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192.168.1.100 / R306 / 2dbc1526a2b84342aa5d5d2a0b7c25c960d13710 / . / ap / lib / libssl / openssl-1.1.1o / ssl / statem / statem_srvr.c
blob: 43f77a58992f9b0ab84b6fb44616881c5b1749fa [file] [log] [blame]
yuezonghe824eb0c2024-06-27 02:32:26 -0700[diff] [blame]1/*
2 * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
5 *
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 */
11
12#include <stdio.h>
13#include "../ssl_local.h"
14#include "statem_local.h"
15#include "internal/constant_time.h"
16#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17#include <openssl/buffer.h>
18#include <openssl/rand.h>
19#include <openssl/objects.h>
20#include <openssl/evp.h>
21#include <openssl/hmac.h>
22#include <openssl/x509.h>
23#include <openssl/dh.h>
24#include <openssl/bn.h>
25#include <openssl/md5.h>
26#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
27
28#define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8
29
30typedef struct {
31 ASN1_TYPE *kxBlob;
32 ASN1_TYPE *opaqueBlob;
33} GOST_KX_MESSAGE;
34
35DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
36
37ASN1_SEQUENCE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE) = {
38 ASN1_SIMPLE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, kxBlob, ASN1_ANY),
39 ASN1_OPT(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, opaqueBlob, ASN1_ANY),
40} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
41
42IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
43
44static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
45
46/*
47 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
48 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
49 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
50 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
51 *
52 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
53 * (transition not allowed)
54 */
55static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
56{
57 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
58
59 /*
60 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
61 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
62 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
63 */
64 switch (st->hand_state) {
65 default:
66 break;
67
68 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
69 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
70 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
71 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
72 return 1;
73 }
74 break;
75 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
76 if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
77 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
78 return 1;
79 }
80 break;
81 }
82 /* Fall through */
83
84 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
85 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
86 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
87 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
88 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
89 return 1;
90 }
91 } else {
92 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
93 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
94 return 1;
95 }
96 }
97 break;
98
99 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
100 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
101 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
102 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
103 return 1;
104 }
105 } else {
106 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
107 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
108 return 1;
109 }
110 }
111 break;
112
113 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
114 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
115 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
116 return 1;
117 }
118 break;
119
120 case TLS_ST_OK:
121 /*
122 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
123 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
124 */
125 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
126 break;
127
128 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
129 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
130 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
131 return 1;
132 }
133
134 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
135 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
136 return 1;
137 }
138 break;
139 }
140
141 /* No valid transition found */
142 return 0;
143}
144
145/*
146 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
147 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
148 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
149 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
150 *
151 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
152 * (transition not allowed)
153 */
154int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
155{
156 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
157
158 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
159 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
160 goto err;
161 return 1;
162 }
163
164 switch (st->hand_state) {
165 default:
166 break;
167
168 case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
169 case TLS_ST_OK:
170 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
171 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
172 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
173 return 1;
174 }
175 break;
176
177 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
178 /*
179 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
180 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
181 * OR
182 * 2) If we did request one then
183 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
184 * AND
185 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
186 * list if we requested a certificate)
187 */
188 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
189 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
190 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
191 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
192 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
193 /*
194 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
195 * not going to accept it because we require a client
196 * cert.
197 */
198 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
199 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
200 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
201 return 0;
202 }
203 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
204 return 1;
205 }
206 } else {
207 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
208 return 1;
209 }
210 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
211 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
212 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
213 return 1;
214 }
215 }
216 break;
217
218 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
219 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
220 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
221 return 1;
222 }
223 break;
224
225 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
226 /*
227 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
228 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
229 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
230 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
231 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
232 * set.
233 */
234 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
235 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
236 /*
237 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
238 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
239 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
240 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
241 */
242 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
243 return 1;
244 }
245 } else {
246 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
247 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
248 return 1;
249 }
250 }
251 break;
252
253 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
254 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
255 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
256 return 1;
257 }
258 break;
259
260 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
261#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
262 if (s->s3->npn_seen) {
263 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
264 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
265 return 1;
266 }
267 } else {
268#endif
269 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
270 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
271 return 1;
272 }
273#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
274 }
275#endif
276 break;
277
278#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
279 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
280 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
281 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
282 return 1;
283 }
284 break;
285#endif
286
287 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
288 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
289 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
290 return 1;
291 }
292 break;
293 }
294
295 err:
296 /* No valid transition found */
297 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
298 BIO *rbio;
299
300 /*
301 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
302 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
303 */
304 s->init_num = 0;
305 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
306 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
307 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
308 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
309 return 0;
310 }
311 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
312 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
313 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
314 return 0;
315}
316
317/*
318 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
319 *
320 * Valid return values are:
321 * 1: Yes
322 * 0: No
323 */
324static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
325{
326 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
327
328 /*
329 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
330 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
331 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
332 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
333 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
334 * key exchange.
335 */
336 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
337 /*
338 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
339 * provided
340 */
341#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
342 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
343 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
344 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
345 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
346 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
347#endif
348#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
349 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
350 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
351#endif
352 ) {
353 return 1;
354 }
355
356 return 0;
357}
358
359/*
360 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
361 *
362 * Valid return values are:
363 * 1: Yes
364 * 0: No
365 */
366int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
367{
368 if (
369 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
370 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
371 /*
372 * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing
373 * post-handshake in TLSv1.3:
374 */
375 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE)
376 || s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING)
377 /*
378 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
379 * a second time:
380 */
381 && (s->certreqs_sent < 1 ||
382 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
383 /*
384 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
385 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
386 * RFC 2246):
387 */
388 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
389 /*
390 * ... except when the application insists on
391 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
392 * this for SSL 3)
393 */
394 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
395 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
396 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
397 /*
398 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
399 * are omitted
400 */
401 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
402 return 1;
403 }
404
405 return 0;
406}
407
408/*
409 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
410 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
411 * client.
412 */
413static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
414{
415 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
416
417 /*
418 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
419 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
420 */
421
422 switch (st->hand_state) {
423 default:
424 /* Shouldn't happen */
425 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
426 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
427 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
428 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
429
430 case TLS_ST_OK:
431 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
432 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
433 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
434 }
435 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
436 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
437 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
438 }
439 /* Try to read from the client instead */
440 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
441
442 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
443 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
444 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
445
446 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
447 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
448 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)
449 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
450 else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
451 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
452 else
453 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
454 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
455
456 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
457 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
458 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
459 else
460 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
461 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
462
463 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
464 if (s->hit)
465 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
466 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
467 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
468 else
469 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
470
471 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
472
473 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
474 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
475 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
476 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
477 } else {
478 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
479 }
480 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
481
482 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
483 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
484 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
485
486 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
487 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
488 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
489
490 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
491 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
492 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
493
494 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
495 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
496
497 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
498 /*
499 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
500 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets
501 * immediately.
502 */
503 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
504 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
505 } else if (!s->ext.ticket_expected) {
506 /*
507 * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the
508 * handshake at this point.
509 */
510 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
511 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
512 }
513 if (s->num_tickets > s->sent_tickets)
514 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
515 else
516 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
517 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
518
519 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
520 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
521 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
522 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
523
524 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
525 /* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket.
526 * Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have
527 * been configured for.
528 */
529 if (s->hit || s->num_tickets <= s->sent_tickets) {
530 /* We've written enough tickets out. */
531 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
532 }
533 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
534 }
535}
536
537/*
538 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
539 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
540 */
541WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
542{
543 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
544
545 /*
546 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
547 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
548 */
549
550 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
551 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
552
553 switch (st->hand_state) {
554 default:
555 /* Shouldn't happen */
556 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
557 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_WRITE_TRANSITION,
558 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
559 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
560
561 case TLS_ST_OK:
562 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
563 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
564 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
565 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
566 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
567 }
568 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
569 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
570 /* SSLfatal() already called */
571 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
572 }
573 /* Fall through */
574
575 case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
576 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
577 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
578
579 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
580 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
581 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
582
583 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
584 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
585 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) {
586 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
587 } else if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
588 /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */
589 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
590 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
591 } else {
592 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
593 }
594 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
595
596 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
597 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
598
599 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
600 if (s->hit) {
601 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
602 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
603 else
604 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
605 } else {
606 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
607 /* normal PSK or SRP */
608 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
609 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
610 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
611 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
612 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
613 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
614 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
615 } else {
616 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
617 }
618 }
619 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
620
621 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
622 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
623 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
624 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
625 }
626 /* Fall through */
627
628 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
629 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
630 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
631 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
632 }
633 /* Fall through */
634
635 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
636 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
637 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
638 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
639 }
640 /* Fall through */
641
642 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
643 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
644 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
645
646 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
647 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
648
649 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
650 if (s->hit) {
651 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
652 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
653 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
654 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
655 } else {
656 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
657 }
658 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
659
660 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
661 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
662 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
663
664 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
665 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
666 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
667
668 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
669 if (s->hit) {
670 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
671 }
672 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
673 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
674 }
675}
676
677/*
678 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
679 * the server to the client.
680 */
681WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
682{
683 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
684
685 switch (st->hand_state) {
686 default:
687 /* No pre work to be done */
688 break;
689
690 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
691 s->shutdown = 0;
692 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
693 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
694 break;
695
696 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
697 s->shutdown = 0;
698 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
699 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
700 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
701 st->use_timer = 0;
702 }
703 break;
704
705 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
706 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
707 /*
708 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
709 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
710 */
711 st->use_timer = 1;
712 }
713 break;
714
715 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
716#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
717 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
718 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
719 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
720 }
721#endif
722 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
723
724 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
725 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->sent_tickets == 0) {
726 /*
727 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
728 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
729 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
730 *
731 * Calls SSLfatal as required.
732 */
733 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0);
734 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
735 /*
736 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
737 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
738 */
739 st->use_timer = 0;
740 }
741 break;
742
743 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
744 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
745 break;
746 /* Writes to s->session are only safe for initial handshakes */
747 if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
748 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
749 } else if (s->session->cipher != s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) {
750 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
751 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PRE_WORK,
752 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
753 return WORK_ERROR;
754 }
755 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
756 /* SSLfatal() already called */
757 return WORK_ERROR;
758 }
759 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
760 /*
761 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
762 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
763 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
764 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
765 */
766 st->use_timer = 0;
767 }
768 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
769
770 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
771 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
772 && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
773 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
774 /* Fall through */
775
776 case TLS_ST_OK:
777 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
778 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
779 }
780
781 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
782}
783
784static ossl_inline int conn_is_closed(void)
785{
786 switch (get_last_sys_error()) {
787#if defined(EPIPE)
788 case EPIPE:
789 return 1;
790#endif
791#if defined(ECONNRESET)
792 case ECONNRESET:
793 return 1;
794#endif
795#if defined(WSAECONNRESET)
796 case WSAECONNRESET:
797 return 1;
798#endif
799 default:
800 return 0;
801 }
802}
803
804/*
805 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
806 * server to the client.
807 */
808WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
809{
810 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
811
812 s->init_num = 0;
813
814 switch (st->hand_state) {
815 default:
816 /* No post work to be done */
817 break;
818
819 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
820 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
821 return WORK_MORE_A;
822 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
823 /* SSLfatal() already called */
824 return WORK_ERROR;
825 }
826 break;
827
828 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
829 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
830 return WORK_MORE_A;
831 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
832 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
833 /* SSLfatal() already called */
834 return WORK_ERROR;
835 }
836 /*
837 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
838 * treat like it was the first packet
839 */
840 s->first_packet = 1;
841 break;
842
843 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
844 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
845 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0
846 && statem_flush(s) != 1)
847 return WORK_MORE_A;
848 break;
849 }
850#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
851 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
852 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
853 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
854 size_t labellen;
855
856 /*
857 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
858 * SCTP used.
859 */
860 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
861 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
862
863 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
864 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
865 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
866 labellen += 1;
867
868 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
869 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
870 labellen, NULL, 0,
871 0) <= 0) {
872 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
873 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK,
874 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
875 return WORK_ERROR;
876 }
877
878 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
879 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
880 }
881#endif
882 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
883 || ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
884 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE))
885 break;
886 /* Fall through */
887
888 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
889 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
890 if (!statem_flush(s))
891 return WORK_MORE_A;
892 break;
893 }
894
895 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
896 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
897 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
898 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
899 /* SSLfatal() already called */
900 return WORK_ERROR;
901 }
902
903 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
904 && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
905 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
906 /* SSLfatal() already called */
907 return WORK_ERROR;
908 }
909 /*
910 * We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive
911 * is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted
912 * handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts.
913 */
914 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS;
915 break;
916 }
917
918#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
919 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
920 /*
921 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
922 * no SCTP used.
923 */
924 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
925 0, NULL);
926 }
927#endif
928 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
929 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
930 {
931 /* SSLfatal() already called */
932 return WORK_ERROR;
933 }
934
935 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
936 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
937 break;
938
939 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
940 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
941 return WORK_MORE_A;
942 break;
943
944 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
945 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
946 return WORK_MORE_A;
947#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
948 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
949 /*
950 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
951 * no SCTP used.
952 */
953 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
954 0, NULL);
955 }
956#endif
957 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
958 /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */
959 size_t dummy;
960 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
961 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
962 &dummy)
963 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
964 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
965 /* SSLfatal() already called */
966 return WORK_ERROR;
967 }
968 break;
969
970 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
971 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
972 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
973 return WORK_MORE_A;
974 }
975 break;
976
977 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
978 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
979 return WORK_MORE_A;
980 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
981 /* SSLfatal() already called */
982 return WORK_ERROR;
983 }
984 break;
985
986 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
987 clear_sys_error();
988 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) {
989 if (SSL_get_error(s, 0) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
990 && conn_is_closed()) {
991 /*
992 * We ignore connection closed errors in TLSv1.3 when sending a
993 * NewSessionTicket and behave as if we were successful. This is
994 * so that we are still able to read data sent to us by a client
995 * that closes soon after the end of the handshake without
996 * waiting to read our post-handshake NewSessionTickets.
997 */
998 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
999 break;
1000 }
1001
1002 return WORK_MORE_A;
1003 }
1004 break;
1005 }
1006
1007 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1008}
1009
1010/*
1011 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
1012 * server
1013 *
1014 * Valid return values are:
1015 * 1: Success
1016 * 0: Error
1017 */
1018int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1019 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
1020{
1021 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1022
1023 switch (st->hand_state) {
1024 default:
1025 /* Shouldn't happen */
1026 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1027 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
1028 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
1029 return 0;
1030
1031 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
1032 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1033 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
1034 else
1035 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
1036 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
1037 break;
1038
1039 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1040 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
1041 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
1042 break;
1043
1044 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
1045 /* No construction function needed */
1046 *confunc = NULL;
1047 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
1048 break;
1049
1050 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
1051 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
1052 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1053 break;
1054
1055 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
1056 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
1057 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
1058 break;
1059
1060 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
1061 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
1062 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
1063 break;
1064
1065
1066 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
1067 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
1068 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1069 break;
1070
1071 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
1072 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
1073 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1074 break;
1075
1076 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
1077 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
1078 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1079 break;
1080
1081 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
1082 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
1083 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
1084 break;
1085
1086 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
1087 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
1088 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
1089 break;
1090
1091 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
1092 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
1093 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
1094 break;
1095
1096 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
1097 *confunc = NULL;
1098 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
1099 break;
1100
1101 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1102 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
1103 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
1104 break;
1105
1106 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
1107 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
1108 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
1109 break;
1110 }
1111
1112 return 1;
1113}
1114
1115/*
1116 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
1117 * calculated as follows:
1118 *
1119 * 2 + # client_version
1120 * 32 + # only valid length for random
1121 * 1 + # length of session_id
1122 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
1123 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
1124 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
1125 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
1126 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
1127 * 2 + # length of extensions
1128 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
1129 */
1130#define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
1131
1132#define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
1133#define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
1134
1135/*
1136 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1137 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1138 */
1139size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
1140{
1141 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1142
1143 switch (st->hand_state) {
1144 default:
1145 /* Shouldn't happen */
1146 return 0;
1147
1148 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1149 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1150
1151 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1152 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
1153
1154 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1155 return s->max_cert_list;
1156
1157 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1158 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1159
1160 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1161 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1162
1163#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1164 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1165 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
1166#endif
1167
1168 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1169 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1170
1171 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1172 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1173
1174 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1175 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1176 }
1177}
1178
1179/*
1180 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1181 */
1182MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1183{
1184 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1185
1186 switch (st->hand_state) {
1187 default:
1188 /* Shouldn't happen */
1189 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1190 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1191 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1192 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1193
1194 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1195 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
1196
1197 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1198 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
1199
1200 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1201 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
1202
1203 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1204 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1205
1206 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1207 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1208
1209#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1210 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1211 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
1212#endif
1213
1214 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1215 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1216
1217 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1218 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1219
1220 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1221 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1222
1223 }
1224}
1225
1226/*
1227 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1228 * from the client
1229 */
1230WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1231{
1232 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1233
1234 switch (st->hand_state) {
1235 default:
1236 /* Shouldn't happen */
1237 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1238 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1239 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1240 return WORK_ERROR;
1241
1242 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1243 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
1244
1245 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1246 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1247 }
1248}
1249
1250#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1251/* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
1252static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s)
1253{
1254 int ret;
1255 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1256
1257 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1258 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1259 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1260 /*
1261 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1262 * login name
1263 */
1264 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
1265 SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1266 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
1267 return -1;
1268 } else {
1269 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, &al);
1270 if (ret < 0)
1271 return 0;
1272 if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1273 SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1274 al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
1275 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
1276 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1277 return -1;
1278 }
1279 }
1280 }
1281 return 1;
1282}
1283#endif
1284
1285int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1286 size_t cookie_len)
1287{
1288 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1289 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1290 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1291 return 0;
1292
1293 return 1;
1294}
1295
1296int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1297{
1298 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1299 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1300 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1301 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1302 cookie_leni > 255) {
1303 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1304 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1305 return 0;
1306 }
1307 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1308
1309 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1310 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1311 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1312 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1313 return 0;
1314 }
1315
1316 return 1;
1317}
1318
1319#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1320/*-
1321 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1322 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1323 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1324 * SNI,
1325 * elliptic_curves
1326 * ec_point_formats
1327 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1328 *
1329 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1330 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1331 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1332 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1333 */
1334static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1335{
1336 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1337 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1338 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1339 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1340 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1341 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1342 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1343
1344 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1345 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1346 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1347 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1348 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1349 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1350 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1351 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1352 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1353 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1354 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1355 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1356 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1357 };
1358 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1359 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1360 unsigned int type;
1361 PACKET sni, tmppkt;
1362 size_t ext_len;
1363
1364 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1365
1366 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1367 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1368 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1369 return;
1370 }
1371
1372 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1373 return;
1374
1375 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1376 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1377
1378 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1379 ext_len);
1380}
1381#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1382
1383MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1384{
1385 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1386 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1387 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1388 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = NULL;
1389
1390 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1391 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1392 if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1393 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1394 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1395 goto err;
1396 }
1397 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) != 0
1398 || (!s->s3->send_connection_binding
1399 && (s->options
1400 & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) {
1401 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1402 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1403 }
1404 s->renegotiate = 1;
1405 s->new_session = 1;
1406 }
1407
1408 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
1409 if (clienthello == NULL) {
1410 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1411 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1412 goto err;
1413 }
1414
1415 /*
1416 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1417 */
1418 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1419 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1420
1421 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1422 unsigned int mt;
1423
1424 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
1425 || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1426 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1427 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1428 goto err;
1429 }
1430
1431 /*-
1432 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1433 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1434 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1435 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1436 * Byte Content
1437 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1438 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1439 * 3-4 version
1440 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1441 * 7-8 session_id_length
1442 * 9-10 challenge_length
1443 * ... ...
1444 */
1445
1446 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1447 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1448 /*
1449 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1450 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1451 * in the first place
1452 */
1453 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1454 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1455 goto err;
1456 }
1457 }
1458
1459 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
1460 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1461 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1462 goto err;
1463 }
1464
1465 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1466 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1467 /*
1468 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1469 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1470 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1471 */
1472 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1473 PACKET challenge;
1474
1475 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1476 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1477 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1478 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1479 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1480 goto err;
1481 }
1482
1483 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1484 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1485 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1486 goto err;
1487 }
1488
1489 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1490 ciphersuite_len)
1491 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
1492 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1493 /* No extensions. */
1494 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1495 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1496 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1497 goto err;
1498 }
1499 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
1500
1501 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1502 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1503 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1504 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1505 */
1506 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1507 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1508 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1509 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1510 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1511 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1512 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1513 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1514 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1515 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1516 goto err;
1517 }
1518
1519 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1520 } else {
1521 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1522 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1523 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1524 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
1525 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1526 &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
1527 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1528 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1529 goto err;
1530 }
1531
1532 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1533 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1534 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1535 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1536 goto err;
1537 }
1538 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1539 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1540 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
1541 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1542 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1543 goto err;
1544 }
1545 /*
1546 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1547 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1548 * So check cookie length...
1549 */
1550 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1551 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0) {
1552 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1553 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1554 }
1555 }
1556 }
1557
1558 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
1559 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1560 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1561 goto err;
1562 }
1563
1564 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1565 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1566 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1567 goto err;
1568 }
1569
1570 /* Could be empty. */
1571 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1572 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1573 } else {
1574 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)
1575 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1576 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1577 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1578 goto err;
1579 }
1580 }
1581 }
1582
1583 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
1584 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1585 &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
1586 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1587 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1588 goto err;
1589 }
1590
1591 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1592 extensions = clienthello->extensions;
1593 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1594 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts,
1595 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) {
1596 /* SSLfatal already been called */
1597 goto err;
1598 }
1599 s->clienthello = clienthello;
1600
1601 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1602
1603 err:
1604 if (clienthello != NULL)
1605 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1606 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1607
1608 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1609}
1610
1611static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s)
1612{
1613 unsigned int j;
1614 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1615 int protverr;
1616 size_t loop;
1617 unsigned long id;
1618#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1619 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1620#endif
1621 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1622 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1623 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
1624 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
1625 DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1626
1627 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1628 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
1629 if (s->ctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) {
1630 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
1631 switch (s->ctx->client_hello_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) {
1632 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS:
1633 break;
1634 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY:
1635 s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB;
1636 return -1;
1637 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR:
1638 default:
1639 SSLfatal(s, al,
1640 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1641 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
1642 goto err;
1643 }
1644 }
1645
1646 /* Set up the client_random */
1647 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1648
1649 /* Choose the version */
1650
1651 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1652 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1653 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
1654 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1655 /*
1656 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
1657 * support it.
1658 */
1659 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1660 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1661 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1662 goto err;
1663 }
1664 /* SSLv3/TLS */
1665 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1666 }
1667 /*
1668 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1669 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1670 */
1671 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1672 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1673 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1674 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
1675 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1676 } else {
1677 protverr = 0;
1678 }
1679
1680 if (protverr) {
1681 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1682 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1683 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1684 }
1685 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1686 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1687 goto err;
1688 }
1689
1690 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1691 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1692 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1693 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1694 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1695 goto err;
1696 }
1697
1698 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1699 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1700 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1701 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1702 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1703 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1704 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1705 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1706 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1707 goto err;
1708 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1709 }
1710 /* default verification */
1711 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
1712 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1713 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1714 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1715 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1716 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1717 goto err;
1718 }
1719 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1720 }
1721 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1722 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1723 if (protverr != 0) {
1724 s->version = s->client_version;
1725 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1726 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1727 goto err;
1728 }
1729 }
1730 }
1731
1732 s->hit = 0;
1733
1734 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1735 clienthello->isv2) ||
1736 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs,
1737 clienthello->isv2, 1)) {
1738 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1739 goto err;
1740 }
1741
1742 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
1743 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1744 if (scsvs != NULL) {
1745 for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
1746 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
1747 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
1748 if (s->renegotiate) {
1749 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1750 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1751 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1752 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
1753 goto err;
1754 }
1755 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
1756 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
1757 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
1758 /*
1759 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1760 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1761 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1762 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1763 * an insecure downgrade.
1764 */
1765 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK,
1766 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1767 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1768 goto err;
1769 }
1770 }
1771 }
1772
1773 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1774 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1775 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher =
1776 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1777
1778 if (cipher == NULL) {
1779 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1780 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1781 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1782 goto err;
1783 }
1784 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
1785 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL
1786 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
1787 /*
1788 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1789 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1790 */
1791 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1792 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1793 SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER);
1794 goto err;
1795 }
1796 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1797 }
1798
1799 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1800 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1801 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1802 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) {
1803 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1804 goto err;
1805 }
1806
1807 /*
1808 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1809 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1810 *
1811 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1812 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1813 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1814 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1815 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1816 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1817 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1818 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1819 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1820 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1821 * ignored.
1822 */
1823 if (clienthello->isv2 ||
1824 (s->new_session &&
1825 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1826 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1827 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1828 goto err;
1829 }
1830 } else {
1831 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello);
1832 if (i == 1) {
1833 /* previous session */
1834 s->hit = 1;
1835 } else if (i == -1) {
1836 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1837 goto err;
1838 } else {
1839 /* i == 0 */
1840 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1841 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1842 goto err;
1843 }
1844 }
1845 }
1846
1847 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1848 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id,
1849 s->clienthello->session_id_len);
1850 s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len;
1851 }
1852
1853 /*
1854 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1855 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1856 */
1857 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) {
1858 j = 0;
1859 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1860
1861#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1862 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1863#endif
1864 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1865 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1866#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1867 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1868 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1869#endif
1870 if (c->id == id) {
1871 j = 1;
1872 break;
1873 }
1874 }
1875 if (j == 0) {
1876 /*
1877 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1878 * to reuse it
1879 */
1880 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1881 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1882 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1883 goto err;
1884 }
1885 }
1886
1887 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
1888 if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
1889 break;
1890 }
1891
1892 if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1893 /* no compress */
1894 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1895 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1896 SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1897 goto err;
1898 }
1899
1900#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1901 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1902 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
1903#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1904
1905 /* TLS extensions */
1906 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1907 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1908 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1909 goto err;
1910 }
1911
1912 /*
1913 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1914 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1915 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1916 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1917 */
1918 {
1919 unsigned char *pos;
1920 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1921 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
1922 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1923 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1924 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1925 goto err;
1926 }
1927 }
1928
1929 if (!s->hit
1930 && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1931 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1932 && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
1933 && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1934 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1935 /*
1936 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1937 * backwards compat reasons
1938 */
1939 int master_key_length;
1940
1941 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1942 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1943 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1944 &pref_cipher,
1945 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1946 && master_key_length > 0) {
1947 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1948 s->hit = 1;
1949 s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
1950 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1951
1952 ciphers = NULL;
1953
1954 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1955 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1956 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers,
1957 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1958 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1959 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1960 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1961 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1962 goto err;
1963 }
1964
1965 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1966 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1967 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
1968 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1969 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
1970 }
1971 }
1972
1973 /*
1974 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1975 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1976 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1977 */
1978 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1979 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1980 /*
1981 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
1982 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
1983 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
1984 */
1985 if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) {
1986 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1987 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1988 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1989 goto err;
1990 }
1991 }
1992#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1993 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1994 else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1995 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1996 unsigned int k;
1997 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1998 /* Can't disable compression */
1999 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
2000 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2001 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2002 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
2003 goto err;
2004 }
2005 /* Look for resumed compression method */
2006 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
2007 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
2008 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
2009 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
2010 break;
2011 }
2012 }
2013 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
2014 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2015 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2016 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
2017 goto err;
2018 }
2019 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
2020 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
2021 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
2022 break;
2023 }
2024 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
2025 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2026 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2027 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
2028 goto err;
2029 }
2030 } else if (s->hit) {
2031 comp = NULL;
2032 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
2033 /* See if we have a match */
2034 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
2035 unsigned int o;
2036
2037 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
2038 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
2039 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
2040 v = comp->id;
2041 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
2042 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
2043 done = 1;
2044 break;
2045 }
2046 }
2047 if (done)
2048 break;
2049 }
2050 if (done)
2051 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
2052 else
2053 comp = NULL;
2054 }
2055#else
2056 /*
2057 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
2058 * using compression.
2059 */
2060 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
2061 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2062 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2063 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
2064 goto err;
2065 }
2066#endif
2067
2068 /*
2069 * Given s->peer_ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
2070 */
2071
2072 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2073 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->peer_ciphers);
2074 s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
2075 if (ciphers == NULL) {
2076 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2077 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2078 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2079 goto err;
2080 }
2081 ciphers = NULL;
2082 }
2083
2084 if (!s->hit) {
2085#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2086 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
2087#else
2088 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
2089#endif
2090 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
2091 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2092 goto err;
2093 }
2094 }
2095
2096 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2097 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2098 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2099 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2100 s->clienthello = NULL;
2101 return 1;
2102 err:
2103 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2104 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2105 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2106 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2107 s->clienthello = NULL;
2108
2109 return 0;
2110}
2111
2112/*
2113 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2114 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2115 */
2116static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s)
2117{
2118 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2119
2120 /*
2121 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2122 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2123 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2124 * influence which certificate is sent
2125 */
2126 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
2127 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2128 int ret;
2129
2130 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2131 if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) {
2132 /*
2133 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2134 * et al can pick it up.
2135 */
2136 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
2137 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2138 switch (ret) {
2139 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2140 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2141 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2142 break;
2143 /* status request response should be sent */
2144 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2145 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
2146 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
2147 break;
2148 /* something bad happened */
2149 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2150 default:
2151 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2152 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_STATUS_REQUEST,
2153 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2154 return 0;
2155 }
2156 }
2157 }
2158
2159 return 1;
2160}
2161
2162/*
2163 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2164 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2165 */
2166int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s)
2167{
2168 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
2169 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
2170
2171 if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
2172 int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
2173 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
2174 (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
2175 s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
2176
2177 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2178 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2179 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
2180 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2181 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
2182 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2183 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2184 return 0;
2185 }
2186 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2187#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2188 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2189 s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
2190#endif
2191
2192 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2193 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
2194 || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
2195 || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
2196 selected_len) != 0) {
2197 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2198 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2199
2200 if (!s->hit) {
2201 /*
2202 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have
2203 * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the
2204 * selected ALPN.
2205 */
2206 if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
2207 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2208 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2209 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2210 return 0;
2211 }
2212 s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected,
2213 selected_len);
2214 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2215 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2216 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2217 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2218 return 0;
2219 }
2220 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2221 }
2222 }
2223
2224 return 1;
2225 } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
2226 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2227 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
2228 return 0;
2229 }
2230 /*
2231 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
2232 * present.
2233 */
2234 }
2235
2236 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2237 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
2238 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2239 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2240 }
2241
2242 return 1;
2243}
2244
2245WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2246{
2247 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
2248
2249 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2250 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s);
2251 if (rv == 0) {
2252 /* SSLfatal() was already called */
2253 goto err;
2254 }
2255 if (rv < 0)
2256 return WORK_MORE_A;
2257 wst = WORK_MORE_B;
2258 }
2259 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2260 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2261 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
2262 if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
2263 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2264 if (rv == 0) {
2265 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2266 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2267 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
2268 goto err;
2269 }
2270 if (rv < 0) {
2271 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2272 return WORK_MORE_B;
2273 }
2274 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2275 }
2276
2277 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
2278 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2279 cipher =
2280 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
2281
2282 if (cipher == NULL) {
2283 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2284 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2285 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
2286 goto err;
2287 }
2288 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
2289 }
2290 if (!s->hit) {
2291 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) {
2292 /* SSLfatal already called */
2293 goto err;
2294 }
2295 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
2296 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
2297 s->session->not_resumable =
2298 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
2299 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
2300 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
2301 if (s->session->not_resumable)
2302 /* do not send a session ticket */
2303 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
2304 }
2305 } else {
2306 /* Session-id reuse */
2307 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
2308 }
2309
2310 /*-
2311 * we now have the following setup.
2312 * client_random
2313 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2314 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2315 * compression - basically ignored right now
2316 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2317 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2318 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2319 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
2320 */
2321
2322 /*
2323 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2324 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2325 */
2326 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) {
2327 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2328 goto err;
2329 }
2330 /*
2331 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
2332 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
2333 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
2334 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
2335 */
2336 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) {
2337 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2338 goto err;
2339 }
2340
2341 wst = WORK_MORE_C;
2342 }
2343#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2344 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
2345 int ret;
2346 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) {
2347 /*
2348 * callback indicates further work to be done
2349 */
2350 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2351 return WORK_MORE_C;
2352 }
2353 if (ret < 0) {
2354 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2355 goto err;
2356 }
2357 }
2358#endif
2359
2360 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
2361 err:
2362 return WORK_ERROR;
2363}
2364
2365int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2366{
2367 int compm;
2368 size_t sl, len;
2369 int version;
2370 unsigned char *session_id;
2371 int usetls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING;
2372
2373 version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
2374 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
2375 /*
2376 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2377 * tls_process_client_hello()
2378 */
2379 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt,
2380 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2381 ? hrrrandom : s->s3->server_random,
2382 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
2383 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2384 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2385 return 0;
2386 }
2387
2388 /*-
2389 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2390 * back in the server hello:
2391 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2392 * we send back the old session ID.
2393 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2394 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2395 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2396 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2397 * session ID.
2398 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2399 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2400 * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
2401 * regardless
2402 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2403 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2404 * to send back.
2405 */
2406 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
2407 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
2408 && !s->hit))
2409 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
2410
2411 if (usetls13) {
2412 sl = s->tmp_session_id_len;
2413 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
2414 } else {
2415 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
2416 session_id = s->session->session_id;
2417 }
2418
2419 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
2420 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2421 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2422 return 0;
2423 }
2424
2425 /* set up the compression method */
2426#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2427 compm = 0;
2428#else
2429 if (usetls13 || s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
2430 compm = 0;
2431 else
2432 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
2433#endif
2434
2435 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl)
2436 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
2437 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) {
2438 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2439 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2440 return 0;
2441 }
2442
2443 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2444 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2445 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
2446 : (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2447 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2448 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO),
2449 NULL, 0)) {
2450 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2451 return 0;
2452 }
2453
2454 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
2455 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
2456 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2457 s->session = NULL;
2458 s->hit = 0;
2459
2460 /*
2461 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
2462 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
2463 */
2464 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
2465 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2466 return 0;
2467 }
2468 } else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
2469 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2470 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2471 return 0;
2472 }
2473
2474 return 1;
2475}
2476
2477int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2478{
2479 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
2480 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2481 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2482 return 0;
2483 }
2484 }
2485 return 1;
2486}
2487
2488int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2489{
2490#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2491 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
2492#endif
2493#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2494 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2495 size_t encodedlen = 0;
2496 int curve_id = 0;
2497#endif
2498 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
2499 int i;
2500 unsigned long type;
2501 const BIGNUM *r[4];
2502 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2503 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2504 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2505
2506 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &paramoffset)) {
2507 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2508 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2509 goto err;
2510 }
2511
2512 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2513 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2514 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2515 goto err;
2516 }
2517
2518 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2519
2520 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2521#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2522 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2523 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2524 } else
2525#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2526#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2527 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2528 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2529
2530 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2531 DH *dh;
2532
2533 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2534 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2535 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
2536 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
2537 DH_free(dhp);
2538 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2539 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2540 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2541 goto err;
2542 }
2543 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
2544 pkdhp = pkdh;
2545 } else {
2546 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2547 }
2548 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2549 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
2550 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
2551 if (pkdh == NULL) {
2552 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2553 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2554 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2555 goto err;
2556 }
2557 pkdhp = pkdh;
2558 }
2559 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2560 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2561 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2562 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2563 goto err;
2564 }
2565 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2566 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2567 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2568 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2569 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2570 goto err;
2571 }
2572 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2573 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2574 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2575 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2576 goto err;
2577 }
2578
2579 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
2580 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2581 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 0, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2582 goto err;
2583 }
2584
2585 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2586 if (dh == NULL) {
2587 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2588 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2589 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2590 goto err;
2591 }
2592
2593 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2594 pkdh = NULL;
2595
2596 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
2597 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
2598 } else
2599#endif
2600#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2601 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2602
2603 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2604 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2605 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2606 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2607 goto err;
2608 }
2609
2610 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2611 curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2612 if (curve_id == 0) {
2613 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2614 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2615 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2616 goto err;
2617 }
2618 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
2619 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2620 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2621 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2622 goto err;
2623 }
2624
2625 /* Encode the public key. */
2626 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
2627 &encodedPoint);
2628 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2629 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2630 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2631 goto err;
2632 }
2633
2634 /*
2635 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2636 * can set these to NULLs
2637 */
2638 r[0] = NULL;
2639 r[1] = NULL;
2640 r[2] = NULL;
2641 r[3] = NULL;
2642 } else
2643#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2644#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2645 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2646 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2647 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2648 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2649 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2650 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2651 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2652 goto err;
2653 }
2654 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2655 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2656 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2657 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2658 } else
2659#endif
2660 {
2661 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2662 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2663 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2664 goto err;
2665 }
2666
2667 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
2668 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
2669 lu = NULL;
2670 } else if (lu == NULL) {
2671 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2672 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2673 goto err;
2674 }
2675
2676#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2677 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2678 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2679 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2680
2681 /*
2682 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2683 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2684 */
2685 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2686 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2687 len)) {
2688 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2689 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2690 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2691 goto err;
2692 }
2693 }
2694#endif
2695
2696 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2697 unsigned char *binval;
2698 int res;
2699
2700#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2701 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2702 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2703 } else
2704#endif
2705 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2706
2707 if (!res) {
2708 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2709 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2710 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2711 goto err;
2712 }
2713
2714#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2715 /*-
2716 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2717 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2718 * as the prime
2719 */
2720 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2721 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2722
2723 if (len > 0) {
2724 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2725 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2726 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2727 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2728 goto err;
2729 }
2730 memset(binval, 0, len);
2731 }
2732 }
2733#endif
2734 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2735 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2736 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2737 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2738 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2739 goto err;
2740 }
2741
2742 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2743 }
2744
2745#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2746 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2747 /*
2748 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2749 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2750 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2751 * point itself
2752 */
2753 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2754 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2755 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2756 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2757 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2758 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2759 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2760 goto err;
2761 }
2762 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2763 encodedPoint = NULL;
2764 }
2765#endif
2766
2767 /* not anonymous */
2768 if (lu != NULL) {
2769 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
2770 const EVP_MD *md;
2771 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs;
2772 size_t siglen, tbslen;
2773 int rv;
2774
2775 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
2776 /* Should never happen */
2777 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2778 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2779 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2780 goto err;
2781 }
2782 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2783 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &paramlen)) {
2784 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2785 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2786 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2787 goto err;
2788 }
2789 /* send signature algorithm */
2790 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
2791 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2792 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2793 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2794 goto err;
2795 }
2796 /*
2797 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2798 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2799 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2800 * afterwards.
2801 */
2802 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2803 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2804 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2805 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2806 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2807 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2808 goto err;
2809 }
2810 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2811 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2812 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2813 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2814 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2815 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2816 goto err;
2817 }
2818 }
2819 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs,
2820 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2821 paramlen);
2822 if (tbslen == 0) {
2823 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2824 goto err;
2825 }
2826 rv = EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen);
2827 OPENSSL_free(tbs);
2828 if (rv <= 0 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2829 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2830 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2831 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2832 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2833 goto err;
2834 }
2835 }
2836
2837 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2838 return 1;
2839 err:
2840#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2841 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2842#endif
2843#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2844 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2845#endif
2846 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2847 return 0;
2848}
2849
2850int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2851{
2852 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2853 /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */
2854 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
2855 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2856 s->pha_context_len = 32;
2857 if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL) {
2858 s->pha_context_len = 0;
2859 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2860 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2861 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2862 return 0;
2863 }
2864 if (RAND_bytes(s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len) <= 0
2865 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context,
2866 s->pha_context_len)) {
2867 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2868 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2869 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2870 return 0;
2871 }
2872 /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */
2873 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
2874 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2875 return 0;
2876 }
2877 } else {
2878 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
2879 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2880 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2881 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2882 return 0;
2883 }
2884 }
2885
2886 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2887 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
2888 0)) {
2889 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2890 return 0;
2891 }
2892 goto done;
2893 }
2894
2895 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2896 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2897 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2898 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2899 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2900 return 0;
2901 }
2902
2903 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2904 const uint16_t *psigs;
2905 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2906
2907 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2908 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
2909 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2910 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2911 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2912 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2913 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2914 return 0;
2915 }
2916 }
2917
2918 if (!construct_ca_names(s, get_ca_names(s), pkt)) {
2919 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2920 return 0;
2921 }
2922
2923 done:
2924 s->certreqs_sent++;
2925 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2926 return 1;
2927}
2928
2929static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2930{
2931#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2932 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2933 size_t psklen;
2934 PACKET psk_identity;
2935
2936 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2937 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2938 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2939 return 0;
2940 }
2941 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2942 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2943 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2944 return 0;
2945 }
2946 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2947 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2948 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2949 return 0;
2950 }
2951
2952 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2953 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2954 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2955 return 0;
2956 }
2957
2958 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2959 psk, sizeof(psk));
2960
2961 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2962 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2963 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2964 return 0;
2965 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2966 /*
2967 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2968 */
2969 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
2970 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2971 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2972 return 0;
2973 }
2974
2975 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2976 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2977 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2978
2979 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2980 s->s3->tmp.psklen = 0;
2981 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2982 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2983 return 0;
2984 }
2985
2986 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2987
2988 return 1;
2989#else
2990 /* Should never happen */
2991 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2992 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2993 return 0;
2994#endif
2995}
2996
2997static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2998{
2999#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3000 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
3001 int decrypt_len;
3002 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
3003 size_t j, padding_len;
3004 PACKET enc_premaster;
3005 RSA *rsa = NULL;
3006 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
3007 int ret = 0;
3008
3009 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey);
3010 if (rsa == NULL) {
3011 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3012 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
3013 return 0;
3014 }
3015
3016 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
3017 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
3018 enc_premaster = *pkt;
3019 } else {
3020 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
3021 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3022 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3023 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3024 return 0;
3025 }
3026 }
3027
3028 /*
3029 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
3030 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
3031 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
3032 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
3033 */
3034 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
3035 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3036 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
3037 return 0;
3038 }
3039
3040 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
3041 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
3042 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3043 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3044 return 0;
3045 }
3046
3047 /*
3048 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
3049 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
3050 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
3051 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
3052 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
3053 */
3054
3055 if (RAND_priv_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
3056 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) {
3057 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3058 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3059 goto err;
3060 }
3061
3062 /*
3063 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
3064 * the timing-sensitive code below.
3065 */
3066 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
3067 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
3068 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
3069 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
3070 if (decrypt_len < 0) {
3071 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3072 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3073 goto err;
3074 }
3075
3076 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
3077
3078 /*
3079 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
3080 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
3081 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
3082 */
3083 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
3084 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3085 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3086 goto err;
3087 }
3088
3089 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
3090 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
3091 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
3092 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
3093 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
3094 }
3095 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
3096
3097 /*
3098 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
3099 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
3100 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
3101 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
3102 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
3103 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
3104 */
3105 version_good =
3106 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
3107 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
3108 version_good &=
3109 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
3110 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
3111
3112 /*
3113 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
3114 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
3115 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
3116 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
3117 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
3118 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
3119 * clients.
3120 */
3121 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
3122 unsigned char workaround_good;
3123 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
3124 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
3125 workaround_good &=
3126 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
3127 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
3128 version_good |= workaround_good;
3129 }
3130
3131 /*
3132 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
3133 * remain non-zero (0xff).
3134 */
3135 decrypt_good &= version_good;
3136
3137 /*
3138 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
3139 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
3140 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
3141 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
3142 */
3143 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
3144 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
3145 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
3146 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
3147 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
3148 }
3149
3150 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
3151 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
3152 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3153 goto err;
3154 }
3155
3156 ret = 1;
3157 err:
3158 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
3159 return ret;
3160#else
3161 /* Should never happen */
3162 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3163 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3164 return 0;
3165#endif
3166}
3167
3168static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3169{
3170#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3171 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
3172 DH *cdh;
3173 unsigned int i;
3174 BIGNUM *pub_key;
3175 const unsigned char *data;
3176 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3177 int ret = 0;
3178
3179 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
3180 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3181 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
3182 goto err;
3183 }
3184 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
3185 if (skey == NULL) {
3186 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3187 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3188 goto err;
3189 }
3190
3191 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3192 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3193 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3194 goto err;
3195 }
3196 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3197 /* We already checked we have enough data */
3198 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3199 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3200 goto err;
3201 }
3202 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3203 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
3204 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3205 SSL_R_BN_LIB);
3206 goto err;
3207 }
3208
3209 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
3210 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
3211 if (pub_key == NULL || cdh == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
3212 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3213 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3214 BN_free(pub_key);
3215 goto err;
3216 }
3217
3218 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3219 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3220 goto err;
3221 }
3222
3223 ret = 1;
3224 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
3225 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
3226 err:
3227 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3228 return ret;
3229#else
3230 /* Should never happen */
3231 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3232 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3233 return 0;
3234#endif
3235}
3236
3237static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3238{
3239#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3240 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
3241 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3242 int ret = 0;
3243
3244 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3245 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
3246 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3247 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3248 goto err;
3249 } else {
3250 unsigned int i;
3251 const unsigned char *data;
3252
3253 /*
3254 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
3255 * ClientKeyExchange message.
3256 */
3257
3258 /* Get encoded point length */
3259 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
3260 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3261 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3262 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3263 goto err;
3264 }
3265 if (skey == NULL) {
3266 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3267 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3268 goto err;
3269 }
3270
3271 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3272 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
3273 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3274 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3275 goto err;
3276 }
3277 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
3278 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3279 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
3280 goto err;
3281 }
3282 }
3283
3284 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3285 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3286 goto err;
3287 }
3288
3289 ret = 1;
3290 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
3291 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
3292 err:
3293 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3294
3295 return ret;
3296#else
3297 /* Should never happen */
3298 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3299 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3300 return 0;
3301#endif
3302}
3303
3304static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3305{
3306#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3307 unsigned int i;
3308 const unsigned char *data;
3309
3310 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
3311 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3312 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3313 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
3314 return 0;
3315 }
3316 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
3317 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3318 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
3319 return 0;
3320 }
3321 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
3322 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3323 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
3324 return 0;
3325 }
3326 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3327 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3328 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3329 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3330 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3331 return 0;
3332 }
3333
3334 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
3335 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3336 return 0;
3337 }
3338
3339 return 1;
3340#else
3341 /* Should never happen */
3342 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3343 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3344 return 0;
3345#endif
3346}
3347
3348static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3349{
3350#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3351 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
3352 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
3353 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
3354 const unsigned char *start;
3355 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
3356 unsigned long alg_a;
3357 GOST_KX_MESSAGE *pKX = NULL;
3358 const unsigned char *ptr;
3359 int ret = 0;
3360
3361 /* Get our certificate private key */
3362 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3363 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
3364 /*
3365 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3366 */
3367 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
3368 if (pk == NULL) {
3369 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
3370 }
3371 if (pk == NULL) {
3372 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3373 }
3374 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
3375 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3376 }
3377
3378 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
3379 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3380 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3381 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3382 return 0;
3383 }
3384 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3385 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3386 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3387 return 0;
3388 }
3389 /*
3390 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3391 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3392 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3393 * client certificate for authorization only.
3394 */
3395 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3396 if (client_pub_pkey) {
3397 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
3398 ERR_clear_error();
3399 }
3400
3401 ptr = PACKET_data(pkt);
3402 /* Some implementations provide extra data in the opaqueBlob
3403 * We have nothing to do with this blob so we just skip it */
3404 pKX = d2i_GOST_KX_MESSAGE(NULL, &ptr, PACKET_remaining(pkt));
3405 if (pKX == NULL
3406 || pKX->kxBlob == NULL
3407 || ASN1_TYPE_get(pKX->kxBlob) != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
3408 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3409 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3410 goto err;
3411 }
3412
3413 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, ptr - PACKET_data(pkt))) {
3414 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3415 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3416 goto err;
3417 }
3418
3419 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3420 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3421 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3422 goto err;
3423 }
3424
3425 inlen = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->length;
3426 start = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->data;
3427
3428 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start,
3429 inlen) <= 0) {
3430 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3431 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3432 goto err;
3433 }
3434 /* Generate master secret */
3435 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
3436 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
3437 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3438 goto err;
3439 }
3440 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3441 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2,
3442 NULL) > 0)
3443 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
3444
3445 ret = 1;
3446 err:
3447 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3448 GOST_KX_MESSAGE_free(pKX);
3449 return ret;
3450#else
3451 /* Should never happen */
3452 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3453 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3454 return 0;
3455#endif
3456}
3457
3458MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3459{
3460 unsigned long alg_k;
3461
3462 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3463
3464 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3465 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
3466 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3467 goto err;
3468 }
3469
3470 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
3471 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3472 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3473 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3474 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3475 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3476 goto err;
3477 }
3478 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3479 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
3480 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3481 goto err;
3482 }
3483 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3484 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) {
3485 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3486 goto err;
3487 }
3488 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3489 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) {
3490 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3491 goto err;
3492 }
3493 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3494 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) {
3495 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3496 goto err;
3497 }
3498 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3499 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) {
3500 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3501 goto err;
3502 }
3503 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3504 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) {
3505 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3506 goto err;
3507 }
3508 } else {
3509 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3510 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3511 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3512 goto err;
3513 }
3514
3515 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3516 err:
3517#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3518 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3519 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3520 s->s3->tmp.psklen = 0;
3521#endif
3522 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3523}
3524
3525WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3526{
3527#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3528 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3529 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3530 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3531 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3532 size_t labellen;
3533 /*
3534 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3535 * used.
3536 */
3537 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3538 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3539
3540 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3541 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
3542 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
3543 labellen += 1;
3544
3545 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3546 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3547 labellen, NULL, 0,
3548 0) <= 0) {
3549 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3550 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3551 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3552 return WORK_ERROR;
3553 }
3554
3555 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3556 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3557 }
3558 }
3559#endif
3560
3561 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
3562 /*
3563 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3564 * the handshake_buffer
3565 */
3566 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3567 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3568 return WORK_ERROR;
3569 }
3570 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3571 } else {
3572 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3573 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3574 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3575 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3576 return WORK_ERROR;
3577 }
3578 /*
3579 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3580 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3581 */
3582 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3583 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3584 return WORK_ERROR;
3585 }
3586 }
3587
3588 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3589}
3590
3591MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3592{
3593 int i;
3594 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3595 X509 *x = NULL;
3596 unsigned long l;
3597 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3598 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3599 PACKET spkt, context;
3600 size_t chainidx;
3601 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL;
3602
3603 /*
3604 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no
3605 * longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less than
3606 * TLSv1.3
3607 */
3608 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID;
3609
3610 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3611 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3612 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3613 goto err;
3614 }
3615
3616 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)
3617 || (s->pha_context == NULL && PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0)
3618 || (s->pha_context != NULL &&
3619 !PACKET_equal(&context, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)))) {
3620 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3621 SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
3622 goto err;
3623 }
3624
3625 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt)
3626 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3627 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3628 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3629 goto err;
3630 }
3631
3632 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3633 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3634 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3635 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3636 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3637 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3638 goto err;
3639 }
3640
3641 certstart = certbytes;
3642 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3643 if (x == NULL) {
3644 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3645 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3646 goto err;
3647 }
3648 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3649 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3650 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3651 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3652 goto err;
3653 }
3654
3655 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3656 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3657 PACKET extensions;
3658
3659 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3660 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3661 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3662 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
3663 goto err;
3664 }
3665 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3666 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
3667 NULL, chainidx == 0)
3668 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3669 rawexts, x, chainidx,
3670 PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) {
3671 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3672 goto err;
3673 }
3674 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3675 }
3676
3677 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3678 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3679 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3680 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3681 goto err;
3682 }
3683 x = NULL;
3684 }
3685
3686 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3687 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3688 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3689 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3690 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3691 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3692 goto err;
3693 }
3694 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3695 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3696 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3697 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
3698 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3699 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3700 goto err;
3701 }
3702 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3703 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3704 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3705 goto err;
3706 }
3707 } else {
3708 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
3709 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3710 if (i <= 0) {
3711 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
3712 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3713 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3714 goto err;
3715 }
3716 if (i > 1) {
3717 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3718 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3719 goto err;
3720 }
3721 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3722 if (pkey == NULL) {
3723 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3724 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3725 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3726 goto err;
3727 }
3728 }
3729
3730 /*
3731 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
3732 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
3733 * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
3734 * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the
3735 * session may have already gone into the session cache.
3736 */
3737
3738 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3739 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
3740 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3741 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3742 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3743 goto err;
3744 }
3745
3746 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
3747 s->session = new_sess;
3748 }
3749
3750 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3751 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3752 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3753
3754 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3755 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3756 sk = NULL;
3757
3758 /*
3759 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3760 * message
3761 */
3762 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3763 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3764 goto err;
3765 }
3766
3767 /*
3768 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3769 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3770 */
3771
3772 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3773 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3774 if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3775 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3776 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3777 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3778 goto err;
3779 }
3780
3781 /* Resend session tickets */
3782 s->sent_tickets = 0;
3783 }
3784
3785 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3786
3787 err:
3788 X509_free(x);
3789 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3790 return ret;
3791}
3792
3793int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3794{
3795 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert;
3796
3797 if (cpk == NULL) {
3798 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3799 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3800 return 0;
3801 }
3802
3803 /*
3804 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3805 * for the server Certificate message
3806 */
3807 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3808 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3809 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3810 return 0;
3811 }
3812 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
3813 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3814 return 0;
3815 }
3816
3817 return 1;
3818}
3819
3820static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3821 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3822{
3823 uint32_t timeout = (uint32_t)s->session->timeout;
3824
3825 /*
3826 * Ticket lifetime hint:
3827 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3828 * timeout, limited to a 1 week period per RFC8446.
3829 * For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this unspecified for
3830 * resumed session (for simplicity).
3831 */
3832#define ONE_WEEK_SEC (7 * 24 * 60 * 60)
3833
3834 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3835 if (s->session->timeout > ONE_WEEK_SEC)
3836 timeout = ONE_WEEK_SEC;
3837 } else if (s->hit)
3838 timeout = 0;
3839
3840 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, timeout)) {
3841 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3842 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3843 return 0;
3844 }
3845
3846 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3847 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add)
3848 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tick_nonce, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE)) {
3849 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3850 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3851 return 0;
3852 }
3853 }
3854
3855 /* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */
3856 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
3857 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3858 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3859 return 0;
3860 }
3861
3862 return 1;
3863}
3864
3865static int construct_stateless_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3866 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3867{
3868 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3869 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3870 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3871 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3872 const unsigned char *const_p;
3873 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3874 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3875 unsigned int hlen;
3876 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3877 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3878 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3879 int iv_len, ok = 0;
3880 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3881
3882 /* get session encoding length */
3883 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3884 /*
3885 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3886 * long
3887 */
3888 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3889 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3890 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3891 goto err;
3892 }
3893 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3894 if (senc == NULL) {
3895 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3896 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3897 goto err;
3898 }
3899
3900 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3901 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3902 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3903 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3904 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3905 goto err;
3906 }
3907
3908 p = senc;
3909 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) {
3910 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3911 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3912 goto err;
3913 }
3914
3915 /*
3916 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3917 */
3918 const_p = senc;
3919 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3920 if (sess == NULL) {
3921 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3922 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3923 goto err;
3924 }
3925
3926 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3927 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) {
3928 /* shouldn't ever happen */
3929 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3930 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3931 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3932 goto err;
3933 }
3934 p = senc;
3935 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3936 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3937 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3938 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3939 goto err;
3940 }
3941 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3942
3943 /*
3944 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3945 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3946 */
3947 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
3948 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3949 int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3950 hctx, 1);
3951
3952 if (ret == 0) {
3953
3954 /* Put timeout and length */
3955 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3956 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3957 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3958 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3959 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3960 goto err;
3961 }
3962 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3963 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3964 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3965 return 1;
3966 }
3967 if (ret < 0) {
3968 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3969 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3970 goto err;
3971 }
3972 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3973 } else {
3974 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3975
3976 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3977 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0
3978 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3979 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv)
3980 || !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
3981 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
3982 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
3983 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3984 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3985 goto err;
3986 }
3987 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
3988 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
3989 }
3990
3991 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
3992 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3993 goto err;
3994 }
3995
3996 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3997 /* Output key name */
3998 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3999 /* output IV */
4000 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
4001 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
4002 &encdata1)
4003 /* Encrypt session data */
4004 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
4005 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
4006 || encdata1 != encdata2
4007 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
4008 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
4009 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
4010 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
4011 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
4012 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
4013 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
4014 macendoffset - macoffset)
4015 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
4016 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
4017 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
4018 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
4019 || macdata1 != macdata2) {
4020 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4021 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4022 goto err;
4023 }
4024
4025 /* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */
4026 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
4027 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
4028 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4029 goto err;
4030 }
4031
4032 ok = 1;
4033 err:
4034 OPENSSL_free(senc);
4035 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
4036 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
4037 return ok;
4038}
4039
4040static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
4041 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
4042{
4043 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
4044 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4045 return 0;
4046 }
4047
4048 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
4049 s->session->session_id_length)
4050 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
4051 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATEFUL_TICKET,
4052 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4053 return 0;
4054 }
4055
4056 return 1;
4057}
4058
4059int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4060{
4061 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
4062 unsigned char tick_nonce[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE];
4063 union {
4064 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
4065 uint32_t age_add;
4066 } age_add_u;
4067
4068 age_add_u.age_add = 0;
4069
4070 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
4071 size_t i, hashlen;
4072 uint64_t nonce;
4073 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
4074 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
4075 int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
4076
4077 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
4078 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
4079 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4080 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4081 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4082 goto err;
4083 }
4084 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
4085
4086 /*
4087 * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then
4088 * s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it.
4089 * Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that.
4090 */
4091 if (s->sent_tickets != 0 || s->hit) {
4092 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0);
4093
4094 if (new_sess == NULL) {
4095 /* SSLfatal already called */
4096 goto err;
4097 }
4098
4099 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
4100 s->session = new_sess;
4101 }
4102
4103 if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) {
4104 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4105 goto err;
4106 }
4107 if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) {
4108 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4109 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4110 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4111 goto err;
4112 }
4113 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
4114
4115 nonce = s->next_ticket_nonce;
4116 for (i = TICKET_NONCE_SIZE; i > 0; i--) {
4117 tick_nonce[i - 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce & 0xff);
4118 nonce >>= 8;
4119 }
4120
4121 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
4122 nonce_label,
4123 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
4124 tick_nonce,
4125 TICKET_NONCE_SIZE,
4126 s->session->master_key,
4127 hashlen, 1)) {
4128 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4129 goto err;
4130 }
4131 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
4132
4133 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
4134 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
4135 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
4136 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
4137 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len);
4138 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
4139 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = 0;
4140 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4141 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4142 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
4143 goto err;
4144 }
4145 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
4146 }
4147 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
4148 }
4149
4150 if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL &&
4151 tctx->generate_ticket_cb(s, tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0) {
4152 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4153 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4154 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4155 goto err;
4156 }
4157 /*
4158 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
4159 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
4160 * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
4161 */
4162 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
4163 && ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0
4164 || (s->max_early_data > 0
4165 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))) {
4166 if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, tick_nonce)) {
4167 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4168 goto err;
4169 }
4170 } else if (!construct_stateless_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add,
4171 tick_nonce)) {
4172 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4173 goto err;
4174 }
4175
4176 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
4177 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
4178 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4179 NULL, 0)) {
4180 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4181 goto err;
4182 }
4183 /*
4184 * Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets|
4185 * gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake
4186 * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not.
4187 */
4188 s->sent_tickets++;
4189 s->next_ticket_nonce++;
4190 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
4191 }
4192
4193 return 1;
4194 err:
4195 return 0;
4196}
4197
4198/*
4199 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
4200 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
4201 */
4202int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4203{
4204 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
4205 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
4206 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
4207 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
4208 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4209 return 0;
4210 }
4211
4212 return 1;
4213}
4214
4215int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4216{
4217 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
4218 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4219 return 0;
4220 }
4221
4222 return 1;
4223}
4224
4225#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
4226/*
4227 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
4228 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
4229 */
4230MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
4231{
4232 PACKET next_proto, padding;
4233 size_t next_proto_len;
4234
4235 /*-
4236 * The payload looks like:
4237 * uint8 proto_len;
4238 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
4239 * uint8 padding_len;
4240 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
4241 */
4242 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
4243 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
4244 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
4245 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
4246 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4247 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4248 }
4249
4250 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
4251 s->ext.npn_len = 0;
4252 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
4253 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4254 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4255 }
4256
4257 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
4258
4259 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
4260}
4261#endif
4262
4263static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4264{
4265 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
4266 NULL, 0)) {
4267 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4268 return 0;
4269 }
4270
4271 return 1;
4272}
4273
4274MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
4275{
4276 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
4277 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4278 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4279 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4280 }
4281
4282 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
4283 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
4284 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4285 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4286 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4287 }
4288
4289 /*
4290 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
4291 * a record boundary.
4292 */
4293 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
4294 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
4295 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4296 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
4297 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4298 }
4299
4300 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
4301 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
4302 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
4303 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4304 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4305 }
4306
4307 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
4308}