zte's code,first commit
Change-Id: I9a04da59e459a9bc0d67f101f700d9d7dc8d681b
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a10d437
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,300 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "crypto/x509.h"
+
+static int tr_cmp(const X509_TRUST *const *a, const X509_TRUST *const *b);
+static void trtable_free(X509_TRUST *p);
+
+static int trust_1oidany(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags);
+static int trust_1oid(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags);
+static int trust_compat(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags);
+
+static int obj_trust(int id, X509 *x, int flags);
+static int (*default_trust) (int id, X509 *x, int flags) = obj_trust;
+
+/*
+ * WARNING: the following table should be kept in order of trust and without
+ * any gaps so we can just subtract the minimum trust value to get an index
+ * into the table
+ */
+
+static X509_TRUST trstandard[] = {
+ {X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, trust_compat, "compatible", 0, NULL},
+ {X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0, trust_1oidany, "SSL Client", NID_client_auth,
+ NULL},
+ {X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, trust_1oidany, "SSL Server", NID_server_auth,
+ NULL},
+ {X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, trust_1oidany, "S/MIME email", NID_email_protect,
+ NULL},
+ {X509_TRUST_OBJECT_SIGN, 0, trust_1oidany, "Object Signer", NID_code_sign,
+ NULL},
+ {X509_TRUST_OCSP_SIGN, 0, trust_1oid, "OCSP responder", NID_OCSP_sign,
+ NULL},
+ {X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST, 0, trust_1oid, "OCSP request", NID_ad_OCSP,
+ NULL},
+ {X509_TRUST_TSA, 0, trust_1oidany, "TSA server", NID_time_stamp, NULL}
+};
+
+#define X509_TRUST_COUNT OSSL_NELEM(trstandard)
+
+static STACK_OF(X509_TRUST) *trtable = NULL;
+
+static int tr_cmp(const X509_TRUST *const *a, const X509_TRUST *const *b)
+{
+ return (*a)->trust - (*b)->trust;
+}
+
+int (*X509_TRUST_set_default(int (*trust) (int, X509 *, int))) (int, X509 *,
+ int) {
+ int (*oldtrust) (int, X509 *, int);
+ oldtrust = default_trust;
+ default_trust = trust;
+ return oldtrust;
+}
+
+int X509_check_trust(X509 *x, int id, int flags)
+{
+ X509_TRUST *pt;
+ int idx;
+
+ /* We get this as a default value */
+ if (id == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
+ return obj_trust(NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage, x,
+ flags | X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT);
+ idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(id);
+ if (idx == -1)
+ return default_trust(id, x, flags);
+ pt = X509_TRUST_get0(idx);
+ return pt->check_trust(pt, x, flags);
+}
+
+int X509_TRUST_get_count(void)
+{
+ if (!trtable)
+ return X509_TRUST_COUNT;
+ return sk_X509_TRUST_num(trtable) + X509_TRUST_COUNT;
+}
+
+X509_TRUST *X509_TRUST_get0(int idx)
+{
+ if (idx < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ if (idx < (int)X509_TRUST_COUNT)
+ return trstandard + idx;
+ return sk_X509_TRUST_value(trtable, idx - X509_TRUST_COUNT);
+}
+
+int X509_TRUST_get_by_id(int id)
+{
+ X509_TRUST tmp;
+ int idx;
+
+ if ((id >= X509_TRUST_MIN) && (id <= X509_TRUST_MAX))
+ return id - X509_TRUST_MIN;
+ if (trtable == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ tmp.trust = id;
+ idx = sk_X509_TRUST_find(trtable, &tmp);
+ if (idx < 0)
+ return -1;
+ return idx + X509_TRUST_COUNT;
+}
+
+int X509_TRUST_set(int *t, int trust)
+{
+ if (X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust) == -1) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_SET, X509_R_INVALID_TRUST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *t = trust;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_TRUST_add(int id, int flags, int (*ck) (X509_TRUST *, X509 *, int),
+ const char *name, int arg1, void *arg2)
+{
+ int idx;
+ X509_TRUST *trtmp;
+ /*
+ * This is set according to what we change: application can't set it
+ */
+ flags &= ~X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC;
+ /* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */
+ flags |= X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC_NAME;
+ /* Get existing entry if any */
+ idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(id);
+ /* Need a new entry */
+ if (idx == -1) {
+ if ((trtmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*trtmp))) == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ trtmp->flags = X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC;
+ } else
+ trtmp = X509_TRUST_get0(idx);
+
+ /* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */
+ if (trtmp->flags & X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC_NAME)
+ OPENSSL_free(trtmp->name);
+ /* dup supplied name */
+ if ((trtmp->name = OPENSSL_strdup(name)) == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */
+ trtmp->flags &= X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC;
+ /* Set all other flags */
+ trtmp->flags |= flags;
+
+ trtmp->trust = id;
+ trtmp->check_trust = ck;
+ trtmp->arg1 = arg1;
+ trtmp->arg2 = arg2;
+
+ /* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */
+ if (idx == -1) {
+ if (trtable == NULL
+ && (trtable = sk_X509_TRUST_new(tr_cmp)) == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;;
+ }
+ if (!sk_X509_TRUST_push(trtable, trtmp)) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ if (idx == -1) {
+ OPENSSL_free(trtmp->name);
+ OPENSSL_free(trtmp);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void trtable_free(X509_TRUST *p)
+{
+ if (!p)
+ return;
+ if (p->flags & X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC) {
+ if (p->flags & X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC_NAME)
+ OPENSSL_free(p->name);
+ OPENSSL_free(p);
+ }
+}
+
+void X509_TRUST_cleanup(void)
+{
+ sk_X509_TRUST_pop_free(trtable, trtable_free);
+ trtable = NULL;
+}
+
+int X509_TRUST_get_flags(const X509_TRUST *xp)
+{
+ return xp->flags;
+}
+
+char *X509_TRUST_get0_name(const X509_TRUST *xp)
+{
+ return xp->name;
+}
+
+int X509_TRUST_get_trust(const X509_TRUST *xp)
+{
+ return xp->trust;
+}
+
+static int trust_1oidany(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags)
+{
+ /*
+ * Declare the chain verified if the desired trust OID is not rejected in
+ * any auxiliary trust info for this certificate, and the OID is either
+ * expressly trusted, or else either "anyEKU" is trusted, or the
+ * certificate is self-signed.
+ */
+ flags |= X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT | X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU;
+ return obj_trust(trust->arg1, x, flags);
+}
+
+static int trust_1oid(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags)
+{
+ /*
+ * Declare the chain verified only if the desired trust OID is not
+ * rejected and is expressly trusted. Neither "anyEKU" nor "compat"
+ * trust in self-signed certificates apply.
+ */
+ flags &= ~(X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT | X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU);
+ return obj_trust(trust->arg1, x, flags);
+}
+
+static int trust_compat(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags)
+{
+ /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
+ if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1)
+ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+ if ((flags & X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT) == 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS))
+ return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+ else
+ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+}
+
+static int obj_trust(int id, X509 *x, int flags)
+{
+ X509_CERT_AUX *ax = x->aux;
+ int i;
+
+ if (ax && ax->reject) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(ax->reject); i++) {
+ ASN1_OBJECT *obj = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(ax->reject, i);
+ int nid = OBJ_obj2nid(obj);
+
+ if (nid == id || (nid == NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage &&
+ (flags & X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU)))
+ return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ax && ax->trust) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(ax->trust); i++) {
+ ASN1_OBJECT *obj = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(ax->trust, i);
+ int nid = OBJ_obj2nid(obj);
+
+ if (nid == id || (nid == NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage &&
+ (flags & X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU)))
+ return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Reject when explicit trust EKU are set and none match.
+ *
+ * Returning untrusted is enough for for full chains that end in
+ * self-signed roots, because when explicit trust is specified it
+ * suppresses the default blanket trust of self-signed objects.
+ *
+ * But for partial chains, this is not enough, because absent a similar
+ * trust-self-signed policy, non matching EKUs are indistinguishable
+ * from lack of EKU constraints.
+ *
+ * Therefore, failure to match any trusted purpose must trigger an
+ * explicit reject.
+ */
+ return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
+ }
+
+ if ((flags & X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT) == 0)
+ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+
+ /*
+ * Not rejected, and there is no list of accepted uses, try compat.
+ */
+ return trust_compat(NULL, x, flags);
+}