yuezonghe | 824eb0c | 2024-06-27 02:32:26 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 1 | /* |
| 2 | * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| 3 | * |
| 4 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
| 5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
| 6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
| 7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
| 8 | */ |
| 9 | |
| 10 | #include <openssl/ocsp.h> |
| 11 | #include "ocsp_local.h" |
| 12 | #include <openssl/err.h> |
| 13 | #include <string.h> |
| 14 | |
| 15 | static int ocsp_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, |
| 16 | STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned long flags); |
| 17 | static X509 *ocsp_find_signer_sk(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, OCSP_RESPID *id); |
| 18 | static int ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *chain); |
| 19 | static int ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp, |
| 20 | OCSP_CERTID **ret); |
| 21 | static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid, |
| 22 | STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp); |
| 23 | static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x); |
| 24 | static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req, |
| 25 | X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, |
| 26 | unsigned long flags); |
| 27 | |
| 28 | /* Verify a basic response message */ |
| 29 | |
| 30 | int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, |
| 31 | X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags) |
| 32 | { |
| 33 | X509 *signer, *x; |
| 34 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; |
| 35 | STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted = NULL; |
| 36 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
| 37 | int i, ret = ocsp_find_signer(&signer, bs, certs, flags); |
| 38 | |
| 39 | if (!ret) { |
| 40 | OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, |
| 41 | OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND); |
| 42 | goto end; |
| 43 | } |
| 44 | ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); |
| 45 | if (ctx == NULL) { |
| 46 | OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 47 | goto f_err; |
| 48 | } |
| 49 | if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER)) |
| 50 | flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY; |
| 51 | if (!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS)) { |
| 52 | EVP_PKEY *skey; |
| 53 | skey = X509_get0_pubkey(signer); |
| 54 | if (skey == NULL) { |
| 55 | OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_NO_SIGNER_KEY); |
| 56 | goto err; |
| 57 | } |
| 58 | ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0); |
| 59 | if (ret <= 0) { |
| 60 | OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE); |
| 61 | goto end; |
| 62 | } |
| 63 | } |
| 64 | if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY)) { |
| 65 | int init_res; |
| 66 | if (flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN) { |
| 67 | untrusted = NULL; |
| 68 | } else if (bs->certs && certs) { |
| 69 | untrusted = sk_X509_dup(bs->certs); |
| 70 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { |
| 71 | if (!sk_X509_push(untrusted, sk_X509_value(certs, i))) { |
| 72 | OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 73 | goto f_err; |
| 74 | } |
| 75 | } |
| 76 | } else if (certs != NULL) { |
| 77 | untrusted = certs; |
| 78 | } else { |
| 79 | untrusted = bs->certs; |
| 80 | } |
| 81 | init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, st, signer, untrusted); |
| 82 | if (!init_res) { |
| 83 | OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB); |
| 84 | goto f_err; |
| 85 | } |
| 86 | |
| 87 | X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER); |
| 88 | ret = X509_verify_cert(ctx); |
| 89 | chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(ctx); |
| 90 | if (ret <= 0) { |
| 91 | i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); |
| 92 | OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, |
| 93 | OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR); |
| 94 | ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:", |
| 95 | X509_verify_cert_error_string(i)); |
| 96 | goto end; |
| 97 | } |
| 98 | if (flags & OCSP_NOCHECKS) { |
| 99 | ret = 1; |
| 100 | goto end; |
| 101 | } |
| 102 | /* |
| 103 | * At this point we have a valid certificate chain need to verify it |
| 104 | * against the OCSP issuer criteria. |
| 105 | */ |
| 106 | ret = ocsp_check_issuer(bs, chain); |
| 107 | |
| 108 | /* If fatal error or valid match then finish */ |
| 109 | if (ret != 0) |
| 110 | goto end; |
| 111 | |
| 112 | /* |
| 113 | * Easy case: explicitly trusted. Get root CA and check for explicit |
| 114 | * trust |
| 115 | */ |
| 116 | if (flags & OCSP_NOEXPLICIT) |
| 117 | goto end; |
| 118 | |
| 119 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1); |
| 120 | if (X509_check_trust(x, NID_OCSP_sign, 0) != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) { |
| 121 | OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_ROOT_CA_NOT_TRUSTED); |
| 122 | goto err; |
| 123 | } |
| 124 | ret = 1; |
| 125 | } |
| 126 | end: |
| 127 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx); |
| 128 | sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free); |
| 129 | if (bs->certs && certs) |
| 130 | sk_X509_free(untrusted); |
| 131 | return ret; |
| 132 | |
| 133 | err: |
| 134 | ret = 0; |
| 135 | goto end; |
| 136 | f_err: |
| 137 | ret = -1; |
| 138 | goto end; |
| 139 | } |
| 140 | |
| 141 | int OCSP_resp_get0_signer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, X509 **signer, |
| 142 | STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs) |
| 143 | { |
| 144 | int ret; |
| 145 | |
| 146 | ret = ocsp_find_signer(signer, bs, extra_certs, 0); |
| 147 | return (ret > 0) ? 1 : 0; |
| 148 | } |
| 149 | |
| 150 | static int ocsp_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, |
| 151 | STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned long flags) |
| 152 | { |
| 153 | X509 *signer; |
| 154 | OCSP_RESPID *rid = &bs->tbsResponseData.responderId; |
| 155 | if ((signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(certs, rid))) { |
| 156 | *psigner = signer; |
| 157 | return 2; |
| 158 | } |
| 159 | if (!(flags & OCSP_NOINTERN) && |
| 160 | (signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(bs->certs, rid))) { |
| 161 | *psigner = signer; |
| 162 | return 1; |
| 163 | } |
| 164 | /* Maybe lookup from store if by subject name */ |
| 165 | |
| 166 | *psigner = NULL; |
| 167 | return 0; |
| 168 | } |
| 169 | |
| 170 | static X509 *ocsp_find_signer_sk(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, OCSP_RESPID *id) |
| 171 | { |
| 172 | int i; |
| 173 | unsigned char tmphash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH], *keyhash; |
| 174 | X509 *x; |
| 175 | |
| 176 | /* Easy if lookup by name */ |
| 177 | if (id->type == V_OCSP_RESPID_NAME) |
| 178 | return X509_find_by_subject(certs, id->value.byName); |
| 179 | |
| 180 | /* Lookup by key hash */ |
| 181 | |
| 182 | /* If key hash isn't SHA1 length then forget it */ |
| 183 | if (id->value.byKey->length != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) |
| 184 | return NULL; |
| 185 | keyhash = id->value.byKey->data; |
| 186 | /* Calculate hash of each key and compare */ |
| 187 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { |
| 188 | x = sk_X509_value(certs, i); |
| 189 | X509_pubkey_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), tmphash, NULL); |
| 190 | if (!memcmp(keyhash, tmphash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)) |
| 191 | return x; |
| 192 | } |
| 193 | return NULL; |
| 194 | } |
| 195 | |
| 196 | static int ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
| 197 | { |
| 198 | STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp; |
| 199 | X509 *signer, *sca; |
| 200 | OCSP_CERTID *caid = NULL; |
| 201 | int i; |
| 202 | sresp = bs->tbsResponseData.responses; |
| 203 | |
| 204 | if (sk_X509_num(chain) <= 0) { |
| 205 | OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_ISSUER, OCSP_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_IN_CHAIN); |
| 206 | return -1; |
| 207 | } |
| 208 | |
| 209 | /* See if the issuer IDs match. */ |
| 210 | i = ocsp_check_ids(sresp, &caid); |
| 211 | |
| 212 | /* If ID mismatch or other error then return */ |
| 213 | if (i <= 0) |
| 214 | return i; |
| 215 | |
| 216 | signer = sk_X509_value(chain, 0); |
| 217 | /* Check to see if OCSP responder CA matches request CA */ |
| 218 | if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 1) { |
| 219 | sca = sk_X509_value(chain, 1); |
| 220 | i = ocsp_match_issuerid(sca, caid, sresp); |
| 221 | if (i < 0) |
| 222 | return i; |
| 223 | if (i) { |
| 224 | /* We have a match, if extensions OK then success */ |
| 225 | if (ocsp_check_delegated(signer)) |
| 226 | return 1; |
| 227 | return 0; |
| 228 | } |
| 229 | } |
| 230 | |
| 231 | /* Otherwise check if OCSP request signed directly by request CA */ |
| 232 | return ocsp_match_issuerid(signer, caid, sresp); |
| 233 | } |
| 234 | |
| 235 | /* |
| 236 | * Check the issuer certificate IDs for equality. If there is a mismatch with |
| 237 | * the same algorithm then there's no point trying to match any certificates |
| 238 | * against the issuer. If the issuer IDs all match then we just need to check |
| 239 | * equality against one of them. |
| 240 | */ |
| 241 | |
| 242 | static int ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp, OCSP_CERTID **ret) |
| 243 | { |
| 244 | OCSP_CERTID *tmpid, *cid; |
| 245 | int i, idcount; |
| 246 | |
| 247 | idcount = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp); |
| 248 | if (idcount <= 0) { |
| 249 | OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_IDS, |
| 250 | OCSP_R_RESPONSE_CONTAINS_NO_REVOCATION_DATA); |
| 251 | return -1; |
| 252 | } |
| 253 | |
| 254 | cid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, 0)->certId; |
| 255 | |
| 256 | *ret = NULL; |
| 257 | |
| 258 | for (i = 1; i < idcount; i++) { |
| 259 | tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i)->certId; |
| 260 | /* Check to see if IDs match */ |
| 261 | if (OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(cid, tmpid)) { |
| 262 | /* If algorithm mismatch let caller deal with it */ |
| 263 | if (OBJ_cmp(tmpid->hashAlgorithm.algorithm, |
| 264 | cid->hashAlgorithm.algorithm)) |
| 265 | return 2; |
| 266 | /* Else mismatch */ |
| 267 | return 0; |
| 268 | } |
| 269 | } |
| 270 | |
| 271 | /* All IDs match: only need to check one ID */ |
| 272 | *ret = cid; |
| 273 | return 1; |
| 274 | } |
| 275 | |
| 276 | static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid, |
| 277 | STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp) |
| 278 | { |
| 279 | /* If only one ID to match then do it */ |
| 280 | if (cid) { |
| 281 | const EVP_MD *dgst; |
| 282 | X509_NAME *iname; |
| 283 | int mdlen; |
| 284 | unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| 285 | if ((dgst = EVP_get_digestbyobj(cid->hashAlgorithm.algorithm)) |
| 286 | == NULL) { |
| 287 | OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_MATCH_ISSUERID, |
| 288 | OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST); |
| 289 | return -1; |
| 290 | } |
| 291 | |
| 292 | mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst); |
| 293 | if (mdlen < 0) |
| 294 | return -1; |
| 295 | if ((cid->issuerNameHash.length != mdlen) || |
| 296 | (cid->issuerKeyHash.length != mdlen)) |
| 297 | return 0; |
| 298 | iname = X509_get_subject_name(cert); |
| 299 | if (!X509_NAME_digest(iname, dgst, md, NULL)) |
| 300 | return -1; |
| 301 | if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerNameHash.data, mdlen)) |
| 302 | return 0; |
| 303 | X509_pubkey_digest(cert, dgst, md, NULL); |
| 304 | if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerKeyHash.data, mdlen)) |
| 305 | return 0; |
| 306 | |
| 307 | return 1; |
| 308 | |
| 309 | } else { |
| 310 | /* We have to match the whole lot */ |
| 311 | int i, ret; |
| 312 | OCSP_CERTID *tmpid; |
| 313 | for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp); i++) { |
| 314 | tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i)->certId; |
| 315 | ret = ocsp_match_issuerid(cert, tmpid, NULL); |
| 316 | if (ret <= 0) |
| 317 | return ret; |
| 318 | } |
| 319 | return 1; |
| 320 | } |
| 321 | |
| 322 | } |
| 323 | |
| 324 | static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x) |
| 325 | { |
| 326 | if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) |
| 327 | && (X509_get_extended_key_usage(x) & XKU_OCSP_SIGN)) |
| 328 | return 1; |
| 329 | OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_DELEGATED, OCSP_R_MISSING_OCSPSIGNING_USAGE); |
| 330 | return 0; |
| 331 | } |
| 332 | |
| 333 | /* |
| 334 | * Verify an OCSP request. This is fortunately much easier than OCSP response |
| 335 | * verify. Just find the signers certificate and verify it against a given |
| 336 | * trust value. |
| 337 | */ |
| 338 | |
| 339 | int OCSP_request_verify(OCSP_REQUEST *req, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, |
| 340 | X509_STORE *store, unsigned long flags) |
| 341 | { |
| 342 | X509 *signer; |
| 343 | X509_NAME *nm; |
| 344 | GENERAL_NAME *gen; |
| 345 | int ret = 0; |
| 346 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); |
| 347 | |
| 348 | if (ctx == NULL) { |
| 349 | OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 350 | goto err; |
| 351 | } |
| 352 | |
| 353 | if (!req->optionalSignature) { |
| 354 | OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_REQUEST_NOT_SIGNED); |
| 355 | goto err; |
| 356 | } |
| 357 | gen = req->tbsRequest.requestorName; |
| 358 | if (!gen || gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) { |
| 359 | OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, |
| 360 | OCSP_R_UNSUPPORTED_REQUESTORNAME_TYPE); |
| 361 | goto err; |
| 362 | } |
| 363 | nm = gen->d.directoryName; |
| 364 | ret = ocsp_req_find_signer(&signer, req, nm, certs, flags); |
| 365 | if (ret <= 0) { |
| 366 | OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, |
| 367 | OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND); |
| 368 | goto err; |
| 369 | } |
| 370 | if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER)) |
| 371 | flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY; |
| 372 | if (!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS)) { |
| 373 | EVP_PKEY *skey; |
| 374 | skey = X509_get0_pubkey(signer); |
| 375 | ret = OCSP_REQUEST_verify(req, skey); |
| 376 | if (ret <= 0) { |
| 377 | OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE); |
| 378 | goto err; |
| 379 | } |
| 380 | } |
| 381 | if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY)) { |
| 382 | int init_res; |
| 383 | if (flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN) |
| 384 | init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, signer, NULL); |
| 385 | else |
| 386 | init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, signer, |
| 387 | req->optionalSignature->certs); |
| 388 | if (!init_res) { |
| 389 | OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB); |
| 390 | goto err; |
| 391 | } |
| 392 | |
| 393 | X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER); |
| 394 | X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(ctx, X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST); |
| 395 | ret = X509_verify_cert(ctx); |
| 396 | if (ret <= 0) { |
| 397 | ret = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); |
| 398 | OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, |
| 399 | OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR); |
| 400 | ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:", |
| 401 | X509_verify_cert_error_string(ret)); |
| 402 | goto err; |
| 403 | } |
| 404 | } |
| 405 | ret = 1; |
| 406 | goto end; |
| 407 | |
| 408 | err: |
| 409 | ret = 0; |
| 410 | end: |
| 411 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx); |
| 412 | return ret; |
| 413 | |
| 414 | } |
| 415 | |
| 416 | static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req, |
| 417 | X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, |
| 418 | unsigned long flags) |
| 419 | { |
| 420 | X509 *signer; |
| 421 | if (!(flags & OCSP_NOINTERN)) { |
| 422 | signer = X509_find_by_subject(req->optionalSignature->certs, nm); |
| 423 | if (signer) { |
| 424 | *psigner = signer; |
| 425 | return 1; |
| 426 | } |
| 427 | } |
| 428 | |
| 429 | signer = X509_find_by_subject(certs, nm); |
| 430 | if (signer) { |
| 431 | *psigner = signer; |
| 432 | return 2; |
| 433 | } |
| 434 | return 0; |
| 435 | } |