diff --git a/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/00-INDEX b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/00-INDEX
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6922644
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/00-INDEX
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+00-INDEX
+	- this file
+boot.txt
+	- List of boot protocol versions
+early-microcode.txt
+	- How to load microcode from an initrd-CPIO archive early to fix CPU issues.
+earlyprintk.txt
+	- Using earlyprintk with a USB2 debug port key.
+entry_64.txt
+	- Describe (some of the) kernel entry points for x86.
+exception-tables.txt
+	- why and how Linux kernel uses exception tables on x86
+mtrr.txt
+	- how to use x86 Memory Type Range Registers to increase performance
+pat.txt
+	- Page Attribute Table intro and API
+usb-legacy-support.txt
+	- how to fix/avoid quirks when using emulated PS/2 mouse/keyboard.
+zero-page.txt
+	- layout of the first page of memory.
diff --git a/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.txt b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f512ab7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+Secure Memory Encryption (SME) is a feature found on AMD processors.
+
+SME provides the ability to mark individual pages of memory as encrypted using
+the standard x86 page tables.  A page that is marked encrypted will be
+automatically decrypted when read from DRAM and encrypted when written to
+DRAM.  SME can therefore be used to protect the contents of DRAM from physical
+attacks on the system.
+
+A page is encrypted when a page table entry has the encryption bit set (see
+below on how to determine its position).  The encryption bit can also be
+specified in the cr3 register, allowing the PGD table to be encrypted. Each
+successive level of page tables can also be encrypted by setting the encryption
+bit in the page table entry that points to the next table. This allows the full
+page table hierarchy to be encrypted. Note, this means that just because the
+encryption bit is set in cr3, doesn't imply the full hierarchy is encyrpted.
+Each page table entry in the hierarchy needs to have the encryption bit set to
+achieve that. So, theoretically, you could have the encryption bit set in cr3
+so that the PGD is encrypted, but not set the encryption bit in the PGD entry
+for a PUD which results in the PUD pointed to by that entry to not be
+encrypted.
+
+Support for SME can be determined through the CPUID instruction. The CPUID
+function 0x8000001f reports information related to SME:
+
+	0x8000001f[eax]:
+		Bit[0] indicates support for SME
+	0x8000001f[ebx]:
+		Bits[5:0]  pagetable bit number used to activate memory
+			   encryption
+		Bits[11:6] reduction in physical address space, in bits, when
+			   memory encryption is enabled (this only affects
+			   system physical addresses, not guest physical
+			   addresses)
+
+If support for SME is present, MSR 0xc00100010 (MSR_K8_SYSCFG) can be used to
+determine if SME is enabled and/or to enable memory encryption:
+
+	0xc0010010:
+		Bit[23]   0 = memory encryption features are disabled
+			  1 = memory encryption features are enabled
+
+Linux relies on BIOS to set this bit if BIOS has determined that the reduction
+in the physical address space as a result of enabling memory encryption (see
+CPUID information above) will not conflict with the address space resource
+requirements for the system.  If this bit is not set upon Linux startup then
+Linux itself will not set it and memory encryption will not be possible.
+
+The state of SME in the Linux kernel can be documented as follows:
+	- Supported:
+	  The CPU supports SME (determined through CPUID instruction).
+
+	- Enabled:
+	  Supported and bit 23 of MSR_K8_SYSCFG is set.
+
+	- Active:
+	  Supported, Enabled and the Linux kernel is actively applying
+	  the encryption bit to page table entries (the SME mask in the
+	  kernel is non-zero).
+
+SME can also be enabled and activated in the BIOS. If SME is enabled and
+activated in the BIOS, then all memory accesses will be encrypted and it will
+not be necessary to activate the Linux memory encryption support.  If the BIOS
+merely enables SME (sets bit 23 of the MSR_K8_SYSCFG), then Linux can activate
+memory encryption by default (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT=y) or
+by supplying mem_encrypt=on on the kernel command line.  However, if BIOS does
+not enable SME, then Linux will not be able to activate memory encryption, even
+if configured to do so by default or the mem_encrypt=on command line parameter
+is specified.
diff --git a/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/boot.txt b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/boot.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5e9b826
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/boot.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,1130 @@
+		     THE LINUX/x86 BOOT PROTOCOL
+		     ---------------------------
+
+On the x86 platform, the Linux kernel uses a rather complicated boot
+convention.  This has evolved partially due to historical aspects, as
+well as the desire in the early days to have the kernel itself be a
+bootable image, the complicated PC memory model and due to changed
+expectations in the PC industry caused by the effective demise of
+real-mode DOS as a mainstream operating system.
+
+Currently, the following versions of the Linux/x86 boot protocol exist.
+
+Old kernels:	zImage/Image support only.  Some very early kernels
+		may not even support a command line.
+
+Protocol 2.00:	(Kernel 1.3.73) Added bzImage and initrd support, as
+		well as a formalized way to communicate between the
+		boot loader and the kernel.  setup.S made relocatable,
+		although the traditional setup area still assumed
+		writable.
+
+Protocol 2.01:	(Kernel 1.3.76) Added a heap overrun warning.
+
+Protocol 2.02:	(Kernel 2.4.0-test3-pre3) New command line protocol.
+		Lower the conventional memory ceiling.	No overwrite
+		of the traditional setup area, thus making booting
+		safe for systems which use the EBDA from SMM or 32-bit
+		BIOS entry points.  zImage deprecated but still
+		supported.
+
+Protocol 2.03:	(Kernel 2.4.18-pre1) Explicitly makes the highest possible
+		initrd address available to the bootloader.
+
+Protocol 2.04:	(Kernel 2.6.14) Extend the syssize field to four bytes.
+
+Protocol 2.05:	(Kernel 2.6.20) Make protected mode kernel relocatable.
+		Introduce relocatable_kernel and kernel_alignment fields.
+
+Protocol 2.06:	(Kernel 2.6.22) Added a field that contains the size of
+		the boot command line.
+
+Protocol 2.07:	(Kernel 2.6.24) Added paravirtualised boot protocol.
+		Introduced hardware_subarch and hardware_subarch_data
+		and KEEP_SEGMENTS flag in load_flags.
+
+Protocol 2.08:	(Kernel 2.6.26) Added crc32 checksum and ELF format
+		payload. Introduced payload_offset and payload_length
+		fields to aid in locating the payload.
+
+Protocol 2.09:	(Kernel 2.6.26) Added a field of 64-bit physical
+		pointer to single linked list of struct	setup_data.
+
+Protocol 2.10:	(Kernel 2.6.31) Added a protocol for relaxed alignment
+		beyond the kernel_alignment added, new init_size and
+		pref_address fields.  Added extended boot loader IDs.
+
+Protocol 2.11:	(Kernel 3.6) Added a field for offset of EFI handover
+		protocol entry point.
+
+Protocol 2.12:	(Kernel 3.8) Added the xloadflags field and extension fields
+	 	to struct boot_params for loading bzImage and ramdisk
+		above 4G in 64bit.
+
+**** MEMORY LAYOUT
+
+The traditional memory map for the kernel loader, used for Image or
+zImage kernels, typically looks like:
+
+	|			 |
+0A0000	+------------------------+
+	|  Reserved for BIOS	 |	Do not use.  Reserved for BIOS EBDA.
+09A000	+------------------------+
+	|  Command line		 |
+	|  Stack/heap		 |	For use by the kernel real-mode code.
+098000	+------------------------+	
+	|  Kernel setup		 |	The kernel real-mode code.
+090200	+------------------------+
+	|  Kernel boot sector	 |	The kernel legacy boot sector.
+090000	+------------------------+
+	|  Protected-mode kernel |	The bulk of the kernel image.
+010000	+------------------------+
+	|  Boot loader		 |	<- Boot sector entry point 0000:7C00
+001000	+------------------------+
+	|  Reserved for MBR/BIOS |
+000800	+------------------------+
+	|  Typically used by MBR |
+000600	+------------------------+ 
+	|  BIOS use only	 |
+000000	+------------------------+
+
+
+When using bzImage, the protected-mode kernel was relocated to
+0x100000 ("high memory"), and the kernel real-mode block (boot sector,
+setup, and stack/heap) was made relocatable to any address between
+0x10000 and end of low memory. Unfortunately, in protocols 2.00 and
+2.01 the 0x90000+ memory range is still used internally by the kernel;
+the 2.02 protocol resolves that problem.
+
+It is desirable to keep the "memory ceiling" -- the highest point in
+low memory touched by the boot loader -- as low as possible, since
+some newer BIOSes have begun to allocate some rather large amounts of
+memory, called the Extended BIOS Data Area, near the top of low
+memory.	 The boot loader should use the "INT 12h" BIOS call to verify
+how much low memory is available.
+
+Unfortunately, if INT 12h reports that the amount of memory is too
+low, there is usually nothing the boot loader can do but to report an
+error to the user.  The boot loader should therefore be designed to
+take up as little space in low memory as it reasonably can.  For
+zImage or old bzImage kernels, which need data written into the
+0x90000 segment, the boot loader should make sure not to use memory
+above the 0x9A000 point; too many BIOSes will break above that point.
+
+For a modern bzImage kernel with boot protocol version >= 2.02, a
+memory layout like the following is suggested:
+
+	~                        ~
+        |  Protected-mode kernel |
+100000  +------------------------+
+	|  I/O memory hole	 |
+0A0000	+------------------------+
+	|  Reserved for BIOS	 |	Leave as much as possible unused
+	~                        ~
+	|  Command line		 |	(Can also be below the X+10000 mark)
+X+10000	+------------------------+
+	|  Stack/heap		 |	For use by the kernel real-mode code.
+X+08000	+------------------------+	
+	|  Kernel setup		 |	The kernel real-mode code.
+	|  Kernel boot sector	 |	The kernel legacy boot sector.
+X       +------------------------+
+	|  Boot loader		 |	<- Boot sector entry point 0000:7C00
+001000	+------------------------+
+	|  Reserved for MBR/BIOS |
+000800	+------------------------+
+	|  Typically used by MBR |
+000600	+------------------------+ 
+	|  BIOS use only	 |
+000000	+------------------------+
+
+... where the address X is as low as the design of the boot loader
+permits.
+
+
+**** THE REAL-MODE KERNEL HEADER
+
+In the following text, and anywhere in the kernel boot sequence, "a
+sector" refers to 512 bytes.  It is independent of the actual sector
+size of the underlying medium.
+
+The first step in loading a Linux kernel should be to load the
+real-mode code (boot sector and setup code) and then examine the
+following header at offset 0x01f1.  The real-mode code can total up to
+32K, although the boot loader may choose to load only the first two
+sectors (1K) and then examine the bootup sector size.
+
+The header looks like:
+
+Offset	Proto	Name		Meaning
+/Size
+
+01F1/1	ALL(1	setup_sects	The size of the setup in sectors
+01F2/2	ALL	root_flags	If set, the root is mounted readonly
+01F4/4	2.04+(2	syssize		The size of the 32-bit code in 16-byte paras
+01F8/2	ALL	ram_size	DO NOT USE - for bootsect.S use only
+01FA/2	ALL	vid_mode	Video mode control
+01FC/2	ALL	root_dev	Default root device number
+01FE/2	ALL	boot_flag	0xAA55 magic number
+0200/2	2.00+	jump		Jump instruction
+0202/4	2.00+	header		Magic signature "HdrS"
+0206/2	2.00+	version		Boot protocol version supported
+0208/4	2.00+	realmode_swtch	Boot loader hook (see below)
+020C/2	2.00+	start_sys_seg	The load-low segment (0x1000) (obsolete)
+020E/2	2.00+	kernel_version	Pointer to kernel version string
+0210/1	2.00+	type_of_loader	Boot loader identifier
+0211/1	2.00+	loadflags	Boot protocol option flags
+0212/2	2.00+	setup_move_size	Move to high memory size (used with hooks)
+0214/4	2.00+	code32_start	Boot loader hook (see below)
+0218/4	2.00+	ramdisk_image	initrd load address (set by boot loader)
+021C/4	2.00+	ramdisk_size	initrd size (set by boot loader)
+0220/4	2.00+	bootsect_kludge	DO NOT USE - for bootsect.S use only
+0224/2	2.01+	heap_end_ptr	Free memory after setup end
+0226/1	2.02+(3 ext_loader_ver	Extended boot loader version
+0227/1	2.02+(3	ext_loader_type	Extended boot loader ID
+0228/4	2.02+	cmd_line_ptr	32-bit pointer to the kernel command line
+022C/4	2.03+	initrd_addr_max	Highest legal initrd address
+0230/4	2.05+	kernel_alignment Physical addr alignment required for kernel
+0234/1	2.05+	relocatable_kernel Whether kernel is relocatable or not
+0235/1	2.10+	min_alignment	Minimum alignment, as a power of two
+0236/2	2.12+	xloadflags	Boot protocol option flags
+0238/4	2.06+	cmdline_size	Maximum size of the kernel command line
+023C/4	2.07+	hardware_subarch Hardware subarchitecture
+0240/8	2.07+	hardware_subarch_data Subarchitecture-specific data
+0248/4	2.08+	payload_offset	Offset of kernel payload
+024C/4	2.08+	payload_length	Length of kernel payload
+0250/8	2.09+	setup_data	64-bit physical pointer to linked list
+				of struct setup_data
+0258/8	2.10+	pref_address	Preferred loading address
+0260/4	2.10+	init_size	Linear memory required during initialization
+0264/4	2.11+	handover_offset	Offset of handover entry point
+
+(1) For backwards compatibility, if the setup_sects field contains 0, the
+    real value is 4.
+
+(2) For boot protocol prior to 2.04, the upper two bytes of the syssize
+    field are unusable, which means the size of a bzImage kernel
+    cannot be determined.
+
+(3) Ignored, but safe to set, for boot protocols 2.02-2.09.
+
+If the "HdrS" (0x53726448) magic number is not found at offset 0x202,
+the boot protocol version is "old".  Loading an old kernel, the
+following parameters should be assumed:
+
+	Image type = zImage
+	initrd not supported
+	Real-mode kernel must be located at 0x90000.
+
+Otherwise, the "version" field contains the protocol version,
+e.g. protocol version 2.01 will contain 0x0201 in this field.  When
+setting fields in the header, you must make sure only to set fields
+supported by the protocol version in use.
+
+
+**** DETAILS OF HEADER FIELDS
+
+For each field, some are information from the kernel to the bootloader
+("read"), some are expected to be filled out by the bootloader
+("write"), and some are expected to be read and modified by the
+bootloader ("modify").
+
+All general purpose boot loaders should write the fields marked
+(obligatory).  Boot loaders who want to load the kernel at a
+nonstandard address should fill in the fields marked (reloc); other
+boot loaders can ignore those fields.
+
+The byte order of all fields is littleendian (this is x86, after all.)
+
+Field name:	setup_sects
+Type:		read
+Offset/size:	0x1f1/1
+Protocol:	ALL
+
+  The size of the setup code in 512-byte sectors.  If this field is
+  0, the real value is 4.  The real-mode code consists of the boot
+  sector (always one 512-byte sector) plus the setup code.
+
+Field name:	 root_flags
+Type:		 modify (optional)
+Offset/size:	 0x1f2/2
+Protocol:	 ALL
+
+  If this field is nonzero, the root defaults to readonly.  The use of
+  this field is deprecated; use the "ro" or "rw" options on the
+  command line instead.
+
+Field name:	syssize
+Type:		read
+Offset/size:	0x1f4/4 (protocol 2.04+) 0x1f4/2 (protocol ALL)
+Protocol:	2.04+
+
+  The size of the protected-mode code in units of 16-byte paragraphs.
+  For protocol versions older than 2.04 this field is only two bytes
+  wide, and therefore cannot be trusted for the size of a kernel if
+  the LOAD_HIGH flag is set.
+
+Field name:	ram_size
+Type:		kernel internal
+Offset/size:	0x1f8/2
+Protocol:	ALL
+
+  This field is obsolete.
+
+Field name:	vid_mode
+Type:		modify (obligatory)
+Offset/size:	0x1fa/2
+
+  Please see the section on SPECIAL COMMAND LINE OPTIONS.
+
+Field name:	root_dev
+Type:		modify (optional)
+Offset/size:	0x1fc/2
+Protocol:	ALL
+
+  The default root device device number.  The use of this field is
+  deprecated, use the "root=" option on the command line instead.
+
+Field name:	boot_flag
+Type:		read
+Offset/size:	0x1fe/2
+Protocol:	ALL
+
+  Contains 0xAA55.  This is the closest thing old Linux kernels have
+  to a magic number.
+
+Field name:	jump
+Type:		read
+Offset/size:	0x200/2
+Protocol:	2.00+
+
+  Contains an x86 jump instruction, 0xEB followed by a signed offset
+  relative to byte 0x202.  This can be used to determine the size of
+  the header.
+
+Field name:	header
+Type:		read
+Offset/size:	0x202/4
+Protocol:	2.00+
+
+  Contains the magic number "HdrS" (0x53726448).
+
+Field name:	version
+Type:		read
+Offset/size:	0x206/2
+Protocol:	2.00+
+
+  Contains the boot protocol version, in (major << 8)+minor format,
+  e.g. 0x0204 for version 2.04, and 0x0a11 for a hypothetical version
+  10.17.
+
+Field name:	realmode_swtch
+Type:		modify (optional)
+Offset/size:	0x208/4
+Protocol:	2.00+
+
+  Boot loader hook (see ADVANCED BOOT LOADER HOOKS below.)
+
+Field name:	start_sys_seg
+Type:		read
+Offset/size:	0x20c/2
+Protocol:	2.00+
+
+  The load low segment (0x1000).  Obsolete.
+
+Field name:	kernel_version
+Type:		read
+Offset/size:	0x20e/2
+Protocol:	2.00+
+
+  If set to a nonzero value, contains a pointer to a NUL-terminated
+  human-readable kernel version number string, less 0x200.  This can
+  be used to display the kernel version to the user.  This value
+  should be less than (0x200*setup_sects).
+
+  For example, if this value is set to 0x1c00, the kernel version
+  number string can be found at offset 0x1e00 in the kernel file.
+  This is a valid value if and only if the "setup_sects" field
+  contains the value 15 or higher, as:
+
+	0x1c00  < 15*0x200 (= 0x1e00) but
+	0x1c00 >= 14*0x200 (= 0x1c00)
+
+	0x1c00 >> 9 = 14, so the minimum value for setup_secs is 15.
+
+Field name:	type_of_loader
+Type:		write (obligatory)
+Offset/size:	0x210/1
+Protocol:	2.00+
+
+  If your boot loader has an assigned id (see table below), enter
+  0xTV here, where T is an identifier for the boot loader and V is
+  a version number.  Otherwise, enter 0xFF here.
+
+  For boot loader IDs above T = 0xD, write T = 0xE to this field and
+  write the extended ID minus 0x10 to the ext_loader_type field.
+  Similarly, the ext_loader_ver field can be used to provide more than
+  four bits for the bootloader version.
+
+  For example, for T = 0x15, V = 0x234, write:
+
+  type_of_loader  <- 0xE4
+  ext_loader_type <- 0x05
+  ext_loader_ver  <- 0x23
+
+  Assigned boot loader ids (hexadecimal):
+
+	0  LILO			(0x00 reserved for pre-2.00 bootloader)
+	1  Loadlin
+	2  bootsect-loader	(0x20, all other values reserved)
+	3  Syslinux
+	4  Etherboot/gPXE/iPXE
+	5  ELILO
+	7  GRUB
+	8  U-Boot
+	9  Xen
+	A  Gujin
+	B  Qemu
+	C  Arcturus Networks uCbootloader
+	D  kexec-tools
+	E  Extended		(see ext_loader_type)
+	F  Special		(0xFF = undefined)
+       10  Reserved
+       11  Minimal Linux Bootloader <http://sebastian-plotz.blogspot.de>
+       12  OVMF UEFI virtualization stack
+
+  Please contact <hpa@zytor.com> if you need a bootloader ID
+  value assigned.
+
+Field name:	loadflags
+Type:		modify (obligatory)
+Offset/size:	0x211/1
+Protocol:	2.00+
+
+  This field is a bitmask.
+
+  Bit 0 (read):	LOADED_HIGH
+	- If 0, the protected-mode code is loaded at 0x10000.
+	- If 1, the protected-mode code is loaded at 0x100000.
+
+  Bit 1 (kernel internal): KASLR_FLAG
+	- Used internally by the compressed kernel to communicate
+	  KASLR status to kernel proper.
+	  If 1, KASLR enabled.
+	  If 0, KASLR disabled.
+
+  Bit 5 (write): QUIET_FLAG
+	- If 0, print early messages.
+	- If 1, suppress early messages.
+		This requests to the kernel (decompressor and early
+		kernel) to not write early messages that require
+		accessing the display hardware directly.
+
+  Bit 6 (write): KEEP_SEGMENTS
+	Protocol: 2.07+
+	- If 0, reload the segment registers in the 32bit entry point.
+	- If 1, do not reload the segment registers in the 32bit entry point.
+		Assume that %cs %ds %ss %es are all set to flat segments with
+		a base of 0 (or the equivalent for their environment).
+
+  Bit 7 (write): CAN_USE_HEAP
+	Set this bit to 1 to indicate that the value entered in the
+	heap_end_ptr is valid.  If this field is clear, some setup code
+	functionality will be disabled.
+
+Field name:	setup_move_size
+Type:		modify (obligatory)
+Offset/size:	0x212/2
+Protocol:	2.00-2.01
+
+  When using protocol 2.00 or 2.01, if the real mode kernel is not
+  loaded at 0x90000, it gets moved there later in the loading
+  sequence.  Fill in this field if you want additional data (such as
+  the kernel command line) moved in addition to the real-mode kernel
+  itself.
+
+  The unit is bytes starting with the beginning of the boot sector.
+  
+  This field is can be ignored when the protocol is 2.02 or higher, or
+  if the real-mode code is loaded at 0x90000.
+
+Field name:	code32_start
+Type:		modify (optional, reloc)
+Offset/size:	0x214/4
+Protocol:	2.00+
+
+  The address to jump to in protected mode.  This defaults to the load
+  address of the kernel, and can be used by the boot loader to
+  determine the proper load address.
+
+  This field can be modified for two purposes:
+
+  1. as a boot loader hook (see ADVANCED BOOT LOADER HOOKS below.)
+
+  2. if a bootloader which does not install a hook loads a
+     relocatable kernel at a nonstandard address it will have to modify
+     this field to point to the load address.
+
+Field name:	ramdisk_image
+Type:		write (obligatory)
+Offset/size:	0x218/4
+Protocol:	2.00+
+
+  The 32-bit linear address of the initial ramdisk or ramfs.  Leave at
+  zero if there is no initial ramdisk/ramfs.
+
+Field name:	ramdisk_size
+Type:		write (obligatory)
+Offset/size:	0x21c/4
+Protocol:	2.00+
+
+  Size of the initial ramdisk or ramfs.  Leave at zero if there is no
+  initial ramdisk/ramfs.
+
+Field name:	bootsect_kludge
+Type:		kernel internal
+Offset/size:	0x220/4
+Protocol:	2.00+
+
+  This field is obsolete.
+
+Field name:	heap_end_ptr
+Type:		write (obligatory)
+Offset/size:	0x224/2
+Protocol:	2.01+
+
+  Set this field to the offset (from the beginning of the real-mode
+  code) of the end of the setup stack/heap, minus 0x0200.
+
+Field name:	ext_loader_ver
+Type:		write (optional)
+Offset/size:	0x226/1
+Protocol:	2.02+
+
+  This field is used as an extension of the version number in the
+  type_of_loader field.  The total version number is considered to be
+  (type_of_loader & 0x0f) + (ext_loader_ver << 4).
+
+  The use of this field is boot loader specific.  If not written, it
+  is zero.
+
+  Kernels prior to 2.6.31 did not recognize this field, but it is safe
+  to write for protocol version 2.02 or higher.
+
+Field name:	ext_loader_type
+Type:		write (obligatory if (type_of_loader & 0xf0) == 0xe0)
+Offset/size:	0x227/1
+Protocol:	2.02+
+
+  This field is used as an extension of the type number in
+  type_of_loader field.  If the type in type_of_loader is 0xE, then
+  the actual type is (ext_loader_type + 0x10).
+
+  This field is ignored if the type in type_of_loader is not 0xE.
+
+  Kernels prior to 2.6.31 did not recognize this field, but it is safe
+  to write for protocol version 2.02 or higher.
+
+Field name:	cmd_line_ptr
+Type:		write (obligatory)
+Offset/size:	0x228/4
+Protocol:	2.02+
+
+  Set this field to the linear address of the kernel command line.
+  The kernel command line can be located anywhere between the end of
+  the setup heap and 0xA0000; it does not have to be located in the
+  same 64K segment as the real-mode code itself.
+
+  Fill in this field even if your boot loader does not support a
+  command line, in which case you can point this to an empty string
+  (or better yet, to the string "auto".)  If this field is left at
+  zero, the kernel will assume that your boot loader does not support
+  the 2.02+ protocol.
+
+Field name:	initrd_addr_max
+Type:		read
+Offset/size:	0x22c/4
+Protocol:	2.03+
+
+  The maximum address that may be occupied by the initial
+  ramdisk/ramfs contents.  For boot protocols 2.02 or earlier, this
+  field is not present, and the maximum address is 0x37FFFFFF.  (This
+  address is defined as the address of the highest safe byte, so if
+  your ramdisk is exactly 131072 bytes long and this field is
+  0x37FFFFFF, you can start your ramdisk at 0x37FE0000.)
+
+Field name:	kernel_alignment
+Type:		read/modify (reloc)
+Offset/size:	0x230/4
+Protocol:	2.05+ (read), 2.10+ (modify)
+
+  Alignment unit required by the kernel (if relocatable_kernel is
+  true.)  A relocatable kernel that is loaded at an alignment
+  incompatible with the value in this field will be realigned during
+  kernel initialization.
+
+  Starting with protocol version 2.10, this reflects the kernel
+  alignment preferred for optimal performance; it is possible for the
+  loader to modify this field to permit a lesser alignment.  See the
+  min_alignment and pref_address field below.
+
+Field name:	relocatable_kernel
+Type:		read (reloc)
+Offset/size:	0x234/1
+Protocol:	2.05+
+
+  If this field is nonzero, the protected-mode part of the kernel can
+  be loaded at any address that satisfies the kernel_alignment field.
+  After loading, the boot loader must set the code32_start field to
+  point to the loaded code, or to a boot loader hook.
+
+Field name:	min_alignment
+Type:		read (reloc)
+Offset/size:	0x235/1
+Protocol:	2.10+
+
+  This field, if nonzero, indicates as a power of two the minimum
+  alignment required, as opposed to preferred, by the kernel to boot.
+  If a boot loader makes use of this field, it should update the
+  kernel_alignment field with the alignment unit desired; typically:
+
+	kernel_alignment = 1 << min_alignment
+
+  There may be a considerable performance cost with an excessively
+  misaligned kernel.  Therefore, a loader should typically try each
+  power-of-two alignment from kernel_alignment down to this alignment.
+
+Field name:     xloadflags
+Type:           read
+Offset/size:    0x236/2
+Protocol:       2.12+
+
+  This field is a bitmask.
+
+  Bit 0 (read):	XLF_KERNEL_64
+	- If 1, this kernel has the legacy 64-bit entry point at 0x200.
+
+  Bit 1 (read): XLF_CAN_BE_LOADED_ABOVE_4G
+        - If 1, kernel/boot_params/cmdline/ramdisk can be above 4G.
+
+  Bit 2 (read):	XLF_EFI_HANDOVER_32
+	- If 1, the kernel supports the 32-bit EFI handoff entry point
+          given at handover_offset.
+
+  Bit 3 (read): XLF_EFI_HANDOVER_64
+	- If 1, the kernel supports the 64-bit EFI handoff entry point
+          given at handover_offset + 0x200.
+
+  Bit 4 (read): XLF_EFI_KEXEC
+	- If 1, the kernel supports kexec EFI boot with EFI runtime support.
+
+Field name:	cmdline_size
+Type:		read
+Offset/size:	0x238/4
+Protocol:	2.06+
+
+  The maximum size of the command line without the terminating
+  zero. This means that the command line can contain at most
+  cmdline_size characters. With protocol version 2.05 and earlier, the
+  maximum size was 255.
+
+Field name:	hardware_subarch
+Type:		write (optional, defaults to x86/PC)
+Offset/size:	0x23c/4
+Protocol:	2.07+
+
+  In a paravirtualized environment the hardware low level architectural
+  pieces such as interrupt handling, page table handling, and
+  accessing process control registers needs to be done differently.
+
+  This field allows the bootloader to inform the kernel we are in one
+  one of those environments.
+
+  0x00000000	The default x86/PC environment
+  0x00000001	lguest
+  0x00000002	Xen
+  0x00000003	Moorestown MID
+  0x00000004	CE4100 TV Platform
+
+Field name:	hardware_subarch_data
+Type:		write (subarch-dependent)
+Offset/size:	0x240/8
+Protocol:	2.07+
+
+  A pointer to data that is specific to hardware subarch
+  This field is currently unused for the default x86/PC environment,
+  do not modify.
+
+Field name:	payload_offset
+Type:		read
+Offset/size:	0x248/4
+Protocol:	2.08+
+
+  If non-zero then this field contains the offset from the beginning
+  of the protected-mode code to the payload.
+
+  The payload may be compressed. The format of both the compressed and
+  uncompressed data should be determined using the standard magic
+  numbers.  The currently supported compression formats are gzip
+  (magic numbers 1F 8B or 1F 9E), bzip2 (magic number 42 5A), LZMA
+  (magic number 5D 00), XZ (magic number FD 37), and LZ4 (magic number
+  02 21).  The uncompressed payload is currently always ELF (magic
+  number 7F 45 4C 46).
+
+Field name:	payload_length
+Type:		read
+Offset/size:	0x24c/4
+Protocol:	2.08+
+
+  The length of the payload.
+
+Field name:	setup_data
+Type:		write (special)
+Offset/size:	0x250/8
+Protocol:	2.09+
+
+  The 64-bit physical pointer to NULL terminated single linked list of
+  struct setup_data. This is used to define a more extensible boot
+  parameters passing mechanism. The definition of struct setup_data is
+  as follow:
+
+  struct setup_data {
+	  u64 next;
+	  u32 type;
+	  u32 len;
+	  u8  data[0];
+  };
+
+  Where, the next is a 64-bit physical pointer to the next node of
+  linked list, the next field of the last node is 0; the type is used
+  to identify the contents of data; the len is the length of data
+  field; the data holds the real payload.
+
+  This list may be modified at a number of points during the bootup
+  process.  Therefore, when modifying this list one should always make
+  sure to consider the case where the linked list already contains
+  entries.
+
+Field name:	pref_address
+Type:		read (reloc)
+Offset/size:	0x258/8
+Protocol:	2.10+
+
+  This field, if nonzero, represents a preferred load address for the
+  kernel.  A relocating bootloader should attempt to load at this
+  address if possible.
+
+  A non-relocatable kernel will unconditionally move itself and to run
+  at this address.
+
+Field name:	init_size
+Type:		read
+Offset/size:	0x260/4
+
+  This field indicates the amount of linear contiguous memory starting
+  at the kernel runtime start address that the kernel needs before it
+  is capable of examining its memory map.  This is not the same thing
+  as the total amount of memory the kernel needs to boot, but it can
+  be used by a relocating boot loader to help select a safe load
+  address for the kernel.
+
+  The kernel runtime start address is determined by the following algorithm:
+
+  if (relocatable_kernel)
+	runtime_start = align_up(load_address, kernel_alignment)
+  else
+	runtime_start = pref_address
+
+Field name:	handover_offset
+Type:		read
+Offset/size:	0x264/4
+
+  This field is the offset from the beginning of the kernel image to
+  the EFI handover protocol entry point. Boot loaders using the EFI
+  handover protocol to boot the kernel should jump to this offset.
+
+  See EFI HANDOVER PROTOCOL below for more details.
+
+
+**** THE IMAGE CHECKSUM
+
+From boot protocol version 2.08 onwards the CRC-32 is calculated over
+the entire file using the characteristic polynomial 0x04C11DB7 and an
+initial remainder of 0xffffffff.  The checksum is appended to the
+file; therefore the CRC of the file up to the limit specified in the
+syssize field of the header is always 0.
+
+
+**** THE KERNEL COMMAND LINE
+
+The kernel command line has become an important way for the boot
+loader to communicate with the kernel.  Some of its options are also
+relevant to the boot loader itself, see "special command line options"
+below.
+
+The kernel command line is a null-terminated string. The maximum
+length can be retrieved from the field cmdline_size.  Before protocol
+version 2.06, the maximum was 255 characters.  A string that is too
+long will be automatically truncated by the kernel.
+
+If the boot protocol version is 2.02 or later, the address of the
+kernel command line is given by the header field cmd_line_ptr (see
+above.)  This address can be anywhere between the end of the setup
+heap and 0xA0000.
+
+If the protocol version is *not* 2.02 or higher, the kernel
+command line is entered using the following protocol:
+
+	At offset 0x0020 (word), "cmd_line_magic", enter the magic
+	number 0xA33F.
+
+	At offset 0x0022 (word), "cmd_line_offset", enter the offset
+	of the kernel command line (relative to the start of the
+	real-mode kernel).
+	
+	The kernel command line *must* be within the memory region
+	covered by setup_move_size, so you may need to adjust this
+	field.
+
+
+**** MEMORY LAYOUT OF THE REAL-MODE CODE
+
+The real-mode code requires a stack/heap to be set up, as well as
+memory allocated for the kernel command line.  This needs to be done
+in the real-mode accessible memory in bottom megabyte.
+
+It should be noted that modern machines often have a sizable Extended
+BIOS Data Area (EBDA).  As a result, it is advisable to use as little
+of the low megabyte as possible.
+
+Unfortunately, under the following circumstances the 0x90000 memory
+segment has to be used:
+
+	- When loading a zImage kernel ((loadflags & 0x01) == 0).
+	- When loading a 2.01 or earlier boot protocol kernel.
+
+	  -> For the 2.00 and 2.01 boot protocols, the real-mode code
+	     can be loaded at another address, but it is internally
+	     relocated to 0x90000.  For the "old" protocol, the
+	     real-mode code must be loaded at 0x90000.
+
+When loading at 0x90000, avoid using memory above 0x9a000.
+
+For boot protocol 2.02 or higher, the command line does not have to be
+located in the same 64K segment as the real-mode setup code; it is
+thus permitted to give the stack/heap the full 64K segment and locate
+the command line above it.
+
+The kernel command line should not be located below the real-mode
+code, nor should it be located in high memory.
+
+
+**** SAMPLE BOOT CONFIGURATION
+
+As a sample configuration, assume the following layout of the real
+mode segment:
+
+    When loading below 0x90000, use the entire segment:
+
+	0x0000-0x7fff	Real mode kernel
+	0x8000-0xdfff	Stack and heap
+	0xe000-0xffff	Kernel command line
+
+    When loading at 0x90000 OR the protocol version is 2.01 or earlier:
+
+	0x0000-0x7fff	Real mode kernel
+	0x8000-0x97ff	Stack and heap
+	0x9800-0x9fff	Kernel command line
+
+Such a boot loader should enter the following fields in the header:
+
+	unsigned long base_ptr;	/* base address for real-mode segment */
+
+	if ( setup_sects == 0 ) {
+		setup_sects = 4;
+	}
+
+	if ( protocol >= 0x0200 ) {
+		type_of_loader = <type code>;
+		if ( loading_initrd ) {
+			ramdisk_image = <initrd_address>;
+			ramdisk_size = <initrd_size>;
+		}
+
+		if ( protocol >= 0x0202 && loadflags & 0x01 )
+			heap_end = 0xe000;
+		else
+			heap_end = 0x9800;
+
+		if ( protocol >= 0x0201 ) {
+			heap_end_ptr = heap_end - 0x200;
+			loadflags |= 0x80; /* CAN_USE_HEAP */
+		}
+
+		if ( protocol >= 0x0202 ) {
+			cmd_line_ptr = base_ptr + heap_end;
+			strcpy(cmd_line_ptr, cmdline);
+		} else {
+			cmd_line_magic	= 0xA33F;
+			cmd_line_offset = heap_end;
+			setup_move_size = heap_end + strlen(cmdline)+1;
+			strcpy(base_ptr+cmd_line_offset, cmdline);
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* Very old kernel */
+
+		heap_end = 0x9800;
+
+		cmd_line_magic	= 0xA33F;
+		cmd_line_offset = heap_end;
+
+		/* A very old kernel MUST have its real-mode code
+		   loaded at 0x90000 */
+
+		if ( base_ptr != 0x90000 ) {
+			/* Copy the real-mode kernel */
+			memcpy(0x90000, base_ptr, (setup_sects+1)*512);
+			base_ptr = 0x90000;		 /* Relocated */
+		}
+
+		strcpy(0x90000+cmd_line_offset, cmdline);
+
+		/* It is recommended to clear memory up to the 32K mark */
+		memset(0x90000 + (setup_sects+1)*512, 0,
+		       (64-(setup_sects+1))*512);
+	}
+
+
+**** LOADING THE REST OF THE KERNEL
+
+The 32-bit (non-real-mode) kernel starts at offset (setup_sects+1)*512
+in the kernel file (again, if setup_sects == 0 the real value is 4.)
+It should be loaded at address 0x10000 for Image/zImage kernels and
+0x100000 for bzImage kernels.
+
+The kernel is a bzImage kernel if the protocol >= 2.00 and the 0x01
+bit (LOAD_HIGH) in the loadflags field is set:
+
+	is_bzImage = (protocol >= 0x0200) && (loadflags & 0x01);
+	load_address = is_bzImage ? 0x100000 : 0x10000;
+
+Note that Image/zImage kernels can be up to 512K in size, and thus use
+the entire 0x10000-0x90000 range of memory.  This means it is pretty
+much a requirement for these kernels to load the real-mode part at
+0x90000.  bzImage kernels allow much more flexibility.
+
+
+**** SPECIAL COMMAND LINE OPTIONS
+
+If the command line provided by the boot loader is entered by the
+user, the user may expect the following command line options to work.
+They should normally not be deleted from the kernel command line even
+though not all of them are actually meaningful to the kernel.  Boot
+loader authors who need additional command line options for the boot
+loader itself should get them registered in
+Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst to make sure they will not
+conflict with actual kernel options now or in the future.
+
+  vga=<mode>
+	<mode> here is either an integer (in C notation, either
+	decimal, octal, or hexadecimal) or one of the strings
+	"normal" (meaning 0xFFFF), "ext" (meaning 0xFFFE) or "ask"
+	(meaning 0xFFFD).  This value should be entered into the
+	vid_mode field, as it is used by the kernel before the command
+	line is parsed.
+
+  mem=<size>
+	<size> is an integer in C notation optionally followed by
+	(case insensitive) K, M, G, T, P or E (meaning << 10, << 20,
+	<< 30, << 40, << 50 or << 60).  This specifies the end of
+	memory to the kernel. This affects the possible placement of
+	an initrd, since an initrd should be placed near end of
+	memory.  Note that this is an option to *both* the kernel and
+	the bootloader!
+
+  initrd=<file>
+	An initrd should be loaded.  The meaning of <file> is
+	obviously bootloader-dependent, and some boot loaders
+	(e.g. LILO) do not have such a command.
+
+In addition, some boot loaders add the following options to the
+user-specified command line:
+
+  BOOT_IMAGE=<file>
+	The boot image which was loaded.  Again, the meaning of <file>
+	is obviously bootloader-dependent.
+
+  auto
+	The kernel was booted without explicit user intervention.
+
+If these options are added by the boot loader, it is highly
+recommended that they are located *first*, before the user-specified
+or configuration-specified command line.  Otherwise, "init=/bin/sh"
+gets confused by the "auto" option.
+
+
+**** RUNNING THE KERNEL
+
+The kernel is started by jumping to the kernel entry point, which is
+located at *segment* offset 0x20 from the start of the real mode
+kernel.  This means that if you loaded your real-mode kernel code at
+0x90000, the kernel entry point is 9020:0000.
+
+At entry, ds = es = ss should point to the start of the real-mode
+kernel code (0x9000 if the code is loaded at 0x90000), sp should be
+set up properly, normally pointing to the top of the heap, and
+interrupts should be disabled.  Furthermore, to guard against bugs in
+the kernel, it is recommended that the boot loader sets fs = gs = ds =
+es = ss.
+
+In our example from above, we would do:
+
+	/* Note: in the case of the "old" kernel protocol, base_ptr must
+	   be == 0x90000 at this point; see the previous sample code */
+
+	seg = base_ptr >> 4;
+
+	cli();	/* Enter with interrupts disabled! */
+
+	/* Set up the real-mode kernel stack */
+	_SS = seg;
+	_SP = heap_end;
+
+	_DS = _ES = _FS = _GS = seg;
+	jmp_far(seg+0x20, 0);	/* Run the kernel */
+
+If your boot sector accesses a floppy drive, it is recommended to
+switch off the floppy motor before running the kernel, since the
+kernel boot leaves interrupts off and thus the motor will not be
+switched off, especially if the loaded kernel has the floppy driver as
+a demand-loaded module!
+
+
+**** ADVANCED BOOT LOADER HOOKS
+
+If the boot loader runs in a particularly hostile environment (such as
+LOADLIN, which runs under DOS) it may be impossible to follow the
+standard memory location requirements.  Such a boot loader may use the
+following hooks that, if set, are invoked by the kernel at the
+appropriate time.  The use of these hooks should probably be
+considered an absolutely last resort!
+
+IMPORTANT: All the hooks are required to preserve %esp, %ebp, %esi and
+%edi across invocation.
+
+  realmode_swtch:
+	A 16-bit real mode far subroutine invoked immediately before
+	entering protected mode.  The default routine disables NMI, so
+	your routine should probably do so, too.
+
+  code32_start:
+	A 32-bit flat-mode routine *jumped* to immediately after the
+	transition to protected mode, but before the kernel is
+	uncompressed.  No segments, except CS, are guaranteed to be
+	set up (current kernels do, but older ones do not); you should
+	set them up to BOOT_DS (0x18) yourself.
+
+	After completing your hook, you should jump to the address
+	that was in this field before your boot loader overwrote it
+	(relocated, if appropriate.)
+
+
+**** 32-bit BOOT PROTOCOL
+
+For machine with some new BIOS other than legacy BIOS, such as EFI,
+LinuxBIOS, etc, and kexec, the 16-bit real mode setup code in kernel
+based on legacy BIOS can not be used, so a 32-bit boot protocol needs
+to be defined.
+
+In 32-bit boot protocol, the first step in loading a Linux kernel
+should be to setup the boot parameters (struct boot_params,
+traditionally known as "zero page"). The memory for struct boot_params
+should be allocated and initialized to all zero. Then the setup header
+from offset 0x01f1 of kernel image on should be loaded into struct
+boot_params and examined. The end of setup header can be calculated as
+follow:
+
+	0x0202 + byte value at offset 0x0201
+
+In addition to read/modify/write the setup header of the struct
+boot_params as that of 16-bit boot protocol, the boot loader should
+also fill the additional fields of the struct boot_params as that
+described in zero-page.txt.
+
+After setting up the struct boot_params, the boot loader can load the
+32/64-bit kernel in the same way as that of 16-bit boot protocol.
+
+In 32-bit boot protocol, the kernel is started by jumping to the
+32-bit kernel entry point, which is the start address of loaded
+32/64-bit kernel.
+
+At entry, the CPU must be in 32-bit protected mode with paging
+disabled; a GDT must be loaded with the descriptors for selectors
+__BOOT_CS(0x10) and __BOOT_DS(0x18); both descriptors must be 4G flat
+segment; __BOOT_CS must have execute/read permission, and __BOOT_DS
+must have read/write permission; CS must be __BOOT_CS and DS, ES, SS
+must be __BOOT_DS; interrupt must be disabled; %esi must hold the base
+address of the struct boot_params; %ebp, %edi and %ebx must be zero.
+
+**** 64-bit BOOT PROTOCOL
+
+For machine with 64bit cpus and 64bit kernel, we could use 64bit bootloader
+and we need a 64-bit boot protocol.
+
+In 64-bit boot protocol, the first step in loading a Linux kernel
+should be to setup the boot parameters (struct boot_params,
+traditionally known as "zero page"). The memory for struct boot_params
+could be allocated anywhere (even above 4G) and initialized to all zero.
+Then, the setup header at offset 0x01f1 of kernel image on should be
+loaded into struct boot_params and examined. The end of setup header
+can be calculated as follows:
+
+	0x0202 + byte value at offset 0x0201
+
+In addition to read/modify/write the setup header of the struct
+boot_params as that of 16-bit boot protocol, the boot loader should
+also fill the additional fields of the struct boot_params as described
+in zero-page.txt.
+
+After setting up the struct boot_params, the boot loader can load
+64-bit kernel in the same way as that of 16-bit boot protocol, but
+kernel could be loaded above 4G.
+
+In 64-bit boot protocol, the kernel is started by jumping to the
+64-bit kernel entry point, which is the start address of loaded
+64-bit kernel plus 0x200.
+
+At entry, the CPU must be in 64-bit mode with paging enabled.
+The range with setup_header.init_size from start address of loaded
+kernel and zero page and command line buffer get ident mapping;
+a GDT must be loaded with the descriptors for selectors
+__BOOT_CS(0x10) and __BOOT_DS(0x18); both descriptors must be 4G flat
+segment; __BOOT_CS must have execute/read permission, and __BOOT_DS
+must have read/write permission; CS must be __BOOT_CS and DS, ES, SS
+must be __BOOT_DS; interrupt must be disabled; %rsi must hold the base
+address of the struct boot_params.
+
+**** EFI HANDOVER PROTOCOL
+
+This protocol allows boot loaders to defer initialisation to the EFI
+boot stub. The boot loader is required to load the kernel/initrd(s)
+from the boot media and jump to the EFI handover protocol entry point
+which is hdr->handover_offset bytes from the beginning of
+startup_{32,64}.
+
+The function prototype for the handover entry point looks like this,
+
+    efi_main(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *table, struct boot_params *bp)
+
+'handle' is the EFI image handle passed to the boot loader by the EFI
+firmware, 'table' is the EFI system table - these are the first two
+arguments of the "handoff state" as described in section 2.3 of the
+UEFI specification. 'bp' is the boot loader-allocated boot params.
+
+The boot loader *must* fill out the following fields in bp,
+
+    o hdr.code32_start
+    o hdr.cmd_line_ptr
+    o hdr.ramdisk_image (if applicable)
+    o hdr.ramdisk_size  (if applicable)
+
+All other fields should be zero.
diff --git a/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/conf.py b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/conf.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..33c5c31
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/conf.py
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# -*- coding: utf-8; mode: python -*-
+
+project = "X86 architecture specific documentation"
+
+tags.add("subproject")
+
+latex_documents = [
+    ('index', 'x86.tex', project,
+     'The kernel development community', 'manual'),
+]
diff --git a/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/earlyprintk.txt b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/earlyprintk.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..688e3ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/earlyprintk.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+
+Mini-HOWTO for using the earlyprintk=dbgp boot option with a
+USB2 Debug port key and a debug cable, on x86 systems.
+
+You need two computers, the 'USB debug key' special gadget and
+and two USB cables, connected like this:
+
+  [host/target] <-------> [USB debug key] <-------> [client/console]
+
+1. There are a number of specific hardware requirements:
+
+ a.) Host/target system needs to have USB debug port capability.
+
+ You can check this capability by looking at a 'Debug port' bit in
+ the lspci -vvv output:
+
+ # lspci -vvv
+ ...
+ 00:1d.7 USB Controller: Intel Corporation 82801H (ICH8 Family) USB2 EHCI Controller #1 (rev 03) (prog-if 20 [EHCI])
+         Subsystem: Lenovo ThinkPad T61
+         Control: I/O- Mem+ BusMaster+ SpecCycle- MemWINV- VGASnoop- ParErr- Stepping- SERR+ FastB2B- DisINTx-
+         Status: Cap+ 66MHz- UDF- FastB2B+ ParErr- DEVSEL=medium >TAbort- <TAbort- <MAbort- >SERR- <PERR- INTx-
+         Latency: 0
+         Interrupt: pin D routed to IRQ 19
+         Region 0: Memory at fe227000 (32-bit, non-prefetchable) [size=1K]
+         Capabilities: [50] Power Management version 2
+                 Flags: PMEClk- DSI- D1- D2- AuxCurrent=375mA PME(D0+,D1-,D2-,D3hot+,D3cold+)
+                 Status: D0 PME-Enable- DSel=0 DScale=0 PME+
+         Capabilities: [58] Debug port: BAR=1 offset=00a0
+                            ^^^^^^^^^^^ <==================== [ HERE ]
+	 Kernel driver in use: ehci_hcd
+         Kernel modules: ehci-hcd
+ ...
+
+( If your system does not list a debug port capability then you probably
+  won't be able to use the USB debug key. )
+
+ b.) You also need a Netchip USB debug cable/key:
+
+        http://www.plxtech.com/products/NET2000/NET20DC/default.asp
+
+     This is a small blue plastic connector with two USB connections,
+     it draws power from its USB connections.
+
+ c.) You need a second client/console system with a high speed USB 2.0
+     port.
+
+ d.) The Netchip device must be plugged directly into the physical
+     debug port on the "host/target" system.  You cannot use a USB hub in
+     between the physical debug port and the "host/target" system.
+
+     The EHCI debug controller is bound to a specific physical USB
+     port and the Netchip device will only work as an early printk
+     device in this port.  The EHCI host controllers are electrically
+     wired such that the EHCI debug controller is hooked up to the
+     first physical and there is no way to change this via software.
+     You can find the physical port through experimentation by trying
+     each physical port on the system and rebooting.  Or you can try
+     and use lsusb or look at the kernel info messages emitted by the
+     usb stack when you plug a usb device into various ports on the
+     "host/target" system.
+
+     Some hardware vendors do not expose the usb debug port with a
+     physical connector and if you find such a device send a complaint
+     to the hardware vendor, because there is no reason not to wire
+     this port into one of the physically accessible ports.
+
+ e.) It is also important to note, that many versions of the Netchip
+     device require the "client/console" system to be plugged into the
+     right and side of the device (with the product logo facing up and
+     readable left to right).  The reason being is that the 5 volt
+     power supply is taken from only one side of the device and it
+     must be the side that does not get rebooted.
+
+2. Software requirements:
+
+ a.) On the host/target system:
+
+    You need to enable the following kernel config option:
+
+      CONFIG_EARLY_PRINTK_DBGP=y
+
+    And you need to add the boot command line: "earlyprintk=dbgp".
+    (If you are using Grub, append it to the 'kernel' line in
+     /etc/grub.conf)
+
+    On systems with more than one EHCI debug controller you must
+    specify the correct EHCI debug controller number.  The ordering
+    comes from the PCI bus enumeration of the EHCI controllers.  The
+    default with no number argument is "0" the first EHCI debug
+    controller.  To use the second EHCI debug controller, you would
+    use the command line: "earlyprintk=dbgp1"
+
+    NOTE: normally earlyprintk console gets turned off once the
+    regular console is alive - use "earlyprintk=dbgp,keep" to keep
+    this channel open beyond early bootup. This can be useful for
+    debugging crashes under Xorg, etc.
+
+ b.) On the client/console system:
+
+    You should enable the following kernel config option:
+
+      CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_DEBUG=y
+
+    On the next bootup with the modified kernel you should
+    get a /dev/ttyUSBx device(s).
+
+    Now this channel of kernel messages is ready to be used: start
+    your favorite terminal emulator (minicom, etc.) and set
+    it up to use /dev/ttyUSB0 - or use a raw 'cat /dev/ttyUSBx' to
+    see the raw output.
+
+ c.) On Nvidia Southbridge based systems: the kernel will try to probe
+     and find out which port has debug device connected.
+
+3. Testing that it works fine:
+
+   You can test the output by using earlyprintk=dbgp,keep and provoking
+   kernel messages on the host/target system. You can provoke a harmless
+   kernel message by for example doing:
+
+     echo h > /proc/sysrq-trigger
+
+   On the host/target system you should see this help line in "dmesg" output:
+
+     SysRq : HELP : loglevel(0-9) reBoot Crashdump terminate-all-tasks(E) memory-full-oom-kill(F) kill-all-tasks(I) saK show-backtrace-all-active-cpus(L) show-memory-usage(M) nice-all-RT-tasks(N) powerOff show-registers(P) show-all-timers(Q) unRaw Sync show-task-states(T) Unmount show-blocked-tasks(W) dump-ftrace-buffer(Z)
+
+   On the client/console system do:
+
+       cat /dev/ttyUSB0
+
+   And you should see the help line above displayed shortly after you've
+   provoked it on the host system.
+
+If it does not work then please ask about it on the linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
+mailing list or contact the x86 maintainers.
diff --git a/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/entry_64.txt b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/entry_64.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c1df8eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/entry_64.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+This file documents some of the kernel entries in
+arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S.  A lot of this explanation is adapted from
+an email from Ingo Molnar:
+
+http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<20110529191055.GC9835%40elte.hu>
+
+The x86 architecture has quite a few different ways to jump into
+kernel code.  Most of these entry points are registered in
+arch/x86/kernel/traps.c and implemented in arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+for 64-bit, arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S for 32-bit and finally
+arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S which implements the 32-bit compatibility
+syscall entry points and thus provides for 32-bit processes the
+ability to execute syscalls when running on 64-bit kernels.
+
+The IDT vector assignments are listed in arch/x86/include/asm/irq_vectors.h.
+
+Some of these entries are:
+
+ - system_call: syscall instruction from 64-bit code.
+
+ - entry_INT80_compat: int 0x80 from 32-bit or 64-bit code; compat syscall
+   either way.
+
+ - entry_INT80_compat, ia32_sysenter: syscall and sysenter from 32-bit
+   code
+
+ - interrupt: An array of entries.  Every IDT vector that doesn't
+   explicitly point somewhere else gets set to the corresponding
+   value in interrupts.  These point to a whole array of
+   magically-generated functions that make their way to do_IRQ with
+   the interrupt number as a parameter.
+
+ - APIC interrupts: Various special-purpose interrupts for things
+   like TLB shootdown.
+
+ - Architecturally-defined exceptions like divide_error.
+
+There are a few complexities here.  The different x86-64 entries
+have different calling conventions.  The syscall and sysenter
+instructions have their own peculiar calling conventions.  Some of
+the IDT entries push an error code onto the stack; others don't.
+IDT entries using the IST alternative stack mechanism need their own
+magic to get the stack frames right.  (You can find some
+documentation in the AMD APM, Volume 2, Chapter 8 and the Intel SDM,
+Volume 3, Chapter 6.)
+
+Dealing with the swapgs instruction is especially tricky.  Swapgs
+toggles whether gs is the kernel gs or the user gs.  The swapgs
+instruction is rather fragile: it must nest perfectly and only in
+single depth, it should only be used if entering from user mode to
+kernel mode and then when returning to user-space, and precisely
+so. If we mess that up even slightly, we crash.
+
+So when we have a secondary entry, already in kernel mode, we *must
+not* use SWAPGS blindly - nor must we forget doing a SWAPGS when it's
+not switched/swapped yet.
+
+Now, there's a secondary complication: there's a cheap way to test
+which mode the CPU is in and an expensive way.
+
+The cheap way is to pick this info off the entry frame on the kernel
+stack, from the CS of the ptregs area of the kernel stack:
+
+	xorl %ebx,%ebx
+	testl $3,CS+8(%rsp)
+	je error_kernelspace
+	SWAPGS
+
+The expensive (paranoid) way is to read back the MSR_GS_BASE value
+(which is what SWAPGS modifies):
+
+	movl $1,%ebx
+	movl $MSR_GS_BASE,%ecx
+	rdmsr
+	testl %edx,%edx
+	js 1f   /* negative -> in kernel */
+	SWAPGS
+	xorl %ebx,%ebx
+1:	ret
+
+If we are at an interrupt or user-trap/gate-alike boundary then we can
+use the faster check: the stack will be a reliable indicator of
+whether SWAPGS was already done: if we see that we are a secondary
+entry interrupting kernel mode execution, then we know that the GS
+base has already been switched. If it says that we interrupted
+user-space execution then we must do the SWAPGS.
+
+But if we are in an NMI/MCE/DEBUG/whatever super-atomic entry context,
+which might have triggered right after a normal entry wrote CS to the
+stack but before we executed SWAPGS, then the only safe way to check
+for GS is the slower method: the RDMSR.
+
+Therefore, super-atomic entries (except NMI, which is handled separately)
+must use idtentry with paranoid=1 to handle gsbase correctly.  This
+triggers three main behavior changes:
+
+ - Interrupt entry will use the slower gsbase check.
+ - Interrupt entry from user mode will switch off the IST stack.
+ - Interrupt exit to kernel mode will not attempt to reschedule.
+
+We try to only use IST entries and the paranoid entry code for vectors
+that absolutely need the more expensive check for the GS base - and we
+generate all 'normal' entry points with the regular (faster) paranoid=0
+variant.
diff --git a/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/exception-tables.txt b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/exception-tables.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e396bcd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/exception-tables.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,327 @@
+     Kernel level exception handling in Linux
+  Commentary by Joerg Pommnitz <joerg@raleigh.ibm.com>
+
+When a process runs in kernel mode, it often has to access user
+mode memory whose address has been passed by an untrusted program.
+To protect itself the kernel has to verify this address.
+
+In older versions of Linux this was done with the
+int verify_area(int type, const void * addr, unsigned long size)
+function (which has since been replaced by access_ok()).
+
+This function verified that the memory area starting at address
+'addr' and of size 'size' was accessible for the operation specified
+in type (read or write). To do this, verify_read had to look up the
+virtual memory area (vma) that contained the address addr. In the
+normal case (correctly working program), this test was successful.
+It only failed for a few buggy programs. In some kernel profiling
+tests, this normally unneeded verification used up a considerable
+amount of time.
+
+To overcome this situation, Linus decided to let the virtual memory
+hardware present in every Linux-capable CPU handle this test.
+
+How does this work?
+
+Whenever the kernel tries to access an address that is currently not
+accessible, the CPU generates a page fault exception and calls the
+page fault handler
+
+void do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
+
+in arch/x86/mm/fault.c. The parameters on the stack are set up by
+the low level assembly glue in arch/x86/kernel/entry_32.S. The parameter
+regs is a pointer to the saved registers on the stack, error_code
+contains a reason code for the exception.
+
+do_page_fault first obtains the unaccessible address from the CPU
+control register CR2. If the address is within the virtual address
+space of the process, the fault probably occurred, because the page
+was not swapped in, write protected or something similar. However,
+we are interested in the other case: the address is not valid, there
+is no vma that contains this address. In this case, the kernel jumps
+to the bad_area label.
+
+There it uses the address of the instruction that caused the exception
+(i.e. regs->eip) to find an address where the execution can continue
+(fixup). If this search is successful, the fault handler modifies the
+return address (again regs->eip) and returns. The execution will
+continue at the address in fixup.
+
+Where does fixup point to?
+
+Since we jump to the contents of fixup, fixup obviously points
+to executable code. This code is hidden inside the user access macros.
+I have picked the get_user macro defined in arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+as an example. The definition is somewhat hard to follow, so let's peek at
+the code generated by the preprocessor and the compiler. I selected
+the get_user call in drivers/char/sysrq.c for a detailed examination.
+
+The original code in sysrq.c line 587:
+        get_user(c, buf);
+
+The preprocessor output (edited to become somewhat readable):
+
+(
+  {
+    long __gu_err = - 14 , __gu_val = 0;
+    const __typeof__(*( (  buf ) )) *__gu_addr = ((buf));
+    if (((((0 + current_set[0])->tss.segment) == 0x18 )  ||
+       (((sizeof(*(buf))) <= 0xC0000000UL) &&
+       ((unsigned long)(__gu_addr ) <= 0xC0000000UL - (sizeof(*(buf)))))))
+      do {
+        __gu_err  = 0;
+        switch ((sizeof(*(buf)))) {
+          case 1:
+            __asm__ __volatile__(
+              "1:      mov" "b" " %2,%" "b" "1\n"
+              "2:\n"
+              ".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n"
+              "3:      movl %3,%0\n"
+              "        xor" "b" " %" "b" "1,%" "b" "1\n"
+              "        jmp 2b\n"
+              ".section __ex_table,\"a\"\n"
+              "        .align 4\n"
+              "        .long 1b,3b\n"
+              ".text"        : "=r"(__gu_err), "=q" (__gu_val): "m"((*(struct __large_struct *)
+                            (   __gu_addr   )) ), "i"(- 14 ), "0"(  __gu_err  )) ;
+              break;
+          case 2:
+            __asm__ __volatile__(
+              "1:      mov" "w" " %2,%" "w" "1\n"
+              "2:\n"
+              ".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n"
+              "3:      movl %3,%0\n"
+              "        xor" "w" " %" "w" "1,%" "w" "1\n"
+              "        jmp 2b\n"
+              ".section __ex_table,\"a\"\n"
+              "        .align 4\n"
+              "        .long 1b,3b\n"
+              ".text"        : "=r"(__gu_err), "=r" (__gu_val) : "m"((*(struct __large_struct *)
+                            (   __gu_addr   )) ), "i"(- 14 ), "0"(  __gu_err  ));
+              break;
+          case 4:
+            __asm__ __volatile__(
+              "1:      mov" "l" " %2,%" "" "1\n"
+              "2:\n"
+              ".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n"
+              "3:      movl %3,%0\n"
+              "        xor" "l" " %" "" "1,%" "" "1\n"
+              "        jmp 2b\n"
+              ".section __ex_table,\"a\"\n"
+              "        .align 4\n"        "        .long 1b,3b\n"
+              ".text"        : "=r"(__gu_err), "=r" (__gu_val) : "m"((*(struct __large_struct *)
+                            (   __gu_addr   )) ), "i"(- 14 ), "0"(__gu_err));
+              break;
+          default:
+            (__gu_val) = __get_user_bad();
+        }
+      } while (0) ;
+    ((c)) = (__typeof__(*((buf))))__gu_val;
+    __gu_err;
+  }
+);
+
+WOW! Black GCC/assembly magic. This is impossible to follow, so let's
+see what code gcc generates:
+
+ >         xorl %edx,%edx
+ >         movl current_set,%eax
+ >         cmpl $24,788(%eax)
+ >         je .L1424
+ >         cmpl $-1073741825,64(%esp)
+ >         ja .L1423
+ > .L1424:
+ >         movl %edx,%eax
+ >         movl 64(%esp),%ebx
+ > #APP
+ > 1:      movb (%ebx),%dl                /* this is the actual user access */
+ > 2:
+ > .section .fixup,"ax"
+ > 3:      movl $-14,%eax
+ >         xorb %dl,%dl
+ >         jmp 2b
+ > .section __ex_table,"a"
+ >         .align 4
+ >         .long 1b,3b
+ > .text
+ > #NO_APP
+ > .L1423:
+ >         movzbl %dl,%esi
+
+The optimizer does a good job and gives us something we can actually
+understand. Can we? The actual user access is quite obvious. Thanks
+to the unified address space we can just access the address in user
+memory. But what does the .section stuff do?????
+
+To understand this we have to look at the final kernel:
+
+ > objdump --section-headers vmlinux
+ >
+ > vmlinux:     file format elf32-i386
+ >
+ > Sections:
+ > Idx Name          Size      VMA       LMA       File off  Algn
+ >   0 .text         00098f40  c0100000  c0100000  00001000  2**4
+ >                   CONTENTS, ALLOC, LOAD, READONLY, CODE
+ >   1 .fixup        000016bc  c0198f40  c0198f40  00099f40  2**0
+ >                   CONTENTS, ALLOC, LOAD, READONLY, CODE
+ >   2 .rodata       0000f127  c019a5fc  c019a5fc  0009b5fc  2**2
+ >                   CONTENTS, ALLOC, LOAD, READONLY, DATA
+ >   3 __ex_table    000015c0  c01a9724  c01a9724  000aa724  2**2
+ >                   CONTENTS, ALLOC, LOAD, READONLY, DATA
+ >   4 .data         0000ea58  c01abcf0  c01abcf0  000abcf0  2**4
+ >                   CONTENTS, ALLOC, LOAD, DATA
+ >   5 .bss          00018e21  c01ba748  c01ba748  000ba748  2**2
+ >                   ALLOC
+ >   6 .comment      00000ec4  00000000  00000000  000ba748  2**0
+ >                   CONTENTS, READONLY
+ >   7 .note         00001068  00000ec4  00000ec4  000bb60c  2**0
+ >                   CONTENTS, READONLY
+
+There are obviously 2 non standard ELF sections in the generated object
+file. But first we want to find out what happened to our code in the
+final kernel executable:
+
+ > objdump --disassemble --section=.text vmlinux
+ >
+ > c017e785 <do_con_write+c1> xorl   %edx,%edx
+ > c017e787 <do_con_write+c3> movl   0xc01c7bec,%eax
+ > c017e78c <do_con_write+c8> cmpl   $0x18,0x314(%eax)
+ > c017e793 <do_con_write+cf> je     c017e79f <do_con_write+db>
+ > c017e795 <do_con_write+d1> cmpl   $0xbfffffff,0x40(%esp,1)
+ > c017e79d <do_con_write+d9> ja     c017e7a7 <do_con_write+e3>
+ > c017e79f <do_con_write+db> movl   %edx,%eax
+ > c017e7a1 <do_con_write+dd> movl   0x40(%esp,1),%ebx
+ > c017e7a5 <do_con_write+e1> movb   (%ebx),%dl
+ > c017e7a7 <do_con_write+e3> movzbl %dl,%esi
+
+The whole user memory access is reduced to 10 x86 machine instructions.
+The instructions bracketed in the .section directives are no longer
+in the normal execution path. They are located in a different section
+of the executable file:
+
+ > objdump --disassemble --section=.fixup vmlinux
+ >
+ > c0199ff5 <.fixup+10b5> movl   $0xfffffff2,%eax
+ > c0199ffa <.fixup+10ba> xorb   %dl,%dl
+ > c0199ffc <.fixup+10bc> jmp    c017e7a7 <do_con_write+e3>
+
+And finally:
+ > objdump --full-contents --section=__ex_table vmlinux
+ >
+ >  c01aa7c4 93c017c0 e09f19c0 97c017c0 99c017c0  ................
+ >  c01aa7d4 f6c217c0 e99f19c0 a5e717c0 f59f19c0  ................
+ >  c01aa7e4 080a18c0 01a019c0 0a0a18c0 04a019c0  ................
+
+or in human readable byte order:
+
+ >  c01aa7c4 c017c093 c0199fe0 c017c097 c017c099  ................
+ >  c01aa7d4 c017c2f6 c0199fe9 c017e7a5 c0199ff5  ................
+                               ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+                               this is the interesting part!
+ >  c01aa7e4 c0180a08 c019a001 c0180a0a c019a004  ................
+
+What happened? The assembly directives
+
+.section .fixup,"ax"
+.section __ex_table,"a"
+
+told the assembler to move the following code to the specified
+sections in the ELF object file. So the instructions
+3:      movl $-14,%eax
+        xorb %dl,%dl
+        jmp 2b
+ended up in the .fixup section of the object file and the addresses
+        .long 1b,3b
+ended up in the __ex_table section of the object file. 1b and 3b
+are local labels. The local label 1b (1b stands for next label 1
+backward) is the address of the instruction that might fault, i.e.
+in our case the address of the label 1 is c017e7a5:
+the original assembly code: > 1:      movb (%ebx),%dl
+and linked in vmlinux     : > c017e7a5 <do_con_write+e1> movb   (%ebx),%dl
+
+The local label 3 (backwards again) is the address of the code to handle
+the fault, in our case the actual value is c0199ff5:
+the original assembly code: > 3:      movl $-14,%eax
+and linked in vmlinux     : > c0199ff5 <.fixup+10b5> movl   $0xfffffff2,%eax
+
+The assembly code
+ > .section __ex_table,"a"
+ >         .align 4
+ >         .long 1b,3b
+
+becomes the value pair
+ >  c01aa7d4 c017c2f6 c0199fe9 c017e7a5 c0199ff5  ................
+                               ^this is ^this is
+                               1b       3b
+c017e7a5,c0199ff5 in the exception table of the kernel.
+
+So, what actually happens if a fault from kernel mode with no suitable
+vma occurs?
+
+1.) access to invalid address:
+ > c017e7a5 <do_con_write+e1> movb   (%ebx),%dl
+2.) MMU generates exception
+3.) CPU calls do_page_fault
+4.) do page fault calls search_exception_table (regs->eip == c017e7a5);
+5.) search_exception_table looks up the address c017e7a5 in the
+    exception table (i.e. the contents of the ELF section __ex_table)
+    and returns the address of the associated fault handle code c0199ff5.
+6.) do_page_fault modifies its own return address to point to the fault
+    handle code and returns.
+7.) execution continues in the fault handling code.
+8.) 8a) EAX becomes -EFAULT (== -14)
+    8b) DL  becomes zero (the value we "read" from user space)
+    8c) execution continues at local label 2 (address of the
+        instruction immediately after the faulting user access).
+
+The steps 8a to 8c in a certain way emulate the faulting instruction.
+
+That's it, mostly. If you look at our example, you might ask why
+we set EAX to -EFAULT in the exception handler code. Well, the
+get_user macro actually returns a value: 0, if the user access was
+successful, -EFAULT on failure. Our original code did not test this
+return value, however the inline assembly code in get_user tries to
+return -EFAULT. GCC selected EAX to return this value.
+
+NOTE:
+Due to the way that the exception table is built and needs to be ordered,
+only use exceptions for code in the .text section.  Any other section
+will cause the exception table to not be sorted correctly, and the
+exceptions will fail.
+
+Things changed when 64-bit support was added to x86 Linux. Rather than
+double the size of the exception table by expanding the two entries
+from 32-bits to 64 bits, a clever trick was used to store addresses
+as relative offsets from the table itself. The assembly code changed
+from:
+	.long 1b,3b
+to:
+        .long (from) - .
+        .long (to) - .
+
+and the C-code that uses these values converts back to absolute addresses
+like this:
+
+	ex_insn_addr(const struct exception_table_entry *x)
+	{
+		return (unsigned long)&x->insn + x->insn;
+	}
+
+In v4.6 the exception table entry was expanded with a new field "handler".
+This is also 32-bits wide and contains a third relative function
+pointer which points to one of:
+
+1) int ex_handler_default(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup)
+   This is legacy case that just jumps to the fixup code
+2) int ex_handler_fault(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup)
+   This case provides the fault number of the trap that occurred at
+   entry->insn. It is used to distinguish page faults from machine
+   check.
+3) int ex_handler_ext(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup)
+   This case is used for uaccess_err ... we need to set a flag
+   in the task structure. Before the handler functions existed this
+   case was handled by adding a large offset to the fixup to tag
+   it as special.
+More functions can easily be added.
diff --git a/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/i386/IO-APIC.txt b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/i386/IO-APIC.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..15f5baf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/i386/IO-APIC.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+Most (all) Intel-MP compliant SMP boards have the so-called 'IO-APIC',
+which is an enhanced interrupt controller. It enables us to route
+hardware interrupts to multiple CPUs, or to CPU groups. Without an
+IO-APIC, interrupts from hardware will be delivered only to the
+CPU which boots the operating system (usually CPU#0).
+
+Linux supports all variants of compliant SMP boards, including ones with
+multiple IO-APICs. Multiple IO-APICs are used in high-end servers to
+distribute IRQ load further.
+
+There are (a few) known breakages in certain older boards, such bugs are
+usually worked around by the kernel. If your MP-compliant SMP board does
+not boot Linux, then consult the linux-smp mailing list archives first.
+
+If your box boots fine with enabled IO-APIC IRQs, then your
+/proc/interrupts will look like this one:
+
+   ---------------------------->
+  hell:~> cat /proc/interrupts
+             CPU0
+    0:    1360293    IO-APIC-edge  timer
+    1:          4    IO-APIC-edge  keyboard
+    2:          0          XT-PIC  cascade
+   13:          1          XT-PIC  fpu
+   14:       1448    IO-APIC-edge  ide0
+   16:      28232   IO-APIC-level  Intel EtherExpress Pro 10/100 Ethernet
+   17:      51304   IO-APIC-level  eth0
+  NMI:          0
+  ERR:          0
+  hell:~>
+  <----------------------------
+
+Some interrupts are still listed as 'XT PIC', but this is not a problem;
+none of those IRQ sources is performance-critical.
+
+
+In the unlikely case that your board does not create a working mp-table,
+you can use the pirq= boot parameter to 'hand-construct' IRQ entries. This
+is non-trivial though and cannot be automated. One sample /etc/lilo.conf
+entry:
+
+	append="pirq=15,11,10"
+
+The actual numbers depend on your system, on your PCI cards and on their
+PCI slot position. Usually PCI slots are 'daisy chained' before they are
+connected to the PCI chipset IRQ routing facility (the incoming PIRQ1-4
+lines):
+
+               ,-.        ,-.        ,-.        ,-.        ,-.
+     PIRQ4 ----| |-.    ,-| |-.    ,-| |-.    ,-| |--------| |
+               |S|  \  /  |S|  \  /  |S|  \  /  |S|        |S|
+     PIRQ3 ----|l|-. `/---|l|-. `/---|l|-. `/---|l|--------|l|
+               |o|  \/    |o|  \/    |o|  \/    |o|        |o|
+     PIRQ2 ----|t|-./`----|t|-./`----|t|-./`----|t|--------|t|
+               |1| /\     |2| /\     |3| /\     |4|        |5|
+     PIRQ1 ----| |-  `----| |-  `----| |-  `----| |--------| |
+               `-'        `-'        `-'        `-'        `-'
+
+Every PCI card emits a PCI IRQ, which can be INTA, INTB, INTC or INTD:
+
+                               ,-.
+                         INTD--| |
+                               |S|
+                         INTC--|l|
+                               |o|
+                         INTB--|t|
+                               |x|
+                         INTA--| |
+                               `-'
+
+These INTA-D PCI IRQs are always 'local to the card', their real meaning
+depends on which slot they are in. If you look at the daisy chaining diagram,
+a card in slot4, issuing INTA IRQ, it will end up as a signal on PIRQ4 of
+the PCI chipset. Most cards issue INTA, this creates optimal distribution
+between the PIRQ lines. (distributing IRQ sources properly is not a
+necessity, PCI IRQs can be shared at will, but it's a good for performance
+to have non shared interrupts). Slot5 should be used for videocards, they
+do not use interrupts normally, thus they are not daisy chained either.
+
+so if you have your SCSI card (IRQ11) in Slot1, Tulip card (IRQ9) in
+Slot2, then you'll have to specify this pirq= line:
+
+	append="pirq=11,9"
+
+the following script tries to figure out such a default pirq= line from
+your PCI configuration:
+
+	echo -n pirq=; echo `scanpci | grep T_L | cut -c56-` | sed 's/ /,/g'
+
+note that this script won't work if you have skipped a few slots or if your
+board does not do default daisy-chaining. (or the IO-APIC has the PIRQ pins
+connected in some strange way). E.g. if in the above case you have your SCSI
+card (IRQ11) in Slot3, and have Slot1 empty:
+
+	append="pirq=0,9,11"
+
+[value '0' is a generic 'placeholder', reserved for empty (or non-IRQ emitting)
+slots.]
+
+Generally, it's always possible to find out the correct pirq= settings, just
+permute all IRQ numbers properly ... it will take some time though. An
+'incorrect' pirq line will cause the booting process to hang, or a device
+won't function properly (e.g. if it's inserted as a module).
+
+If you have 2 PCI buses, then you can use up to 8 pirq values, although such
+boards tend to have a good configuration.
+
+Be prepared that it might happen that you need some strange pirq line:
+
+	append="pirq=0,0,0,0,0,0,9,11"
+
+Use smart trial-and-error techniques to find out the correct pirq line ...
+
+Good luck and mail to linux-smp@vger.kernel.org or
+linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org if you have any problems that are not covered
+by this document.
+
+-- mingo
+
diff --git a/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/index.rst b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/index.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0780d55
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/index.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+==========================
+x86 architecture specifics
+==========================
+
+.. toctree::
+   :maxdepth: 1
+
+   mds
+   tsx_async_abort
diff --git a/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/intel_mpx.txt b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/intel_mpx.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..85d0549
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/intel_mpx.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,244 @@
+1. Intel(R) MPX Overview
+========================
+
+Intel(R) Memory Protection Extensions (Intel(R) MPX) is a new capability
+introduced into Intel Architecture. Intel MPX provides hardware features
+that can be used in conjunction with compiler changes to check memory
+references, for those references whose compile-time normal intentions are
+usurped at runtime due to buffer overflow or underflow.
+
+You can tell if your CPU supports MPX by looking in /proc/cpuinfo:
+
+	cat /proc/cpuinfo  | grep ' mpx '
+
+For more information, please refer to Intel(R) Architecture Instruction
+Set Extensions Programming Reference, Chapter 9: Intel(R) Memory Protection
+Extensions.
+
+Note: As of December 2014, no hardware with MPX is available but it is
+possible to use SDE (Intel(R) Software Development Emulator) instead, which
+can be downloaded from
+http://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/intel-software-development-emulator
+
+
+2. How to get the advantage of MPX
+==================================
+
+For MPX to work, changes are required in the kernel, binutils and compiler.
+No source changes are required for applications, just a recompile.
+
+There are a lot of moving parts of this to all work right. The following
+is how we expect the compiler, application and kernel to work together.
+
+1) Application developer compiles with -fmpx. The compiler will add the
+   instrumentation as well as some setup code called early after the app
+   starts. New instruction prefixes are noops for old CPUs.
+2) That setup code allocates (virtual) space for the "bounds directory",
+   points the "bndcfgu" register to the directory (must also set the valid
+   bit) and notifies the kernel (via the new prctl(PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT))
+   that the app will be using MPX.  The app must be careful not to access
+   the bounds tables between the time when it populates "bndcfgu" and
+   when it calls the prctl().  This might be hard to guarantee if the app
+   is compiled with MPX.  You can add "__attribute__((bnd_legacy))" to
+   the function to disable MPX instrumentation to help guarantee this.
+   Also be careful not to call out to any other code which might be
+   MPX-instrumented.
+3) The kernel detects that the CPU has MPX, allows the new prctl() to
+   succeed, and notes the location of the bounds directory. Userspace is
+   expected to keep the bounds directory at that location. We note it
+   instead of reading it each time because the 'xsave' operation needed
+   to access the bounds directory register is an expensive operation.
+4) If the application needs to spill bounds out of the 4 registers, it
+   issues a bndstx instruction. Since the bounds directory is empty at
+   this point, a bounds fault (#BR) is raised, the kernel allocates a
+   bounds table (in the user address space) and makes the relevant entry
+   in the bounds directory point to the new table.
+5) If the application violates the bounds specified in the bounds registers,
+   a separate kind of #BR is raised which will deliver a signal with
+   information about the violation in the 'struct siginfo'.
+6) Whenever memory is freed, we know that it can no longer contain valid
+   pointers, and we attempt to free the associated space in the bounds
+   tables. If an entire table becomes unused, we will attempt to free
+   the table and remove the entry in the directory.
+
+To summarize, there are essentially three things interacting here:
+
+GCC with -fmpx:
+ * enables annotation of code with MPX instructions and prefixes
+ * inserts code early in the application to call in to the "gcc runtime"
+GCC MPX Runtime:
+ * Checks for hardware MPX support in cpuid leaf
+ * allocates virtual space for the bounds directory (malloc() essentially)
+ * points the hardware BNDCFGU register at the directory
+ * calls a new prctl(PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT) to notify the kernel to
+   start managing the bounds directories
+Kernel MPX Code:
+ * Checks for hardware MPX support in cpuid leaf
+ * Handles #BR exceptions and sends SIGSEGV to the app when it violates
+   bounds, like during a buffer overflow.
+ * When bounds are spilled in to an unallocated bounds table, the kernel
+   notices in the #BR exception, allocates the virtual space, then
+   updates the bounds directory to point to the new table. It keeps
+   special track of the memory with a VM_MPX flag.
+ * Frees unused bounds tables at the time that the memory they described
+   is unmapped.
+
+
+3. How does MPX kernel code work
+================================
+
+Handling #BR faults caused by MPX
+---------------------------------
+
+When MPX is enabled, there are 2 new situations that can generate
+#BR faults.
+  * new bounds tables (BT) need to be allocated to save bounds.
+  * bounds violation caused by MPX instructions.
+
+We hook #BR handler to handle these two new situations.
+
+On-demand kernel allocation of bounds tables
+--------------------------------------------
+
+MPX only has 4 hardware registers for storing bounds information. If
+MPX-enabled code needs more than these 4 registers, it needs to spill
+them somewhere. It has two special instructions for this which allow
+the bounds to be moved between the bounds registers and some new "bounds
+tables".
+
+#BR exceptions are a new class of exceptions just for MPX. They are
+similar conceptually to a page fault and will be raised by the MPX
+hardware during both bounds violations or when the tables are not
+present. The kernel handles those #BR exceptions for not-present tables
+by carving the space out of the normal processes address space and then
+pointing the bounds-directory over to it.
+
+The tables need to be accessed and controlled by userspace because
+the instructions for moving bounds in and out of them are extremely
+frequent. They potentially happen every time a register points to
+memory. Any direct kernel involvement (like a syscall) to access the
+tables would obviously destroy performance.
+
+Why not do this in userspace? MPX does not strictly require anything in
+the kernel. It can theoretically be done completely from userspace. Here
+are a few ways this could be done. We don't think any of them are practical
+in the real-world, but here they are.
+
+Q: Can virtual space simply be reserved for the bounds tables so that we
+   never have to allocate them?
+A: MPX-enabled application will possibly create a lot of bounds tables in
+   process address space to save bounds information. These tables can take
+   up huge swaths of memory (as much as 80% of the memory on the system)
+   even if we clean them up aggressively. In the worst-case scenario, the
+   tables can be 4x the size of the data structure being tracked. IOW, a
+   1-page structure can require 4 bounds-table pages. An X-GB virtual
+   area needs 4*X GB of virtual space, plus 2GB for the bounds directory.
+   If we were to preallocate them for the 128TB of user virtual address
+   space, we would need to reserve 512TB+2GB, which is larger than the
+   entire virtual address space today. This means they can not be reserved
+   ahead of time. Also, a single process's pre-populated bounds directory
+   consumes 2GB of virtual *AND* physical memory. IOW, it's completely
+   infeasible to prepopulate bounds directories.
+
+Q: Can we preallocate bounds table space at the same time memory is
+   allocated which might contain pointers that might eventually need
+   bounds tables?
+A: This would work if we could hook the site of each and every memory
+   allocation syscall. This can be done for small, constrained applications.
+   But, it isn't practical at a larger scale since a given app has no
+   way of controlling how all the parts of the app might allocate memory
+   (think libraries). The kernel is really the only place to intercept
+   these calls.
+
+Q: Could a bounds fault be handed to userspace and the tables allocated
+   there in a signal handler instead of in the kernel?
+A: mmap() is not on the list of safe async handler functions and even
+   if mmap() would work it still requires locking or nasty tricks to
+   keep track of the allocation state there.
+
+Having ruled out all of the userspace-only approaches for managing
+bounds tables that we could think of, we create them on demand in
+the kernel.
+
+Decoding MPX instructions
+-------------------------
+
+If a #BR is generated due to a bounds violation caused by MPX.
+We need to decode MPX instructions to get violation address and
+set this address into extended struct siginfo.
+
+The _sigfault field of struct siginfo is extended as follow:
+
+87		/* SIGILL, SIGFPE, SIGSEGV, SIGBUS */
+88		struct {
+89			void __user *_addr; /* faulting insn/memory ref. */
+90 #ifdef __ARCH_SI_TRAPNO
+91			int _trapno;	/* TRAP # which caused the signal */
+92 #endif
+93			short _addr_lsb; /* LSB of the reported address */
+94			struct {
+95				void __user *_lower;
+96				void __user *_upper;
+97			} _addr_bnd;
+98		} _sigfault;
+
+The '_addr' field refers to violation address, and new '_addr_and'
+field refers to the upper/lower bounds when a #BR is caused.
+
+Glibc will be also updated to support this new siginfo. So user
+can get violation address and bounds when bounds violations occur.
+
+Cleanup unused bounds tables
+----------------------------
+
+When a BNDSTX instruction attempts to save bounds to a bounds directory
+entry marked as invalid, a #BR is generated. This is an indication that
+no bounds table exists for this entry. In this case the fault handler
+will allocate a new bounds table on demand.
+
+Since the kernel allocated those tables on-demand without userspace
+knowledge, it is also responsible for freeing them when the associated
+mappings go away.
+
+Here, the solution for this issue is to hook do_munmap() to check
+whether one process is MPX enabled. If yes, those bounds tables covered
+in the virtual address region which is being unmapped will be freed also.
+
+Adding new prctl commands
+-------------------------
+
+Two new prctl commands are added to enable and disable MPX bounds tables
+management in kernel.
+
+155	#define PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT	43
+156	#define PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT	44
+
+Runtime library in userspace is responsible for allocation of bounds
+directory. So kernel have to use XSAVE instruction to get the base
+of bounds directory from BNDCFG register.
+
+But XSAVE is expected to be very expensive. In order to do performance
+optimization, we have to get the base of bounds directory and save it
+into struct mm_struct to be used in future during PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT
+command execution.
+
+
+4. Special rules
+================
+
+1) If userspace is requesting help from the kernel to do the management
+of bounds tables, it may not create or modify entries in the bounds directory.
+
+Certainly users can allocate bounds tables and forcibly point the bounds
+directory at them through XSAVE instruction, and then set valid bit
+of bounds entry to have this entry valid.  But, the kernel will decline
+to assist in managing these tables.
+
+2) Userspace may not take multiple bounds directory entries and point
+them at the same bounds table.
+
+This is allowed architecturally.  See more information "Intel(R) Architecture
+Instruction Set Extensions Programming Reference" (9.3.4).
+
+However, if users did this, the kernel might be fooled in to unmapping an
+in-use bounds table since it does not recognize sharing.
diff --git a/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/intel_rdt_ui.txt b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/intel_rdt_ui.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4d8848e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/intel_rdt_ui.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,659 @@
+User Interface for Resource Allocation in Intel Resource Director Technology
+
+Copyright (C) 2016 Intel Corporation
+
+Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
+Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
+Vikas Shivappa <vikas.shivappa@intel.com>
+
+This feature is enabled by the CONFIG_INTEL_RDT Kconfig and the
+X86 /proc/cpuinfo flag bits "rdt", "cqm", "cat_l3" and "cdp_l3".
+
+To use the feature mount the file system:
+
+ # mount -t resctrl resctrl [-o cdp] /sys/fs/resctrl
+
+mount options are:
+
+"cdp": Enable code/data prioritization in L3 cache allocations.
+
+RDT features are orthogonal. A particular system may support only
+monitoring, only control, or both monitoring and control.
+
+The mount succeeds if either of allocation or monitoring is present, but
+only those files and directories supported by the system will be created.
+For more details on the behavior of the interface during monitoring
+and allocation, see the "Resource alloc and monitor groups" section.
+
+Info directory
+--------------
+
+The 'info' directory contains information about the enabled
+resources. Each resource has its own subdirectory. The subdirectory
+names reflect the resource names.
+
+Each subdirectory contains the following files with respect to
+allocation:
+
+Cache resource(L3/L2)  subdirectory contains the following files
+related to allocation:
+
+"num_closids":  	The number of CLOSIDs which are valid for this
+			resource. The kernel uses the smallest number of
+			CLOSIDs of all enabled resources as limit.
+
+"cbm_mask":     	The bitmask which is valid for this resource.
+			This mask is equivalent to 100%.
+
+"min_cbm_bits": 	The minimum number of consecutive bits which
+			must be set when writing a mask.
+
+"shareable_bits":	Bitmask of shareable resource with other executing
+			entities (e.g. I/O). User can use this when
+			setting up exclusive cache partitions. Note that
+			some platforms support devices that have their
+			own settings for cache use which can over-ride
+			these bits.
+
+Memory bandwitdh(MB) subdirectory contains the following files
+with respect to allocation:
+
+"min_bandwidth":	The minimum memory bandwidth percentage which
+			user can request.
+
+"bandwidth_gran":	The granularity in which the memory bandwidth
+			percentage is allocated. The allocated
+			b/w percentage is rounded off to the next
+			control step available on the hardware. The
+			available bandwidth control steps are:
+			min_bandwidth + N * bandwidth_gran.
+
+"delay_linear": 	Indicates if the delay scale is linear or
+			non-linear. This field is purely informational
+			only.
+
+If RDT monitoring is available there will be an "L3_MON" directory
+with the following files:
+
+"num_rmids":		The number of RMIDs available. This is the
+			upper bound for how many "CTRL_MON" + "MON"
+			groups can be created.
+
+"mon_features":	Lists the monitoring events if
+			monitoring is enabled for the resource.
+
+"max_threshold_occupancy":
+			Read/write file provides the largest value (in
+			bytes) at which a previously used LLC_occupancy
+			counter can be considered for re-use.
+
+
+Resource alloc and monitor groups
+---------------------------------
+
+Resource groups are represented as directories in the resctrl file
+system.  The default group is the root directory which, immediately
+after mounting, owns all the tasks and cpus in the system and can make
+full use of all resources.
+
+On a system with RDT control features additional directories can be
+created in the root directory that specify different amounts of each
+resource (see "schemata" below). The root and these additional top level
+directories are referred to as "CTRL_MON" groups below.
+
+On a system with RDT monitoring the root directory and other top level
+directories contain a directory named "mon_groups" in which additional
+directories can be created to monitor subsets of tasks in the CTRL_MON
+group that is their ancestor. These are called "MON" groups in the rest
+of this document.
+
+Removing a directory will move all tasks and cpus owned by the group it
+represents to the parent. Removing one of the created CTRL_MON groups
+will automatically remove all MON groups below it.
+
+All groups contain the following files:
+
+"tasks":
+	Reading this file shows the list of all tasks that belong to
+	this group. Writing a task id to the file will add a task to the
+	group. If the group is a CTRL_MON group the task is removed from
+	whichever previous CTRL_MON group owned the task and also from
+	any MON group that owned the task. If the group is a MON group,
+	then the task must already belong to the CTRL_MON parent of this
+	group. The task is removed from any previous MON group.
+
+
+"cpus":
+	Reading this file shows a bitmask of the logical CPUs owned by
+	this group. Writing a mask to this file will add and remove
+	CPUs to/from this group. As with the tasks file a hierarchy is
+	maintained where MON groups may only include CPUs owned by the
+	parent CTRL_MON group.
+
+
+"cpus_list":
+	Just like "cpus", only using ranges of CPUs instead of bitmasks.
+
+
+When control is enabled all CTRL_MON groups will also contain:
+
+"schemata":
+	A list of all the resources available to this group.
+	Each resource has its own line and format - see below for details.
+
+When monitoring is enabled all MON groups will also contain:
+
+"mon_data":
+	This contains a set of files organized by L3 domain and by
+	RDT event. E.g. on a system with two L3 domains there will
+	be subdirectories "mon_L3_00" and "mon_L3_01".	Each of these
+	directories have one file per event (e.g. "llc_occupancy",
+	"mbm_total_bytes", and "mbm_local_bytes"). In a MON group these
+	files provide a read out of the current value of the event for
+	all tasks in the group. In CTRL_MON groups these files provide
+	the sum for all tasks in the CTRL_MON group and all tasks in
+	MON groups. Please see example section for more details on usage.
+
+Resource allocation rules
+-------------------------
+When a task is running the following rules define which resources are
+available to it:
+
+1) If the task is a member of a non-default group, then the schemata
+   for that group is used.
+
+2) Else if the task belongs to the default group, but is running on a
+   CPU that is assigned to some specific group, then the schemata for the
+   CPU's group is used.
+
+3) Otherwise the schemata for the default group is used.
+
+Resource monitoring rules
+-------------------------
+1) If a task is a member of a MON group, or non-default CTRL_MON group
+   then RDT events for the task will be reported in that group.
+
+2) If a task is a member of the default CTRL_MON group, but is running
+   on a CPU that is assigned to some specific group, then the RDT events
+   for the task will be reported in that group.
+
+3) Otherwise RDT events for the task will be reported in the root level
+   "mon_data" group.
+
+
+Notes on cache occupancy monitoring and control
+-----------------------------------------------
+When moving a task from one group to another you should remember that
+this only affects *new* cache allocations by the task. E.g. you may have
+a task in a monitor group showing 3 MB of cache occupancy. If you move
+to a new group and immediately check the occupancy of the old and new
+groups you will likely see that the old group is still showing 3 MB and
+the new group zero. When the task accesses locations still in cache from
+before the move, the h/w does not update any counters. On a busy system
+you will likely see the occupancy in the old group go down as cache lines
+are evicted and re-used while the occupancy in the new group rises as
+the task accesses memory and loads into the cache are counted based on
+membership in the new group.
+
+The same applies to cache allocation control. Moving a task to a group
+with a smaller cache partition will not evict any cache lines. The
+process may continue to use them from the old partition.
+
+Hardware uses CLOSid(Class of service ID) and an RMID(Resource monitoring ID)
+to identify a control group and a monitoring group respectively. Each of
+the resource groups are mapped to these IDs based on the kind of group. The
+number of CLOSid and RMID are limited by the hardware and hence the creation of
+a "CTRL_MON" directory may fail if we run out of either CLOSID or RMID
+and creation of "MON" group may fail if we run out of RMIDs.
+
+max_threshold_occupancy - generic concepts
+------------------------------------------
+
+Note that an RMID once freed may not be immediately available for use as
+the RMID is still tagged the cache lines of the previous user of RMID.
+Hence such RMIDs are placed on limbo list and checked back if the cache
+occupancy has gone down. If there is a time when system has a lot of
+limbo RMIDs but which are not ready to be used, user may see an -EBUSY
+during mkdir.
+
+max_threshold_occupancy is a user configurable value to determine the
+occupancy at which an RMID can be freed.
+
+Schemata files - general concepts
+---------------------------------
+Each line in the file describes one resource. The line starts with
+the name of the resource, followed by specific values to be applied
+in each of the instances of that resource on the system.
+
+Cache IDs
+---------
+On current generation systems there is one L3 cache per socket and L2
+caches are generally just shared by the hyperthreads on a core, but this
+isn't an architectural requirement. We could have multiple separate L3
+caches on a socket, multiple cores could share an L2 cache. So instead
+of using "socket" or "core" to define the set of logical cpus sharing
+a resource we use a "Cache ID". At a given cache level this will be a
+unique number across the whole system (but it isn't guaranteed to be a
+contiguous sequence, there may be gaps).  To find the ID for each logical
+CPU look in /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu*/cache/index*/id
+
+Cache Bit Masks (CBM)
+---------------------
+For cache resources we describe the portion of the cache that is available
+for allocation using a bitmask. The maximum value of the mask is defined
+by each cpu model (and may be different for different cache levels). It
+is found using CPUID, but is also provided in the "info" directory of
+the resctrl file system in "info/{resource}/cbm_mask". X86 hardware
+requires that these masks have all the '1' bits in a contiguous block. So
+0x3, 0x6 and 0xC are legal 4-bit masks with two bits set, but 0x5, 0x9
+and 0xA are not.  On a system with a 20-bit mask each bit represents 5%
+of the capacity of the cache. You could partition the cache into four
+equal parts with masks: 0x1f, 0x3e0, 0x7c00, 0xf8000.
+
+Memory bandwidth(b/w) percentage
+--------------------------------
+For Memory b/w resource, user controls the resource by indicating the
+percentage of total memory b/w.
+
+The minimum bandwidth percentage value for each cpu model is predefined
+and can be looked up through "info/MB/min_bandwidth". The bandwidth
+granularity that is allocated is also dependent on the cpu model and can
+be looked up at "info/MB/bandwidth_gran". The available bandwidth
+control steps are: min_bw + N * bw_gran. Intermediate values are rounded
+to the next control step available on the hardware.
+
+The bandwidth throttling is a core specific mechanism on some of Intel
+SKUs. Using a high bandwidth and a low bandwidth setting on two threads
+sharing a core will result in both threads being throttled to use the
+low bandwidth.
+
+L3 schemata file details (code and data prioritization disabled)
+----------------------------------------------------------------
+With CDP disabled the L3 schemata format is:
+
+	L3:<cache_id0>=<cbm>;<cache_id1>=<cbm>;...
+
+L3 schemata file details (CDP enabled via mount option to resctrl)
+------------------------------------------------------------------
+When CDP is enabled L3 control is split into two separate resources
+so you can specify independent masks for code and data like this:
+
+	L3data:<cache_id0>=<cbm>;<cache_id1>=<cbm>;...
+	L3code:<cache_id0>=<cbm>;<cache_id1>=<cbm>;...
+
+L2 schemata file details
+------------------------
+L2 cache does not support code and data prioritization, so the
+schemata format is always:
+
+	L2:<cache_id0>=<cbm>;<cache_id1>=<cbm>;...
+
+Memory b/w Allocation details
+-----------------------------
+
+Memory b/w domain is L3 cache.
+
+	MB:<cache_id0>=bandwidth0;<cache_id1>=bandwidth1;...
+
+Reading/writing the schemata file
+---------------------------------
+Reading the schemata file will show the state of all resources
+on all domains. When writing you only need to specify those values
+which you wish to change.  E.g.
+
+# cat schemata
+L3DATA:0=fffff;1=fffff;2=fffff;3=fffff
+L3CODE:0=fffff;1=fffff;2=fffff;3=fffff
+# echo "L3DATA:2=3c0;" > schemata
+# cat schemata
+L3DATA:0=fffff;1=fffff;2=3c0;3=fffff
+L3CODE:0=fffff;1=fffff;2=fffff;3=fffff
+
+Examples for RDT allocation usage:
+
+Example 1
+---------
+On a two socket machine (one L3 cache per socket) with just four bits
+for cache bit masks, minimum b/w of 10% with a memory bandwidth
+granularity of 10%
+
+# mount -t resctrl resctrl /sys/fs/resctrl
+# cd /sys/fs/resctrl
+# mkdir p0 p1
+# echo "L3:0=3;1=c\nMB:0=50;1=50" > /sys/fs/resctrl/p0/schemata
+# echo "L3:0=3;1=3\nMB:0=50;1=50" > /sys/fs/resctrl/p1/schemata
+
+The default resource group is unmodified, so we have access to all parts
+of all caches (its schemata file reads "L3:0=f;1=f").
+
+Tasks that are under the control of group "p0" may only allocate from the
+"lower" 50% on cache ID 0, and the "upper" 50% of cache ID 1.
+Tasks in group "p1" use the "lower" 50% of cache on both sockets.
+
+Similarly, tasks that are under the control of group "p0" may use a
+maximum memory b/w of 50% on socket0 and 50% on socket 1.
+Tasks in group "p1" may also use 50% memory b/w on both sockets.
+Note that unlike cache masks, memory b/w cannot specify whether these
+allocations can overlap or not. The allocations specifies the maximum
+b/w that the group may be able to use and the system admin can configure
+the b/w accordingly.
+
+Example 2
+---------
+Again two sockets, but this time with a more realistic 20-bit mask.
+
+Two real time tasks pid=1234 running on processor 0 and pid=5678 running on
+processor 1 on socket 0 on a 2-socket and dual core machine. To avoid noisy
+neighbors, each of the two real-time tasks exclusively occupies one quarter
+of L3 cache on socket 0.
+
+# mount -t resctrl resctrl /sys/fs/resctrl
+# cd /sys/fs/resctrl
+
+First we reset the schemata for the default group so that the "upper"
+50% of the L3 cache on socket 0 and 50% of memory b/w cannot be used by
+ordinary tasks:
+
+# echo "L3:0=3ff;1=fffff\nMB:0=50;1=100" > schemata
+
+Next we make a resource group for our first real time task and give
+it access to the "top" 25% of the cache on socket 0.
+
+# mkdir p0
+# echo "L3:0=f8000;1=fffff" > p0/schemata
+
+Finally we move our first real time task into this resource group. We
+also use taskset(1) to ensure the task always runs on a dedicated CPU
+on socket 0. Most uses of resource groups will also constrain which
+processors tasks run on.
+
+# echo 1234 > p0/tasks
+# taskset -cp 1 1234
+
+Ditto for the second real time task (with the remaining 25% of cache):
+
+# mkdir p1
+# echo "L3:0=7c00;1=fffff" > p1/schemata
+# echo 5678 > p1/tasks
+# taskset -cp 2 5678
+
+For the same 2 socket system with memory b/w resource and CAT L3 the
+schemata would look like(Assume min_bandwidth 10 and bandwidth_gran is
+10):
+
+For our first real time task this would request 20% memory b/w on socket
+0.
+
+# echo -e "L3:0=f8000;1=fffff\nMB:0=20;1=100" > p0/schemata
+
+For our second real time task this would request an other 20% memory b/w
+on socket 0.
+
+# echo -e "L3:0=f8000;1=fffff\nMB:0=20;1=100" > p0/schemata
+
+Example 3
+---------
+
+A single socket system which has real-time tasks running on core 4-7 and
+non real-time workload assigned to core 0-3. The real-time tasks share text
+and data, so a per task association is not required and due to interaction
+with the kernel it's desired that the kernel on these cores shares L3 with
+the tasks.
+
+# mount -t resctrl resctrl /sys/fs/resctrl
+# cd /sys/fs/resctrl
+
+First we reset the schemata for the default group so that the "upper"
+50% of the L3 cache on socket 0, and 50% of memory bandwidth on socket 0
+cannot be used by ordinary tasks:
+
+# echo "L3:0=3ff\nMB:0=50" > schemata
+
+Next we make a resource group for our real time cores and give it access
+to the "top" 50% of the cache on socket 0 and 50% of memory bandwidth on
+socket 0.
+
+# mkdir p0
+# echo "L3:0=ffc00\nMB:0=50" > p0/schemata
+
+Finally we move core 4-7 over to the new group and make sure that the
+kernel and the tasks running there get 50% of the cache. They should
+also get 50% of memory bandwidth assuming that the cores 4-7 are SMT
+siblings and only the real time threads are scheduled on the cores 4-7.
+
+# echo F0 > p0/cpus
+
+4) Locking between applications
+
+Certain operations on the resctrl filesystem, composed of read/writes
+to/from multiple files, must be atomic.
+
+As an example, the allocation of an exclusive reservation of L3 cache
+involves:
+
+  1. Read the cbmmasks from each directory
+  2. Find a contiguous set of bits in the global CBM bitmask that is clear
+     in any of the directory cbmmasks
+  3. Create a new directory
+  4. Set the bits found in step 2 to the new directory "schemata" file
+
+If two applications attempt to allocate space concurrently then they can
+end up allocating the same bits so the reservations are shared instead of
+exclusive.
+
+To coordinate atomic operations on the resctrlfs and to avoid the problem
+above, the following locking procedure is recommended:
+
+Locking is based on flock, which is available in libc and also as a shell
+script command
+
+Write lock:
+
+ A) Take flock(LOCK_EX) on /sys/fs/resctrl
+ B) Read/write the directory structure.
+ C) funlock
+
+Read lock:
+
+ A) Take flock(LOCK_SH) on /sys/fs/resctrl
+ B) If success read the directory structure.
+ C) funlock
+
+Example with bash:
+
+# Atomically read directory structure
+$ flock -s /sys/fs/resctrl/ find /sys/fs/resctrl
+
+# Read directory contents and create new subdirectory
+
+$ cat create-dir.sh
+find /sys/fs/resctrl/ > output.txt
+mask = function-of(output.txt)
+mkdir /sys/fs/resctrl/newres/
+echo mask > /sys/fs/resctrl/newres/schemata
+
+$ flock /sys/fs/resctrl/ ./create-dir.sh
+
+Example with C:
+
+/*
+ * Example code do take advisory locks
+ * before accessing resctrl filesystem
+ */
+#include <sys/file.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+void resctrl_take_shared_lock(int fd)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	/* take shared lock on resctrl filesystem */
+	ret = flock(fd, LOCK_SH);
+	if (ret) {
+		perror("flock");
+		exit(-1);
+	}
+}
+
+void resctrl_take_exclusive_lock(int fd)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	/* release lock on resctrl filesystem */
+	ret = flock(fd, LOCK_EX);
+	if (ret) {
+		perror("flock");
+		exit(-1);
+	}
+}
+
+void resctrl_release_lock(int fd)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	/* take shared lock on resctrl filesystem */
+	ret = flock(fd, LOCK_UN);
+	if (ret) {
+		perror("flock");
+		exit(-1);
+	}
+}
+
+void main(void)
+{
+	int fd, ret;
+
+	fd = open("/sys/fs/resctrl", O_DIRECTORY);
+	if (fd == -1) {
+		perror("open");
+		exit(-1);
+	}
+	resctrl_take_shared_lock(fd);
+	/* code to read directory contents */
+	resctrl_release_lock(fd);
+
+	resctrl_take_exclusive_lock(fd);
+	/* code to read and write directory contents */
+	resctrl_release_lock(fd);
+}
+
+Examples for RDT Monitoring along with allocation usage:
+
+Reading monitored data
+----------------------
+Reading an event file (for ex: mon_data/mon_L3_00/llc_occupancy) would
+show the current snapshot of LLC occupancy of the corresponding MON
+group or CTRL_MON group.
+
+
+Example 1 (Monitor CTRL_MON group and subset of tasks in CTRL_MON group)
+---------
+On a two socket machine (one L3 cache per socket) with just four bits
+for cache bit masks
+
+# mount -t resctrl resctrl /sys/fs/resctrl
+# cd /sys/fs/resctrl
+# mkdir p0 p1
+# echo "L3:0=3;1=c" > /sys/fs/resctrl/p0/schemata
+# echo "L3:0=3;1=3" > /sys/fs/resctrl/p1/schemata
+# echo 5678 > p1/tasks
+# echo 5679 > p1/tasks
+
+The default resource group is unmodified, so we have access to all parts
+of all caches (its schemata file reads "L3:0=f;1=f").
+
+Tasks that are under the control of group "p0" may only allocate from the
+"lower" 50% on cache ID 0, and the "upper" 50% of cache ID 1.
+Tasks in group "p1" use the "lower" 50% of cache on both sockets.
+
+Create monitor groups and assign a subset of tasks to each monitor group.
+
+# cd /sys/fs/resctrl/p1/mon_groups
+# mkdir m11 m12
+# echo 5678 > m11/tasks
+# echo 5679 > m12/tasks
+
+fetch data (data shown in bytes)
+
+# cat m11/mon_data/mon_L3_00/llc_occupancy
+16234000
+# cat m11/mon_data/mon_L3_01/llc_occupancy
+14789000
+# cat m12/mon_data/mon_L3_00/llc_occupancy
+16789000
+
+The parent ctrl_mon group shows the aggregated data.
+
+# cat /sys/fs/resctrl/p1/mon_data/mon_l3_00/llc_occupancy
+31234000
+
+Example 2 (Monitor a task from its creation)
+---------
+On a two socket machine (one L3 cache per socket)
+
+# mount -t resctrl resctrl /sys/fs/resctrl
+# cd /sys/fs/resctrl
+# mkdir p0 p1
+
+An RMID is allocated to the group once its created and hence the <cmd>
+below is monitored from its creation.
+
+# echo $$ > /sys/fs/resctrl/p1/tasks
+# <cmd>
+
+Fetch the data
+
+# cat /sys/fs/resctrl/p1/mon_data/mon_l3_00/llc_occupancy
+31789000
+
+Example 3 (Monitor without CAT support or before creating CAT groups)
+---------
+
+Assume a system like HSW has only CQM and no CAT support. In this case
+the resctrl will still mount but cannot create CTRL_MON directories.
+But user can create different MON groups within the root group thereby
+able to monitor all tasks including kernel threads.
+
+This can also be used to profile jobs cache size footprint before being
+able to allocate them to different allocation groups.
+
+# mount -t resctrl resctrl /sys/fs/resctrl
+# cd /sys/fs/resctrl
+# mkdir mon_groups/m01
+# mkdir mon_groups/m02
+
+# echo 3478 > /sys/fs/resctrl/mon_groups/m01/tasks
+# echo 2467 > /sys/fs/resctrl/mon_groups/m02/tasks
+
+Monitor the groups separately and also get per domain data. From the
+below its apparent that the tasks are mostly doing work on
+domain(socket) 0.
+
+# cat /sys/fs/resctrl/mon_groups/m01/mon_L3_00/llc_occupancy
+31234000
+# cat /sys/fs/resctrl/mon_groups/m01/mon_L3_01/llc_occupancy
+34555
+# cat /sys/fs/resctrl/mon_groups/m02/mon_L3_00/llc_occupancy
+31234000
+# cat /sys/fs/resctrl/mon_groups/m02/mon_L3_01/llc_occupancy
+32789
+
+
+Example 4 (Monitor real time tasks)
+-----------------------------------
+
+A single socket system which has real time tasks running on cores 4-7
+and non real time tasks on other cpus. We want to monitor the cache
+occupancy of the real time threads on these cores.
+
+# mount -t resctrl resctrl /sys/fs/resctrl
+# cd /sys/fs/resctrl
+# mkdir p1
+
+Move the cpus 4-7 over to p1
+# echo f0 > p0/cpus
+
+View the llc occupancy snapshot
+
+# cat /sys/fs/resctrl/p1/mon_data/mon_L3_00/llc_occupancy
+11234000
diff --git a/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/kernel-stacks b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/kernel-stacks
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9a0aa4d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/kernel-stacks
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+Kernel stacks on x86-64 bit
+---------------------------
+
+Most of the text from Keith Owens, hacked by AK
+
+x86_64 page size (PAGE_SIZE) is 4K.
+
+Like all other architectures, x86_64 has a kernel stack for every
+active thread.  These thread stacks are THREAD_SIZE (2*PAGE_SIZE) big.
+These stacks contain useful data as long as a thread is alive or a
+zombie. While the thread is in user space the kernel stack is empty
+except for the thread_info structure at the bottom.
+
+In addition to the per thread stacks, there are specialized stacks
+associated with each CPU.  These stacks are only used while the kernel
+is in control on that CPU; when a CPU returns to user space the
+specialized stacks contain no useful data.  The main CPU stacks are:
+
+* Interrupt stack.  IRQ_STACK_SIZE
+
+  Used for external hardware interrupts.  If this is the first external
+  hardware interrupt (i.e. not a nested hardware interrupt) then the
+  kernel switches from the current task to the interrupt stack.  Like
+  the split thread and interrupt stacks on i386, this gives more room
+  for kernel interrupt processing without having to increase the size
+  of every per thread stack.
+
+  The interrupt stack is also used when processing a softirq.
+
+Switching to the kernel interrupt stack is done by software based on a
+per CPU interrupt nest counter. This is needed because x86-64 "IST"
+hardware stacks cannot nest without races.
+
+x86_64 also has a feature which is not available on i386, the ability
+to automatically switch to a new stack for designated events such as
+double fault or NMI, which makes it easier to handle these unusual
+events on x86_64.  This feature is called the Interrupt Stack Table
+(IST).  There can be up to 7 IST entries per CPU. The IST code is an
+index into the Task State Segment (TSS). The IST entries in the TSS
+point to dedicated stacks; each stack can be a different size.
+
+An IST is selected by a non-zero value in the IST field of an
+interrupt-gate descriptor.  When an interrupt occurs and the hardware
+loads such a descriptor, the hardware automatically sets the new stack
+pointer based on the IST value, then invokes the interrupt handler.  If
+the interrupt came from user mode, then the interrupt handler prologue
+will switch back to the per-thread stack.  If software wants to allow
+nested IST interrupts then the handler must adjust the IST values on
+entry to and exit from the interrupt handler.  (This is occasionally
+done, e.g. for debug exceptions.)
+
+Events with different IST codes (i.e. with different stacks) can be
+nested.  For example, a debug interrupt can safely be interrupted by an
+NMI.  arch/x86_64/kernel/entry.S::paranoidentry adjusts the stack
+pointers on entry to and exit from all IST events, in theory allowing
+IST events with the same code to be nested.  However in most cases, the
+stack size allocated to an IST assumes no nesting for the same code.
+If that assumption is ever broken then the stacks will become corrupt.
+
+The currently assigned IST stacks are :-
+
+* DOUBLEFAULT_STACK.  EXCEPTION_STKSZ (PAGE_SIZE).
+
+  Used for interrupt 8 - Double Fault Exception (#DF).
+
+  Invoked when handling one exception causes another exception. Happens
+  when the kernel is very confused (e.g. kernel stack pointer corrupt).
+  Using a separate stack allows the kernel to recover from it well enough
+  in many cases to still output an oops.
+
+* NMI_STACK.  EXCEPTION_STKSZ (PAGE_SIZE).
+
+  Used for non-maskable interrupts (NMI).
+
+  NMI can be delivered at any time, including when the kernel is in the
+  middle of switching stacks.  Using IST for NMI events avoids making
+  assumptions about the previous state of the kernel stack.
+
+* DEBUG_STACK.  DEBUG_STKSZ
+
+  Used for hardware debug interrupts (interrupt 1) and for software
+  debug interrupts (INT3).
+
+  When debugging a kernel, debug interrupts (both hardware and
+  software) can occur at any time.  Using IST for these interrupts
+  avoids making assumptions about the previous state of the kernel
+  stack.
+
+* MCE_STACK.  EXCEPTION_STKSZ (PAGE_SIZE).
+
+  Used for interrupt 18 - Machine Check Exception (#MC).
+
+  MCE can be delivered at any time, including when the kernel is in the
+  middle of switching stacks.  Using IST for MCE events avoids making
+  assumptions about the previous state of the kernel stack.
+
+For more details see the Intel IA32 or AMD AMD64 architecture manuals.
+
+
+Printing backtraces on x86
+--------------------------
+
+The question about the '?' preceding function names in an x86 stacktrace
+keeps popping up, here's an indepth explanation. It helps if the reader
+stares at print_context_stack() and the whole machinery in and around
+arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c.
+
+Adapted from Ingo's mail, Message-ID: <20150521101614.GA10889@gmail.com>:
+
+We always scan the full kernel stack for return addresses stored on
+the kernel stack(s) [*], from stack top to stack bottom, and print out
+anything that 'looks like' a kernel text address.
+
+If it fits into the frame pointer chain, we print it without a question
+mark, knowing that it's part of the real backtrace.
+
+If the address does not fit into our expected frame pointer chain we
+still print it, but we print a '?'. It can mean two things:
+
+ - either the address is not part of the call chain: it's just stale
+   values on the kernel stack, from earlier function calls. This is
+   the common case.
+
+ - or it is part of the call chain, but the frame pointer was not set
+   up properly within the function, so we don't recognize it.
+
+This way we will always print out the real call chain (plus a few more
+entries), regardless of whether the frame pointer was set up correctly
+or not - but in most cases we'll get the call chain right as well. The
+entries printed are strictly in stack order, so you can deduce more
+information from that as well.
+
+The most important property of this method is that we _never_ lose
+information: we always strive to print _all_ addresses on the stack(s)
+that look like kernel text addresses, so if debug information is wrong,
+we still print out the real call chain as well - just with more question
+marks than ideal.
+
+[*] For things like IRQ and IST stacks, we also scan those stacks, in
+    the right order, and try to cross from one stack into another
+    reconstructing the call chain. This works most of the time.
diff --git a/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/mds.rst b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/mds.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5d4330b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/mds.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) mitigation
+=================================================
+
+.. _mds:
+
+Overview
+--------
+
+Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) is a family of side channel attacks
+on internal buffers in Intel CPUs. The variants are:
+
+ - Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling (MSBDS) (CVE-2018-12126)
+ - Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling (MFBDS) (CVE-2018-12130)
+ - Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling (MLPDS) (CVE-2018-12127)
+ - Microarchitectural Data Sampling Uncacheable Memory (MDSUM) (CVE-2019-11091)
+
+MSBDS leaks Store Buffer Entries which can be speculatively forwarded to a
+dependent load (store-to-load forwarding) as an optimization. The forward
+can also happen to a faulting or assisting load operation for a different
+memory address, which can be exploited under certain conditions. Store
+buffers are partitioned between Hyper-Threads so cross thread forwarding is
+not possible. But if a thread enters or exits a sleep state the store
+buffer is repartitioned which can expose data from one thread to the other.
+
+MFBDS leaks Fill Buffer Entries. Fill buffers are used internally to manage
+L1 miss situations and to hold data which is returned or sent in response
+to a memory or I/O operation. Fill buffers can forward data to a load
+operation and also write data to the cache. When the fill buffer is
+deallocated it can retain the stale data of the preceding operations which
+can then be forwarded to a faulting or assisting load operation, which can
+be exploited under certain conditions. Fill buffers are shared between
+Hyper-Threads so cross thread leakage is possible.
+
+MLPDS leaks Load Port Data. Load ports are used to perform load operations
+from memory or I/O. The received data is then forwarded to the register
+file or a subsequent operation. In some implementations the Load Port can
+contain stale data from a previous operation which can be forwarded to
+faulting or assisting loads under certain conditions, which again can be
+exploited eventually. Load ports are shared between Hyper-Threads so cross
+thread leakage is possible.
+
+MDSUM is a special case of MSBDS, MFBDS and MLPDS. An uncacheable load from
+memory that takes a fault or assist can leave data in a microarchitectural
+structure that may later be observed using one of the same methods used by
+MSBDS, MFBDS or MLPDS.
+
+Exposure assumptions
+--------------------
+
+It is assumed that attack code resides in user space or in a guest with one
+exception. The rationale behind this assumption is that the code construct
+needed for exploiting MDS requires:
+
+ - to control the load to trigger a fault or assist
+
+ - to have a disclosure gadget which exposes the speculatively accessed
+   data for consumption through a side channel.
+
+ - to control the pointer through which the disclosure gadget exposes the
+   data
+
+The existence of such a construct in the kernel cannot be excluded with
+100% certainty, but the complexity involved makes it extremly unlikely.
+
+There is one exception, which is untrusted BPF. The functionality of
+untrusted BPF is limited, but it needs to be thoroughly investigated
+whether it can be used to create such a construct.
+
+
+Mitigation strategy
+-------------------
+
+All variants have the same mitigation strategy at least for the single CPU
+thread case (SMT off): Force the CPU to clear the affected buffers.
+
+This is achieved by using the otherwise unused and obsolete VERW
+instruction in combination with a microcode update. The microcode clears
+the affected CPU buffers when the VERW instruction is executed.
+
+For virtualization there are two ways to achieve CPU buffer
+clearing. Either the modified VERW instruction or via the L1D Flush
+command. The latter is issued when L1TF mitigation is enabled so the extra
+VERW can be avoided. If the CPU is not affected by L1TF then VERW needs to
+be issued.
+
+If the VERW instruction with the supplied segment selector argument is
+executed on a CPU without the microcode update there is no side effect
+other than a small number of pointlessly wasted CPU cycles.
+
+This does not protect against cross Hyper-Thread attacks except for MSBDS
+which is only exploitable cross Hyper-thread when one of the Hyper-Threads
+enters a C-state.
+
+The kernel provides a function to invoke the buffer clearing:
+
+    mds_clear_cpu_buffers()
+
+The mitigation is invoked on kernel/userspace, hypervisor/guest and C-state
+(idle) transitions.
+
+As a special quirk to address virtualization scenarios where the host has
+the microcode updated, but the hypervisor does not (yet) expose the
+MD_CLEAR CPUID bit to guests, the kernel issues the VERW instruction in the
+hope that it might actually clear the buffers. The state is reflected
+accordingly.
+
+According to current knowledge additional mitigations inside the kernel
+itself are not required because the necessary gadgets to expose the leaked
+data cannot be controlled in a way which allows exploitation from malicious
+user space or VM guests.
+
+Kernel internal mitigation modes
+--------------------------------
+
+ ======= ============================================================
+ off      Mitigation is disabled. Either the CPU is not affected or
+          mds=off is supplied on the kernel command line
+
+ full     Mitigation is enabled. CPU is affected and MD_CLEAR is
+          advertised in CPUID.
+
+ vmwerv	  Mitigation is enabled. CPU is affected and MD_CLEAR is not
+	  advertised in CPUID. That is mainly for virtualization
+	  scenarios where the host has the updated microcode but the
+	  hypervisor does not expose MD_CLEAR in CPUID. It's a best
+	  effort approach without guarantee.
+ ======= ============================================================
+
+If the CPU is affected and mds=off is not supplied on the kernel command
+line then the kernel selects the appropriate mitigation mode depending on
+the availability of the MD_CLEAR CPUID bit.
+
+Mitigation points
+-----------------
+
+1. Return to user space
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   When transitioning from kernel to user space the CPU buffers are flushed
+   on affected CPUs when the mitigation is not disabled on the kernel
+   command line. The migitation is enabled through the static key
+   mds_user_clear.
+
+   The mitigation is invoked in prepare_exit_to_usermode() which covers
+   all but one of the kernel to user space transitions.  The exception
+   is when we return from a Non Maskable Interrupt (NMI), which is
+   handled directly in do_nmi().
+
+   (The reason that NMI is special is that prepare_exit_to_usermode() can
+    enable IRQs.  In NMI context, NMIs are blocked, and we don't want to
+    enable IRQs with NMIs blocked.)
+
+
+2. C-State transition
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   When a CPU goes idle and enters a C-State the CPU buffers need to be
+   cleared on affected CPUs when SMT is active. This addresses the
+   repartitioning of the store buffer when one of the Hyper-Threads enters
+   a C-State.
+
+   When SMT is inactive, i.e. either the CPU does not support it or all
+   sibling threads are offline CPU buffer clearing is not required.
+
+   The idle clearing is enabled on CPUs which are only affected by MSBDS
+   and not by any other MDS variant. The other MDS variants cannot be
+   protected against cross Hyper-Thread attacks because the Fill Buffer and
+   the Load Ports are shared. So on CPUs affected by other variants, the
+   idle clearing would be a window dressing exercise and is therefore not
+   activated.
+
+   The invocation is controlled by the static key mds_idle_clear which is
+   switched depending on the chosen mitigation mode and the SMT state of
+   the system.
+
+   The buffer clear is only invoked before entering the C-State to prevent
+   that stale data from the idling CPU from spilling to the Hyper-Thread
+   sibling after the store buffer got repartitioned and all entries are
+   available to the non idle sibling.
+
+   When coming out of idle the store buffer is partitioned again so each
+   sibling has half of it available. The back from idle CPU could be then
+   speculatively exposed to contents of the sibling. The buffers are
+   flushed either on exit to user space or on VMENTER so malicious code
+   in user space or the guest cannot speculatively access them.
+
+   The mitigation is hooked into all variants of halt()/mwait(), but does
+   not cover the legacy ACPI IO-Port mechanism because the ACPI idle driver
+   has been superseded by the intel_idle driver around 2010 and is
+   preferred on all affected CPUs which are expected to gain the MD_CLEAR
+   functionality in microcode. Aside of that the IO-Port mechanism is a
+   legacy interface which is only used on older systems which are either
+   not affected or do not receive microcode updates anymore.
diff --git a/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/microcode.txt b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/microcode.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f57e1b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/microcode.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+	The Linux Microcode Loader
+
+Authors: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
+	 Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
+
+The kernel has a x86 microcode loading facility which is supposed to
+provide microcode loading methods in the OS. Potential use cases are
+updating the microcode on platforms beyond the OEM End-Of-Life support,
+and updating the microcode on long-running systems without rebooting.
+
+The loader supports three loading methods:
+
+1. Early load microcode
+=======================
+
+The kernel can update microcode very early during boot. Loading
+microcode early can fix CPU issues before they are observed during
+kernel boot time.
+
+The microcode is stored in an initrd file. During boot, it is read from
+it and loaded into the CPU cores.
+
+The format of the combined initrd image is microcode in (uncompressed)
+cpio format followed by the (possibly compressed) initrd image. The
+loader parses the combined initrd image during boot.
+
+The microcode files in cpio name space are:
+
+on Intel: kernel/x86/microcode/GenuineIntel.bin
+on AMD  : kernel/x86/microcode/AuthenticAMD.bin
+
+During BSP (BootStrapping Processor) boot (pre-SMP), the kernel
+scans the microcode file in the initrd. If microcode matching the
+CPU is found, it will be applied in the BSP and later on in all APs
+(Application Processors).
+
+The loader also saves the matching microcode for the CPU in memory.
+Thus, the cached microcode patch is applied when CPUs resume from a
+sleep state.
+
+Here's a crude example how to prepare an initrd with microcode (this is
+normally done automatically by the distribution, when recreating the
+initrd, so you don't really have to do it yourself. It is documented
+here for future reference only).
+
+---
+  #!/bin/bash
+
+  if [ -z "$1" ]; then
+      echo "You need to supply an initrd file"
+      exit 1
+  fi
+
+  INITRD="$1"
+
+  DSTDIR=kernel/x86/microcode
+  TMPDIR=/tmp/initrd
+
+  rm -rf $TMPDIR
+
+  mkdir $TMPDIR
+  cd $TMPDIR
+  mkdir -p $DSTDIR
+
+  if [ -d /lib/firmware/amd-ucode ]; then
+          cat /lib/firmware/amd-ucode/microcode_amd*.bin > $DSTDIR/AuthenticAMD.bin
+  fi
+
+  if [ -d /lib/firmware/intel-ucode ]; then
+          cat /lib/firmware/intel-ucode/* > $DSTDIR/GenuineIntel.bin
+  fi
+
+  find . | cpio -o -H newc >../ucode.cpio
+  cd ..
+  mv $INITRD $INITRD.orig
+  cat ucode.cpio $INITRD.orig > $INITRD
+
+  rm -rf $TMPDIR
+---
+
+The system needs to have the microcode packages installed into
+/lib/firmware or you need to fixup the paths above if yours are
+somewhere else and/or you've downloaded them directly from the processor
+vendor's site.
+
+2. Late loading
+===============
+
+There are two legacy user space interfaces to load microcode, either through
+/dev/cpu/microcode or through /sys/devices/system/cpu/microcode/reload file
+in sysfs.
+
+The /dev/cpu/microcode method is deprecated because it needs a special
+userspace tool for that.
+
+The easier method is simply installing the microcode packages your distro
+supplies and running:
+
+# echo 1 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/microcode/reload
+
+as root.
+
+The loading mechanism looks for microcode blobs in
+/lib/firmware/{intel-ucode,amd-ucode}. The default distro installation
+packages already put them there.
+
+3. Builtin microcode
+====================
+
+The loader supports also loading of a builtin microcode supplied through
+the regular firmware builtin method CONFIG_FIRMWARE_IN_KERNEL. Only
+64-bit is currently supported.
+
+Here's an example:
+
+CONFIG_FIRMWARE_IN_KERNEL=y
+CONFIG_EXTRA_FIRMWARE="intel-ucode/06-3a-09 amd-ucode/microcode_amd_fam15h.bin"
+CONFIG_EXTRA_FIRMWARE_DIR="/lib/firmware"
+
+This basically means, you have the following tree structure locally:
+
+/lib/firmware/
+|-- amd-ucode
+...
+|   |-- microcode_amd_fam15h.bin
+...
+|-- intel-ucode
+...
+|   |-- 06-3a-09
+...
+
+so that the build system can find those files and integrate them into
+the final kernel image. The early loader finds them and applies them.
+
+Needless to say, this method is not the most flexible one because it
+requires rebuilding the kernel each time updated microcode from the CPU
+vendor is available.
diff --git a/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/mtrr.txt b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/mtrr.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dc3e703
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/mtrr.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,329 @@
+MTRR (Memory Type Range Register) control
+
+Richard Gooch <rgooch@atnf.csiro.au> - 3 Jun 1999
+Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@do-not-panic.com> - April 9, 2015
+
+===============================================================================
+Phasing out MTRR use
+
+MTRR use is replaced on modern x86 hardware with PAT. Direct MTRR use by
+drivers on Linux is now completely phased out, device drivers should use
+arch_phys_wc_add() in combination with ioremap_wc() to make MTRR effective on
+non-PAT systems while a no-op but equally effective on PAT enabled systems.
+
+Even if Linux does not use MTRRs directly, some x86 platform firmware may still
+set up MTRRs early before booting the OS. They do this as some platform
+firmware may still have implemented access to MTRRs which would be controlled
+and handled by the platform firmware directly. An example of platform use of
+MTRRs is through the use of SMI handlers, one case could be for fan control,
+the platform code would need uncachable access to some of its fan control
+registers. Such platform access does not need any Operating System MTRR code in
+place other than mtrr_type_lookup() to ensure any OS specific mapping requests
+are aligned with platform MTRR setup. If MTRRs are only set up by the platform
+firmware code though and the OS does not make any specific MTRR mapping
+requests mtrr_type_lookup() should always return MTRR_TYPE_INVALID.
+
+For details refer to Documentation/x86/pat.txt.
+
+===============================================================================
+
+  On Intel P6 family processors (Pentium Pro, Pentium II and later)
+  the Memory Type Range Registers (MTRRs) may be used to control
+  processor access to memory ranges. This is most useful when you have
+  a video (VGA) card on a PCI or AGP bus. Enabling write-combining
+  allows bus write transfers to be combined into a larger transfer
+  before bursting over the PCI/AGP bus. This can increase performance
+  of image write operations 2.5 times or more.
+
+  The Cyrix 6x86, 6x86MX and M II processors have Address Range
+  Registers (ARRs) which provide a similar functionality to MTRRs. For
+  these, the ARRs are used to emulate the MTRRs.
+
+  The AMD K6-2 (stepping 8 and above) and K6-3 processors have two
+  MTRRs. These are supported.  The AMD Athlon family provide 8 Intel
+  style MTRRs.
+
+  The Centaur C6 (WinChip) has 8 MCRs, allowing write-combining. These
+  are supported.
+
+  The VIA Cyrix III and VIA C3 CPUs offer 8 Intel style MTRRs.
+
+  The CONFIG_MTRR option creates a /proc/mtrr file which may be used
+  to manipulate your MTRRs. Typically the X server should use
+  this. This should have a reasonably generic interface so that
+  similar control registers on other processors can be easily
+  supported.
+
+
+There are two interfaces to /proc/mtrr: one is an ASCII interface
+which allows you to read and write. The other is an ioctl()
+interface. The ASCII interface is meant for administration. The
+ioctl() interface is meant for C programs (i.e. the X server). The
+interfaces are described below, with sample commands and C code.
+
+===============================================================================
+Reading MTRRs from the shell:
+
+% cat /proc/mtrr
+reg00: base=0x00000000 (   0MB), size= 128MB: write-back, count=1
+reg01: base=0x08000000 ( 128MB), size=  64MB: write-back, count=1
+===============================================================================
+Creating MTRRs from the C-shell:
+# echo "base=0xf8000000 size=0x400000 type=write-combining" >! /proc/mtrr
+or if you use bash:
+# echo "base=0xf8000000 size=0x400000 type=write-combining" >| /proc/mtrr
+
+And the result thereof:
+% cat /proc/mtrr
+reg00: base=0x00000000 (   0MB), size= 128MB: write-back, count=1
+reg01: base=0x08000000 ( 128MB), size=  64MB: write-back, count=1
+reg02: base=0xf8000000 (3968MB), size=   4MB: write-combining, count=1
+
+This is for video RAM at base address 0xf8000000 and size 4 megabytes. To
+find out your base address, you need to look at the output of your X
+server, which tells you where the linear framebuffer address is. A
+typical line that you may get is:
+
+(--) S3: PCI: 968 rev 0, Linear FB @ 0xf8000000
+
+Note that you should only use the value from the X server, as it may
+move the framebuffer base address, so the only value you can trust is
+that reported by the X server.
+
+To find out the size of your framebuffer (what, you don't actually
+know?), the following line will tell you:
+
+(--) S3: videoram:  4096k
+
+That's 4 megabytes, which is 0x400000 bytes (in hexadecimal).
+A patch is being written for XFree86 which will make this automatic:
+in other words the X server will manipulate /proc/mtrr using the
+ioctl() interface, so users won't have to do anything. If you use a
+commercial X server, lobby your vendor to add support for MTRRs.
+===============================================================================
+Creating overlapping MTRRs:
+
+%echo "base=0xfb000000 size=0x1000000 type=write-combining" >/proc/mtrr
+%echo "base=0xfb000000 size=0x1000 type=uncachable" >/proc/mtrr
+
+And the results: cat /proc/mtrr
+reg00: base=0x00000000 (   0MB), size=  64MB: write-back, count=1
+reg01: base=0xfb000000 (4016MB), size=  16MB: write-combining, count=1
+reg02: base=0xfb000000 (4016MB), size=   4kB: uncachable, count=1
+
+Some cards (especially Voodoo Graphics boards) need this 4 kB area
+excluded from the beginning of the region because it is used for
+registers.
+
+NOTE: You can only create type=uncachable region, if the first
+region that you created is type=write-combining.
+===============================================================================
+Removing MTRRs from the C-shell:
+% echo "disable=2" >! /proc/mtrr
+or using bash:
+% echo "disable=2" >| /proc/mtrr
+===============================================================================
+Reading MTRRs from a C program using ioctl()'s:
+
+/*  mtrr-show.c
+
+    Source file for mtrr-show (example program to show MTRRs using ioctl()'s)
+
+    Copyright (C) 1997-1998  Richard Gooch
+
+    This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+    it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+    the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+    (at your option) any later version.
+
+    This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+    but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+    MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+    GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+    You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+    along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+    Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
+
+    Richard Gooch may be reached by email at  rgooch@atnf.csiro.au
+    The postal address is:
+      Richard Gooch, c/o ATNF, P. O. Box 76, Epping, N.S.W., 2121, Australia.
+*/
+
+/*
+    This program will use an ioctl() on /proc/mtrr to show the current MTRR
+    settings. This is an alternative to reading /proc/mtrr.
+
+
+    Written by      Richard Gooch   17-DEC-1997
+
+    Last updated by Richard Gooch   2-MAY-1998
+
+
+*/
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <asm/mtrr.h>
+
+#define TRUE 1
+#define FALSE 0
+#define ERRSTRING strerror (errno)
+
+static char *mtrr_strings[MTRR_NUM_TYPES] =
+{
+    "uncachable",               /* 0 */
+    "write-combining",          /* 1 */
+    "?",                        /* 2 */
+    "?",                        /* 3 */
+    "write-through",            /* 4 */
+    "write-protect",            /* 5 */
+    "write-back",               /* 6 */
+};
+
+int main ()
+{
+    int fd;
+    struct mtrr_gentry gentry;
+
+    if ( ( fd = open ("/proc/mtrr", O_RDONLY, 0) ) == -1 )
+    {
+	if (errno == ENOENT)
+	{
+	    fputs ("/proc/mtrr not found: not supported or you don't have a PPro?\n",
+		   stderr);
+	    exit (1);
+	}
+	fprintf (stderr, "Error opening /proc/mtrr\t%s\n", ERRSTRING);
+	exit (2);
+    }
+    for (gentry.regnum = 0; ioctl (fd, MTRRIOC_GET_ENTRY, &gentry) == 0;
+	 ++gentry.regnum)
+    {
+	if (gentry.size < 1)
+	{
+	    fprintf (stderr, "Register: %u disabled\n", gentry.regnum);
+	    continue;
+	}
+	fprintf (stderr, "Register: %u base: 0x%lx size: 0x%lx type: %s\n",
+		 gentry.regnum, gentry.base, gentry.size,
+		 mtrr_strings[gentry.type]);
+    }
+    if (errno == EINVAL) exit (0);
+    fprintf (stderr, "Error doing ioctl(2) on /dev/mtrr\t%s\n", ERRSTRING);
+    exit (3);
+}   /*  End Function main  */
+===============================================================================
+Creating MTRRs from a C programme using ioctl()'s:
+
+/*  mtrr-add.c
+
+    Source file for mtrr-add (example programme to add an MTRRs using ioctl())
+
+    Copyright (C) 1997-1998  Richard Gooch
+
+    This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+    it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+    the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+    (at your option) any later version.
+
+    This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+    but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+    MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+    GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+    You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+    along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+    Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
+
+    Richard Gooch may be reached by email at  rgooch@atnf.csiro.au
+    The postal address is:
+      Richard Gooch, c/o ATNF, P. O. Box 76, Epping, N.S.W., 2121, Australia.
+*/
+
+/*
+    This programme will use an ioctl() on /proc/mtrr to add an entry. The first
+    available mtrr is used. This is an alternative to writing /proc/mtrr.
+
+
+    Written by      Richard Gooch   17-DEC-1997
+
+    Last updated by Richard Gooch   2-MAY-1998
+
+
+*/
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <asm/mtrr.h>
+
+#define TRUE 1
+#define FALSE 0
+#define ERRSTRING strerror (errno)
+
+static char *mtrr_strings[MTRR_NUM_TYPES] =
+{
+    "uncachable",               /* 0 */
+    "write-combining",          /* 1 */
+    "?",                        /* 2 */
+    "?",                        /* 3 */
+    "write-through",            /* 4 */
+    "write-protect",            /* 5 */
+    "write-back",               /* 6 */
+};
+
+int main (int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    int fd;
+    struct mtrr_sentry sentry;
+
+    if (argc != 4)
+    {
+	fprintf (stderr, "Usage:\tmtrr-add base size type\n");
+	exit (1);
+    }
+    sentry.base = strtoul (argv[1], NULL, 0);
+    sentry.size = strtoul (argv[2], NULL, 0);
+    for (sentry.type = 0; sentry.type < MTRR_NUM_TYPES; ++sentry.type)
+    {
+	if (strcmp (argv[3], mtrr_strings[sentry.type]) == 0) break;
+    }
+    if (sentry.type >= MTRR_NUM_TYPES)
+    {
+	fprintf (stderr, "Illegal type: \"%s\"\n", argv[3]);
+	exit (2);
+    }
+    if ( ( fd = open ("/proc/mtrr", O_WRONLY, 0) ) == -1 )
+    {
+	if (errno == ENOENT)
+	{
+	    fputs ("/proc/mtrr not found: not supported or you don't have a PPro?\n",
+		   stderr);
+	    exit (3);
+	}
+	fprintf (stderr, "Error opening /proc/mtrr\t%s\n", ERRSTRING);
+	exit (4);
+    }
+    if (ioctl (fd, MTRRIOC_ADD_ENTRY, &sentry) == -1)
+    {
+	fprintf (stderr, "Error doing ioctl(2) on /dev/mtrr\t%s\n", ERRSTRING);
+	exit (5);
+    }
+    fprintf (stderr, "Sleeping for 5 seconds so you can see the new entry\n");
+    sleep (5);
+    close (fd);
+    fputs ("I've just closed /proc/mtrr so now the new entry should be gone\n",
+	   stderr);
+}   /*  End Function main  */
+===============================================================================
diff --git a/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/orc-unwinder.txt b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/orc-unwinder.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cd4b29b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/orc-unwinder.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+ORC unwinder
+============
+
+Overview
+--------
+
+The kernel CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC option enables the ORC unwinder, which is
+similar in concept to a DWARF unwinder.  The difference is that the
+format of the ORC data is much simpler than DWARF, which in turn allows
+the ORC unwinder to be much simpler and faster.
+
+The ORC data consists of unwind tables which are generated by objtool.
+They contain out-of-band data which is used by the in-kernel ORC
+unwinder.  Objtool generates the ORC data by first doing compile-time
+stack metadata validation (CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION).  After analyzing
+all the code paths of a .o file, it determines information about the
+stack state at each instruction address in the file and outputs that
+information to the .orc_unwind and .orc_unwind_ip sections.
+
+The per-object ORC sections are combined at link time and are sorted and
+post-processed at boot time.  The unwinder uses the resulting data to
+correlate instruction addresses with their stack states at run time.
+
+
+ORC vs frame pointers
+---------------------
+
+With frame pointers enabled, GCC adds instrumentation code to every
+function in the kernel.  The kernel's .text size increases by about
+3.2%, resulting in a broad kernel-wide slowdown.  Measurements by Mel
+Gorman [1] have shown a slowdown of 5-10% for some workloads.
+
+In contrast, the ORC unwinder has no effect on text size or runtime
+performance, because the debuginfo is out of band.  So if you disable
+frame pointers and enable the ORC unwinder, you get a nice performance
+improvement across the board, and still have reliable stack traces.
+
+Ingo Molnar says:
+
+  "Note that it's not just a performance improvement, but also an
+  instruction cache locality improvement: 3.2% .text savings almost
+  directly transform into a similarly sized reduction in cache
+  footprint. That can transform to even higher speedups for workloads
+  whose cache locality is borderline."
+
+Another benefit of ORC compared to frame pointers is that it can
+reliably unwind across interrupts and exceptions.  Frame pointer based
+unwinds can sometimes skip the caller of the interrupted function, if it
+was a leaf function or if the interrupt hit before the frame pointer was
+saved.
+
+The main disadvantage of the ORC unwinder compared to frame pointers is
+that it needs more memory to store the ORC unwind tables: roughly 2-4MB
+depending on the kernel config.
+
+
+ORC vs DWARF
+------------
+
+ORC debuginfo's advantage over DWARF itself is that it's much simpler.
+It gets rid of the complex DWARF CFI state machine and also gets rid of
+the tracking of unnecessary registers.  This allows the unwinder to be
+much simpler, meaning fewer bugs, which is especially important for
+mission critical oops code.
+
+The simpler debuginfo format also enables the unwinder to be much faster
+than DWARF, which is important for perf and lockdep.  In a basic
+performance test by Jiri Slaby [2], the ORC unwinder was about 20x
+faster than an out-of-tree DWARF unwinder.  (Note: That measurement was
+taken before some performance tweaks were added, which doubled
+performance, so the speedup over DWARF may be closer to 40x.)
+
+The ORC data format does have a few downsides compared to DWARF.  ORC
+unwind tables take up ~50% more RAM (+1.3MB on an x86 defconfig kernel)
+than DWARF-based eh_frame tables.
+
+Another potential downside is that, as GCC evolves, it's conceivable
+that the ORC data may end up being *too* simple to describe the state of
+the stack for certain optimizations.  But IMO this is unlikely because
+GCC saves the frame pointer for any unusual stack adjustments it does,
+so I suspect we'll really only ever need to keep track of the stack
+pointer and the frame pointer between call frames.  But even if we do
+end up having to track all the registers DWARF tracks, at least we will
+still be able to control the format, e.g. no complex state machines.
+
+
+ORC unwind table generation
+---------------------------
+
+The ORC data is generated by objtool.  With the existing compile-time
+stack metadata validation feature, objtool already follows all code
+paths, and so it already has all the information it needs to be able to
+generate ORC data from scratch.  So it's an easy step to go from stack
+validation to ORC data generation.
+
+It should be possible to instead generate the ORC data with a simple
+tool which converts DWARF to ORC data.  However, such a solution would
+be incomplete due to the kernel's extensive use of asm, inline asm, and
+special sections like exception tables.
+
+That could be rectified by manually annotating those special code paths
+using GNU assembler .cfi annotations in .S files, and homegrown
+annotations for inline asm in .c files.  But asm annotations were tried
+in the past and were found to be unmaintainable.  They were often
+incorrect/incomplete and made the code harder to read and keep updated.
+And based on looking at glibc code, annotating inline asm in .c files
+might be even worse.
+
+Objtool still needs a few annotations, but only in code which does
+unusual things to the stack like entry code.  And even then, far fewer
+annotations are needed than what DWARF would need, so they're much more
+maintainable than DWARF CFI annotations.
+
+So the advantages of using objtool to generate ORC data are that it
+gives more accurate debuginfo, with very few annotations.  It also
+insulates the kernel from toolchain bugs which can be very painful to
+deal with in the kernel since we often have to workaround issues in
+older versions of the toolchain for years.
+
+The downside is that the unwinder now becomes dependent on objtool's
+ability to reverse engineer GCC code flow.  If GCC optimizations become
+too complicated for objtool to follow, the ORC data generation might
+stop working or become incomplete.  (It's worth noting that livepatch
+already has such a dependency on objtool's ability to follow GCC code
+flow.)
+
+If newer versions of GCC come up with some optimizations which break
+objtool, we may need to revisit the current implementation.  Some
+possible solutions would be asking GCC to make the optimizations more
+palatable, or having objtool use DWARF as an additional input, or
+creating a GCC plugin to assist objtool with its analysis.  But for now,
+objtool follows GCC code quite well.
+
+
+Unwinder implementation details
+-------------------------------
+
+Objtool generates the ORC data by integrating with the compile-time
+stack metadata validation feature, which is described in detail in
+tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.  After analyzing all
+the code paths of a .o file, it creates an array of orc_entry structs,
+and a parallel array of instruction addresses associated with those
+structs, and writes them to the .orc_unwind and .orc_unwind_ip sections
+respectively.
+
+The ORC data is split into the two arrays for performance reasons, to
+make the searchable part of the data (.orc_unwind_ip) more compact.  The
+arrays are sorted in parallel at boot time.
+
+Performance is further improved by the use of a fast lookup table which
+is created at runtime.  The fast lookup table associates a given address
+with a range of indices for the .orc_unwind table, so that only a small
+subset of the table needs to be searched.
+
+
+Etymology
+---------
+
+Orcs, fearsome creatures of medieval folklore, are the Dwarves' natural
+enemies.  Similarly, the ORC unwinder was created in opposition to the
+complexity and slowness of DWARF.
+
+"Although Orcs rarely consider multiple solutions to a problem, they do
+excel at getting things done because they are creatures of action, not
+thought." [3]  Similarly, unlike the esoteric DWARF unwinder, the
+veracious ORC unwinder wastes no time or siloconic effort decoding
+variable-length zero-extended unsigned-integer byte-coded
+state-machine-based debug information entries.
+
+Similar to how Orcs frequently unravel the well-intentioned plans of
+their adversaries, the ORC unwinder frequently unravels stacks with
+brutal, unyielding efficiency.
+
+ORC stands for Oops Rewind Capability.
+
+
+[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170602104048.jkkzssljsompjdwy@suse.de
+[2] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/d2ca5435-6386-29b8-db87-7f227c2b713a@suse.cz
+[3] http://dustin.wikidot.com/half-orcs-and-orcs
diff --git a/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/pat.txt b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/pat.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2a4ee63
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/pat.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
+
+PAT (Page Attribute Table)
+
+x86 Page Attribute Table (PAT) allows for setting the memory attribute at the
+page level granularity. PAT is complementary to the MTRR settings which allows
+for setting of memory types over physical address ranges. However, PAT is
+more flexible than MTRR due to its capability to set attributes at page level
+and also due to the fact that there are no hardware limitations on number of
+such attribute settings allowed. Added flexibility comes with guidelines for
+not having memory type aliasing for the same physical memory with multiple
+virtual addresses.
+
+PAT allows for different types of memory attributes. The most commonly used
+ones that will be supported at this time are Write-back, Uncached,
+Write-combined, Write-through and Uncached Minus.
+
+
+PAT APIs
+--------
+
+There are many different APIs in the kernel that allows setting of memory
+attributes at the page level. In order to avoid aliasing, these interfaces
+should be used thoughtfully. Below is a table of interfaces available,
+their intended usage and their memory attribute relationships. Internally,
+these APIs use a reserve_memtype()/free_memtype() interface on the physical
+address range to avoid any aliasing.
+
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+API                    |    RAM   |  ACPI,...  |  Reserved/Holes  |
+-----------------------|----------|------------|------------------|
+                       |          |            |                  |
+ioremap                |    --    |    UC-     |       UC-        |
+                       |          |            |                  |
+ioremap_cache          |    --    |    WB      |       WB         |
+                       |          |            |                  |
+ioremap_uc             |    --    |    UC      |       UC         |
+                       |          |            |                  |
+ioremap_nocache        |    --    |    UC-     |       UC-        |
+                       |          |            |                  |
+ioremap_wc             |    --    |    --      |       WC         |
+                       |          |            |                  |
+ioremap_wt             |    --    |    --      |       WT         |
+                       |          |            |                  |
+set_memory_uc          |    UC-   |    --      |       --         |
+ set_memory_wb         |          |            |                  |
+                       |          |            |                  |
+set_memory_wc          |    WC    |    --      |       --         |
+ set_memory_wb         |          |            |                  |
+                       |          |            |                  |
+set_memory_wt          |    WT    |    --      |       --         |
+ set_memory_wb         |          |            |                  |
+                       |          |            |                  |
+pci sysfs resource     |    --    |    --      |       UC-        |
+                       |          |            |                  |
+pci sysfs resource_wc  |    --    |    --      |       WC         |
+ is IORESOURCE_PREFETCH|          |            |                  |
+                       |          |            |                  |
+pci proc               |    --    |    --      |       UC-        |
+ !PCIIOC_WRITE_COMBINE |          |            |                  |
+                       |          |            |                  |
+pci proc               |    --    |    --      |       WC         |
+ PCIIOC_WRITE_COMBINE  |          |            |                  |
+                       |          |            |                  |
+/dev/mem               |    --    |  WB/WC/UC- |    WB/WC/UC-     |
+ read-write            |          |            |                  |
+                       |          |            |                  |
+/dev/mem               |    --    |    UC-     |       UC-        |
+ mmap SYNC flag        |          |            |                  |
+                       |          |            |                  |
+/dev/mem               |    --    |  WB/WC/UC- |    WB/WC/UC-     |
+ mmap !SYNC flag       |          |(from exist-|  (from exist-    |
+ and                   |          |  ing alias)|    ing alias)    |
+ any alias to this area|          |            |                  |
+                       |          |            |                  |
+/dev/mem               |    --    |    WB      |       WB         |
+ mmap !SYNC flag       |          |            |                  |
+ no alias to this area |          |            |                  |
+ and                   |          |            |                  |
+ MTRR says WB          |          |            |                  |
+                       |          |            |                  |
+/dev/mem               |    --    |    --      |       UC-        |
+ mmap !SYNC flag       |          |            |                  |
+ no alias to this area |          |            |                  |
+ and                   |          |            |                  |
+ MTRR says !WB         |          |            |                  |
+                       |          |            |                  |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+Advanced APIs for drivers
+-------------------------
+A. Exporting pages to users with remap_pfn_range, io_remap_pfn_range,
+vm_insert_pfn
+
+Drivers wanting to export some pages to userspace do it by using mmap
+interface and a combination of
+1) pgprot_noncached()
+2) io_remap_pfn_range() or remap_pfn_range() or vm_insert_pfn()
+
+With PAT support, a new API pgprot_writecombine is being added. So, drivers can
+continue to use the above sequence, with either pgprot_noncached() or
+pgprot_writecombine() in step 1, followed by step 2.
+
+In addition, step 2 internally tracks the region as UC or WC in memtype
+list in order to ensure no conflicting mapping.
+
+Note that this set of APIs only works with IO (non RAM) regions. If driver
+wants to export a RAM region, it has to do set_memory_uc() or set_memory_wc()
+as step 0 above and also track the usage of those pages and use set_memory_wb()
+before the page is freed to free pool.
+
+MTRR effects on PAT / non-PAT systems
+-------------------------------------
+
+The following table provides the effects of using write-combining MTRRs when
+using ioremap*() calls on x86 for both non-PAT and PAT systems. Ideally
+mtrr_add() usage will be phased out in favor of arch_phys_wc_add() which will
+be a no-op on PAT enabled systems. The region over which a arch_phys_wc_add()
+is made, should already have been ioremapped with WC attributes or PAT entries,
+this can be done by using ioremap_wc() / set_memory_wc().  Devices which
+combine areas of IO memory desired to remain uncacheable with areas where
+write-combining is desirable should consider use of ioremap_uc() followed by
+set_memory_wc() to white-list effective write-combined areas.  Such use is
+nevertheless discouraged as the effective memory type is considered
+implementation defined, yet this strategy can be used as last resort on devices
+with size-constrained regions where otherwise MTRR write-combining would
+otherwise not be effective.
+
+----------------------------------------------------------------------
+MTRR Non-PAT   PAT    Linux ioremap value        Effective memory type
+----------------------------------------------------------------------
+                                                  Non-PAT |  PAT
+     PAT
+     |PCD
+     ||PWT
+     |||
+WC   000      WB      _PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WB            WC   |   WC
+WC   001      WC      _PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WC            WC*  |   WC
+WC   010      UC-     _PAGE_CACHE_MODE_UC_MINUS      WC*  |   UC
+WC   011      UC      _PAGE_CACHE_MODE_UC            UC   |   UC
+----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+(*) denotes implementation defined and is discouraged
+
+Notes:
+
+-- in the above table mean "Not suggested usage for the API". Some of the --'s
+are strictly enforced by the kernel. Some others are not really enforced
+today, but may be enforced in future.
+
+For ioremap and pci access through /sys or /proc - The actual type returned
+can be more restrictive, in case of any existing aliasing for that address.
+For example: If there is an existing uncached mapping, a new ioremap_wc can
+return uncached mapping in place of write-combine requested.
+
+set_memory_[uc|wc|wt] and set_memory_wb should be used in pairs, where driver
+will first make a region uc, wc or wt and switch it back to wb after use.
+
+Over time writes to /proc/mtrr will be deprecated in favor of using PAT based
+interfaces. Users writing to /proc/mtrr are suggested to use above interfaces.
+
+Drivers should use ioremap_[uc|wc] to access PCI BARs with [uc|wc] access
+types.
+
+Drivers should use set_memory_[uc|wc|wt] to set access type for RAM ranges.
+
+
+PAT debugging
+-------------
+
+With CONFIG_DEBUG_FS enabled, PAT memtype list can be examined by
+
+# mount -t debugfs debugfs /sys/kernel/debug
+# cat /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pat_memtype_list
+PAT memtype list:
+uncached-minus @ 0x7fadf000-0x7fae0000
+uncached-minus @ 0x7fb19000-0x7fb1a000
+uncached-minus @ 0x7fb1a000-0x7fb1b000
+uncached-minus @ 0x7fb1b000-0x7fb1c000
+uncached-minus @ 0x7fb1c000-0x7fb1d000
+uncached-minus @ 0x7fb1d000-0x7fb1e000
+uncached-minus @ 0x7fb1e000-0x7fb25000
+uncached-minus @ 0x7fb25000-0x7fb26000
+uncached-minus @ 0x7fb26000-0x7fb27000
+uncached-minus @ 0x7fb27000-0x7fb28000
+uncached-minus @ 0x7fb28000-0x7fb2e000
+uncached-minus @ 0x7fb2e000-0x7fb2f000
+uncached-minus @ 0x7fb2f000-0x7fb30000
+uncached-minus @ 0x7fb31000-0x7fb32000
+uncached-minus @ 0x80000000-0x90000000
+
+This list shows physical address ranges and various PAT settings used to
+access those physical address ranges.
+
+Another, more verbose way of getting PAT related debug messages is with
+"debugpat" boot parameter. With this parameter, various debug messages are
+printed to dmesg log.
+
+PAT Initialization
+------------------
+
+The following table describes how PAT is initialized under various
+configurations. The PAT MSR must be updated by Linux in order to support WC
+and WT attributes. Otherwise, the PAT MSR has the value programmed in it
+by the firmware. Note, Xen enables WC attribute in the PAT MSR for guests.
+
+ MTRR PAT   Call Sequence               PAT State  PAT MSR
+ =========================================================
+ E    E     MTRR -> PAT init            Enabled    OS
+ E    D     MTRR -> PAT init            Disabled    -
+ D    E     MTRR -> PAT disable         Disabled   BIOS
+ D    D     MTRR -> PAT disable         Disabled    -
+ -    np/E  PAT  -> PAT disable         Disabled   BIOS
+ -    np/D  PAT  -> PAT disable         Disabled    -
+ E    !P/E  MTRR -> PAT init            Disabled   BIOS
+ D    !P/E  MTRR -> PAT disable         Disabled   BIOS
+ !M   !P/E  MTRR stub -> PAT disable    Disabled   BIOS
+
+ Legend
+ ------------------------------------------------
+ E         Feature enabled in CPU
+ D	   Feature disabled/unsupported in CPU
+ np	   "nopat" boot option specified
+ !P	   CONFIG_X86_PAT option unset
+ !M	   CONFIG_MTRR option unset
+ Enabled   PAT state set to enabled
+ Disabled  PAT state set to disabled
+ OS        PAT initializes PAT MSR with OS setting
+ BIOS      PAT keeps PAT MSR with BIOS setting
+
diff --git a/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fa46dcb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+Memory Protection Keys for Userspace (PKU aka PKEYs) is a CPU feature
+which will be found on future Intel CPUs.
+
+Memory Protection Keys provides a mechanism for enforcing page-based
+protections, but without requiring modification of the page tables
+when an application changes protection domains.  It works by
+dedicating 4 previously ignored bits in each page table entry to a
+"protection key", giving 16 possible keys.
+
+There is also a new user-accessible register (PKRU) with two separate
+bits (Access Disable and Write Disable) for each key.  Being a CPU
+register, PKRU is inherently thread-local, potentially giving each
+thread a different set of protections from every other thread.
+
+There are two new instructions (RDPKRU/WRPKRU) for reading and writing
+to the new register.  The feature is only available in 64-bit mode,
+even though there is theoretically space in the PAE PTEs.  These
+permissions are enforced on data access only and have no effect on
+instruction fetches.
+
+=========================== Syscalls ===========================
+
+There are 3 system calls which directly interact with pkeys:
+
+	int pkey_alloc(unsigned long flags, unsigned long init_access_rights)
+	int pkey_free(int pkey);
+	int pkey_mprotect(unsigned long start, size_t len,
+			  unsigned long prot, int pkey);
+
+Before a pkey can be used, it must first be allocated with
+pkey_alloc().  An application calls the WRPKRU instruction
+directly in order to change access permissions to memory covered
+with a key.  In this example WRPKRU is wrapped by a C function
+called pkey_set().
+
+	int real_prot = PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE;
+	pkey = pkey_alloc(0, PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
+	ptr = mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE, MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
+	ret = pkey_mprotect(ptr, PAGE_SIZE, real_prot, pkey);
+	... application runs here
+
+Now, if the application needs to update the data at 'ptr', it can
+gain access, do the update, then remove its write access:
+
+	pkey_set(pkey, 0); // clear PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE
+	*ptr = foo; // assign something
+	pkey_set(pkey, PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE); // set PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE again
+
+Now when it frees the memory, it will also free the pkey since it
+is no longer in use:
+
+	munmap(ptr, PAGE_SIZE);
+	pkey_free(pkey);
+
+(Note: pkey_set() is a wrapper for the RDPKRU and WRPKRU instructions.
+ An example implementation can be found in
+ tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c)
+
+=========================== Behavior ===========================
+
+The kernel attempts to make protection keys consistent with the
+behavior of a plain mprotect().  For instance if you do this:
+
+	mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_NONE);
+	something(ptr);
+
+you can expect the same effects with protection keys when doing this:
+
+	pkey = pkey_alloc(0, PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE | PKEY_DISABLE_READ);
+	pkey_mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, pkey);
+	something(ptr);
+
+That should be true whether something() is a direct access to 'ptr'
+like:
+
+	*ptr = foo;
+
+or when the kernel does the access on the application's behalf like
+with a read():
+
+	read(fd, ptr, 1);
+
+The kernel will send a SIGSEGV in both cases, but si_code will be set
+to SEGV_PKERR when violating protection keys versus SEGV_ACCERR when
+the plain mprotect() permissions are violated.
diff --git a/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/pti.txt b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/pti.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5cd5843
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/pti.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+Overview
+========
+
+Page Table Isolation (pti, previously known as KAISER[1]) is a
+countermeasure against attacks on the shared user/kernel address
+space such as the "Meltdown" approach[2].
+
+To mitigate this class of attacks, we create an independent set of
+page tables for use only when running userspace applications.  When
+the kernel is entered via syscalls, interrupts or exceptions, the
+page tables are switched to the full "kernel" copy.  When the system
+switches back to user mode, the user copy is used again.
+
+The userspace page tables contain only a minimal amount of kernel
+data: only what is needed to enter/exit the kernel such as the
+entry/exit functions themselves and the interrupt descriptor table
+(IDT).  There are a few strictly unnecessary things that get mapped
+such as the first C function when entering an interrupt (see
+comments in pti.c).
+
+This approach helps to ensure that side-channel attacks leveraging
+the paging structures do not function when PTI is enabled.  It can be
+enabled by setting CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y at compile time.
+Once enabled at compile-time, it can be disabled at boot with the
+'nopti' or 'pti=' kernel parameters (see kernel-parameters.txt).
+
+Page Table Management
+=====================
+
+When PTI is enabled, the kernel manages two sets of page tables.
+The first set is very similar to the single set which is present in
+kernels without PTI.  This includes a complete mapping of userspace
+that the kernel can use for things like copy_to_user().
+
+Although _complete_, the user portion of the kernel page tables is
+crippled by setting the NX bit in the top level.  This ensures
+that any missed kernel->user CR3 switch will immediately crash
+userspace upon executing its first instruction.
+
+The userspace page tables map only the kernel data needed to enter
+and exit the kernel.  This data is entirely contained in the 'struct
+cpu_entry_area' structure which is placed in the fixmap which gives
+each CPU's copy of the area a compile-time-fixed virtual address.
+
+For new userspace mappings, the kernel makes the entries in its
+page tables like normal.  The only difference is when the kernel
+makes entries in the top (PGD) level.  In addition to setting the
+entry in the main kernel PGD, a copy of the entry is made in the
+userspace page tables' PGD.
+
+This sharing at the PGD level also inherently shares all the lower
+layers of the page tables.  This leaves a single, shared set of
+userspace page tables to manage.  One PTE to lock, one set of
+accessed bits, dirty bits, etc...
+
+Overhead
+========
+
+Protection against side-channel attacks is important.  But,
+this protection comes at a cost:
+
+1. Increased Memory Use
+  a. Each process now needs an order-1 PGD instead of order-0.
+     (Consumes an additional 4k per process).
+  b. The 'cpu_entry_area' structure must be 2MB in size and 2MB
+     aligned so that it can be mapped by setting a single PMD
+     entry.  This consumes nearly 2MB of RAM once the kernel
+     is decompressed, but no space in the kernel image itself.
+
+2. Runtime Cost
+  a. CR3 manipulation to switch between the page table copies
+     must be done at interrupt, syscall, and exception entry
+     and exit (it can be skipped when the kernel is interrupted,
+     though.)  Moves to CR3 are on the order of a hundred
+     cycles, and are required at every entry and exit.
+  b. A "trampoline" must be used for SYSCALL entry.  This
+     trampoline depends on a smaller set of resources than the
+     non-PTI SYSCALL entry code, so requires mapping fewer
+     things into the userspace page tables.  The downside is
+     that stacks must be switched at entry time.
+  c. Global pages are disabled for all kernel structures not
+     mapped into both kernel and userspace page tables.  This
+     feature of the MMU allows different processes to share TLB
+     entries mapping the kernel.  Losing the feature means more
+     TLB misses after a context switch.  The actual loss of
+     performance is very small, however, never exceeding 1%.
+  d. Process Context IDentifiers (PCID) is a CPU feature that
+     allows us to skip flushing the entire TLB when switching page
+     tables by setting a special bit in CR3 when the page tables
+     are changed.  This makes switching the page tables (at context
+     switch, or kernel entry/exit) cheaper.  But, on systems with
+     PCID support, the context switch code must flush both the user
+     and kernel entries out of the TLB.  The user PCID TLB flush is
+     deferred until the exit to userspace, minimizing the cost.
+     See intel.com/sdm for the gory PCID/INVPCID details.
+  e. The userspace page tables must be populated for each new
+     process.  Even without PTI, the shared kernel mappings
+     are created by copying top-level (PGD) entries into each
+     new process.  But, with PTI, there are now *two* kernel
+     mappings: one in the kernel page tables that maps everything
+     and one for the entry/exit structures.  At fork(), we need to
+     copy both.
+  f. In addition to the fork()-time copying, there must also
+     be an update to the userspace PGD any time a set_pgd() is done
+     on a PGD used to map userspace.  This ensures that the kernel
+     and userspace copies always map the same userspace
+     memory.
+  g. On systems without PCID support, each CR3 write flushes
+     the entire TLB.  That means that each syscall, interrupt
+     or exception flushes the TLB.
+  h. INVPCID is a TLB-flushing instruction which allows flushing
+     of TLB entries for non-current PCIDs.  Some systems support
+     PCIDs, but do not support INVPCID.  On these systems, addresses
+     can only be flushed from the TLB for the current PCID.  When
+     flushing a kernel address, we need to flush all PCIDs, so a
+     single kernel address flush will require a TLB-flushing CR3
+     write upon the next use of every PCID.
+
+Possible Future Work
+====================
+1. We can be more careful about not actually writing to CR3
+   unless its value is actually changed.
+2. Allow PTI to be enabled/disabled at runtime in addition to the
+   boot-time switching.
+
+Testing
+========
+
+To test stability of PTI, the following test procedure is recommended,
+ideally doing all of these in parallel:
+
+1. Set CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY=y
+2. Run several copies of all of the tools/testing/selftests/x86/ tests
+   (excluding MPX and protection_keys) in a loop on multiple CPUs for
+   several minutes.  These tests frequently uncover corner cases in the
+   kernel entry code.  In general, old kernels might cause these tests
+   themselves to crash, but they should never crash the kernel.
+3. Run the 'perf' tool in a mode (top or record) that generates many
+   frequent performance monitoring non-maskable interrupts (see "NMI"
+   in /proc/interrupts).  This exercises the NMI entry/exit code which
+   is known to trigger bugs in code paths that did not expect to be
+   interrupted, including nested NMIs.  Using "-c" boosts the rate of
+   NMIs, and using two -c with separate counters encourages nested NMIs
+   and less deterministic behavior.
+
+	while true; do perf record -c 10000 -e instructions,cycles -a sleep 10; done
+
+4. Launch a KVM virtual machine.
+5. Run 32-bit binaries on systems supporting the SYSCALL instruction.
+   This has been a lightly-tested code path and needs extra scrutiny.
+
+Debugging
+=========
+
+Bugs in PTI cause a few different signatures of crashes
+that are worth noting here.
+
+ * Failures of the selftests/x86 code.  Usually a bug in one of the
+   more obscure corners of entry_64.S
+ * Crashes in early boot, especially around CPU bringup.  Bugs
+   in the trampoline code or mappings cause these.
+ * Crashes at the first interrupt.  Caused by bugs in entry_64.S,
+   like screwing up a page table switch.  Also caused by
+   incorrectly mapping the IRQ handler entry code.
+ * Crashes at the first NMI.  The NMI code is separate from main
+   interrupt handlers and can have bugs that do not affect
+   normal interrupts.  Also caused by incorrectly mapping NMI
+   code.  NMIs that interrupt the entry code must be very
+   careful and can be the cause of crashes that show up when
+   running perf.
+ * Kernel crashes at the first exit to userspace.  entry_64.S
+   bugs, or failing to map some of the exit code.
+ * Crashes at first interrupt that interrupts userspace. The paths
+   in entry_64.S that return to userspace are sometimes separate
+   from the ones that return to the kernel.
+ * Double faults: overflowing the kernel stack because of page
+   faults upon page faults.  Caused by touching non-pti-mapped
+   data in the entry code, or forgetting to switch to kernel
+   CR3 before calling into C functions which are not pti-mapped.
+ * Userspace segfaults early in boot, sometimes manifesting
+   as mount(8) failing to mount the rootfs.  These have
+   tended to be TLB invalidation issues.  Usually invalidating
+   the wrong PCID, or otherwise missing an invalidation.
+
+1. https://gruss.cc/files/kaiser.pdf
+2. https://meltdownattack.com/meltdown.pdf
diff --git a/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/tlb.txt b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/tlb.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6a0607b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/tlb.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+When the kernel unmaps or modified the attributes of a range of
+memory, it has two choices:
+ 1. Flush the entire TLB with a two-instruction sequence.  This is
+    a quick operation, but it causes collateral damage: TLB entries
+    from areas other than the one we are trying to flush will be
+    destroyed and must be refilled later, at some cost.
+ 2. Use the invlpg instruction to invalidate a single page at a
+    time.  This could potentially cost many more instructions, but
+    it is a much more precise operation, causing no collateral
+    damage to other TLB entries.
+
+Which method to do depends on a few things:
+ 1. The size of the flush being performed.  A flush of the entire
+    address space is obviously better performed by flushing the
+    entire TLB than doing 2^48/PAGE_SIZE individual flushes.
+ 2. The contents of the TLB.  If the TLB is empty, then there will
+    be no collateral damage caused by doing the global flush, and
+    all of the individual flush will have ended up being wasted
+    work.
+ 3. The size of the TLB.  The larger the TLB, the more collateral
+    damage we do with a full flush.  So, the larger the TLB, the
+    more attractive an individual flush looks.  Data and
+    instructions have separate TLBs, as do different page sizes.
+ 4. The microarchitecture.  The TLB has become a multi-level
+    cache on modern CPUs, and the global flushes have become more
+    expensive relative to single-page flushes.
+
+There is obviously no way the kernel can know all these things,
+especially the contents of the TLB during a given flush.  The
+sizes of the flush will vary greatly depending on the workload as
+well.  There is essentially no "right" point to choose.
+
+You may be doing too many individual invalidations if you see the
+invlpg instruction (or instructions _near_ it) show up high in
+profiles.  If you believe that individual invalidations being
+called too often, you can lower the tunable:
+
+	/sys/kernel/debug/x86/tlb_single_page_flush_ceiling
+
+This will cause us to do the global flush for more cases.
+Lowering it to 0 will disable the use of the individual flushes.
+Setting it to 1 is a very conservative setting and it should
+never need to be 0 under normal circumstances.
+
+Despite the fact that a single individual flush on x86 is
+guaranteed to flush a full 2MB [1], hugetlbfs always uses the full
+flushes.  THP is treated exactly the same as normal memory.
+
+You might see invlpg inside of flush_tlb_mm_range() show up in
+profiles, or you can use the trace_tlb_flush() tracepoints. to
+determine how long the flush operations are taking.
+
+Essentially, you are balancing the cycles you spend doing invlpg
+with the cycles that you spend refilling the TLB later.
+
+You can measure how expensive TLB refills are by using
+performance counters and 'perf stat', like this:
+
+perf stat -e
+	cpu/event=0x8,umask=0x84,name=dtlb_load_misses_walk_duration/,
+	cpu/event=0x8,umask=0x82,name=dtlb_load_misses_walk_completed/,
+	cpu/event=0x49,umask=0x4,name=dtlb_store_misses_walk_duration/,
+	cpu/event=0x49,umask=0x2,name=dtlb_store_misses_walk_completed/,
+	cpu/event=0x85,umask=0x4,name=itlb_misses_walk_duration/,
+	cpu/event=0x85,umask=0x2,name=itlb_misses_walk_completed/
+
+That works on an IvyBridge-era CPU (i5-3320M).  Different CPUs
+may have differently-named counters, but they should at least
+be there in some form.  You can use pmu-tools 'ocperf list'
+(https://github.com/andikleen/pmu-tools) to find the right
+counters for a given CPU.
+
+1. A footnote in Intel's SDM "4.10.4.2 Recommended Invalidation"
+   says: "One execution of INVLPG is sufficient even for a page
+   with size greater than 4 KBytes."
diff --git a/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/topology.txt b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/topology.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f3e9d7e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/topology.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
+x86 Topology
+============
+
+This documents and clarifies the main aspects of x86 topology modelling and
+representation in the kernel. Update/change when doing changes to the
+respective code.
+
+The architecture-agnostic topology definitions are in
+Documentation/cputopology.txt. This file holds x86-specific
+differences/specialities which must not necessarily apply to the generic
+definitions. Thus, the way to read up on Linux topology on x86 is to start
+with the generic one and look at this one in parallel for the x86 specifics.
+
+Needless to say, code should use the generic functions - this file is *only*
+here to *document* the inner workings of x86 topology.
+
+Started by Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> and Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>.
+
+The main aim of the topology facilities is to present adequate interfaces to
+code which needs to know/query/use the structure of the running system wrt
+threads, cores, packages, etc.
+
+The kernel does not care about the concept of physical sockets because a
+socket has no relevance to software. It's an electromechanical component. In
+the past a socket always contained a single package (see below), but with the
+advent of Multi Chip Modules (MCM) a socket can hold more than one package. So
+there might be still references to sockets in the code, but they are of
+historical nature and should be cleaned up.
+
+The topology of a system is described in the units of:
+
+    - packages
+    - cores
+    - threads
+
+* Package:
+
+  Packages contain a number of cores plus shared resources, e.g. DRAM
+  controller, shared caches etc.
+
+  AMD nomenclature for package is 'Node'.
+
+  Package-related topology information in the kernel:
+
+  - cpuinfo_x86.x86_max_cores:
+
+    The number of cores in a package. This information is retrieved via CPUID.
+
+  - cpuinfo_x86.phys_proc_id:
+
+    The physical ID of the package. This information is retrieved via CPUID
+    and deduced from the APIC IDs of the cores in the package.
+
+  - cpuinfo_x86.logical_id:
+
+    The logical ID of the package. As we do not trust BIOSes to enumerate the
+    packages in a consistent way, we introduced the concept of logical package
+    ID so we can sanely calculate the number of maximum possible packages in
+    the system and have the packages enumerated linearly.
+
+  - topology_max_packages():
+
+    The maximum possible number of packages in the system. Helpful for per
+    package facilities to preallocate per package information.
+
+  - cpu_llc_id:
+
+    A per-CPU variable containing:
+    - On Intel, the first APIC ID of the list of CPUs sharing the Last Level
+    Cache
+
+    - On AMD, the Node ID or Core Complex ID containing the Last Level
+    Cache. In general, it is a number identifying an LLC uniquely on the
+    system.
+
+* Cores:
+
+  A core consists of 1 or more threads. It does not matter whether the threads
+  are SMT- or CMT-type threads.
+
+  AMDs nomenclature for a CMT core is "Compute Unit". The kernel always uses
+  "core".
+
+  Core-related topology information in the kernel:
+
+  - smp_num_siblings:
+
+    The number of threads in a core. The number of threads in a package can be
+    calculated by:
+
+	threads_per_package = cpuinfo_x86.x86_max_cores * smp_num_siblings
+
+
+* Threads:
+
+  A thread is a single scheduling unit. It's the equivalent to a logical Linux
+  CPU.
+
+  AMDs nomenclature for CMT threads is "Compute Unit Core". The kernel always
+  uses "thread".
+
+  Thread-related topology information in the kernel:
+
+  - topology_core_cpumask():
+
+    The cpumask contains all online threads in the package to which a thread
+    belongs.
+
+    The number of online threads is also printed in /proc/cpuinfo "siblings."
+
+  - topology_sibling_mask():
+
+    The cpumask contains all online threads in the core to which a thread
+    belongs.
+
+   - topology_logical_package_id():
+
+    The logical package ID to which a thread belongs.
+
+   - topology_physical_package_id():
+
+    The physical package ID to which a thread belongs.
+
+   - topology_core_id();
+
+    The ID of the core to which a thread belongs. It is also printed in /proc/cpuinfo
+    "core_id."
+
+
+
+System topology examples
+
+Note:
+
+The alternative Linux CPU enumeration depends on how the BIOS enumerates the
+threads. Many BIOSes enumerate all threads 0 first and then all threads 1.
+That has the "advantage" that the logical Linux CPU numbers of threads 0 stay
+the same whether threads are enabled or not. That's merely an implementation
+detail and has no practical impact.
+
+1) Single Package, Single Core
+
+   [package 0] -> [core 0] -> [thread 0] -> Linux CPU 0
+
+2) Single Package, Dual Core
+
+   a) One thread per core
+
+	[package 0] -> [core 0] -> [thread 0] -> Linux CPU 0
+		    -> [core 1] -> [thread 0] -> Linux CPU 1
+
+   b) Two threads per core
+
+	[package 0] -> [core 0] -> [thread 0] -> Linux CPU 0
+				-> [thread 1] -> Linux CPU 1
+		    -> [core 1] -> [thread 0] -> Linux CPU 2
+				-> [thread 1] -> Linux CPU 3
+
+      Alternative enumeration:
+
+	[package 0] -> [core 0] -> [thread 0] -> Linux CPU 0
+				-> [thread 1] -> Linux CPU 2
+		    -> [core 1] -> [thread 0] -> Linux CPU 1
+				-> [thread 1] -> Linux CPU 3
+
+      AMD nomenclature for CMT systems:
+
+	[node 0] -> [Compute Unit 0] -> [Compute Unit Core 0] -> Linux CPU 0
+				     -> [Compute Unit Core 1] -> Linux CPU 1
+		 -> [Compute Unit 1] -> [Compute Unit Core 0] -> Linux CPU 2
+				     -> [Compute Unit Core 1] -> Linux CPU 3
+
+4) Dual Package, Dual Core
+
+   a) One thread per core
+
+	[package 0] -> [core 0] -> [thread 0] -> Linux CPU 0
+		    -> [core 1] -> [thread 0] -> Linux CPU 1
+
+	[package 1] -> [core 0] -> [thread 0] -> Linux CPU 2
+		    -> [core 1] -> [thread 0] -> Linux CPU 3
+
+   b) Two threads per core
+
+	[package 0] -> [core 0] -> [thread 0] -> Linux CPU 0
+				-> [thread 1] -> Linux CPU 1
+		    -> [core 1] -> [thread 0] -> Linux CPU 2
+				-> [thread 1] -> Linux CPU 3
+
+	[package 1] -> [core 0] -> [thread 0] -> Linux CPU 4
+				-> [thread 1] -> Linux CPU 5
+		    -> [core 1] -> [thread 0] -> Linux CPU 6
+				-> [thread 1] -> Linux CPU 7
+
+      Alternative enumeration:
+
+	[package 0] -> [core 0] -> [thread 0] -> Linux CPU 0
+				-> [thread 1] -> Linux CPU 4
+		    -> [core 1] -> [thread 0] -> Linux CPU 1
+				-> [thread 1] -> Linux CPU 5
+
+	[package 1] -> [core 0] -> [thread 0] -> Linux CPU 2
+				-> [thread 1] -> Linux CPU 6
+		    -> [core 1] -> [thread 0] -> Linux CPU 3
+				-> [thread 1] -> Linux CPU 7
+
+      AMD nomenclature for CMT systems:
+
+	[node 0] -> [Compute Unit 0] -> [Compute Unit Core 0] -> Linux CPU 0
+				     -> [Compute Unit Core 1] -> Linux CPU 1
+		 -> [Compute Unit 1] -> [Compute Unit Core 0] -> Linux CPU 2
+				     -> [Compute Unit Core 1] -> Linux CPU 3
+
+	[node 1] -> [Compute Unit 0] -> [Compute Unit Core 0] -> Linux CPU 4
+				     -> [Compute Unit Core 1] -> Linux CPU 5
+		 -> [Compute Unit 1] -> [Compute Unit Core 0] -> Linux CPU 6
+				     -> [Compute Unit Core 1] -> Linux CPU 7
diff --git a/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/tsx_async_abort.rst b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/tsx_async_abort.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..583ddc1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/tsx_async_abort.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+TSX Async Abort (TAA) mitigation
+================================
+
+.. _tsx_async_abort:
+
+Overview
+--------
+
+TSX Async Abort (TAA) is a side channel attack on internal buffers in some
+Intel processors similar to Microachitectural Data Sampling (MDS).  In this
+case certain loads may speculatively pass invalid data to dependent operations
+when an asynchronous abort condition is pending in a Transactional
+Synchronization Extensions (TSX) transaction.  This includes loads with no
+fault or assist condition. Such loads may speculatively expose stale data from
+the same uarch data structures as in MDS, with same scope of exposure i.e.
+same-thread and cross-thread. This issue affects all current processors that
+support TSX.
+
+Mitigation strategy
+-------------------
+
+a) TSX disable - one of the mitigations is to disable TSX. A new MSR
+IA32_TSX_CTRL will be available in future and current processors after
+microcode update which can be used to disable TSX. In addition, it
+controls the enumeration of the TSX feature bits (RTM and HLE) in CPUID.
+
+b) Clear CPU buffers - similar to MDS, clearing the CPU buffers mitigates this
+vulnerability. More details on this approach can be found in
+:ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst <mds>`.
+
+Kernel internal mitigation modes
+--------------------------------
+
+ =============    ============================================================
+ off              Mitigation is disabled. Either the CPU is not affected or
+                  tsx_async_abort=off is supplied on the kernel command line.
+
+ tsx disabled     Mitigation is enabled. TSX feature is disabled by default at
+                  bootup on processors that support TSX control.
+
+ verw             Mitigation is enabled. CPU is affected and MD_CLEAR is
+                  advertised in CPUID.
+
+ ucode needed     Mitigation is enabled. CPU is affected and MD_CLEAR is not
+                  advertised in CPUID. That is mainly for virtualization
+                  scenarios where the host has the updated microcode but the
+                  hypervisor does not expose MD_CLEAR in CPUID. It's a best
+                  effort approach without guarantee.
+ =============    ============================================================
+
+If the CPU is affected and the "tsx_async_abort" kernel command line parameter is
+not provided then the kernel selects an appropriate mitigation depending on the
+status of RTM and MD_CLEAR CPUID bits.
+
+Below tables indicate the impact of tsx=on|off|auto cmdline options on state of
+TAA mitigation, VERW behavior and TSX feature for various combinations of
+MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES bits.
+
+1. "tsx=off"
+
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES bits     Result with cmdline tsx=off
+----------------------------------  -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+TAA_NO     MDS_NO     TSX_CTRL_MSR  TSX state     VERW can clear  TAA mitigation       TAA mitigation
+                                    after bootup  CPU buffers     tsx_async_abort=off  tsx_async_abort=full
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+    0          0           0         HW default         Yes           Same as MDS           Same as MDS
+    0          0           1        Invalid case   Invalid case       Invalid case          Invalid case
+    0          1           0         HW default         No         Need ucode update     Need ucode update
+    0          1           1          Disabled          Yes           TSX disabled          TSX disabled
+    1          X           1          Disabled           X             None needed           None needed
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+
+2. "tsx=on"
+
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES bits     Result with cmdline tsx=on
+----------------------------------  -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+TAA_NO     MDS_NO     TSX_CTRL_MSR  TSX state     VERW can clear  TAA mitigation       TAA mitigation
+                                    after bootup  CPU buffers     tsx_async_abort=off  tsx_async_abort=full
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+    0          0           0         HW default        Yes            Same as MDS          Same as MDS
+    0          0           1        Invalid case   Invalid case       Invalid case         Invalid case
+    0          1           0         HW default        No          Need ucode update     Need ucode update
+    0          1           1          Enabled          Yes               None              Same as MDS
+    1          X           1          Enabled          X              None needed          None needed
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+
+3. "tsx=auto"
+
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES bits     Result with cmdline tsx=auto
+----------------------------------  -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+TAA_NO     MDS_NO     TSX_CTRL_MSR  TSX state     VERW can clear  TAA mitigation       TAA mitigation
+                                    after bootup  CPU buffers     tsx_async_abort=off  tsx_async_abort=full
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+    0          0           0         HW default    Yes                Same as MDS           Same as MDS
+    0          0           1        Invalid case  Invalid case        Invalid case          Invalid case
+    0          1           0         HW default    No              Need ucode update     Need ucode update
+    0          1           1          Disabled      Yes               TSX disabled          TSX disabled
+    1          X           1          Enabled       X                 None needed           None needed
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+
+In the tables, TSX_CTRL_MSR is a new bit in MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES that
+indicates whether MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL is supported.
+
+There are two control bits in IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR:
+
+      Bit 0: When set it disables the Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM)
+             sub-feature of TSX (will force all transactions to abort on the
+             XBEGIN instruction).
+
+      Bit 1: When set it disables the enumeration of the RTM and HLE feature
+             (i.e. it will make CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4} and
+             CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit11} read as 0).
diff --git a/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/usb-legacy-support.txt b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/usb-legacy-support.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1894cdf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/usb-legacy-support.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+USB Legacy support
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Vojtech Pavlik <vojtech@suse.cz>, January 2004
+
+
+Also known as "USB Keyboard" or "USB Mouse support" in the BIOS Setup is a
+feature that allows one to use the USB mouse and keyboard as if they were
+their classic PS/2 counterparts.  This means one can use an USB keyboard to
+type in LILO for example.
+
+It has several drawbacks, though:
+
+1) On some machines, the emulated PS/2 mouse takes over even when no USB
+   mouse is present and a real PS/2 mouse is present.  In that case the extra
+   features (wheel, extra buttons, touchpad mode) of the real PS/2 mouse may
+   not be available.
+
+2) If CONFIG_HIGHMEM64G is enabled, the PS/2 mouse emulation can cause
+   system crashes, because the SMM BIOS is not expecting to be in PAE mode.
+   The Intel E7505 is a typical machine where this happens.
+
+3) If AMD64 64-bit mode is enabled, again system crashes often happen,
+   because the SMM BIOS isn't expecting the CPU to be in 64-bit mode.  The
+   BIOS manufacturers only test with Windows, and Windows doesn't do 64-bit
+   yet.
+
+Solutions:
+
+Problem 1) can be solved by loading the USB drivers prior to loading the
+PS/2 mouse driver. Since the PS/2 mouse driver is in 2.6 compiled into
+the kernel unconditionally, this means the USB drivers need to be
+compiled-in, too.
+
+Problem 2) can currently only be solved by either disabling HIGHMEM64G
+in the kernel config or USB Legacy support in the BIOS. A BIOS update
+could help, but so far no such update exists.
+
+Problem 3) is usually fixed by a BIOS update. Check the board
+manufacturers web site. If an update is not available, disable USB
+Legacy support in the BIOS. If this alone doesn't help, try also adding
+idle=poll on the kernel command line. The BIOS may be entering the SMM
+on the HLT instruction as well.
+
diff --git a/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/x86_64/00-INDEX b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/x86_64/00-INDEX
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..92fc20a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/x86_64/00-INDEX
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+00-INDEX
+	- This file
+boot-options.txt
+	- AMD64-specific boot options.
+cpu-hotplug-spec
+	- Firmware support for CPU hotplug under Linux/x86-64
+fake-numa-for-cpusets
+	- Using numa=fake and CPUSets for Resource Management
+kernel-stacks
+	- Context-specific per-processor interrupt stacks.
+machinecheck
+	- Configurable sysfs parameters for the x86-64 machine check code.
+mm.txt
+	- Memory layout of x86-64 (4 level page tables, 46 bits physical).
+uefi.txt
+	- Booting Linux via Unified Extensible Firmware Interface.
diff --git a/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/x86_64/5level-paging.txt b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/x86_64/5level-paging.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..087251a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/x86_64/5level-paging.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+== Overview ==
+
+Original x86-64 was limited by 4-level paing to 256 TiB of virtual address
+space and 64 TiB of physical address space. We are already bumping into
+this limit: some vendors offers servers with 64 TiB of memory today.
+
+To overcome the limitation upcoming hardware will introduce support for
+5-level paging. It is a straight-forward extension of the current page
+table structure adding one more layer of translation.
+
+It bumps the limits to 128 PiB of virtual address space and 4 PiB of
+physical address space. This "ought to be enough for anybody" ©.
+
+QEMU 2.9 and later support 5-level paging.
+
+Virtual memory layout for 5-level paging is described in
+Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt
+
+== Enabling 5-level paging ==
+
+CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL=y enables the feature.
+
+So far, a kernel compiled with the option enabled will be able to boot
+only on machines that supports the feature -- see for 'la57' flag in
+/proc/cpuinfo.
+
+The plan is to implement boot-time switching between 4- and 5-level paging
+in the future.
+
+== User-space and large virtual address space ==
+
+On x86, 5-level paging enables 56-bit userspace virtual address space.
+Not all user space is ready to handle wide addresses. It's known that
+at least some JIT compilers use higher bits in pointers to encode their
+information. It collides with valid pointers with 5-level paging and
+leads to crashes.
+
+To mitigate this, we are not going to allocate virtual address space
+above 47-bit by default.
+
+But userspace can ask for allocation from full address space by
+specifying hint address (with or without MAP_FIXED) above 47-bits.
+
+If hint address set above 47-bit, but MAP_FIXED is not specified, we try
+to look for unmapped area by specified address. If it's already
+occupied, we look for unmapped area in *full* address space, rather than
+from 47-bit window.
+
+A high hint address would only affect the allocation in question, but not
+any future mmap()s.
+
+Specifying high hint address on older kernel or on machine without 5-level
+paging support is safe. The hint will be ignored and kernel will fall back
+to allocation from 47-bit address space.
+
+This approach helps to easily make application's memory allocator aware
+about large address space without manually tracking allocated virtual
+address space.
+
+One important case we need to handle here is interaction with MPX.
+MPX (without MAWA extension) cannot handle addresses above 47-bit, so we
+need to make sure that MPX cannot be enabled we already have VMA above
+the boundary and forbid creating such VMAs once MPX is enabled.
+
diff --git a/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/x86_64/boot-options.txt b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/x86_64/boot-options.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b297c48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/x86_64/boot-options.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,286 @@
+AMD64 specific boot options
+
+There are many others (usually documented in driver documentation), but
+only the AMD64 specific ones are listed here.
+
+Machine check
+
+   Please see Documentation/x86/x86_64/machinecheck for sysfs runtime tunables.
+
+   mce=off
+		Disable machine check
+   mce=no_cmci
+		Disable CMCI(Corrected Machine Check Interrupt) that
+		Intel processor supports.  Usually this disablement is
+		not recommended, but it might be handy if your hardware
+		is misbehaving.
+		Note that you'll get more problems without CMCI than with
+		due to the shared banks, i.e. you might get duplicated
+		error logs.
+   mce=dont_log_ce
+		Don't make logs for corrected errors.  All events reported
+		as corrected are silently cleared by OS.
+		This option will be useful if you have no interest in any
+		of corrected errors.
+   mce=ignore_ce
+		Disable features for corrected errors, e.g. polling timer
+		and CMCI.  All events reported as corrected are not cleared
+		by OS and remained in its error banks.
+		Usually this disablement is not recommended, however if
+		there is an agent checking/clearing corrected errors
+		(e.g. BIOS or hardware monitoring applications), conflicting
+		with OS's error handling, and you cannot deactivate the agent,
+		then this option will be a help.
+   mce=no_lmce
+		Do not opt-in to Local MCE delivery. Use legacy method
+		to broadcast MCEs.
+   mce=bootlog
+		Enable logging of machine checks left over from booting.
+		Disabled by default on AMD Fam10h and older because some BIOS
+		leave bogus ones.
+		If your BIOS doesn't do that it's a good idea to enable though
+		to make sure you log even machine check events that result
+		in a reboot. On Intel systems it is enabled by default.
+   mce=nobootlog
+		Disable boot machine check logging.
+   mce=tolerancelevel[,monarchtimeout] (number,number)
+		tolerance levels:
+		0: always panic on uncorrected errors, log corrected errors
+		1: panic or SIGBUS on uncorrected errors, log corrected errors
+		2: SIGBUS or log uncorrected errors, log corrected errors
+		3: never panic or SIGBUS, log all errors (for testing only)
+		Default is 1
+		Can be also set using sysfs which is preferable.
+		monarchtimeout:
+		Sets the time in us to wait for other CPUs on machine checks. 0
+		to disable.
+   mce=bios_cmci_threshold
+		Don't overwrite the bios-set CMCI threshold. This boot option
+		prevents Linux from overwriting the CMCI threshold set by the
+		bios. Without this option, Linux always sets the CMCI
+		threshold to 1. Enabling this may make memory predictive failure
+		analysis less effective if the bios sets thresholds for memory
+		errors since we will not see details for all errors.
+   mce=recovery
+		Force-enable recoverable machine check code paths
+
+   nomce (for compatibility with i386): same as mce=off
+
+   Everything else is in sysfs now.
+
+APICs
+
+   apic		 Use IO-APIC. Default
+
+   noapic	 Don't use the IO-APIC.
+
+   disableapic	 Don't use the local APIC
+
+   nolapic	 Don't use the local APIC (alias for i386 compatibility)
+
+   pirq=...	 See Documentation/x86/i386/IO-APIC.txt
+
+   noapictimer	 Don't set up the APIC timer
+
+   no_timer_check Don't check the IO-APIC timer. This can work around
+		 problems with incorrect timer initialization on some boards.
+   apicpmtimer
+		 Do APIC timer calibration using the pmtimer. Implies
+		 apicmaintimer. Useful when your PIT timer is totally
+		 broken.
+
+Timing
+
+  notsc
+  Don't use the CPU time stamp counter to read the wall time.
+  This can be used to work around timing problems on multiprocessor systems
+  with not properly synchronized CPUs.
+
+  nohpet
+  Don't use the HPET timer.
+
+Idle loop
+
+  idle=poll
+  Don't do power saving in the idle loop using HLT, but poll for rescheduling
+  event. This will make the CPUs eat a lot more power, but may be useful
+  to get slightly better performance in multiprocessor benchmarks. It also
+  makes some profiling using performance counters more accurate.
+  Please note that on systems with MONITOR/MWAIT support (like Intel EM64T
+  CPUs) this option has no performance advantage over the normal idle loop.
+  It may also interact badly with hyperthreading.
+
+Rebooting
+
+   reboot=b[ios] | t[riple] | k[bd] | a[cpi] | e[fi] [, [w]arm | [c]old]
+   bios	  Use the CPU reboot vector for warm reset
+   warm   Don't set the cold reboot flag
+   cold   Set the cold reboot flag
+   triple Force a triple fault (init)
+   kbd    Use the keyboard controller. cold reset (default)
+   acpi   Use the ACPI RESET_REG in the FADT. If ACPI is not configured or the
+          ACPI reset does not work, the reboot path attempts the reset using
+          the keyboard controller.
+   efi    Use efi reset_system runtime service. If EFI is not configured or the
+          EFI reset does not work, the reboot path attempts the reset using
+          the keyboard controller.
+
+   Using warm reset will be much faster especially on big memory
+   systems because the BIOS will not go through the memory check.
+   Disadvantage is that not all hardware will be completely reinitialized
+   on reboot so there may be boot problems on some systems.
+
+   reboot=force
+
+   Don't stop other CPUs on reboot. This can make reboot more reliable
+   in some cases.
+
+Non Executable Mappings
+
+  noexec=on|off
+
+  on      Enable(default)
+  off     Disable
+
+NUMA
+
+  numa=off	Only set up a single NUMA node spanning all memory.
+
+  numa=noacpi   Don't parse the SRAT table for NUMA setup
+
+  numa=fake=<size>[MG]
+		If given as a memory unit, fills all system RAM with nodes of
+		size interleaved over physical nodes.
+
+  numa=fake=<N>
+		If given as an integer, fills all system RAM with N fake nodes
+		interleaved over physical nodes.
+
+ACPI
+
+  acpi=off	Don't enable ACPI
+  acpi=ht	Use ACPI boot table parsing, but don't enable ACPI
+		interpreter
+  acpi=force	Force ACPI on (currently not needed)
+
+  acpi=strict   Disable out of spec ACPI workarounds.
+
+  acpi_sci={edge,level,high,low}  Set up ACPI SCI interrupt.
+
+  acpi=noirq	Don't route interrupts
+
+  acpi=nocmcff	Disable firmware first mode for corrected errors. This
+		disables parsing the HEST CMC error source to check if
+		firmware has set the FF flag. This may result in
+		duplicate corrected error reports.
+
+PCI
+
+  pci=off		Don't use PCI
+  pci=conf1		Use conf1 access.
+  pci=conf2		Use conf2 access.
+  pci=rom		Assign ROMs.
+  pci=assign-busses	Assign busses
+  pci=irqmask=MASK	Set PCI interrupt mask to MASK
+  pci=lastbus=NUMBER	Scan up to NUMBER busses, no matter what the mptable says.
+  pci=noacpi		Don't use ACPI to set up PCI interrupt routing.
+
+IOMMU (input/output memory management unit)
+
+ Currently four x86-64 PCI-DMA mapping implementations exist:
+
+   1. <arch/x86_64/kernel/pci-nommu.c>: use no hardware/software IOMMU at all
+      (e.g. because you have < 3 GB memory).
+      Kernel boot message: "PCI-DMA: Disabling IOMMU"
+
+   2. <arch/x86/kernel/amd_gart_64.c>: AMD GART based hardware IOMMU.
+      Kernel boot message: "PCI-DMA: using GART IOMMU"
+
+   3. <arch/x86_64/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c> : Software IOMMU implementation. Used
+      e.g. if there is no hardware IOMMU in the system and it is need because
+      you have >3GB memory or told the kernel to us it (iommu=soft))
+      Kernel boot message: "PCI-DMA: Using software bounce buffering
+      for IO (SWIOTLB)"
+
+   4. <arch/x86_64/pci-calgary.c> : IBM Calgary hardware IOMMU. Used in IBM
+      pSeries and xSeries servers. This hardware IOMMU supports DMA address
+      mapping with memory protection, etc.
+      Kernel boot message: "PCI-DMA: Using Calgary IOMMU"
+
+ iommu=[<size>][,noagp][,off][,force][,noforce][,leak[=<nr_of_leak_pages>]
+	[,memaper[=<order>]][,merge][,forcesac][,fullflush][,nomerge]
+	[,noaperture][,calgary]
+
+  General iommu options:
+    off                Don't initialize and use any kind of IOMMU.
+    noforce            Don't force hardware IOMMU usage when it is not needed.
+                       (default).
+    force              Force the use of the hardware IOMMU even when it is
+                       not actually needed (e.g. because < 3 GB memory).
+    soft               Use software bounce buffering (SWIOTLB) (default for
+                       Intel machines). This can be used to prevent the usage
+                       of an available hardware IOMMU.
+
+  iommu options only relevant to the AMD GART hardware IOMMU:
+    <size>             Set the size of the remapping area in bytes.
+    allowed            Overwrite iommu off workarounds for specific chipsets.
+    fullflush          Flush IOMMU on each allocation (default).
+    nofullflush        Don't use IOMMU fullflush.
+    leak               Turn on simple iommu leak tracing (only when
+                       CONFIG_IOMMU_LEAK is on). Default number of leak pages
+                       is 20.
+    memaper[=<order>]  Allocate an own aperture over RAM with size 32MB<<order.
+                       (default: order=1, i.e. 64MB)
+    merge              Do scatter-gather (SG) merging. Implies "force"
+                       (experimental).
+    nomerge            Don't do scatter-gather (SG) merging.
+    noaperture         Ask the IOMMU not to touch the aperture for AGP.
+    forcesac           Force single-address cycle (SAC) mode for masks <40bits
+                       (experimental).
+    noagp              Don't initialize the AGP driver and use full aperture.
+    allowdac           Allow double-address cycle (DAC) mode, i.e. DMA >4GB.
+                       DAC is used with 32-bit PCI to push a 64-bit address in
+                       two cycles. When off all DMA over >4GB is forced through
+                       an IOMMU or software bounce buffering.
+    nodac              Forbid DAC mode, i.e. DMA >4GB.
+    panic              Always panic when IOMMU overflows.
+    calgary            Use the Calgary IOMMU if it is available
+
+  iommu options only relevant to the software bounce buffering (SWIOTLB) IOMMU
+  implementation:
+    swiotlb=<pages>[,force]
+    <pages>            Prereserve that many 128K pages for the software IO
+                       bounce buffering.
+    force              Force all IO through the software TLB.
+
+  Settings for the IBM Calgary hardware IOMMU currently found in IBM
+  pSeries and xSeries machines:
+
+    calgary=[64k,128k,256k,512k,1M,2M,4M,8M]
+    calgary=[translate_empty_slots]
+    calgary=[disable=<PCI bus number>]
+    panic              Always panic when IOMMU overflows
+
+    64k,...,8M - Set the size of each PCI slot's translation table
+    when using the Calgary IOMMU. This is the size of the translation
+    table itself in main memory. The smallest table, 64k, covers an IO
+    space of 32MB; the largest, 8MB table, can cover an IO space of
+    4GB. Normally the kernel will make the right choice by itself.
+
+    translate_empty_slots - Enable translation even on slots that have
+    no devices attached to them, in case a device will be hotplugged
+    in the future.
+
+    disable=<PCI bus number> - Disable translation on a given PHB. For
+    example, the built-in graphics adapter resides on the first bridge
+    (PCI bus number 0); if translation (isolation) is enabled on this
+    bridge, X servers that access the hardware directly from user
+    space might stop working. Use this option if you have devices that
+    are accessed from userspace directly on some PCI host bridge.
+
+Miscellaneous
+
+	nogbpages
+		Do not use GB pages for kernel direct mappings.
+	gbpages
+		Use GB pages for kernel direct mappings.
diff --git a/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/x86_64/cpu-hotplug-spec b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/x86_64/cpu-hotplug-spec
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3c23e05
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/x86_64/cpu-hotplug-spec
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+Firmware support for CPU hotplug under Linux/x86-64
+---------------------------------------------------
+
+Linux/x86-64 supports CPU hotplug now. For various reasons Linux wants to
+know in advance of boot time the maximum number of CPUs that could be plugged
+into the system. ACPI 3.0 currently has no official way to supply
+this information from the firmware to the operating system.
+
+In ACPI each CPU needs an LAPIC object in the MADT table (5.2.11.5 in the
+ACPI 3.0 specification).  ACPI already has the concept of disabled LAPIC
+objects by setting the Enabled bit in the LAPIC object to zero.
+
+For CPU hotplug Linux/x86-64 expects now that any possible future hotpluggable
+CPU is already available in the MADT. If the CPU is not available yet
+it should have its LAPIC Enabled bit set to 0. Linux will use the number
+of disabled LAPICs to compute the maximum number of future CPUs.
+
+In the worst case the user can overwrite this choice using a command line
+option (additional_cpus=...), but it is recommended to supply the correct
+number (or a reasonable approximation of it, with erring towards more not less)
+in the MADT to avoid manual configuration.
diff --git a/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/x86_64/fake-numa-for-cpusets b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/x86_64/fake-numa-for-cpusets
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4b09f18
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/x86_64/fake-numa-for-cpusets
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+Using numa=fake and CPUSets for Resource Management
+Written by David Rientjes <rientjes@cs.washington.edu>
+
+This document describes how the numa=fake x86_64 command-line option can be used
+in conjunction with cpusets for coarse memory management.  Using this feature,
+you can create fake NUMA nodes that represent contiguous chunks of memory and
+assign them to cpusets and their attached tasks.  This is a way of limiting the
+amount of system memory that are available to a certain class of tasks.
+
+For more information on the features of cpusets, see
+Documentation/cgroup-v1/cpusets.txt.
+There are a number of different configurations you can use for your needs.  For
+more information on the numa=fake command line option and its various ways of
+configuring fake nodes, see Documentation/x86/x86_64/boot-options.txt.
+
+For the purposes of this introduction, we'll assume a very primitive NUMA
+emulation setup of "numa=fake=4*512,".  This will split our system memory into
+four equal chunks of 512M each that we can now use to assign to cpusets.  As
+you become more familiar with using this combination for resource control,
+you'll determine a better setup to minimize the number of nodes you have to deal
+with.
+
+A machine may be split as follows with "numa=fake=4*512," as reported by dmesg:
+
+	Faking node 0 at 0000000000000000-0000000020000000 (512MB)
+	Faking node 1 at 0000000020000000-0000000040000000 (512MB)
+	Faking node 2 at 0000000040000000-0000000060000000 (512MB)
+	Faking node 3 at 0000000060000000-0000000080000000 (512MB)
+	...
+	On node 0 totalpages: 130975
+	On node 1 totalpages: 131072
+	On node 2 totalpages: 131072
+	On node 3 totalpages: 131072
+
+Now following the instructions for mounting the cpusets filesystem from
+Documentation/cgroup-v1/cpusets.txt, you can assign fake nodes (i.e. contiguous memory
+address spaces) to individual cpusets:
+
+	[root@xroads /]# mkdir exampleset
+	[root@xroads /]# mount -t cpuset none exampleset
+	[root@xroads /]# mkdir exampleset/ddset
+	[root@xroads /]# cd exampleset/ddset
+	[root@xroads /exampleset/ddset]# echo 0-1 > cpus
+	[root@xroads /exampleset/ddset]# echo 0-1 > mems
+
+Now this cpuset, 'ddset', will only allowed access to fake nodes 0 and 1 for
+memory allocations (1G).
+
+You can now assign tasks to these cpusets to limit the memory resources
+available to them according to the fake nodes assigned as mems:
+
+	[root@xroads /exampleset/ddset]# echo $$ > tasks
+	[root@xroads /exampleset/ddset]# dd if=/dev/zero of=tmp bs=1024 count=1G
+	[1] 13425
+
+Notice the difference between the system memory usage as reported by
+/proc/meminfo between the restricted cpuset case above and the unrestricted
+case (i.e. running the same 'dd' command without assigning it to a fake NUMA
+cpuset):
+				Unrestricted	Restricted
+	MemTotal:		3091900 kB	3091900 kB
+	MemFree:		  42113 kB	1513236 kB
+
+This allows for coarse memory management for the tasks you assign to particular
+cpusets.  Since cpusets can form a hierarchy, you can create some pretty
+interesting combinations of use-cases for various classes of tasks for your
+memory management needs.
diff --git a/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/x86_64/machinecheck b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/x86_64/machinecheck
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d0648a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/x86_64/machinecheck
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+
+Configurable sysfs parameters for the x86-64 machine check code.
+
+Machine checks report internal hardware error conditions detected
+by the CPU. Uncorrected errors typically cause a machine check
+(often with panic), corrected ones cause a machine check log entry.
+
+Machine checks are organized in banks (normally associated with
+a hardware subsystem) and subevents in a bank. The exact meaning
+of the banks and subevent is CPU specific.
+
+mcelog knows how to decode them.
+
+When you see the "Machine check errors logged" message in the system
+log then mcelog should run to collect and decode machine check entries
+from /dev/mcelog. Normally mcelog should be run regularly from a cronjob.
+
+Each CPU has a directory in /sys/devices/system/machinecheck/machinecheckN
+(N = CPU number)
+
+The directory contains some configurable entries:
+
+Entries:
+
+bankNctl
+(N bank number)
+	64bit Hex bitmask enabling/disabling specific subevents for bank N
+	When a bit in the bitmask is zero then the respective
+	subevent will not be reported.
+	By default all events are enabled.
+	Note that BIOS maintain another mask to disable specific events
+	per bank.  This is not visible here
+
+The following entries appear for each CPU, but they are truly shared
+between all CPUs.
+
+check_interval
+	How often to poll for corrected machine check errors, in seconds
+	(Note output is hexadecimal). Default 5 minutes.  When the poller
+	finds MCEs it triggers an exponential speedup (poll more often) on
+	the polling interval.  When the poller stops finding MCEs, it
+	triggers an exponential backoff (poll less often) on the polling
+	interval. The check_interval variable is both the initial and
+	maximum polling interval. 0 means no polling for corrected machine
+	check errors (but some corrected errors might be still reported
+	in other ways)
+
+tolerant
+	Tolerance level. When a machine check exception occurs for a non
+	corrected machine check the kernel can take different actions.
+	Since machine check exceptions can happen any time it is sometimes
+	risky for the kernel to kill a process because it defies
+	normal kernel locking rules. The tolerance level configures
+	how hard the kernel tries to recover even at some risk of
+	deadlock.  Higher tolerant values trade potentially better uptime
+	with the risk of a crash or even corruption (for tolerant >= 3).
+
+	0: always panic on uncorrected errors, log corrected errors
+	1: panic or SIGBUS on uncorrected errors, log corrected errors
+	2: SIGBUS or log uncorrected errors, log corrected errors
+	3: never panic or SIGBUS, log all errors (for testing only)
+
+	Default: 1
+
+	Note this only makes a difference if the CPU allows recovery
+	from a machine check exception. Current x86 CPUs generally do not.
+
+trigger
+	Program to run when a machine check event is detected.
+	This is an alternative to running mcelog regularly from cron
+	and allows to detect events faster.
+monarch_timeout
+	How long to wait for the other CPUs to machine check too on a
+	exception. 0 to disable waiting for other CPUs.
+	Unit: us
+
+TBD document entries for AMD threshold interrupt configuration
+
+For more details about the x86 machine check architecture
+see the Intel and AMD architecture manuals from their developer websites.
+
+For more details about the architecture see
+see http://one.firstfloor.org/~andi/mce.pdf
diff --git a/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..43f066c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+
+Virtual memory map with 4 level page tables:
+
+0000000000000000 - 00007fffffffffff (=47 bits) user space, different per mm
+hole caused by [47:63] sign extension
+ffff800000000000 - ffff87ffffffffff (=43 bits) guard hole, reserved for hypervisor
+ffff880000000000 - ffff887fffffffff (=39 bits) LDT remap for PTI
+ffff888000000000 - ffffc87fffffffff (=64 TB) direct mapping of all phys. memory
+ffffc88000000000 - ffffc8ffffffffff (=39 bits) hole
+ffffc90000000000 - ffffe8ffffffffff (=45 bits) vmalloc/ioremap space
+ffffe90000000000 - ffffe9ffffffffff (=40 bits) hole
+ffffea0000000000 - ffffeaffffffffff (=40 bits) virtual memory map (1TB)
+... unused hole ...
+ffffec0000000000 - fffffbffffffffff (=44 bits) kasan shadow memory (16TB)
+... unused hole ...
+				    vaddr_end for KASLR
+fffffe0000000000 - fffffe7fffffffff (=39 bits) cpu_entry_area mapping
+fffffe8000000000 - fffffeffffffffff (=39 bits) LDT remap for PTI
+ffffff0000000000 - ffffff7fffffffff (=39 bits) %esp fixup stacks
+... unused hole ...
+ffffffef00000000 - fffffffeffffffff (=64 GB) EFI region mapping space
+... unused hole ...
+ffffffff80000000 - ffffffff9fffffff (=512 MB)  kernel text mapping, from phys 0
+ffffffffa0000000 - [fixmap start]   (~1526 MB) module mapping space (variable)
+[fixmap start]   - ffffffffff5fffff kernel-internal fixmap range
+ffffffffff600000 - ffffffffff600fff (=4 kB) legacy vsyscall ABI
+ffffffffffe00000 - ffffffffffffffff (=2 MB) unused hole
+
+Virtual memory map with 5 level page tables:
+
+0000000000000000 - 00ffffffffffffff (=56 bits) user space, different per mm
+hole caused by [56:63] sign extension
+ff00000000000000 - ff0fffffffffffff (=52 bits) guard hole, reserved for hypervisor
+ff10000000000000 - ff10ffffffffffff (=48 bits) LDT remap for PTI
+ff11000000000000 - ff90ffffffffffff (=55 bits) direct mapping of all phys. memory
+ff91000000000000 - ff9fffffffffffff (=3840 TB) hole
+ffa0000000000000 - ffd1ffffffffffff (=54 bits) vmalloc/ioremap space (12800 TB)
+ffd2000000000000 - ffd3ffffffffffff (=49 bits) hole
+ffd4000000000000 - ffd5ffffffffffff (=49 bits) virtual memory map (512TB)
+... unused hole ...
+ffdf000000000000 - fffffc0000000000 (=53 bits) kasan shadow memory (8PB)
+... unused hole ...
+				    vaddr_end for KASLR
+fffffe0000000000 - fffffe7fffffffff (=39 bits) cpu_entry_area mapping
+... unused hole ...
+ffffff0000000000 - ffffff7fffffffff (=39 bits) %esp fixup stacks
+... unused hole ...
+ffffffef00000000 - fffffffeffffffff (=64 GB) EFI region mapping space
+... unused hole ...
+ffffffff80000000 - ffffffff9fffffff (=512 MB)  kernel text mapping, from phys 0
+ffffffffa0000000 - fffffffffeffffff (1520 MB) module mapping space
+[fixmap start]   - ffffffffff5fffff kernel-internal fixmap range
+ffffffffff600000 - ffffffffff600fff (=4 kB) legacy vsyscall ABI
+ffffffffffe00000 - ffffffffffffffff (=2 MB) unused hole
+
+Architecture defines a 64-bit virtual address. Implementations can support
+less. Currently supported are 48- and 57-bit virtual addresses. Bits 63
+through to the most-significant implemented bit are sign extended.
+This causes hole between user space and kernel addresses if you interpret them
+as unsigned.
+
+The direct mapping covers all memory in the system up to the highest
+memory address (this means in some cases it can also include PCI memory
+holes).
+
+vmalloc space is lazily synchronized into the different PML4/PML5 pages of
+the processes using the page fault handler, with init_top_pgt as
+reference.
+
+We map EFI runtime services in the 'efi_pgd' PGD in a 64Gb large virtual
+memory window (this size is arbitrary, it can be raised later if needed).
+The mappings are not part of any other kernel PGD and are only available
+during EFI runtime calls.
+
+Note that if CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY is enabled, the direct mapping of all
+physical memory, vmalloc/ioremap space and virtual memory map are randomized.
+Their order is preserved but their base will be offset early at boot time.
+
+Be very careful vs. KASLR when changing anything here. The KASLR address
+range must not overlap with anything except the KASAN shadow area, which is
+correct as KASAN disables KASLR.
diff --git a/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/x86_64/uefi.txt b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/x86_64/uefi.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a5e2b4f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/x86_64/uefi.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+General note on [U]EFI x86_64 support
+-------------------------------------
+
+The nomenclature EFI and UEFI are used interchangeably in this document.
+
+Although the tools below are _not_ needed for building the kernel,
+the needed bootloader support and associated tools for x86_64 platforms
+with EFI firmware and specifications are listed below.
+
+1. UEFI specification:  http://www.uefi.org
+
+2. Booting Linux kernel on UEFI x86_64 platform requires bootloader
+   support. Elilo with x86_64 support can be used.
+
+3. x86_64 platform with EFI/UEFI firmware.
+
+Mechanics:
+---------
+- Build the kernel with the following configuration.
+	CONFIG_FB_EFI=y
+	CONFIG_FRAMEBUFFER_CONSOLE=y
+  If EFI runtime services are expected, the following configuration should
+  be selected.
+	CONFIG_EFI=y
+	CONFIG_EFI_VARS=y or m		# optional
+- Create a VFAT partition on the disk
+- Copy the following to the VFAT partition:
+	elilo bootloader with x86_64 support, elilo configuration file,
+	kernel image built in first step and corresponding
+	initrd. Instructions on building elilo	and its dependencies
+	can be found in the elilo sourceforge project.
+- Boot to EFI shell and invoke elilo choosing the kernel image built
+  in first step.
+- If some or all EFI runtime services don't work, you can try following
+  kernel command line parameters to turn off some or all EFI runtime
+  services.
+	noefi		turn off all EFI runtime services
+	reboot_type=k	turn off EFI reboot runtime service
+- If the EFI memory map has additional entries not in the E820 map,
+  you can include those entries in the kernels memory map of available
+  physical RAM by using the following kernel command line parameter.
+	add_efi_memmap	include EFI memory map of available physical RAM
diff --git a/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..97b7adb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+The additional fields in struct boot_params as a part of 32-bit boot
+protocol of kernel. These should be filled by bootloader or 16-bit
+real-mode setup code of the kernel. References/settings to it mainly
+are in:
+
+  arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
+
+
+Offset	Proto	Name		Meaning
+/Size
+
+000/040	ALL	screen_info	Text mode or frame buffer information
+				(struct screen_info)
+040/014	ALL	apm_bios_info	APM BIOS information (struct apm_bios_info)
+058/008	ALL	tboot_addr      Physical address of tboot shared page
+060/010	ALL	ist_info	Intel SpeedStep (IST) BIOS support information
+				(struct ist_info)
+080/010	ALL	hd0_info	hd0 disk parameter, OBSOLETE!!
+090/010	ALL	hd1_info	hd1 disk parameter, OBSOLETE!!
+0A0/010	ALL	sys_desc_table	System description table (struct sys_desc_table),
+				OBSOLETE!!
+0B0/010	ALL	olpc_ofw_header	OLPC's OpenFirmware CIF and friends
+0C0/004	ALL	ext_ramdisk_image ramdisk_image high 32bits
+0C4/004	ALL	ext_ramdisk_size  ramdisk_size high 32bits
+0C8/004	ALL	ext_cmd_line_ptr  cmd_line_ptr high 32bits
+140/080	ALL	edid_info	Video mode setup (struct edid_info)
+1C0/020	ALL	efi_info	EFI 32 information (struct efi_info)
+1E0/004	ALL	alk_mem_k	Alternative mem check, in KB
+1E4/004	ALL	scratch		Scratch field for the kernel setup code
+1E8/001	ALL	e820_entries	Number of entries in e820_table (below)
+1E9/001	ALL	eddbuf_entries	Number of entries in eddbuf (below)
+1EA/001	ALL	edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries	Number of entries in edd_mbr_sig_buffer
+				(below)
+1EB/001	ALL     kbd_status      Numlock is enabled
+1EC/001	ALL     secure_boot	Secure boot is enabled in the firmware
+1EF/001	ALL	sentinel	Used to detect broken bootloaders
+290/040	ALL	edd_mbr_sig_buffer EDD MBR signatures
+2D0/A00	ALL	e820_table	E820 memory map table
+				(array of struct e820_entry)
+D00/1EC	ALL	eddbuf		EDD data (array of struct edd_info)