| /* |
| * Copyright 2002-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved |
| * |
| * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
| * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
| * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
| * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
| */ |
| |
| #include <openssl/opensslconf.h> /* To see if OPENSSL_NO_EC is defined */ |
| #include "testutil.h" |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
| |
| # include <openssl/evp.h> |
| # include <openssl/bn.h> |
| # include <openssl/ec.h> |
| # include <openssl/rand.h> |
| # include "internal/nelem.h" |
| # include "ecdsatest.h" |
| |
| /* functions to change the RAND_METHOD */ |
| static int fbytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); |
| |
| static RAND_METHOD fake_rand; |
| static const RAND_METHOD *old_rand; |
| static int use_fake = 0; |
| static const char *numbers[2]; |
| static size_t crv_len = 0; |
| static EC_builtin_curve *curves = NULL; |
| |
| static int change_rand(void) |
| { |
| /* save old rand method */ |
| if (!TEST_ptr(old_rand = RAND_get_rand_method())) |
| return 0; |
| |
| fake_rand = *old_rand; |
| /* use own random function */ |
| fake_rand.bytes = fbytes; |
| /* set new RAND_METHOD */ |
| if (!TEST_true(RAND_set_rand_method(&fake_rand))) |
| return 0; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int restore_rand(void) |
| { |
| if (!TEST_true(RAND_set_rand_method(old_rand))) |
| return 0; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int fbytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) |
| { |
| int ret = 0; |
| static int fbytes_counter = 0; |
| BIGNUM *tmp = NULL; |
| |
| if (use_fake == 0) |
| return old_rand->bytes(buf, num); |
| |
| use_fake = 0; |
| |
| if (!TEST_ptr(tmp = BN_new()) |
| || !TEST_int_lt(fbytes_counter, OSSL_NELEM(numbers)) |
| || !TEST_true(BN_hex2bn(&tmp, numbers[fbytes_counter])) |
| /* tmp might need leading zeros so pad it out */ |
| || !TEST_int_le(BN_num_bytes(tmp), num) |
| || !TEST_true(BN_bn2binpad(tmp, buf, num))) |
| goto err; |
| |
| fbytes_counter = (fbytes_counter + 1) % OSSL_NELEM(numbers); |
| ret = 1; |
| err: |
| BN_free(tmp); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /*- |
| * This function hijacks the RNG to feed it the chosen ECDSA key and nonce. |
| * The ECDSA KATs are from: |
| * - the X9.62 draft (4) |
| * - NIST CAVP (720) |
| * |
| * It uses the low-level ECDSA_sign_setup instead of EVP to control the RNG. |
| * NB: This is not how applications should use ECDSA; this is only for testing. |
| * |
| * Tests the library can successfully: |
| * - generate public keys that matches those KATs |
| * - create ECDSA signatures that match those KATs |
| * - accept those signatures as valid |
| */ |
| static int x9_62_tests(int n) |
| { |
| int nid, md_nid, ret = 0; |
| const char *r_in = NULL, *s_in = NULL, *tbs = NULL; |
| unsigned char *pbuf = NULL, *qbuf = NULL, *message = NULL; |
| unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| unsigned int dgst_len = 0; |
| long q_len, msg_len = 0; |
| size_t p_len; |
| EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; |
| EC_KEY *key = NULL; |
| ECDSA_SIG *signature = NULL; |
| BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL; |
| BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *rp = NULL; |
| const BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL; |
| |
| nid = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].nid; |
| md_nid = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].md_nid; |
| r_in = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].r; |
| s_in = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].s; |
| tbs = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].msg; |
| numbers[0] = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].d; |
| numbers[1] = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].k; |
| |
| TEST_info("ECDSA KATs for curve %s", OBJ_nid2sn(nid)); |
| |
| if (!TEST_ptr(mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) |
| /* get the message digest */ |
| || !TEST_ptr(message = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(tbs, &msg_len)) |
| || !TEST_true(EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid), NULL)) |
| || !TEST_true(EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, message, msg_len)) |
| || !TEST_true(EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, digest, &dgst_len)) |
| /* create the key */ |
| || !TEST_ptr(key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid)) |
| /* load KAT variables */ |
| || !TEST_ptr(r = BN_new()) |
| || !TEST_ptr(s = BN_new()) |
| || !TEST_true(BN_hex2bn(&r, r_in)) |
| || !TEST_true(BN_hex2bn(&s, s_in)) |
| /* swap the RNG source */ |
| || !TEST_true(change_rand())) |
| goto err; |
| |
| /* public key must match KAT */ |
| use_fake = 1; |
| if (!TEST_true(EC_KEY_generate_key(key)) |
| || !TEST_true(p_len = EC_KEY_key2buf(key, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, |
| &pbuf, NULL)) |
| || !TEST_ptr(qbuf = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].Q, &q_len)) |
| || !TEST_int_eq(q_len, p_len) |
| || !TEST_mem_eq(qbuf, q_len, pbuf, p_len)) |
| goto err; |
| |
| /* create the signature via ECDSA_sign_setup to avoid use of ECDSA nonces */ |
| use_fake = 1; |
| if (!TEST_true(ECDSA_sign_setup(key, NULL, &kinv, &rp)) |
| || !TEST_ptr(signature = ECDSA_do_sign_ex(digest, dgst_len, |
| kinv, rp, key)) |
| /* verify the signature */ |
| || !TEST_int_eq(ECDSA_do_verify(digest, dgst_len, signature, key), 1)) |
| goto err; |
| |
| /* compare the created signature with the expected signature */ |
| ECDSA_SIG_get0(signature, &sig_r, &sig_s); |
| if (!TEST_BN_eq(sig_r, r) |
| || !TEST_BN_eq(sig_s, s)) |
| goto err; |
| |
| ret = 1; |
| |
| err: |
| /* restore the RNG source */ |
| if (!TEST_true(restore_rand())) |
| ret = 0; |
| |
| OPENSSL_free(message); |
| OPENSSL_free(pbuf); |
| OPENSSL_free(qbuf); |
| EC_KEY_free(key); |
| ECDSA_SIG_free(signature); |
| BN_free(r); |
| BN_free(s); |
| EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); |
| BN_clear_free(kinv); |
| BN_clear_free(rp); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /*- |
| * Positive and negative ECDSA testing through EVP interface: |
| * - EVP_DigestSign (this is the one-shot version) |
| * - EVP_DigestVerify |
| * |
| * Tests the library can successfully: |
| * - create a key |
| * - create a signature |
| * - accept that signature |
| * - reject that signature with a different public key |
| * - reject that signature if its length is not correct |
| * - reject that signature after modifying the message |
| * - accept that signature after un-modifying the message |
| * - reject that signature after modifying the signature |
| * - accept that signature after un-modifying the signature |
| */ |
| static int test_builtin(int n) |
| { |
| EC_KEY *eckey_neg = NULL, *eckey = NULL; |
| unsigned char dirt, offset, tbs[128]; |
| unsigned char *sig = NULL; |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey_neg = NULL, *pkey = NULL; |
| EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; |
| size_t sig_len; |
| int nid, ret = 0; |
| |
| nid = curves[n].nid; |
| |
| /* skip built-in curves where ord(G) is not prime */ |
| if (nid == NID_ipsec4 || nid == NID_ipsec3) { |
| TEST_info("skipped: ECDSA unsupported for curve %s", OBJ_nid2sn(nid)); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| TEST_info("testing ECDSA for curve %s", OBJ_nid2sn(nid)); |
| |
| if (!TEST_ptr(mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) |
| /* get some random message data */ |
| || !TEST_true(RAND_bytes(tbs, sizeof(tbs))) |
| /* real key */ |
| || !TEST_ptr(eckey = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid)) |
| || !TEST_true(EC_KEY_generate_key(eckey)) |
| || !TEST_ptr(pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) |
| || !TEST_true(EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, eckey)) |
| /* fake key for negative testing */ |
| || !TEST_ptr(eckey_neg = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid)) |
| || !TEST_true(EC_KEY_generate_key(eckey_neg)) |
| || !TEST_ptr(pkey_neg = EVP_PKEY_new()) |
| || !TEST_true(EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey_neg, eckey_neg))) |
| goto err; |
| |
| sig_len = ECDSA_size(eckey); |
| |
| if (!TEST_ptr(sig = OPENSSL_malloc(sig_len)) |
| /* create a signature */ |
| || !TEST_true(EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey)) |
| || !TEST_true(EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &sig_len, tbs, sizeof(tbs))) |
| || !TEST_int_le(sig_len, ECDSA_size(eckey)) |
| /* negative test, verify with wrong key, 0 return */ |
| || !TEST_true(EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx)) |
| || !TEST_true(EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey_neg)) |
| || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, sig, sig_len, tbs, sizeof(tbs)), 0) |
| /* negative test, verify with wrong signature length, -1 return */ |
| || !TEST_true(EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx)) |
| || !TEST_true(EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey)) |
| || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, sig, sig_len - 1, tbs, sizeof(tbs)), -1) |
| /* positive test, verify with correct key, 1 return */ |
| || !TEST_true(EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx)) |
| || !TEST_true(EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey)) |
| || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, sig, sig_len, tbs, sizeof(tbs)), 1)) |
| goto err; |
| |
| /* muck with the message, test it fails with 0 return */ |
| tbs[0] ^= 1; |
| if (!TEST_true(EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx)) |
| || !TEST_true(EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey)) |
| || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, sig, sig_len, tbs, sizeof(tbs)), 0)) |
| goto err; |
| /* un-muck and test it verifies */ |
| tbs[0] ^= 1; |
| if (!TEST_true(EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx)) |
| || !TEST_true(EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey)) |
| || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, sig, sig_len, tbs, sizeof(tbs)), 1)) |
| goto err; |
| |
| /*- |
| * Muck with the ECDSA signature. The DER encoding is one of: |
| * - 30 LL 02 .. |
| * - 30 81 LL 02 .. |
| * |
| * - Sometimes this mucks with the high level DER sequence wrapper: |
| * in that case, DER-parsing of the whole signature should fail. |
| * |
| * - Sometimes this mucks with the DER-encoding of ECDSA.r: |
| * in that case, DER-parsing of ECDSA.r should fail. |
| * |
| * - Sometimes this mucks with the DER-encoding of ECDSA.s: |
| * in that case, DER-parsing of ECDSA.s should fail. |
| * |
| * - Sometimes this mucks with ECDSA.r: |
| * in that case, the signature verification should fail. |
| * |
| * - Sometimes this mucks with ECDSA.s: |
| * in that case, the signature verification should fail. |
| * |
| * The usual case is changing the integer value of ECDSA.r or ECDSA.s. |
| * Because the ratio of DER overhead to signature bytes is small. |
| * So most of the time it will be one of the last two cases. |
| * |
| * In any case, EVP_PKEY_verify should not return 1 for valid. |
| */ |
| offset = tbs[0] % sig_len; |
| dirt = tbs[1] ? tbs[1] : 1; |
| sig[offset] ^= dirt; |
| if (!TEST_true(EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx)) |
| || !TEST_true(EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey)) |
| || !TEST_int_ne(EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, sig, sig_len, tbs, sizeof(tbs)), 1)) |
| goto err; |
| /* un-muck and test it verifies */ |
| sig[offset] ^= dirt; |
| if (!TEST_true(EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx)) |
| || !TEST_true(EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey)) |
| || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, sig, sig_len, tbs, sizeof(tbs)), 1)) |
| goto err; |
| |
| ret = 1; |
| err: |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey_neg); |
| EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); |
| OPENSSL_free(sig); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| int setup_tests(void) |
| { |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
| TEST_note("Elliptic curves are disabled."); |
| #else |
| /* get a list of all internal curves */ |
| crv_len = EC_get_builtin_curves(NULL, 0); |
| if (!TEST_ptr(curves = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*curves) * crv_len)) |
| || !TEST_true(EC_get_builtin_curves(curves, crv_len))) |
| return 0; |
| ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_builtin, crv_len); |
| ADD_ALL_TESTS(x9_62_tests, OSSL_NELEM(ecdsa_cavs_kats)); |
| #endif |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| void cleanup_tests(void) |
| { |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
| OPENSSL_free(curves); |
| #endif |
| } |