[T106][ZXW-22]7520V3SCV2.01.01.02P42U09_VEC_V0.8_AP_VEC origin source commit
Change-Id: Ic6e05d89ecd62fc34f82b23dcf306c93764aec4b
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/srp/build.info b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/srp/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b6c7fe7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/srp/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=srp_lib.c srp_vfy.c
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/srp/srp_lib.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/srp/srp_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ce35048
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/srp/srp_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,291 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2004-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, EdelKey Project. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ *
+ * Originally written by Christophe Renou and Peter Sylvester,
+ * for the EdelKey project.
+ */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+# include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+# include <openssl/sha.h>
+# include <openssl/srp.h>
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include "crypto/bn_srp.h"
+
+/* calculate = SHA1(PAD(x) || PAD(y)) */
+
+static BIGNUM *srp_Calc_xy(const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, const BIGNUM *N)
+{
+ unsigned char digest[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char *tmp = NULL;
+ int numN = BN_num_bytes(N);
+ BIGNUM *res = NULL;
+
+ if (x != N && BN_ucmp(x, N) >= 0)
+ return NULL;
+ if (y != N && BN_ucmp(y, N) >= 0)
+ return NULL;
+ if ((tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(numN * 2)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (BN_bn2binpad(x, tmp, numN) < 0
+ || BN_bn2binpad(y, tmp + numN, numN) < 0
+ || !EVP_Digest(tmp, numN * 2, digest, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL))
+ goto err;
+ res = BN_bin2bn(digest, sizeof(digest), NULL);
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_free(tmp);
+ return res;
+}
+
+static BIGNUM *srp_Calc_k(const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *g)
+{
+ /* k = SHA1(N | PAD(g)) -- tls-srp draft 8 */
+ return srp_Calc_xy(N, g, N);
+}
+
+BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_u(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *B, const BIGNUM *N)
+{
+ /* k = SHA1(PAD(A) || PAD(B) ) -- tls-srp draft 8 */
+ return srp_Calc_xy(A, B, N);
+}
+
+BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_server_key(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *v, const BIGNUM *u,
+ const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *N)
+{
+ BIGNUM *tmp = NULL, *S = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
+
+ if (u == NULL || A == NULL || v == NULL || b == NULL || N == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL || (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* S = (A*v**u) ** b */
+
+ if (!BN_mod_exp(tmp, v, u, N, bn_ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, A, tmp, N, bn_ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ S = BN_new();
+ if (S != NULL && !BN_mod_exp(S, tmp, b, N, bn_ctx)) {
+ BN_free(S);
+ S = NULL;
+ }
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ BN_clear_free(tmp);
+ return S;
+}
+
+BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_B(const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *g,
+ const BIGNUM *v)
+{
+ BIGNUM *kv = NULL, *gb = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *B = NULL, *k = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
+
+ if (b == NULL || N == NULL || g == NULL || v == NULL ||
+ (bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if ((kv = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (gb = BN_new()) == NULL || (B = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* B = g**b + k*v */
+
+ if (!BN_mod_exp(gb, g, b, N, bn_ctx)
+ || (k = srp_Calc_k(N, g)) == NULL
+ || !BN_mod_mul(kv, v, k, N, bn_ctx)
+ || !BN_mod_add(B, gb, kv, N, bn_ctx)) {
+ BN_free(B);
+ B = NULL;
+ }
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ BN_clear_free(kv);
+ BN_clear_free(gb);
+ BN_free(k);
+ return B;
+}
+
+BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_x(const BIGNUM *s, const char *user, const char *pass)
+{
+ unsigned char dig[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctxt;
+ unsigned char *cs = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *res = NULL;
+
+ if ((s == NULL) || (user == NULL) || (pass == NULL))
+ return NULL;
+
+ ctxt = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (ctxt == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ if ((cs = OPENSSL_malloc(BN_num_bytes(s))) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctxt, EVP_sha1(), NULL)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctxt, user, strlen(user))
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctxt, ":", 1)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctxt, pass, strlen(pass))
+ || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctxt, dig, NULL)
+ || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctxt, EVP_sha1(), NULL))
+ goto err;
+ if (BN_bn2bin(s, cs) < 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctxt, cs, BN_num_bytes(s)))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctxt, dig, sizeof(dig))
+ || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctxt, dig, NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ res = BN_bin2bn(dig, sizeof(dig), NULL);
+
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_free(cs);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctxt);
+ return res;
+}
+
+BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_A(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *g)
+{
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
+ BIGNUM *A = NULL;
+
+ if (a == NULL || N == NULL || g == NULL || (bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if ((A = BN_new()) != NULL && !BN_mod_exp(A, g, a, N, bn_ctx)) {
+ BN_free(A);
+ A = NULL;
+ }
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ return A;
+}
+
+BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_client_key(const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *B, const BIGNUM *g,
+ const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *u)
+{
+ BIGNUM *tmp = NULL, *tmp2 = NULL, *tmp3 = NULL, *k = NULL, *K = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *xtmp = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
+
+ if (u == NULL || B == NULL || N == NULL || g == NULL || x == NULL
+ || a == NULL || (bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if ((tmp = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (tmp2 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (tmp3 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (xtmp = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ BN_with_flags(xtmp, x, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ BN_set_flags(tmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ if (!BN_mod_exp(tmp, g, xtmp, N, bn_ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if ((k = srp_Calc_k(N, g)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp2, tmp, k, N, bn_ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_mod_sub(tmp, B, tmp2, N, bn_ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_mul(tmp3, u, xtmp, bn_ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_add(tmp2, a, tmp3))
+ goto err;
+ K = BN_new();
+ if (K != NULL && !BN_mod_exp(K, tmp, tmp2, N, bn_ctx)) {
+ BN_free(K);
+ K = NULL;
+ }
+
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ BN_free(xtmp);
+ BN_clear_free(tmp);
+ BN_clear_free(tmp2);
+ BN_clear_free(tmp3);
+ BN_free(k);
+ return K;
+}
+
+int SRP_Verify_B_mod_N(const BIGNUM *B, const BIGNUM *N)
+{
+ BIGNUM *r;
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (B == NULL || N == NULL || (bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ /* Checks if B % N == 0 */
+ if (!BN_nnmod(r, B, N, bn_ctx))
+ goto err;
+ ret = !BN_is_zero(r);
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ BN_free(r);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int SRP_Verify_A_mod_N(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *N)
+{
+ /* Checks if A % N == 0 */
+ return SRP_Verify_B_mod_N(A, N);
+}
+
+static SRP_gN knowngN[] = {
+ {"8192", &bn_generator_19, &bn_group_8192},
+ {"6144", &bn_generator_5, &bn_group_6144},
+ {"4096", &bn_generator_5, &bn_group_4096},
+ {"3072", &bn_generator_5, &bn_group_3072},
+ {"2048", &bn_generator_2, &bn_group_2048},
+ {"1536", &bn_generator_2, &bn_group_1536},
+ {"1024", &bn_generator_2, &bn_group_1024},
+};
+
+# define KNOWN_GN_NUMBER sizeof(knowngN) / sizeof(SRP_gN)
+
+/*
+ * Check if G and N are known parameters. The values have been generated
+ * from the ietf-tls-srp draft version 8
+ */
+char *SRP_check_known_gN_param(const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *N)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ if ((g == NULL) || (N == NULL))
+ return 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < KNOWN_GN_NUMBER; i++) {
+ if (BN_cmp(knowngN[i].g, g) == 0 && BN_cmp(knowngN[i].N, N) == 0)
+ return knowngN[i].id;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+SRP_gN *SRP_get_default_gN(const char *id)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ if (id == NULL)
+ return knowngN;
+ for (i = 0; i < KNOWN_GN_NUMBER; i++) {
+ if (strcmp(knowngN[i].id, id) == 0)
+ return knowngN + i;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..394e118
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,731 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2004-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, EdelKey Project. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ *
+ * Originally written by Christophe Renou and Peter Sylvester,
+ * for the EdelKey project.
+ */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+# include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+# include "crypto/evp.h"
+# include <openssl/sha.h>
+# include <openssl/srp.h>
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/buffer.h>
+# include <openssl/rand.h>
+# include <openssl/txt_db.h>
+# include <openssl/err.h>
+
+# define SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN 20
+# define MAX_LEN 2500
+
+/*
+ * Note that SRP uses its own variant of base 64 encoding. A different base64
+ * alphabet is used and no padding '=' characters are added. Instead we pad to
+ * the front with 0 bytes and subsequently strip off leading encoded padding.
+ * This variant is used for compatibility with other SRP implementations -
+ * notably libsrp, but also others. It is also required for backwards
+ * compatibility in order to load verifier files from other OpenSSL versions.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Convert a base64 string into raw byte array representation.
+ * Returns the length of the decoded data, or -1 on error.
+ */
+static int t_fromb64(unsigned char *a, size_t alen, const char *src)
+{
+ EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx;
+ int outl = 0, outl2 = 0;
+ size_t size, padsize;
+ const unsigned char *pad = (const unsigned char *)"00";
+
+ while (*src == ' ' || *src == '\t' || *src == '\n')
+ ++src;
+ size = strlen(src);
+ padsize = 4 - (size & 3);
+ padsize &= 3;
+
+ /* Four bytes in src become three bytes output. */
+ if (size > INT_MAX || ((size + padsize) / 4) * 3 > alen)
+ return -1;
+
+ ctx = EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ /*
+ * This should never occur because 1 byte of data always requires 2 bytes of
+ * encoding, i.e.
+ * 0 bytes unencoded = 0 bytes encoded
+ * 1 byte unencoded = 2 bytes encoded
+ * 2 bytes unencoded = 3 bytes encoded
+ * 3 bytes unencoded = 4 bytes encoded
+ * 4 bytes unencoded = 6 bytes encoded
+ * etc
+ */
+ if (padsize == 3) {
+ outl = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Valid padsize values are now 0, 1 or 2 */
+
+ EVP_DecodeInit(ctx);
+ evp_encode_ctx_set_flags(ctx, EVP_ENCODE_CTX_USE_SRP_ALPHABET);
+
+ /* Add any encoded padding that is required */
+ if (padsize != 0
+ && EVP_DecodeUpdate(ctx, a, &outl, pad, padsize) < 0) {
+ outl = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EVP_DecodeUpdate(ctx, a, &outl2, (const unsigned char *)src, size) < 0) {
+ outl = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ outl += outl2;
+ EVP_DecodeFinal(ctx, a + outl, &outl2);
+ outl += outl2;
+
+ /* Strip off the leading padding */
+ if (padsize != 0) {
+ if ((int)padsize >= outl) {
+ outl = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we added 1 byte of padding prior to encoding then we have 2 bytes
+ * of "real" data which gets spread across 4 encoded bytes like this:
+ * (6 bits pad)(2 bits pad | 4 bits data)(6 bits data)(6 bits data)
+ * So 1 byte of pre-encoding padding results in 1 full byte of encoded
+ * padding.
+ * If we added 2 bytes of padding prior to encoding this gets encoded
+ * as:
+ * (6 bits pad)(6 bits pad)(4 bits pad | 2 bits data)(6 bits data)
+ * So 2 bytes of pre-encoding padding results in 2 full bytes of encoded
+ * padding, i.e. we have to strip the same number of bytes of padding
+ * from the encoded data as we added to the pre-encoded data.
+ */
+ memmove(a, a + padsize, outl - padsize);
+ outl -= padsize;
+ }
+
+ err:
+ EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+ return outl;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert a raw byte string into a null-terminated base64 ASCII string.
+ * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error.
+ */
+static int t_tob64(char *dst, const unsigned char *src, int size)
+{
+ EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx = EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new();
+ int outl = 0, outl2 = 0;
+ unsigned char pad[2] = {0, 0};
+ size_t leadz = 0;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ EVP_EncodeInit(ctx);
+ evp_encode_ctx_set_flags(ctx, EVP_ENCODE_CTX_NO_NEWLINES
+ | EVP_ENCODE_CTX_USE_SRP_ALPHABET);
+
+ /*
+ * We pad at the front with zero bytes until the length is a multiple of 3
+ * so that EVP_EncodeUpdate/EVP_EncodeFinal does not add any of its own "="
+ * padding
+ */
+ leadz = 3 - (size % 3);
+ if (leadz != 3
+ && !EVP_EncodeUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)dst, &outl, pad,
+ leadz)) {
+ EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!EVP_EncodeUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)dst + outl, &outl2, src,
+ size)) {
+ EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ outl += outl2;
+ EVP_EncodeFinal(ctx, (unsigned char *)dst + outl, &outl2);
+ outl += outl2;
+
+ /* Strip the encoded padding at the front */
+ if (leadz != 3) {
+ memmove(dst, dst + leadz, outl - leadz);
+ dst[outl - leadz] = '\0';
+ }
+
+ EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void SRP_user_pwd_free(SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd)
+{
+ if (user_pwd == NULL)
+ return;
+ BN_free(user_pwd->s);
+ BN_clear_free(user_pwd->v);
+ OPENSSL_free(user_pwd->id);
+ OPENSSL_free(user_pwd->info);
+ OPENSSL_free(user_pwd);
+}
+
+static SRP_user_pwd *SRP_user_pwd_new(void)
+{
+ SRP_user_pwd *ret;
+
+ if ((ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) {
+ /* SRPerr(SRP_F_SRP_USER_PWD_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); */ /*ckerr_ignore*/
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ret->N = NULL;
+ ret->g = NULL;
+ ret->s = NULL;
+ ret->v = NULL;
+ ret->id = NULL;
+ ret->info = NULL;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const BIGNUM *g,
+ const BIGNUM *N)
+{
+ vinfo->N = N;
+ vinfo->g = g;
+}
+
+static int SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const char *id,
+ const char *info)
+{
+ if (id != NULL && NULL == (vinfo->id = OPENSSL_strdup(id)))
+ return 0;
+ return (info == NULL || NULL != (vinfo->info = OPENSSL_strdup(info)));
+}
+
+static int SRP_user_pwd_set_sv(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const char *s,
+ const char *v)
+{
+ unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN];
+ int len;
+
+ vinfo->v = NULL;
+ vinfo->s = NULL;
+
+ len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), v);
+ if (len < 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (NULL == (vinfo->v = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL)))
+ return 0;
+ len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), s);
+ if (len < 0)
+ goto err;
+ vinfo->s = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL);
+ if (vinfo->s == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ BN_free(vinfo->v);
+ vinfo->v = NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int SRP_user_pwd_set_sv_BN(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, BIGNUM *s, BIGNUM *v)
+{
+ vinfo->v = v;
+ vinfo->s = s;
+ return (vinfo->s != NULL && vinfo->v != NULL);
+}
+
+static SRP_user_pwd *srp_user_pwd_dup(SRP_user_pwd *src)
+{
+ SRP_user_pwd *ret;
+
+ if (src == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ if ((ret = SRP_user_pwd_new()) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(ret, src->g, src->N);
+ if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(ret, src->id, src->info)
+ || !SRP_user_pwd_set_sv_BN(ret, BN_dup(src->s), BN_dup(src->v))) {
+ SRP_user_pwd_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+SRP_VBASE *SRP_VBASE_new(char *seed_key)
+{
+ SRP_VBASE *vb = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*vb));
+
+ if (vb == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ if ((vb->users_pwd = sk_SRP_user_pwd_new_null()) == NULL
+ || (vb->gN_cache = sk_SRP_gN_cache_new_null()) == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(vb);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ vb->default_g = NULL;
+ vb->default_N = NULL;
+ vb->seed_key = NULL;
+ if ((seed_key != NULL) && (vb->seed_key = OPENSSL_strdup(seed_key)) == NULL) {
+ sk_SRP_user_pwd_free(vb->users_pwd);
+ sk_SRP_gN_cache_free(vb->gN_cache);
+ OPENSSL_free(vb);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return vb;
+}
+
+void SRP_VBASE_free(SRP_VBASE *vb)
+{
+ if (!vb)
+ return;
+ sk_SRP_user_pwd_pop_free(vb->users_pwd, SRP_user_pwd_free);
+ sk_SRP_gN_cache_free(vb->gN_cache);
+ OPENSSL_free(vb->seed_key);
+ OPENSSL_free(vb);
+}
+
+static SRP_gN_cache *SRP_gN_new_init(const char *ch)
+{
+ unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN];
+ int len;
+ SRP_gN_cache *newgN = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*newgN));
+
+ if (newgN == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), ch);
+ if (len < 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if ((newgN->b64_bn = OPENSSL_strdup(ch)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if ((newgN->bn = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL)))
+ return newgN;
+
+ OPENSSL_free(newgN->b64_bn);
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_free(newgN);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void SRP_gN_free(SRP_gN_cache *gN_cache)
+{
+ if (gN_cache == NULL)
+ return;
+ OPENSSL_free(gN_cache->b64_bn);
+ BN_free(gN_cache->bn);
+ OPENSSL_free(gN_cache);
+}
+
+static SRP_gN *SRP_get_gN_by_id(const char *id, STACK_OF(SRP_gN) *gN_tab)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ SRP_gN *gN;
+ if (gN_tab != NULL)
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SRP_gN_num(gN_tab); i++) {
+ gN = sk_SRP_gN_value(gN_tab, i);
+ if (gN && (id == NULL || strcmp(gN->id, id) == 0))
+ return gN;
+ }
+
+ return SRP_get_default_gN(id);
+}
+
+static BIGNUM *SRP_gN_place_bn(STACK_OF(SRP_gN_cache) *gN_cache, char *ch)
+{
+ int i;
+ if (gN_cache == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* search if we have already one... */
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SRP_gN_cache_num(gN_cache); i++) {
+ SRP_gN_cache *cache = sk_SRP_gN_cache_value(gN_cache, i);
+ if (strcmp(cache->b64_bn, ch) == 0)
+ return cache->bn;
+ }
+ { /* it is the first time that we find it */
+ SRP_gN_cache *newgN = SRP_gN_new_init(ch);
+ if (newgN) {
+ if (sk_SRP_gN_cache_insert(gN_cache, newgN, 0) > 0)
+ return newgN->bn;
+ SRP_gN_free(newgN);
+ }
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * this function parses verifier file. Format is:
+ * string(index):base64(N):base64(g):0
+ * string(username):base64(v):base64(salt):int(index)
+ */
+
+int SRP_VBASE_init(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *verifier_file)
+{
+ int error_code;
+ STACK_OF(SRP_gN) *SRP_gN_tab = sk_SRP_gN_new_null();
+ char *last_index = NULL;
+ int i;
+ char **pp;
+
+ SRP_gN *gN = NULL;
+ SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd = NULL;
+
+ TXT_DB *tmpdb = NULL;
+ BIO *in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+
+ error_code = SRP_ERR_OPEN_FILE;
+
+ if (in == NULL || BIO_read_filename(in, verifier_file) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ error_code = SRP_ERR_VBASE_INCOMPLETE_FILE;
+
+ if ((tmpdb = TXT_DB_read(in, DB_NUMBER)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ error_code = SRP_ERR_MEMORY;
+
+ if (vb->seed_key) {
+ last_index = SRP_get_default_gN(NULL)->id;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(tmpdb->data); i++) {
+ pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(tmpdb->data, i);
+ if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_INDEX) {
+ /*
+ * we add this couple in the internal Stack
+ */
+
+ if ((gN = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*gN))) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if ((gN->id = OPENSSL_strdup(pp[DB_srpid])) == NULL
+ || (gN->N = SRP_gN_place_bn(vb->gN_cache, pp[DB_srpverifier]))
+ == NULL
+ || (gN->g = SRP_gN_place_bn(vb->gN_cache, pp[DB_srpsalt]))
+ == NULL
+ || sk_SRP_gN_insert(SRP_gN_tab, gN, 0) == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ gN = NULL;
+
+ if (vb->seed_key != NULL) {
+ last_index = pp[DB_srpid];
+ }
+ } else if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_VALID) {
+ /* it is a user .... */
+ const SRP_gN *lgN;
+
+ if ((lgN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(pp[DB_srpgN], SRP_gN_tab)) != NULL) {
+ error_code = SRP_ERR_MEMORY;
+ if ((user_pwd = SRP_user_pwd_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(user_pwd, lgN->g, lgN->N);
+ if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids
+ (user_pwd, pp[DB_srpid], pp[DB_srpinfo]))
+ goto err;
+
+ error_code = SRP_ERR_VBASE_BN_LIB;
+ if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_sv
+ (user_pwd, pp[DB_srpsalt], pp[DB_srpverifier]))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (sk_SRP_user_pwd_insert(vb->users_pwd, user_pwd, 0) == 0)
+ goto err;
+ user_pwd = NULL; /* abandon responsibility */
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (last_index != NULL) {
+ /* this means that we want to simulate a default user */
+
+ if (((gN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(last_index, SRP_gN_tab)) == NULL)) {
+ error_code = SRP_ERR_VBASE_BN_LIB;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ vb->default_g = gN->g;
+ vb->default_N = gN->N;
+ gN = NULL;
+ }
+ error_code = SRP_NO_ERROR;
+
+ err:
+ /*
+ * there may be still some leaks to fix, if this fails, the application
+ * terminates most likely
+ */
+
+ if (gN != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(gN->id);
+ OPENSSL_free(gN);
+ }
+
+ SRP_user_pwd_free(user_pwd);
+
+ TXT_DB_free(tmpdb);
+ BIO_free_all(in);
+
+ sk_SRP_gN_free(SRP_gN_tab);
+
+ return error_code;
+
+}
+
+static SRP_user_pwd *find_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username)
+{
+ int i;
+ SRP_user_pwd *user;
+
+ if (vb == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SRP_user_pwd_num(vb->users_pwd); i++) {
+ user = sk_SRP_user_pwd_value(vb->users_pwd, i);
+ if (strcmp(user->id, username) == 0)
+ return user;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+/*
+ * DEPRECATED: use SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user instead.
+ * This method ignores the configured seed and fails for an unknown user.
+ * Ownership of the returned pointer is not released to the caller.
+ * In other words, caller must not free the result.
+ */
+SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username)
+{
+ return find_user(vb, username);
+}
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * Ownership of the returned pointer is released to the caller.
+ * In other words, caller must free the result once done.
+ */
+SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username)
+{
+ SRP_user_pwd *user;
+ unsigned char digv[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char digs[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctxt = NULL;
+
+ if (vb == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if ((user = find_user(vb, username)) != NULL)
+ return srp_user_pwd_dup(user);
+
+ if ((vb->seed_key == NULL) ||
+ (vb->default_g == NULL) || (vb->default_N == NULL))
+ return NULL;
+
+/* if the user is unknown we set parameters as well if we have a seed_key */
+
+ if ((user = SRP_user_pwd_new()) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(user, vb->default_g, vb->default_N);
+
+ if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(user, username, NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (RAND_priv_bytes(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ ctxt = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (ctxt == NULL
+ || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctxt, EVP_sha1(), NULL)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctxt, vb->seed_key, strlen(vb->seed_key))
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctxt, username, strlen(username))
+ || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctxt, digs, NULL))
+ goto err;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctxt);
+ ctxt = NULL;
+ if (SRP_user_pwd_set_sv_BN(user,
+ BN_bin2bn(digs, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, NULL),
+ BN_bin2bn(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, NULL)))
+ return user;
+
+ err:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctxt);
+ SRP_user_pwd_free(user);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * create a verifier (*salt,*verifier,g and N are in base64)
+ */
+char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
+ char **verifier, const char *N, const char *g)
+{
+ int len;
+ char *result = NULL, *vf = NULL;
+ const BIGNUM *N_bn = NULL, *g_bn = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *N_bn_alloc = NULL, *g_bn_alloc = NULL, *s = NULL, *v = NULL;
+ unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN];
+ unsigned char tmp2[MAX_LEN];
+ char *defgNid = NULL;
+ int vfsize = 0;
+
+ if ((user == NULL) ||
+ (pass == NULL) || (salt == NULL) || (verifier == NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (N) {
+ if ((len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), N)) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ N_bn_alloc = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL);
+ if (N_bn_alloc == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ N_bn = N_bn_alloc;
+ if ((len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp) ,g)) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ g_bn_alloc = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL);
+ if (g_bn_alloc == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ g_bn = g_bn_alloc;
+ defgNid = "*";
+ } else {
+ SRP_gN *gN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(g, NULL);
+ if (gN == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ N_bn = gN->N;
+ g_bn = gN->g;
+ defgNid = gN->id;
+ }
+
+ if (*salt == NULL) {
+ if (RAND_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ s = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL);
+ } else {
+ if ((len = t_fromb64(tmp2, sizeof(tmp2), *salt)) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ s = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, len, NULL);
+ }
+ if (s == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!SRP_create_verifier_BN(user, pass, &s, &v, N_bn, g_bn))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BN_bn2bin(v, tmp) < 0)
+ goto err;
+ vfsize = BN_num_bytes(v) * 2;
+ if (((vf = OPENSSL_malloc(vfsize)) == NULL))
+ goto err;
+ if (!t_tob64(vf, tmp, BN_num_bytes(v)))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (*salt == NULL) {
+ char *tmp_salt;
+
+ if ((tmp_salt = OPENSSL_malloc(SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN * 2)) == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!t_tob64(tmp_salt, tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(tmp_salt);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ *salt = tmp_salt;
+ }
+
+ *verifier = vf;
+ vf = NULL;
+ result = defgNid;
+
+ err:
+ BN_free(N_bn_alloc);
+ BN_free(g_bn_alloc);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(vf, vfsize);
+ BN_clear_free(s);
+ BN_clear_free(v);
+ return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * create a verifier (*salt,*verifier,g and N are BIGNUMs). If *salt != NULL
+ * then the provided salt will be used. On successful exit *verifier will point
+ * to a newly allocated BIGNUM containing the verifier and (if a salt was not
+ * provided) *salt will be populated with a newly allocated BIGNUM containing a
+ * random salt.
+ * The caller is responsible for freeing the allocated *salt and *verifier
+ * BIGNUMS.
+ */
+int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
+ BIGNUM **verifier, const BIGNUM *N,
+ const BIGNUM *g)
+{
+ int result = 0;
+ BIGNUM *x = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ unsigned char tmp2[MAX_LEN];
+ BIGNUM *salttmp = NULL, *verif;
+
+ if ((user == NULL) ||
+ (pass == NULL) ||
+ (salt == NULL) ||
+ (verifier == NULL) || (N == NULL) || (g == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (*salt == NULL) {
+ if (RAND_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ salttmp = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL);
+ if (salttmp == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ salttmp = *salt;
+ }
+
+ x = SRP_Calc_x(salttmp, user, pass);
+ if (x == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ verif = BN_new();
+ if (verif == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_mod_exp(verif, g, x, N, bn_ctx)) {
+ BN_clear_free(verif);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ result = 1;
+ *salt = salttmp;
+ *verifier = verif;
+
+ err:
+ if (salt != NULL && *salt != salttmp)
+ BN_clear_free(salttmp);
+ BN_clear_free(x);
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ return result;
+}
+
+#endif