yuezonghe | 824eb0c | 2024-06-27 02:32:26 -0700 | [diff] [blame^] | 1 | =pod |
| 2 | |
| 3 | =head1 NAME |
| 4 | |
| 5 | des_modes - the variants of DES and other crypto algorithms of OpenSSL |
| 6 | |
| 7 | =head1 DESCRIPTION |
| 8 | |
| 9 | Several crypto algorithms for OpenSSL can be used in a number of modes. Those |
| 10 | are used for using block ciphers in a way similar to stream ciphers, among |
| 11 | other things. |
| 12 | |
| 13 | =head1 OVERVIEW |
| 14 | |
| 15 | =head2 Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB) |
| 16 | |
| 17 | Normally, this is found as the function I<algorithm>_ecb_encrypt(). |
| 18 | |
| 19 | =over 2 |
| 20 | |
| 21 | =item * |
| 22 | |
| 23 | 64 bits are enciphered at a time. |
| 24 | |
| 25 | =item * |
| 26 | |
| 27 | The order of the blocks can be rearranged without detection. |
| 28 | |
| 29 | =item * |
| 30 | |
| 31 | The same plaintext block always produces the same ciphertext block |
| 32 | (for the same key) making it vulnerable to a 'dictionary attack'. |
| 33 | |
| 34 | =item * |
| 35 | |
| 36 | An error will only affect one ciphertext block. |
| 37 | |
| 38 | =back |
| 39 | |
| 40 | =head2 Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC) |
| 41 | |
| 42 | Normally, this is found as the function I<algorithm>_cbc_encrypt(). |
| 43 | Be aware that des_cbc_encrypt() is not really DES CBC (it does |
| 44 | not update the IV); use des_ncbc_encrypt() instead. |
| 45 | |
| 46 | =over 2 |
| 47 | |
| 48 | =item * |
| 49 | |
| 50 | a multiple of 64 bits are enciphered at a time. |
| 51 | |
| 52 | =item * |
| 53 | |
| 54 | The CBC mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same |
| 55 | plaintext is encrypted using the same key and starting variable. |
| 56 | |
| 57 | =item * |
| 58 | |
| 59 | The chaining operation makes the ciphertext blocks dependent on the |
| 60 | current and all preceding plaintext blocks and therefore blocks can not |
| 61 | be rearranged. |
| 62 | |
| 63 | =item * |
| 64 | |
| 65 | The use of different starting variables prevents the same plaintext |
| 66 | enciphering to the same ciphertext. |
| 67 | |
| 68 | =item * |
| 69 | |
| 70 | An error will affect the current and the following ciphertext blocks. |
| 71 | |
| 72 | =back |
| 73 | |
| 74 | =head2 Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB) |
| 75 | |
| 76 | Normally, this is found as the function I<algorithm>_cfb_encrypt(). |
| 77 | |
| 78 | =over 2 |
| 79 | |
| 80 | =item * |
| 81 | |
| 82 | a number of bits (j) <= 64 are enciphered at a time. |
| 83 | |
| 84 | =item * |
| 85 | |
| 86 | The CFB mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same |
| 87 | plaintext is encrypted using the same key and starting variable. |
| 88 | |
| 89 | =item * |
| 90 | |
| 91 | The chaining operation makes the ciphertext variables dependent on the |
| 92 | current and all preceding variables and therefore j-bit variables are |
| 93 | chained together and can not be rearranged. |
| 94 | |
| 95 | =item * |
| 96 | |
| 97 | The use of different starting variables prevents the same plaintext |
| 98 | enciphering to the same ciphertext. |
| 99 | |
| 100 | =item * |
| 101 | |
| 102 | The strength of the CFB mode depends on the size of k (maximal if |
| 103 | j == k). In my implementation this is always the case. |
| 104 | |
| 105 | =item * |
| 106 | |
| 107 | Selection of a small value for j will require more cycles through |
| 108 | the encipherment algorithm per unit of plaintext and thus cause |
| 109 | greater processing overheads. |
| 110 | |
| 111 | =item * |
| 112 | |
| 113 | Only multiples of j bits can be enciphered. |
| 114 | |
| 115 | =item * |
| 116 | |
| 117 | An error will affect the current and the following ciphertext variables. |
| 118 | |
| 119 | =back |
| 120 | |
| 121 | =head2 Output Feedback Mode (OFB) |
| 122 | |
| 123 | Normally, this is found as the function I<algorithm>_ofb_encrypt(). |
| 124 | |
| 125 | =over 2 |
| 126 | |
| 127 | =item * |
| 128 | |
| 129 | a number of bits (j) <= 64 are enciphered at a time. |
| 130 | |
| 131 | =item * |
| 132 | |
| 133 | The OFB mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same |
| 134 | plaintext enciphered using the same key and starting variable. More |
| 135 | over, in the OFB mode the same key stream is produced when the same |
| 136 | key and start variable are used. Consequently, for security reasons |
| 137 | a specific start variable should be used only once for a given key. |
| 138 | |
| 139 | =item * |
| 140 | |
| 141 | The absence of chaining makes the OFB more vulnerable to specific attacks. |
| 142 | |
| 143 | =item * |
| 144 | |
| 145 | The use of different start variables values prevents the same |
| 146 | plaintext enciphering to the same ciphertext, by producing different |
| 147 | key streams. |
| 148 | |
| 149 | =item * |
| 150 | |
| 151 | Selection of a small value for j will require more cycles through |
| 152 | the encipherment algorithm per unit of plaintext and thus cause |
| 153 | greater processing overheads. |
| 154 | |
| 155 | =item * |
| 156 | |
| 157 | Only multiples of j bits can be enciphered. |
| 158 | |
| 159 | =item * |
| 160 | |
| 161 | OFB mode of operation does not extend ciphertext errors in the |
| 162 | resultant plaintext output. Every bit error in the ciphertext causes |
| 163 | only one bit to be in error in the deciphered plaintext. |
| 164 | |
| 165 | =item * |
| 166 | |
| 167 | OFB mode is not self-synchronizing. If the two operation of |
| 168 | encipherment and decipherment get out of synchronism, the system needs |
| 169 | to be re-initialized. |
| 170 | |
| 171 | =item * |
| 172 | |
| 173 | Each re-initialization should use a value of the start variable |
| 174 | different from the start variable values used before with the same |
| 175 | key. The reason for this is that an identical bit stream would be |
| 176 | produced each time from the same parameters. This would be |
| 177 | susceptible to a 'known plaintext' attack. |
| 178 | |
| 179 | =back |
| 180 | |
| 181 | =head2 Triple ECB Mode |
| 182 | |
| 183 | Normally, this is found as the function I<algorithm>_ecb3_encrypt(). |
| 184 | |
| 185 | =over 2 |
| 186 | |
| 187 | =item * |
| 188 | |
| 189 | Encrypt with key1, decrypt with key2 and encrypt with key3 again. |
| 190 | |
| 191 | =item * |
| 192 | |
| 193 | As for ECB encryption but increases the key length to 168 bits. |
| 194 | There are theoretic attacks that can be used that make the effective |
| 195 | key length 112 bits, but this attack also requires 2^56 blocks of |
| 196 | memory, not very likely, even for the NSA. |
| 197 | |
| 198 | =item * |
| 199 | |
| 200 | If both keys are the same it is equivalent to encrypting once with |
| 201 | just one key. |
| 202 | |
| 203 | =item * |
| 204 | |
| 205 | If the first and last key are the same, the key length is 112 bits. |
| 206 | There are attacks that could reduce the effective key strength |
| 207 | to only slightly more than 56 bits, but these require a lot of memory. |
| 208 | |
| 209 | =item * |
| 210 | |
| 211 | If all 3 keys are the same, this is effectively the same as normal |
| 212 | ecb mode. |
| 213 | |
| 214 | =back |
| 215 | |
| 216 | =head2 Triple CBC Mode |
| 217 | |
| 218 | Normally, this is found as the function I<algorithm>_ede3_cbc_encrypt(). |
| 219 | |
| 220 | =over 2 |
| 221 | |
| 222 | =item * |
| 223 | |
| 224 | Encrypt with key1, decrypt with key2 and then encrypt with key3. |
| 225 | |
| 226 | =item * |
| 227 | |
| 228 | As for CBC encryption but increases the key length to 168 bits with |
| 229 | the same restrictions as for triple ecb mode. |
| 230 | |
| 231 | =back |
| 232 | |
| 233 | =head1 NOTES |
| 234 | |
| 235 | This text was been written in large parts by Eric Young in his original |
| 236 | documentation for SSLeay, the predecessor of OpenSSL. In turn, he attributed |
| 237 | it to: |
| 238 | |
| 239 | AS 2805.5.2 |
| 240 | Australian Standard |
| 241 | Electronic funds transfer - Requirements for interfaces, |
| 242 | Part 5.2: Modes of operation for an n-bit block cipher algorithm |
| 243 | Appendix A |
| 244 | |
| 245 | =head1 SEE ALSO |
| 246 | |
| 247 | L<BF_encrypt(3)>, L<DES_crypt(3)> |
| 248 | |
| 249 | =head1 COPYRIGHT |
| 250 | |
| 251 | Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| 252 | |
| 253 | Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
| 254 | this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
| 255 | in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
| 256 | L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>. |
| 257 | |
| 258 | =cut |