[Feature]add MT2731_MP2_MR2_SVN388 baseline version
Change-Id: Ief04314834b31e27effab435d3ca8ba33b499059
diff --git a/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/security/Kconfig b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/security/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
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+++ b/src/kernel/linux/v4.14/security/Kconfig
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+#
+# Security configuration
+#
+
+menu "Security options"
+
+source security/keys/Kconfig
+
+config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
+ bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog"
+ default n
+ help
+ This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel
+ syslog via dmesg(8).
+
+ If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced
+ unless the dmesg_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1).
+
+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT
+ bool "Restrict unprivileged use of performance events"
+ depends on PERF_EVENTS
+ help
+ If you say Y here, the kernel.perf_event_paranoid sysctl
+ will be set to 3 by default, and no unprivileged use of the
+ perf_event_open syscall will be permitted unless it is
+ changed.
+
+config SECURITY
+ bool "Enable different security models"
+ depends on SYSFS
+ depends on MULTIUSER
+ help
+ This allows you to choose different security modules to be
+ configured into your kernel.
+
+ If this option is not selected, the default Linux security
+ model will be used.
+
+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS
+ depends on SECURITY
+ bool
+ default n
+
+config SECURITYFS
+ bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem"
+ help
+ This will build the securityfs filesystem. It is currently used by
+ the TPM bios character driver and IMA, an integrity provider. It is
+ not used by SELinux or SMACK.
+
+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_NETWORK
+ bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks"
+ depends on SECURITY
+ help
+ This enables the socket and networking security hooks.
+ If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
+ implement socket and networking access controls.
+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+ bool "Remove the kernel mapping in user mode"
+ depends on X86_64 && !UML
+ default y
+ help
+ This feature reduces the number of hardware side channels by
+ ensuring that the majority of kernel addresses are not mapped
+ into userspace.
+
+ See Documentation/x86/pti.txt for more details.
+
+config SECURITY_INFINIBAND
+ bool "Infiniband Security Hooks"
+ depends on SECURITY && INFINIBAND
+ help
+ This enables the Infiniband security hooks.
+ If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
+ implement Infiniband access controls.
+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
+ bool "XFRM (IPSec) Networking Security Hooks"
+ depends on XFRM && SECURITY_NETWORK
+ help
+ This enables the XFRM (IPSec) networking security hooks.
+ If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
+ implement per-packet access controls based on labels
+ derived from IPSec policy. Non-IPSec communications are
+ designated as unlabelled, and only sockets authorized
+ to communicate unlabelled data can send without using
+ IPSec.
+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_PATH
+ bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control"
+ depends on SECURITY
+ help
+ This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control.
+ If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
+ implement pathname based access controls.
+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config INTEL_TXT
+ bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)"
+ depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT
+ help
+ This option enables support for booting the kernel with the
+ Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize
+ Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch
+ of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this
+ will have no effect.
+
+ Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of system configuration and
+ initial state as well as data reset protection. This is used to
+ create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification, which
+ helps to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are functioning
+ correctly. This level of protection requires a root of trust outside
+ of the kernel itself.
+
+ Intel TXT also helps solve real end user concerns about having
+ confidence that their hardware is running the VMM or kernel that
+ it was configured with, especially since they may be responsible for
+ providing such assurances to VMs and services running on it.
+
+ See <http://www.intel.com/technology/security/> for more information
+ about Intel(R) TXT.
+ See <http://tboot.sourceforge.net> for more information about tboot.
+ See Documentation/intel_txt.txt for a description of how to enable
+ Intel TXT support in a kernel boot.
+
+ If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+
+config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
+ int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation"
+ depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX
+ default 32768 if ARM || (ARM64 && COMPAT)
+ default 65536
+ help
+ This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
+ from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages
+ can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.
+
+ For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
+ a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
+ On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.
+ Programs which use vm86 functionality or have some need to map
+ this low address space will need the permission specific to the
+ systems running LSM.
+
+config HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
+ bool
+ help
+ The heap allocator implements __check_heap_object() for
+ validating memory ranges against heap object sizes in
+ support of CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
+
+config HARDENED_USERCOPY
+ bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace"
+ depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
+ select BUG
+ imply STRICT_DEVMEM
+ help
+ This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when
+ copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and
+ copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that
+ are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple
+ separately allocated pages, are not on the process stack,
+ or are part of the kernel text. This kills entire classes
+ of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures.
+
+config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN
+ bool "Refuse to copy allocations that span multiple pages"
+ depends on HARDENED_USERCOPY
+ depends on EXPERT
+ help
+ When a multi-page allocation is done without __GFP_COMP,
+ hardened usercopy will reject attempts to copy it. There are,
+ however, several cases of this in the kernel that have not all
+ been removed. This config is intended to be used only while
+ trying to find such users.
+
+config FORTIFY_SOURCE
+ bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows"
+ depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
+ help
+ Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions
+ where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes.
+
+config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
+ bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary"
+ help
+ By default, the kernel can call many different userspace
+ binary programs through the "usermode helper" kernel
+ interface. Some of these binaries are statically defined
+ either in the kernel code itself, or as a kernel configuration
+ option. However, some of these are dynamically created at
+ runtime, or can be modified after the kernel has started up.
+ To provide an additional layer of security, route all of these
+ calls through a single executable that can not have its name
+ changed.
+
+ Note, it is up to this single binary to then call the relevant
+ "real" usermode helper binary, based on the first argument
+ passed to it. If desired, this program can filter and pick
+ and choose what real programs are called.
+
+ If you wish for all usermode helper programs are to be
+ disabled, choose this option and then set
+ STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH to an empty string.
+
+config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH
+ string "Path to the static usermode helper binary"
+ depends on STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
+ default "/sbin/usermode-helper"
+ help
+ The binary called by the kernel when any usermode helper
+ program is wish to be run. The "real" application's name will
+ be in the first argument passed to this program on the command
+ line.
+
+ If you wish for all usermode helper programs to be disabled,
+ specify an empty string here (i.e. "").
+
+source security/selinux/Kconfig
+source security/smack/Kconfig
+source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
+source security/apparmor/Kconfig
+source security/loadpin/Kconfig
+source security/yama/Kconfig
+
+source security/integrity/Kconfig
+
+choice
+ prompt "Default security module"
+ default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX
+ default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
+ default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
+ default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR
+ default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
+
+ help
+ Select the security module that will be used by default if the
+ kernel parameter security= is not specified.
+
+ config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
+ bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y
+
+ config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
+ bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y
+
+ config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
+ bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y
+
+ config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
+ bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
+
+ config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
+ bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"
+
+endchoice
+
+config DEFAULT_SECURITY
+ string
+ default "selinux" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
+ default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
+ default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
+ default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
+ default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
+
+endmenu
+