. In
+ * future we could have different return codes for decode
+ * errors and fatal errors such as malloc failure.
+ */
+ if (!pkey->ameth->pub_decode(pkey, key)) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_DECODE, X509_R_PUBLIC_KEY_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto error;
+ }
+ } else {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_DECODE, X509_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ *ppkey = pkey;
+ return 1;
+
+ error:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *X509_PUBKEY_get0(X509_PUBKEY *key)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL;
+
+ if (key == NULL || key->public_key == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (key->pkey != NULL)
+ return key->pkey;
+
+ /*
+ * When the key ASN.1 is initially parsed an attempt is made to
+ * decode the public key and cache the EVP_PKEY structure. If this
+ * operation fails the cached value will be NULL. Parsing continues
+ * to allow parsing of unknown key types or unsupported forms.
+ * We repeat the decode operation so the appropriate errors are left
+ * in the queue.
+ */
+ x509_pubkey_decode(&ret, key);
+ /* If decode doesn't fail something bad happened */
+ if (ret != NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_GET0, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *X509_PUBKEY_get(X509_PUBKEY *key)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *ret = X509_PUBKEY_get0(key);
+
+ if (ret != NULL && !EVP_PKEY_up_ref(ret)) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_GET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ret = NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Now two pseudo ASN1 routines that take an EVP_PKEY structure and encode or
+ * decode as X509_PUBKEY
+ */
+
+EVP_PKEY *d2i_PUBKEY(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
+{
+ X509_PUBKEY *xpk;
+ EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
+ const unsigned char *q;
+ q = *pp;
+ xpk = d2i_X509_PUBKEY(NULL, &q, length);
+ if (!xpk)
+ return NULL;
+ pktmp = X509_PUBKEY_get(xpk);
+ X509_PUBKEY_free(xpk);
+ if (!pktmp)
+ return NULL;
+ *pp = q;
+ if (a) {
+ EVP_PKEY_free(*a);
+ *a = pktmp;
+ }
+ return pktmp;
+}
+
+int i2d_PUBKEY(EVP_PKEY *a, unsigned char **pp)
+{
+ X509_PUBKEY *xpk = NULL;
+ int ret;
+ if (!a)
+ return 0;
+ if (!X509_PUBKEY_set(&xpk, a))
+ return -1;
+ ret = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(xpk, pp);
+ X509_PUBKEY_free(xpk);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The following are equivalents but which return RSA and DSA keys
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+RSA *d2i_RSA_PUBKEY(RSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+ RSA *key;
+ const unsigned char *q;
+ q = *pp;
+ pkey = d2i_PUBKEY(NULL, &q, length);
+ if (!pkey)
+ return NULL;
+ key = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ if (!key)
+ return NULL;
+ *pp = q;
+ if (a) {
+ RSA_free(*a);
+ *a = key;
+ }
+ return key;
+}
+
+int i2d_RSA_PUBKEY(RSA *a, unsigned char **pp)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
+ int ret;
+ if (!a)
+ return 0;
+ pktmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
+ if (pktmp == NULL) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_I2D_RSA_PUBKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pktmp, a);
+ ret = i2d_PUBKEY(pktmp, pp);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+DSA *d2i_DSA_PUBKEY(DSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+ DSA *key;
+ const unsigned char *q;
+ q = *pp;
+ pkey = d2i_PUBKEY(NULL, &q, length);
+ if (!pkey)
+ return NULL;
+ key = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ if (!key)
+ return NULL;
+ *pp = q;
+ if (a) {
+ DSA_free(*a);
+ *a = key;
+ }
+ return key;
+}
+
+int i2d_DSA_PUBKEY(DSA *a, unsigned char **pp)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
+ int ret;
+ if (!a)
+ return 0;
+ pktmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
+ if (pktmp == NULL) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_I2D_DSA_PUBKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pktmp, a);
+ ret = i2d_PUBKEY(pktmp, pp);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+EC_KEY *d2i_EC_PUBKEY(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+ EC_KEY *key;
+ const unsigned char *q;
+ q = *pp;
+ pkey = d2i_PUBKEY(NULL, &q, length);
+ if (!pkey)
+ return NULL;
+ key = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ if (!key)
+ return NULL;
+ *pp = q;
+ if (a) {
+ EC_KEY_free(*a);
+ *a = key;
+ }
+ return key;
+}
+
+int i2d_EC_PUBKEY(EC_KEY *a, unsigned char **pp)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
+ int ret;
+ if (!a)
+ return 0;
+ if ((pktmp = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_I2D_EC_PUBKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pktmp, a);
+ ret = i2d_PUBKEY(pktmp, pp);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+int X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(X509_PUBKEY *pub, ASN1_OBJECT *aobj,
+ int ptype, void *pval,
+ unsigned char *penc, int penclen)
+{
+ if (!X509_ALGOR_set0(pub->algor, aobj, ptype, pval))
+ return 0;
+ if (penc) {
+ OPENSSL_free(pub->public_key->data);
+ pub->public_key->data = penc;
+ pub->public_key->length = penclen;
+ /* Set number of unused bits to zero */
+ pub->public_key->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07);
+ pub->public_key->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(ASN1_OBJECT **ppkalg,
+ const unsigned char **pk, int *ppklen,
+ X509_ALGOR **pa, X509_PUBKEY *pub)
+{
+ if (ppkalg)
+ *ppkalg = pub->algor->algorithm;
+ if (pk) {
+ *pk = pub->public_key->data;
+ *ppklen = pub->public_key->length;
+ }
+ if (pa)
+ *pa = pub->algor;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x)
+{
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ return x->cert_info.key->public_key;
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x_req.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x_req.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d2b02f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x_req.c
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "crypto/x509.h"
+
+/*-
+ * X509_REQ_INFO is handled in an unusual way to get round
+ * invalid encodings. Some broken certificate requests don't
+ * encode the attributes field if it is empty. This is in
+ * violation of PKCS#10 but we need to tolerate it. We do
+ * this by making the attributes field OPTIONAL then using
+ * the callback to initialise it to an empty STACK.
+ *
+ * This means that the field will be correctly encoded unless
+ * we NULL out the field.
+ *
+ * As a result we no longer need the req_kludge field because
+ * the information is now contained in the attributes field:
+ * 1. If it is NULL then it's the invalid omission.
+ * 2. If it is empty it is the correct encoding.
+ * 3. If it is not empty then some attributes are present.
+ *
+ */
+
+static int rinf_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+ void *exarg)
+{
+ X509_REQ_INFO *rinf = (X509_REQ_INFO *)*pval;
+
+ if (operation == ASN1_OP_NEW_POST) {
+ rinf->attributes = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_new_null();
+ if (!rinf->attributes)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_enc(X509_REQ_INFO, enc, rinf_cb) = {
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REQ_INFO, version, ASN1_INTEGER),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REQ_INFO, subject, X509_NAME),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REQ_INFO, pubkey, X509_PUBKEY),
+ /* This isn't really OPTIONAL but it gets round invalid
+ * encodings
+ */
+ ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(X509_REQ_INFO, attributes, X509_ATTRIBUTE, 0)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_enc(X509_REQ_INFO, X509_REQ_INFO)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_REQ_INFO)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_ref(X509_REQ, 0) = {
+ ASN1_EMBED(X509_REQ, req_info, X509_REQ_INFO),
+ ASN1_EMBED(X509_REQ, sig_alg, X509_ALGOR),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REQ, signature, ASN1_BIT_STRING)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(X509_REQ, X509_REQ)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_REQ)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_REQ)
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x_x509.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x_x509.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7aa8b77
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x_x509.c
@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "crypto/x509.h"
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_enc(X509_CINF, enc, 0) = {
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(X509_CINF, version, ASN1_INTEGER, 0),
+ ASN1_EMBED(X509_CINF, serialNumber, ASN1_INTEGER),
+ ASN1_EMBED(X509_CINF, signature, X509_ALGOR),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, issuer, X509_NAME),
+ ASN1_EMBED(X509_CINF, validity, X509_VAL),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, subject, X509_NAME),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, key, X509_PUBKEY),
+ ASN1_IMP_OPT(X509_CINF, issuerUID, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 1),
+ ASN1_IMP_OPT(X509_CINF, subjectUID, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 2),
+ ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CINF, extensions, X509_EXTENSION, 3)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_enc(X509_CINF, X509_CINF)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CINF)
+/* X509 top level structure needs a bit of customisation */
+
+extern void policy_cache_free(X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache);
+
+static int x509_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+ void *exarg)
+{
+ X509 *ret = (X509 *)*pval;
+
+ switch (operation) {
+
+ case ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE:
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509, ret, &ret->ex_data);
+ X509_CERT_AUX_free(ret->aux);
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ret->skid);
+ AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(ret->akid);
+ CRL_DIST_POINTS_free(ret->crldp);
+ policy_cache_free(ret->policy_cache);
+ GENERAL_NAMES_free(ret->altname);
+ NAME_CONSTRAINTS_free(ret->nc);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
+ sk_IPAddressFamily_pop_free(ret->rfc3779_addr, IPAddressFamily_free);
+ ASIdentifiers_free(ret->rfc3779_asid);
+#endif
+
+ /* fall thru */
+
+ case ASN1_OP_NEW_POST:
+ ret->ex_cached = 0;
+ ret->ex_kusage = 0;
+ ret->ex_xkusage = 0;
+ ret->ex_nscert = 0;
+ ret->ex_flags = 0;
+ ret->ex_pathlen = -1;
+ ret->ex_pcpathlen = -1;
+ ret->skid = NULL;
+ ret->akid = NULL;
+ ret->policy_cache = NULL;
+ ret->altname = NULL;
+ ret->nc = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
+ ret->rfc3779_addr = NULL;
+ ret->rfc3779_asid = NULL;
+#endif
+ ret->aux = NULL;
+ ret->crldp = NULL;
+ if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509, ret, &ret->ex_data))
+ return 0;
+ break;
+
+ case ASN1_OP_FREE_POST:
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509, ret, &ret->ex_data);
+ X509_CERT_AUX_free(ret->aux);
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ret->skid);
+ AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(ret->akid);
+ CRL_DIST_POINTS_free(ret->crldp);
+ policy_cache_free(ret->policy_cache);
+ GENERAL_NAMES_free(ret->altname);
+ NAME_CONSTRAINTS_free(ret->nc);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
+ sk_IPAddressFamily_pop_free(ret->rfc3779_addr, IPAddressFamily_free);
+ ASIdentifiers_free(ret->rfc3779_asid);
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+
+}
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_ref(X509, x509_cb) = {
+ ASN1_EMBED(X509, cert_info, X509_CINF),
+ ASN1_EMBED(X509, sig_alg, X509_ALGOR),
+ ASN1_EMBED(X509, signature, ASN1_BIT_STRING)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(X509, X509)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509)
+
+int X509_set_ex_data(X509 *r, int idx, void *arg)
+{
+ return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx, arg);
+}
+
+void *X509_get_ex_data(X509 *r, int idx)
+{
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * X509_AUX ASN1 routines. X509_AUX is the name given to a certificate with
+ * extra info tagged on the end. Since these functions set how a certificate
+ * is trusted they should only be used when the certificate comes from a
+ * reliable source such as local storage.
+ */
+
+X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
+{
+ const unsigned char *q;
+ X509 *ret;
+ int freeret = 0;
+
+ /* Save start position */
+ q = *pp;
+
+ if (a == NULL || *a == NULL)
+ freeret = 1;
+ ret = d2i_X509(a, &q, length);
+ /* If certificate unreadable then forget it */
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ /* update length */
+ length -= q - *pp;
+ if (length > 0 && !d2i_X509_CERT_AUX(&ret->aux, &q, length))
+ goto err;
+ *pp = q;
+ return ret;
+ err:
+ if (freeret) {
+ X509_free(ret);
+ if (a)
+ *a = NULL;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Serialize trusted certificate to *pp or just return the required buffer
+ * length if pp == NULL. We ultimately want to avoid modifying *pp in the
+ * error path, but that depends on similar hygiene in lower-level functions.
+ * Here we avoid compounding the problem.
+ */
+static int i2d_x509_aux_internal(X509 *a, unsigned char **pp)
+{
+ int length, tmplen;
+ unsigned char *start = pp != NULL ? *pp : NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * This might perturb *pp on error, but fixing that belongs in i2d_X509()
+ * not here. It should be that if a == NULL length is zero, but we check
+ * both just in case.
+ */
+ length = i2d_X509(a, pp);
+ if (length <= 0 || a == NULL)
+ return length;
+
+ tmplen = i2d_X509_CERT_AUX(a->aux, pp);
+ if (tmplen < 0) {
+ if (start != NULL)
+ *pp = start;
+ return tmplen;
+ }
+ length += tmplen;
+
+ return length;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Serialize trusted certificate to *pp, or just return the required buffer
+ * length if pp == NULL.
+ *
+ * When pp is not NULL, but *pp == NULL, we allocate the buffer, but since
+ * we're writing two ASN.1 objects back to back, we can't have i2d_X509() do
+ * the allocation, nor can we allow i2d_X509_CERT_AUX() to increment the
+ * allocated buffer.
+ */
+int i2d_X509_AUX(X509 *a, unsigned char **pp)
+{
+ int length;
+ unsigned char *tmp;
+
+ /* Buffer provided by caller */
+ if (pp == NULL || *pp != NULL)
+ return i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, pp);
+
+ /* Obtain the combined length */
+ if ((length = i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, NULL)) <= 0)
+ return length;
+
+ /* Allocate requisite combined storage */
+ *pp = tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(length);
+ if (tmp == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_I2D_X509_AUX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Encode, but keep *pp at the originally malloced pointer */
+ length = i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, &tmp);
+ if (length <= 0) {
+ OPENSSL_free(*pp);
+ *pp = NULL;
+ }
+ return length;
+}
+
+int i2d_re_X509_tbs(X509 *x, unsigned char **pp)
+{
+ x->cert_info.enc.modified = 1;
+ return i2d_X509_CINF(&x->cert_info, pp);
+}
+
+void X509_get0_signature(const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psig,
+ const X509_ALGOR **palg, const X509 *x)
+{
+ if (psig)
+ *psig = &x->signature;
+ if (palg)
+ *palg = &x->sig_alg;
+}
+
+int X509_get_signature_nid(const X509 *x)
+{
+ return OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg.algorithm);
+}
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x_x509a.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x_x509a.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c5175fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x_x509a.c
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "crypto/x509.h"
+
+/*
+ * X509_CERT_AUX routines. These are used to encode additional user
+ * modifiable data about a certificate. This data is appended to the X509
+ * encoding when the *_X509_AUX routines are used. This means that the
+ * "traditional" X509 routines will simply ignore the extra data.
+ */
+
+static X509_CERT_AUX *aux_get(X509 *x);
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(X509_CERT_AUX) = {
+ ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CERT_AUX, trust, ASN1_OBJECT),
+ ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CERT_AUX, reject, ASN1_OBJECT, 0),
+ ASN1_OPT(X509_CERT_AUX, alias, ASN1_UTF8STRING),
+ ASN1_OPT(X509_CERT_AUX, keyid, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+ ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CERT_AUX, other, X509_ALGOR, 1)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X509_CERT_AUX)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CERT_AUX)
+
+int X509_trusted(const X509 *x)
+{
+ return x->aux ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+static X509_CERT_AUX *aux_get(X509 *x)
+{
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ if (x->aux == NULL && (x->aux = X509_CERT_AUX_new()) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ return x->aux;
+}
+
+int X509_alias_set1(X509 *x, const unsigned char *name, int len)
+{
+ X509_CERT_AUX *aux;
+ if (!name) {
+ if (!x || !x->aux || !x->aux->alias)
+ return 1;
+ ASN1_UTF8STRING_free(x->aux->alias);
+ x->aux->alias = NULL;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if ((aux = aux_get(x)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (aux->alias == NULL && (aux->alias = ASN1_UTF8STRING_new()) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ return ASN1_STRING_set(aux->alias, name, len);
+}
+
+int X509_keyid_set1(X509 *x, const unsigned char *id, int len)
+{
+ X509_CERT_AUX *aux;
+ if (!id) {
+ if (!x || !x->aux || !x->aux->keyid)
+ return 1;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(x->aux->keyid);
+ x->aux->keyid = NULL;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if ((aux = aux_get(x)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (aux->keyid == NULL
+ && (aux->keyid = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ return ASN1_STRING_set(aux->keyid, id, len);
+}
+
+unsigned char *X509_alias_get0(X509 *x, int *len)
+{
+ if (!x->aux || !x->aux->alias)
+ return NULL;
+ if (len)
+ *len = x->aux->alias->length;
+ return x->aux->alias->data;
+}
+
+unsigned char *X509_keyid_get0(X509 *x, int *len)
+{
+ if (!x->aux || !x->aux->keyid)
+ return NULL;
+ if (len)
+ *len = x->aux->keyid->length;
+ return x->aux->keyid->data;
+}
+
+int X509_add1_trust_object(X509 *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj)
+{
+ X509_CERT_AUX *aux;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *objtmp = NULL;
+ if (obj) {
+ objtmp = OBJ_dup(obj);
+ if (!objtmp)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((aux = aux_get(x)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (aux->trust == NULL
+ && (aux->trust = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_new_null()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!objtmp || sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(aux->trust, objtmp))
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(objtmp);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int X509_add1_reject_object(X509 *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj)
+{
+ X509_CERT_AUX *aux;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *objtmp;
+ if ((objtmp = OBJ_dup(obj)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if ((aux = aux_get(x)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (aux->reject == NULL
+ && (aux->reject = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_new_null()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ return sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(aux->reject, objtmp);
+ err:
+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(objtmp);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void X509_trust_clear(X509 *x)
+{
+ if (x->aux) {
+ sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(x->aux->trust, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
+ x->aux->trust = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+void X509_reject_clear(X509 *x)
+{
+ if (x->aux) {
+ sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(x->aux->reject, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
+ x->aux->reject = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *X509_get0_trust_objects(X509 *x)
+{
+ if (x->aux != NULL)
+ return x->aux->trust;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *X509_get0_reject_objects(X509 *x)
+{
+ if (x->aux != NULL)
+ return x->aux->reject;
+ return NULL;
+}