yuezonghe | 824eb0c | 2024-06-27 02:32:26 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 1 | /* |
| 2 | * Copyright 2013-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| 3 | * |
| 4 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
| 5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
| 6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
| 7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
| 8 | */ |
| 9 | |
| 10 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
| 11 | #include <openssl/asn1t.h> |
| 12 | #include <openssl/pem.h> |
| 13 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
| 14 | #include <openssl/err.h> |
| 15 | #include <openssl/cms.h> |
| 16 | #include <openssl/aes.h> |
| 17 | #include "cms_local.h" |
| 18 | #include "crypto/asn1.h" |
| 19 | |
| 20 | /* Key Agreement Recipient Info (KARI) routines */ |
| 21 | |
| 22 | int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, |
| 23 | X509_ALGOR **palg, |
| 24 | ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pukm) |
| 25 | { |
| 26 | if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) { |
| 27 | CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ALG, |
| 28 | CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT); |
| 29 | return 0; |
| 30 | } |
| 31 | if (palg) |
| 32 | *palg = ri->d.kari->keyEncryptionAlgorithm; |
| 33 | if (pukm) |
| 34 | *pukm = ri->d.kari->ukm; |
| 35 | return 1; |
| 36 | } |
| 37 | |
| 38 | /* Retrieve recipient encrypted keys from a kari */ |
| 39 | |
| 40 | STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) |
| 41 | *CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_reks(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) |
| 42 | { |
| 43 | if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) { |
| 44 | CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_REKS, |
| 45 | CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT); |
| 46 | return NULL; |
| 47 | } |
| 48 | return ri->d.kari->recipientEncryptedKeys; |
| 49 | } |
| 50 | |
| 51 | int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, |
| 52 | X509_ALGOR **pubalg, |
| 53 | ASN1_BIT_STRING **pubkey, |
| 54 | ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, |
| 55 | X509_NAME **issuer, |
| 56 | ASN1_INTEGER **sno) |
| 57 | { |
| 58 | CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik; |
| 59 | if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) { |
| 60 | CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ORIG_ID, |
| 61 | CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT); |
| 62 | return 0; |
| 63 | } |
| 64 | oik = ri->d.kari->originator; |
| 65 | if (issuer) |
| 66 | *issuer = NULL; |
| 67 | if (sno) |
| 68 | *sno = NULL; |
| 69 | if (keyid) |
| 70 | *keyid = NULL; |
| 71 | if (pubalg) |
| 72 | *pubalg = NULL; |
| 73 | if (pubkey) |
| 74 | *pubkey = NULL; |
| 75 | if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL) { |
| 76 | if (issuer) |
| 77 | *issuer = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer; |
| 78 | if (sno) |
| 79 | *sno = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber; |
| 80 | } else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER) { |
| 81 | if (keyid) |
| 82 | *keyid = oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier; |
| 83 | } else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_PUBKEY) { |
| 84 | if (pubalg) |
| 85 | *pubalg = oik->d.originatorKey->algorithm; |
| 86 | if (pubkey) |
| 87 | *pubkey = oik->d.originatorKey->publicKey; |
| 88 | } else |
| 89 | return 0; |
| 90 | return 1; |
| 91 | } |
| 92 | |
| 93 | int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_orig_id_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *cert) |
| 94 | { |
| 95 | CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik; |
| 96 | if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) { |
| 97 | CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ORIG_ID_CMP, |
| 98 | CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT); |
| 99 | return -2; |
| 100 | } |
| 101 | oik = ri->d.kari->originator; |
| 102 | if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL) |
| 103 | return cms_ias_cert_cmp(oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert); |
| 104 | else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER) |
| 105 | return cms_keyid_cert_cmp(oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier, cert); |
| 106 | return -1; |
| 107 | } |
| 108 | |
| 109 | int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_get0_id(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek, |
| 110 | ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, |
| 111 | ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **tm, |
| 112 | CMS_OtherKeyAttribute **other, |
| 113 | X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno) |
| 114 | { |
| 115 | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid; |
| 116 | if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL) { |
| 117 | if (issuer) |
| 118 | *issuer = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer; |
| 119 | if (sno) |
| 120 | *sno = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber; |
| 121 | if (keyid) |
| 122 | *keyid = NULL; |
| 123 | if (tm) |
| 124 | *tm = NULL; |
| 125 | if (other) |
| 126 | *other = NULL; |
| 127 | } else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER) { |
| 128 | if (keyid) |
| 129 | *keyid = rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier; |
| 130 | if (tm) |
| 131 | *tm = rid->d.rKeyId->date; |
| 132 | if (other) |
| 133 | *other = rid->d.rKeyId->other; |
| 134 | if (issuer) |
| 135 | *issuer = NULL; |
| 136 | if (sno) |
| 137 | *sno = NULL; |
| 138 | } else |
| 139 | return 0; |
| 140 | return 1; |
| 141 | } |
| 142 | |
| 143 | int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_cert_cmp(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek, |
| 144 | X509 *cert) |
| 145 | { |
| 146 | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid; |
| 147 | if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL) |
| 148 | return cms_ias_cert_cmp(rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert); |
| 149 | else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER) |
| 150 | return cms_keyid_cert_cmp(rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, cert); |
| 151 | else |
| 152 | return -1; |
| 153 | } |
| 154 | |
| 155 | int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY *pk) |
| 156 | { |
| 157 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; |
| 158 | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari = ri->d.kari; |
| 159 | |
| 160 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx); |
| 161 | kari->pctx = NULL; |
| 162 | if (!pk) |
| 163 | return 1; |
| 164 | pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); |
| 165 | if (!pctx || EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0) |
| 166 | goto err; |
| 167 | kari->pctx = pctx; |
| 168 | return 1; |
| 169 | err: |
| 170 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); |
| 171 | return 0; |
| 172 | } |
| 173 | |
| 174 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) |
| 175 | { |
| 176 | if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) |
| 177 | return ri->d.kari->ctx; |
| 178 | return NULL; |
| 179 | } |
| 180 | |
| 181 | /* |
| 182 | * Derive KEK and decrypt/encrypt with it to produce either the original CEK |
| 183 | * or the encrypted CEK. |
| 184 | */ |
| 185 | |
| 186 | static int cms_kek_cipher(unsigned char **pout, size_t *poutlen, |
| 187 | const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, |
| 188 | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari, int enc) |
| 189 | { |
| 190 | /* Key encryption key */ |
| 191 | unsigned char kek[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; |
| 192 | size_t keklen; |
| 193 | int rv = 0; |
| 194 | unsigned char *out = NULL; |
| 195 | int outlen; |
| 196 | keklen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(kari->ctx); |
| 197 | if (keklen > EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH) |
| 198 | return 0; |
| 199 | /* Derive KEK */ |
| 200 | if (EVP_PKEY_derive(kari->pctx, kek, &keklen) <= 0) |
| 201 | goto err; |
| 202 | /* Set KEK in context */ |
| 203 | if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(kari->ctx, NULL, NULL, kek, NULL, enc)) |
| 204 | goto err; |
| 205 | /* obtain output length of ciphered key */ |
| 206 | if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(kari->ctx, NULL, &outlen, in, inlen)) |
| 207 | goto err; |
| 208 | out = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen); |
| 209 | if (out == NULL) |
| 210 | goto err; |
| 211 | if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(kari->ctx, out, &outlen, in, inlen)) |
| 212 | goto err; |
| 213 | *pout = out; |
| 214 | *poutlen = (size_t)outlen; |
| 215 | rv = 1; |
| 216 | |
| 217 | err: |
| 218 | OPENSSL_cleanse(kek, keklen); |
| 219 | if (!rv) |
| 220 | OPENSSL_free(out); |
| 221 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(kari->ctx); |
| 222 | /* FIXME: WHY IS kari->pctx freed here? /RL */ |
| 223 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx); |
| 224 | kari->pctx = NULL; |
| 225 | return rv; |
| 226 | } |
| 227 | |
| 228 | int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, |
| 229 | CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, |
| 230 | CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek) |
| 231 | { |
| 232 | int rv = 0; |
| 233 | unsigned char *enckey = NULL, *cek = NULL; |
| 234 | size_t enckeylen; |
| 235 | size_t ceklen; |
| 236 | CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec; |
| 237 | enckeylen = rek->encryptedKey->length; |
| 238 | enckey = rek->encryptedKey->data; |
| 239 | /* Setup all parameters to derive KEK */ |
| 240 | if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 1)) |
| 241 | goto err; |
| 242 | /* Attempt to decrypt CEK */ |
| 243 | if (!cms_kek_cipher(&cek, &ceklen, enckey, enckeylen, ri->d.kari, 0)) |
| 244 | goto err; |
| 245 | ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo; |
| 246 | OPENSSL_clear_free(ec->key, ec->keylen); |
| 247 | ec->key = cek; |
| 248 | ec->keylen = ceklen; |
| 249 | cek = NULL; |
| 250 | rv = 1; |
| 251 | err: |
| 252 | OPENSSL_free(cek); |
| 253 | return rv; |
| 254 | } |
| 255 | |
| 256 | /* Create ephemeral key and initialise context based on it */ |
| 257 | static int cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari, |
| 258 | EVP_PKEY *pk) |
| 259 | { |
| 260 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
| 261 | EVP_PKEY *ekey = NULL; |
| 262 | int rv = 0; |
| 263 | pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); |
| 264 | if (!pctx) |
| 265 | goto err; |
| 266 | if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(pctx) <= 0) |
| 267 | goto err; |
| 268 | if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(pctx, &ekey) <= 0) |
| 269 | goto err; |
| 270 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); |
| 271 | pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(ekey, NULL); |
| 272 | if (!pctx) |
| 273 | goto err; |
| 274 | if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0) |
| 275 | goto err; |
| 276 | kari->pctx = pctx; |
| 277 | rv = 1; |
| 278 | err: |
| 279 | if (!rv) |
| 280 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); |
| 281 | EVP_PKEY_free(ekey); |
| 282 | return rv; |
| 283 | } |
| 284 | |
| 285 | /* Initialise a kari based on passed certificate and key */ |
| 286 | |
| 287 | int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *recip, |
| 288 | EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned int flags) |
| 289 | { |
| 290 | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari; |
| 291 | CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek = NULL; |
| 292 | |
| 293 | ri->d.kari = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo); |
| 294 | if (!ri->d.kari) |
| 295 | return 0; |
| 296 | ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE; |
| 297 | |
| 298 | kari = ri->d.kari; |
| 299 | kari->version = 3; |
| 300 | |
| 301 | rek = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey); |
| 302 | if (rek == NULL) |
| 303 | return 0; |
| 304 | |
| 305 | if (!sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_push(kari->recipientEncryptedKeys, rek)) { |
| 306 | M_ASN1_free_of(rek, CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey); |
| 307 | return 0; |
| 308 | } |
| 309 | |
| 310 | if (flags & CMS_USE_KEYID) { |
| 311 | rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER; |
| 312 | rek->rid->d.rKeyId = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier); |
| 313 | if (rek->rid->d.rKeyId == NULL) |
| 314 | return 0; |
| 315 | if (!cms_set1_keyid(&rek->rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, recip)) |
| 316 | return 0; |
| 317 | } else { |
| 318 | rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL; |
| 319 | if (!cms_set1_ias(&rek->rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, recip)) |
| 320 | return 0; |
| 321 | } |
| 322 | |
| 323 | /* Create ephemeral key */ |
| 324 | if (!cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(kari, pk)) |
| 325 | return 0; |
| 326 | |
| 327 | EVP_PKEY_up_ref(pk); |
| 328 | rek->pkey = pk; |
| 329 | return 1; |
| 330 | } |
| 331 | |
| 332 | static int cms_wrap_init(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari, |
| 333 | const EVP_CIPHER *cipher) |
| 334 | { |
| 335 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = kari->ctx; |
| 336 | const EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher; |
| 337 | int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher); |
| 338 | /* If a suitable wrap algorithm is already set nothing to do */ |
| 339 | kekcipher = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx); |
| 340 | |
| 341 | if (kekcipher) { |
| 342 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) != EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE) |
| 343 | return 0; |
| 344 | return 1; |
| 345 | } |
| 346 | /* |
| 347 | * Pick a cipher based on content encryption cipher. If it is DES3 use |
| 348 | * DES3 wrap otherwise use AES wrap similar to key size. |
| 349 | */ |
| 350 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES |
| 351 | if (EVP_CIPHER_type(cipher) == NID_des_ede3_cbc) |
| 352 | kekcipher = EVP_des_ede3_wrap(); |
| 353 | else |
| 354 | #endif |
| 355 | if (keylen <= 16) |
| 356 | kekcipher = EVP_aes_128_wrap(); |
| 357 | else if (keylen <= 24) |
| 358 | kekcipher = EVP_aes_192_wrap(); |
| 359 | else |
| 360 | kekcipher = EVP_aes_256_wrap(); |
| 361 | return EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL); |
| 362 | } |
| 363 | |
| 364 | /* Encrypt content key in key agreement recipient info */ |
| 365 | |
| 366 | int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_encrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, |
| 367 | CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) |
| 368 | { |
| 369 | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari; |
| 370 | CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec; |
| 371 | CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek; |
| 372 | STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) *reks; |
| 373 | int i; |
| 374 | |
| 375 | if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) { |
| 376 | CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT); |
| 377 | return 0; |
| 378 | } |
| 379 | kari = ri->d.kari; |
| 380 | reks = kari->recipientEncryptedKeys; |
| 381 | ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo; |
| 382 | /* Initialise wrap algorithm parameters */ |
| 383 | if (!cms_wrap_init(kari, ec->cipher)) |
| 384 | return 0; |
| 385 | /* |
| 386 | * If no originator key set up initialise for ephemeral key the public key |
| 387 | * ASN1 structure will set the actual public key value. |
| 388 | */ |
| 389 | if (kari->originator->type == -1) { |
| 390 | CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik = kari->originator; |
| 391 | oik->type = CMS_OIK_PUBKEY; |
| 392 | oik->d.originatorKey = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey); |
| 393 | if (!oik->d.originatorKey) |
| 394 | return 0; |
| 395 | } |
| 396 | /* Initialise KDF algorithm */ |
| 397 | if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 0)) |
| 398 | return 0; |
| 399 | /* For each rek, derive KEK, encrypt CEK */ |
| 400 | for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_num(reks); i++) { |
| 401 | unsigned char *enckey; |
| 402 | size_t enckeylen; |
| 403 | rek = sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_value(reks, i); |
| 404 | if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(kari->pctx, rek->pkey) <= 0) |
| 405 | return 0; |
| 406 | if (!cms_kek_cipher(&enckey, &enckeylen, ec->key, ec->keylen, |
| 407 | kari, 1)) |
| 408 | return 0; |
| 409 | ASN1_STRING_set0(rek->encryptedKey, enckey, enckeylen); |
| 410 | } |
| 411 | |
| 412 | return 1; |
| 413 | |
| 414 | } |