yuezonghe | 824eb0c | 2024-06-27 02:32:26 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 1 | /* |
| 2 | * Copyright 2004-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| 3 | * |
| 4 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
| 5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
| 6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
| 7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
| 8 | */ |
| 9 | |
| 10 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
| 11 | #include <openssl/x509.h> |
| 12 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
| 13 | |
| 14 | #include "pcy_local.h" |
| 15 | |
| 16 | /* |
| 17 | * Enable this to print out the complete policy tree at various point during |
| 18 | * evaluation. |
| 19 | */ |
| 20 | |
| 21 | /* |
| 22 | * #define OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG |
| 23 | */ |
| 24 | |
| 25 | #ifdef OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG |
| 26 | |
| 27 | static void expected_print(BIO *err, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lev, |
| 28 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node, int indent) |
| 29 | { |
| 30 | if ((lev->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) |
| 31 | || !(node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK)) |
| 32 | BIO_puts(err, " Not Mapped\n"); |
| 33 | else { |
| 34 | int i; |
| 35 | STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *pset = node->data->expected_policy_set; |
| 36 | ASN1_OBJECT *oid; |
| 37 | BIO_puts(err, " Expected: "); |
| 38 | for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(pset); i++) { |
| 39 | oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(pset, i); |
| 40 | if (i) |
| 41 | BIO_puts(err, ", "); |
| 42 | i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(err, oid); |
| 43 | } |
| 44 | BIO_puts(err, "\n"); |
| 45 | } |
| 46 | } |
| 47 | |
| 48 | static void tree_print(char *str, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, |
| 49 | X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr) |
| 50 | { |
| 51 | BIO *err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE); |
| 52 | X509_POLICY_LEVEL *plev; |
| 53 | |
| 54 | if (err == NULL) |
| 55 | return; |
| 56 | if (!curr) |
| 57 | curr = tree->levels + tree->nlevel; |
| 58 | else |
| 59 | curr++; |
| 60 | |
| 61 | BIO_printf(err, "Level print after %s\n", str); |
| 62 | BIO_printf(err, "Printing Up to Level %ld\n", curr - tree->levels); |
| 63 | for (plev = tree->levels; plev != curr; plev++) { |
| 64 | int i; |
| 65 | |
| 66 | BIO_printf(err, "Level %ld, flags = %x\n", |
| 67 | (long)(plev - tree->levels), plev->flags); |
| 68 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(plev->nodes); i++) { |
| 69 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(plev->nodes, i); |
| 70 | |
| 71 | X509_POLICY_NODE_print(err, node, 2); |
| 72 | expected_print(err, plev, node, 2); |
| 73 | BIO_printf(err, " Flags: %x\n", node->data->flags); |
| 74 | } |
| 75 | if (plev->anyPolicy) |
| 76 | X509_POLICY_NODE_print(err, plev->anyPolicy, 2); |
| 77 | } |
| 78 | BIO_free(err); |
| 79 | } |
| 80 | #endif |
| 81 | |
| 82 | /*- |
| 83 | * Return value: <= 0 on error, or positive bit mask: |
| 84 | * |
| 85 | * X509_PCY_TREE_VALID: valid tree |
| 86 | * X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY: empty tree (including bare TA case) |
| 87 | * X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT: explicit policy required |
| 88 | */ |
| 89 | static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, |
| 90 | unsigned int flags) |
| 91 | { |
| 92 | X509_POLICY_TREE *tree; |
| 93 | X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level; |
| 94 | const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache; |
| 95 | X509_POLICY_DATA *data = NULL; |
| 96 | int ret = X509_PCY_TREE_VALID; |
| 97 | int n = sk_X509_num(certs) - 1; /* RFC5280 paths omit the TA */ |
| 98 | int explicit_policy = (flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY) ? 0 : n+1; |
| 99 | int any_skip = (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY) ? 0 : n+1; |
| 100 | int map_skip = (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) ? 0 : n+1; |
| 101 | int i; |
| 102 | |
| 103 | *ptree = NULL; |
| 104 | |
| 105 | /* Can't do anything with just a trust anchor */ |
| 106 | if (n == 0) |
| 107 | return X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY; |
| 108 | |
| 109 | /* |
| 110 | * First setup the policy cache in all n non-TA certificates, this will be |
| 111 | * used in X509_verify_cert() which will invoke the verify callback for all |
| 112 | * certificates with invalid policy extensions. |
| 113 | */ |
| 114 | for (i = n - 1; i >= 0; i--) { |
| 115 | X509 *x = sk_X509_value(certs, i); |
| 116 | |
| 117 | /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */ |
| 118 | X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); |
| 119 | |
| 120 | /* If cache is NULL, likely ENOMEM: return immediately */ |
| 121 | if (policy_cache_set(x) == NULL) |
| 122 | return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; |
| 123 | } |
| 124 | |
| 125 | /* |
| 126 | * At this point check for invalid policies and required explicit policy. |
| 127 | * Note that the explicit_policy counter is a count-down to zero, with the |
| 128 | * requirement kicking in if and once it does that. The counter is |
| 129 | * decremented for every non-self-issued certificate in the path, but may |
| 130 | * be further reduced by policy constraints in a non-leaf certificate. |
| 131 | * |
| 132 | * The ultimate policy set is the intersection of all the policies along |
| 133 | * the path, if we hit a certificate with an empty policy set, and explicit |
| 134 | * policy is required we're done. |
| 135 | */ |
| 136 | for (i = n - 1; |
| 137 | i >= 0 && (explicit_policy > 0 || (ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY) == 0); |
| 138 | i--) { |
| 139 | X509 *x = sk_X509_value(certs, i); |
| 140 | uint32_t ex_flags = X509_get_extension_flags(x); |
| 141 | |
| 142 | /* All the policies are already cached, we can return early */ |
| 143 | if (ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) |
| 144 | return X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID; |
| 145 | |
| 146 | /* Access the cache which we now know exists */ |
| 147 | cache = policy_cache_set(x); |
| 148 | |
| 149 | if ((ret & X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) && cache->data == NULL) |
| 150 | ret = X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY; |
| 151 | if (explicit_policy > 0) { |
| 152 | if (!(ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) |
| 153 | explicit_policy--; |
| 154 | if ((cache->explicit_skip >= 0) |
| 155 | && (cache->explicit_skip < explicit_policy)) |
| 156 | explicit_policy = cache->explicit_skip; |
| 157 | } |
| 158 | } |
| 159 | |
| 160 | if (explicit_policy == 0) |
| 161 | ret |= X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT; |
| 162 | if ((ret & X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) == 0) |
| 163 | return ret; |
| 164 | |
| 165 | /* If we get this far initialize the tree */ |
| 166 | if ((tree = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*tree))) == NULL) { |
| 167 | X509V3err(X509V3_F_TREE_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 168 | return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; |
| 169 | } |
| 170 | |
| 171 | /* |
| 172 | * http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.2, figure 3. |
| 173 | * |
| 174 | * The top level is implicitly for the trust anchor with valid expected |
| 175 | * policies of anyPolicy. (RFC 5280 has the TA at depth 0 and the leaf at |
| 176 | * depth n, we have the leaf at depth 0 and the TA at depth n). |
| 177 | */ |
| 178 | if ((tree->levels = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*tree->levels)*(n+1))) == NULL) { |
| 179 | OPENSSL_free(tree); |
| 180 | X509V3err(X509V3_F_TREE_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 181 | return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; |
| 182 | } |
| 183 | tree->nlevel = n+1; |
| 184 | level = tree->levels; |
| 185 | if ((data = policy_data_new(NULL, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0)) == NULL) |
| 186 | goto bad_tree; |
| 187 | if (level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree) == NULL) { |
| 188 | policy_data_free(data); |
| 189 | goto bad_tree; |
| 190 | } |
| 191 | |
| 192 | /* |
| 193 | * In this pass initialize all the tree levels and whether anyPolicy and |
| 194 | * policy mapping are inhibited at each level. |
| 195 | */ |
| 196 | for (i = n - 1; i >= 0; i--) { |
| 197 | X509 *x = sk_X509_value(certs, i); |
| 198 | uint32_t ex_flags = X509_get_extension_flags(x); |
| 199 | |
| 200 | /* Access the cache which we now know exists */ |
| 201 | cache = policy_cache_set(x); |
| 202 | |
| 203 | X509_up_ref(x); |
| 204 | (++level)->cert = x; |
| 205 | |
| 206 | if (!cache->anyPolicy) |
| 207 | level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY; |
| 208 | |
| 209 | /* Determine inhibit any and inhibit map flags */ |
| 210 | if (any_skip == 0) { |
| 211 | /* |
| 212 | * Any matching allowed only if certificate is self issued and not |
| 213 | * the last in the chain. |
| 214 | */ |
| 215 | if (!(ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) || (i == 0)) |
| 216 | level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY; |
| 217 | } else { |
| 218 | if (!(ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) |
| 219 | any_skip--; |
| 220 | if ((cache->any_skip >= 0) && (cache->any_skip < any_skip)) |
| 221 | any_skip = cache->any_skip; |
| 222 | } |
| 223 | |
| 224 | if (map_skip == 0) |
| 225 | level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP; |
| 226 | else { |
| 227 | if (!(ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) |
| 228 | map_skip--; |
| 229 | if ((cache->map_skip >= 0) && (cache->map_skip < map_skip)) |
| 230 | map_skip = cache->map_skip; |
| 231 | } |
| 232 | } |
| 233 | |
| 234 | *ptree = tree; |
| 235 | return ret; |
| 236 | |
| 237 | bad_tree: |
| 238 | X509_policy_tree_free(tree); |
| 239 | return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; |
| 240 | } |
| 241 | |
| 242 | /* |
| 243 | * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise |
| 244 | */ |
| 245 | static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, |
| 246 | X509_POLICY_DATA *data) |
| 247 | { |
| 248 | X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1; |
| 249 | int i, matched = 0; |
| 250 | |
| 251 | /* Iterate through all in nodes linking matches */ |
| 252 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++) { |
| 253 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i); |
| 254 | |
| 255 | if (policy_node_match(last, node, data->valid_policy)) { |
| 256 | if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, NULL) == NULL) |
| 257 | return 0; |
| 258 | matched = 1; |
| 259 | } |
| 260 | } |
| 261 | if (!matched && last->anyPolicy) { |
| 262 | if (level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL) |
| 263 | return 0; |
| 264 | } |
| 265 | return 1; |
| 266 | } |
| 267 | |
| 268 | /* |
| 269 | * This corresponds to RFC3280 6.1.3(d)(1): link any data from |
| 270 | * CertificatePolicies onto matching parent or anyPolicy if no match. |
| 271 | * |
| 272 | * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise. |
| 273 | */ |
| 274 | static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, |
| 275 | const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache) |
| 276 | { |
| 277 | int i; |
| 278 | |
| 279 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_num(cache->data); i++) { |
| 280 | X509_POLICY_DATA *data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i); |
| 281 | |
| 282 | /* Look for matching nodes in previous level */ |
| 283 | if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data)) |
| 284 | return 0; |
| 285 | } |
| 286 | return 1; |
| 287 | } |
| 288 | |
| 289 | /* |
| 290 | * This corresponds to RFC3280 6.1.3(d)(2): Create new data for any unmatched |
| 291 | * policies in the parent and link to anyPolicy. |
| 292 | * |
| 293 | * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise. |
| 294 | */ |
| 295 | static int tree_add_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, |
| 296 | const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache, |
| 297 | const ASN1_OBJECT *id, |
| 298 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) |
| 299 | { |
| 300 | X509_POLICY_DATA *data; |
| 301 | |
| 302 | if (id == NULL) |
| 303 | id = node->data->valid_policy; |
| 304 | /* |
| 305 | * Create a new node with qualifiers from anyPolicy and id from unmatched |
| 306 | * node. |
| 307 | */ |
| 308 | if ((data = policy_data_new(NULL, id, node_critical(node))) == NULL) |
| 309 | return 0; |
| 310 | |
| 311 | /* Curr may not have anyPolicy */ |
| 312 | data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set; |
| 313 | data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS; |
| 314 | if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree) == NULL) { |
| 315 | policy_data_free(data); |
| 316 | return 0; |
| 317 | } |
| 318 | return 1; |
| 319 | } |
| 320 | |
| 321 | /* |
| 322 | * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise. |
| 323 | */ |
| 324 | static int tree_link_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, |
| 325 | const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache, |
| 326 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) |
| 327 | { |
| 328 | const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1; |
| 329 | int i; |
| 330 | |
| 331 | if ((last->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) |
| 332 | || !(node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED)) { |
| 333 | /* If no policy mapping: matched if one child present */ |
| 334 | if (node->nchild) |
| 335 | return 1; |
| 336 | if (!tree_add_unmatched(curr, cache, NULL, node, tree)) |
| 337 | return 0; |
| 338 | /* Add it */ |
| 339 | } else { |
| 340 | /* If mapping: matched if one child per expected policy set */ |
| 341 | STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *expset = node->data->expected_policy_set; |
| 342 | if (node->nchild == sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(expset)) |
| 343 | return 1; |
| 344 | /* Locate unmatched nodes */ |
| 345 | for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(expset); i++) { |
| 346 | ASN1_OBJECT *oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(expset, i); |
| 347 | if (level_find_node(curr, node, oid)) |
| 348 | continue; |
| 349 | if (!tree_add_unmatched(curr, cache, oid, node, tree)) |
| 350 | return 0; |
| 351 | } |
| 352 | |
| 353 | } |
| 354 | return 1; |
| 355 | } |
| 356 | |
| 357 | /* |
| 358 | * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise |
| 359 | */ |
| 360 | static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, |
| 361 | const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache, |
| 362 | X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) |
| 363 | { |
| 364 | int i; |
| 365 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node; |
| 366 | X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1; |
| 367 | |
| 368 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++) { |
| 369 | node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i); |
| 370 | |
| 371 | if (!tree_link_unmatched(curr, cache, node, tree)) |
| 372 | return 0; |
| 373 | } |
| 374 | /* Finally add link to anyPolicy */ |
| 375 | if (last->anyPolicy && |
| 376 | level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL) |
| 377 | return 0; |
| 378 | return 1; |
| 379 | } |
| 380 | |
| 381 | /*- |
| 382 | * Prune the tree: delete any child mapped child data on the current level then |
| 383 | * proceed up the tree deleting any data with no children. If we ever have no |
| 384 | * data on a level we can halt because the tree will be empty. |
| 385 | * |
| 386 | * Return value: <= 0 error, otherwise one of: |
| 387 | * |
| 388 | * X509_PCY_TREE_VALID: valid tree |
| 389 | * X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY: empty tree |
| 390 | */ |
| 391 | static int tree_prune(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr) |
| 392 | { |
| 393 | STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes; |
| 394 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node; |
| 395 | int i; |
| 396 | nodes = curr->nodes; |
| 397 | if (curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) { |
| 398 | for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { |
| 399 | node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i); |
| 400 | /* Delete any mapped data: see RFC3280 XXXX */ |
| 401 | if (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK) { |
| 402 | node->parent->nchild--; |
| 403 | OPENSSL_free(node); |
| 404 | (void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(nodes, i); |
| 405 | } |
| 406 | } |
| 407 | } |
| 408 | |
| 409 | for (;;) { |
| 410 | --curr; |
| 411 | nodes = curr->nodes; |
| 412 | for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { |
| 413 | node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i); |
| 414 | if (node->nchild == 0) { |
| 415 | node->parent->nchild--; |
| 416 | OPENSSL_free(node); |
| 417 | (void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(nodes, i); |
| 418 | } |
| 419 | } |
| 420 | if (curr->anyPolicy && !curr->anyPolicy->nchild) { |
| 421 | if (curr->anyPolicy->parent) |
| 422 | curr->anyPolicy->parent->nchild--; |
| 423 | OPENSSL_free(curr->anyPolicy); |
| 424 | curr->anyPolicy = NULL; |
| 425 | } |
| 426 | if (curr == tree->levels) { |
| 427 | /* If we zapped anyPolicy at top then tree is empty */ |
| 428 | if (!curr->anyPolicy) |
| 429 | return X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY; |
| 430 | break; |
| 431 | } |
| 432 | } |
| 433 | return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID; |
| 434 | } |
| 435 | |
| 436 | /* |
| 437 | * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise. |
| 438 | */ |
| 439 | static int tree_add_auth_node(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes, |
| 440 | X509_POLICY_NODE *pcy) |
| 441 | { |
| 442 | if (*pnodes == NULL && |
| 443 | (*pnodes = policy_node_cmp_new()) == NULL) |
| 444 | return 0; |
| 445 | if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_find(*pnodes, pcy) >= 0) |
| 446 | return 1; |
| 447 | return sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(*pnodes, pcy) != 0; |
| 448 | } |
| 449 | |
| 450 | #define TREE_CALC_FAILURE 0 |
| 451 | #define TREE_CALC_OK_NOFREE 1 |
| 452 | #define TREE_CALC_OK_DOFREE 2 |
| 453 | |
| 454 | /*- |
| 455 | * Calculate the authority set based on policy tree. The 'pnodes' parameter is |
| 456 | * used as a store for the set of policy nodes used to calculate the user set. |
| 457 | * If the authority set is not anyPolicy then pnodes will just point to the |
| 458 | * authority set. If however the authority set is anyPolicy then the set of |
| 459 | * valid policies (other than anyPolicy) is store in pnodes. |
| 460 | * |
| 461 | * Return value: |
| 462 | * TREE_CALC_FAILURE on failure, |
| 463 | * TREE_CALC_OK_NOFREE on success and pnodes need not be freed, |
| 464 | * TREE_CALC_OK_DOFREE on success and pnodes needs to be freed |
| 465 | */ |
| 466 | static int tree_calculate_authority_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, |
| 467 | STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes) |
| 468 | { |
| 469 | X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr; |
| 470 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node, *anyptr; |
| 471 | STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **addnodes; |
| 472 | int i, j; |
| 473 | curr = tree->levels + tree->nlevel - 1; |
| 474 | |
| 475 | /* If last level contains anyPolicy set is anyPolicy */ |
| 476 | if (curr->anyPolicy) { |
| 477 | if (!tree_add_auth_node(&tree->auth_policies, curr->anyPolicy)) |
| 478 | return TREE_CALC_FAILURE; |
| 479 | addnodes = pnodes; |
| 480 | } else |
| 481 | /* Add policies to authority set */ |
| 482 | addnodes = &tree->auth_policies; |
| 483 | |
| 484 | curr = tree->levels; |
| 485 | for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++) { |
| 486 | /* |
| 487 | * If no anyPolicy node on this this level it can't appear on lower |
| 488 | * levels so end search. |
| 489 | */ |
| 490 | if ((anyptr = curr->anyPolicy) == NULL) |
| 491 | break; |
| 492 | curr++; |
| 493 | for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(curr->nodes); j++) { |
| 494 | node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(curr->nodes, j); |
| 495 | if ((node->parent == anyptr) |
| 496 | && !tree_add_auth_node(addnodes, node)) { |
| 497 | if (addnodes == pnodes) { |
| 498 | sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(*pnodes); |
| 499 | *pnodes = NULL; |
| 500 | } |
| 501 | return TREE_CALC_FAILURE; |
| 502 | } |
| 503 | } |
| 504 | } |
| 505 | if (addnodes == pnodes) |
| 506 | return TREE_CALC_OK_DOFREE; |
| 507 | |
| 508 | *pnodes = tree->auth_policies; |
| 509 | return TREE_CALC_OK_NOFREE; |
| 510 | } |
| 511 | |
| 512 | /* |
| 513 | * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise. |
| 514 | */ |
| 515 | static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, |
| 516 | STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids, |
| 517 | STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *auth_nodes) |
| 518 | { |
| 519 | int i; |
| 520 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node; |
| 521 | ASN1_OBJECT *oid; |
| 522 | X509_POLICY_NODE *anyPolicy; |
| 523 | X509_POLICY_DATA *extra; |
| 524 | |
| 525 | /* |
| 526 | * Check if anyPolicy present in authority constrained policy set: this |
| 527 | * will happen if it is a leaf node. |
| 528 | */ |
| 529 | if (sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids) <= 0) |
| 530 | return 1; |
| 531 | |
| 532 | anyPolicy = tree->levels[tree->nlevel - 1].anyPolicy; |
| 533 | |
| 534 | for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++) { |
| 535 | oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i); |
| 536 | if (OBJ_obj2nid(oid) == NID_any_policy) { |
| 537 | tree->flags |= POLICY_FLAG_ANY_POLICY; |
| 538 | return 1; |
| 539 | } |
| 540 | } |
| 541 | |
| 542 | for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++) { |
| 543 | oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i); |
| 544 | node = tree_find_sk(auth_nodes, oid); |
| 545 | if (!node) { |
| 546 | if (!anyPolicy) |
| 547 | continue; |
| 548 | /* |
| 549 | * Create a new node with policy ID from user set and qualifiers |
| 550 | * from anyPolicy. |
| 551 | */ |
| 552 | extra = policy_data_new(NULL, oid, node_critical(anyPolicy)); |
| 553 | if (extra == NULL) |
| 554 | return 0; |
| 555 | extra->qualifier_set = anyPolicy->data->qualifier_set; |
| 556 | extra->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS |
| 557 | | POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE; |
| 558 | node = level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, tree); |
| 559 | } |
| 560 | if (!tree->user_policies) { |
| 561 | tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null(); |
| 562 | if (!tree->user_policies) |
| 563 | return 1; |
| 564 | } |
| 565 | if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(tree->user_policies, node)) |
| 566 | return 0; |
| 567 | } |
| 568 | return 1; |
| 569 | } |
| 570 | |
| 571 | /*- |
| 572 | * Return value: <= 0 error, otherwise one of: |
| 573 | * X509_PCY_TREE_VALID: valid tree |
| 574 | * X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY: empty tree |
| 575 | * (see tree_prune()). |
| 576 | */ |
| 577 | static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) |
| 578 | { |
| 579 | int ret, i; |
| 580 | X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr = tree->levels + 1; |
| 581 | const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache; |
| 582 | |
| 583 | for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) { |
| 584 | cache = policy_cache_set(curr->cert); |
| 585 | if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache)) |
| 586 | return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; |
| 587 | |
| 588 | if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY) |
| 589 | && !tree_link_any(curr, cache, tree)) |
| 590 | return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; |
| 591 | #ifdef OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG |
| 592 | tree_print("before tree_prune()", tree, curr); |
| 593 | #endif |
| 594 | ret = tree_prune(tree, curr); |
| 595 | if (ret != X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) |
| 596 | return ret; |
| 597 | } |
| 598 | return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID; |
| 599 | } |
| 600 | |
| 601 | static void exnode_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node) |
| 602 | { |
| 603 | if (node->data && (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE)) |
| 604 | OPENSSL_free(node); |
| 605 | } |
| 606 | |
| 607 | void X509_policy_tree_free(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) |
| 608 | { |
| 609 | X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr; |
| 610 | int i; |
| 611 | |
| 612 | if (!tree) |
| 613 | return; |
| 614 | |
| 615 | sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(tree->auth_policies); |
| 616 | sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(tree->user_policies, exnode_free); |
| 617 | |
| 618 | for (i = 0, curr = tree->levels; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) { |
| 619 | X509_free(curr->cert); |
| 620 | sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(curr->nodes, policy_node_free); |
| 621 | policy_node_free(curr->anyPolicy); |
| 622 | } |
| 623 | |
| 624 | sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_pop_free(tree->extra_data, policy_data_free); |
| 625 | OPENSSL_free(tree->levels); |
| 626 | OPENSSL_free(tree); |
| 627 | |
| 628 | } |
| 629 | |
| 630 | /*- |
| 631 | * Application policy checking function. |
| 632 | * Return codes: |
| 633 | * X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE: Failure to satisfy explicit policy |
| 634 | * X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID: Inconsistent or invalid extensions |
| 635 | * X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL: Internal error, most likely malloc |
| 636 | * X509_PCY_TREE_VALID: Success (null tree if empty or bare TA) |
| 637 | */ |
| 638 | int X509_policy_check(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, int *pexplicit_policy, |
| 639 | STACK_OF(X509) *certs, |
| 640 | STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids, unsigned int flags) |
| 641 | { |
| 642 | int init_ret; |
| 643 | int ret; |
| 644 | int calc_ret; |
| 645 | X509_POLICY_TREE *tree = NULL; |
| 646 | STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes, *auth_nodes = NULL; |
| 647 | |
| 648 | *ptree = NULL; |
| 649 | *pexplicit_policy = 0; |
| 650 | init_ret = tree_init(&tree, certs, flags); |
| 651 | |
| 652 | if (init_ret <= 0) |
| 653 | return init_ret; |
| 654 | |
| 655 | if ((init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT) == 0) { |
| 656 | if (init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY) { |
| 657 | X509_policy_tree_free(tree); |
| 658 | return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID; |
| 659 | } |
| 660 | } else { |
| 661 | *pexplicit_policy = 1; |
| 662 | /* Tree empty and requireExplicit True: Error */ |
| 663 | if (init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY) |
| 664 | return X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE; |
| 665 | } |
| 666 | |
| 667 | ret = tree_evaluate(tree); |
| 668 | #ifdef OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG |
| 669 | tree_print("tree_evaluate()", tree, NULL); |
| 670 | #endif |
| 671 | if (ret <= 0) |
| 672 | goto error; |
| 673 | |
| 674 | if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY) { |
| 675 | X509_policy_tree_free(tree); |
| 676 | if (init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT) |
| 677 | return X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE; |
| 678 | return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID; |
| 679 | } |
| 680 | |
| 681 | /* Tree is not empty: continue */ |
| 682 | |
| 683 | if ((calc_ret = tree_calculate_authority_set(tree, &auth_nodes)) == 0) |
| 684 | goto error; |
| 685 | ret = tree_calculate_user_set(tree, policy_oids, auth_nodes); |
| 686 | if (calc_ret == TREE_CALC_OK_DOFREE) |
| 687 | sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(auth_nodes); |
| 688 | if (!ret) |
| 689 | goto error; |
| 690 | |
| 691 | *ptree = tree; |
| 692 | |
| 693 | if (init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT) { |
| 694 | nodes = X509_policy_tree_get0_user_policies(tree); |
| 695 | if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) <= 0) |
| 696 | return X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE; |
| 697 | } |
| 698 | return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID; |
| 699 | |
| 700 | error: |
| 701 | X509_policy_tree_free(tree); |
| 702 | return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; |
| 703 | } |