[Feature]add MT2731_MP2_MR2_SVN388 baseline version
Change-Id: Ief04314834b31e27effab435d3ca8ba33b499059
diff --git a/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-thunderbolt b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-thunderbolt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..392bef5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-thunderbolt
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../domainX/security
+Date: Sep 2017
+KernelVersion: 4.13
+Contact: thunderbolt-software@lists.01.org
+Description: This attribute holds current Thunderbolt security level
+ set by the system BIOS. Possible values are:
+
+ none: All devices are automatically authorized
+ user: Devices are only authorized based on writing
+ appropriate value to the authorized attribute
+ secure: Require devices that support secure connect at
+ minimum. User needs to authorize each device.
+ dponly: Automatically tunnel Display port (and USB). No
+ PCIe tunnels are created.
+
+What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../authorized
+Date: Sep 2017
+KernelVersion: 4.13
+Contact: thunderbolt-software@lists.01.org
+Description: This attribute is used to authorize Thunderbolt devices
+ after they have been connected. If the device is not
+ authorized, no devices such as PCIe and Display port are
+ available to the system.
+
+ Contents of this attribute will be 0 when the device is not
+ yet authorized.
+
+ Possible values are supported:
+ 1: The device will be authorized and connected
+
+ When key attribute contains 32 byte hex string the possible
+ values are:
+ 1: The 32 byte hex string is added to the device NVM and
+ the device is authorized.
+ 2: Send a challenge based on the 32 byte hex string. If the
+ challenge response from device is valid, the device is
+ authorized. In case of failure errno will be ENOKEY if
+ the device did not contain a key at all, and
+ EKEYREJECTED if the challenge response did not match.
+
+What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../key
+Date: Sep 2017
+KernelVersion: 4.13
+Contact: thunderbolt-software@lists.01.org
+Description: When a devices supports Thunderbolt secure connect it will
+ have this attribute. Writing 32 byte hex string changes
+ authorization to use the secure connection method instead.
+ Writing an empty string clears the key and regular connection
+ method can be used again.
+
+What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../device
+Date: Sep 2017
+KernelVersion: 4.13
+Contact: thunderbolt-software@lists.01.org
+Description: This attribute contains id of this device extracted from
+ the device DROM.
+
+What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../device_name
+Date: Sep 2017
+KernelVersion: 4.13
+Contact: thunderbolt-software@lists.01.org
+Description: This attribute contains name of this device extracted from
+ the device DROM.
+
+What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../vendor
+Date: Sep 2017
+KernelVersion: 4.13
+Contact: thunderbolt-software@lists.01.org
+Description: This attribute contains vendor id of this device extracted
+ from the device DROM.
+
+What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../vendor_name
+Date: Sep 2017
+KernelVersion: 4.13
+Contact: thunderbolt-software@lists.01.org
+Description: This attribute contains vendor name of this device extracted
+ from the device DROM.
+
+What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../unique_id
+Date: Sep 2017
+KernelVersion: 4.13
+Contact: thunderbolt-software@lists.01.org
+Description: This attribute contains unique_id string of this device.
+ This is either read from hardware registers (UUID on
+ newer hardware) or based on UID from the device DROM.
+ Can be used to uniquely identify particular device.
+
+What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../nvm_version
+Date: Sep 2017
+KernelVersion: 4.13
+Contact: thunderbolt-software@lists.01.org
+Description: If the device has upgradeable firmware the version
+ number is available here. Format: %x.%x, major.minor.
+ If the device is in safe mode reading the file returns
+ -ENODATA instead as the NVM version is not available.
+
+What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../nvm_authenticate
+Date: Sep 2017
+KernelVersion: 4.13
+Contact: thunderbolt-software@lists.01.org
+Description: When new NVM image is written to the non-active NVM
+ area (through non_activeX NVMem device), the
+ authentication procedure is started by writing 1 to
+ this file. If everything goes well, the device is
+ restarted with the new NVM firmware. If the image
+ verification fails an error code is returned instead.
+
+ When read holds status of the last authentication
+ operation if an error occurred during the process. This
+ is directly the status value from the DMA configuration
+ based mailbox before the device is power cycled. Writing
+ 0 here clears the status.