[T106][ZXW-22]7520V3SCV2.01.01.02P42U09_VEC_V0.8_AP_VEC origin source commit
Change-Id: Ic6e05d89ecd62fc34f82b23dcf306c93764aec4b
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/ssl/t1_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5f657f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2923 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "internal/nelem.h"
+#include "ssl_local.h"
+#include <openssl/ct.h>
+
+static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu);
+
+SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
+ tls1_enc,
+ tls1_mac,
+ tls1_setup_key_block,
+ tls1_generate_master_secret,
+ tls1_change_cipher_state,
+ tls1_final_finish_mac,
+ TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+ TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+ tls1_alert_code,
+ tls1_export_keying_material,
+ 0,
+ ssl3_set_handshake_header,
+ tls_close_construct_packet,
+ ssl3_handshake_write
+};
+
+SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
+ tls1_enc,
+ tls1_mac,
+ tls1_setup_key_block,
+ tls1_generate_master_secret,
+ tls1_change_cipher_state,
+ tls1_final_finish_mac,
+ TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+ TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+ tls1_alert_code,
+ tls1_export_keying_material,
+ SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
+ ssl3_set_handshake_header,
+ tls_close_construct_packet,
+ ssl3_handshake_write
+};
+
+SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
+ tls1_enc,
+ tls1_mac,
+ tls1_setup_key_block,
+ tls1_generate_master_secret,
+ tls1_change_cipher_state,
+ tls1_final_finish_mac,
+ TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+ TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+ tls1_alert_code,
+ tls1_export_keying_material,
+ SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
+ | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
+ ssl3_set_handshake_header,
+ tls_close_construct_packet,
+ ssl3_handshake_write
+};
+
+SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
+ tls13_enc,
+ tls1_mac,
+ tls13_setup_key_block,
+ tls13_generate_master_secret,
+ tls13_change_cipher_state,
+ tls13_final_finish_mac,
+ TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+ TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+ tls13_alert_code,
+ tls13_export_keying_material,
+ SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
+ ssl3_set_handshake_header,
+ tls_close_construct_packet,
+ ssl3_handshake_write
+};
+
+long tls1_default_timeout(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
+ * http, the cache would over fill
+ */
+ return (60 * 60 * 2);
+}
+
+int tls1_new(SSL *s)
+{
+ if (!ssl3_new(s))
+ return 0;
+ if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void tls1_free(SSL *s)
+{
+ OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
+ ssl3_free(s);
+}
+
+int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
+{
+ if (!ssl3_clear(s))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
+ s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
+ else
+ s->version = s->method->version;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+
+/*
+ * Table of curve information.
+ * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
+ * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
+ */
+static const TLS_GROUP_INFO nid_list[] = {
+ {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
+ {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
+ {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
+ {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
+ {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
+ {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
+ {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
+ {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
+ {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
+ {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
+ {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
+ {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
+ {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
+ {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
+ {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
+ {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
+ {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
+ {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
+ {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
+ {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
+ {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
+ {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
+ {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
+ {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
+ {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
+ {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
+ {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
+ {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
+ {EVP_PKEY_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
+ {EVP_PKEY_X448, 224, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X448 (30) */
+};
+
+static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
+ TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
+ TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
+ TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
+};
+
+/* The default curves */
+static const uint16_t eccurves_default[] = {
+ 29, /* X25519 (29) */
+ 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
+ 30, /* X448 (30) */
+ 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
+ 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
+};
+
+static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
+ TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
+ TLSEXT_curve_P_384
+};
+
+const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(uint16_t group_id)
+{
+ /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
+ if (group_id < 1 || group_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list))
+ return NULL;
+ return &nid_list[group_id - 1];
+}
+
+static uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
+ if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
+ return (uint16_t)(i + 1);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
+ * the number of groups supported.
+ */
+void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL *s, const uint16_t **pgroups,
+ size_t *pgroupslen)
+{
+
+ /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
+ switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
+ case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
+ *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
+ *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
+ *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
+ *pgroupslen = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
+ *pgroups = suiteb_curves + 1;
+ *pgroupslen = 1;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) {
+ *pgroups = eccurves_default;
+ *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(eccurves_default);
+ } else {
+ *pgroups = s->ext.supportedgroups;
+ *pgroupslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+/* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
+int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t curve, int op)
+{
+ const TLS_GROUP_INFO *cinfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(curve);
+ unsigned char ctmp[2];
+
+ if (cinfo == NULL)
+ return 0;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
+ return 0;
+# endif
+ ctmp[0] = curve >> 8;
+ ctmp[1] = curve & 0xff;
+ return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)ctmp);
+}
+
+/* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
+static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id, const uint16_t *list, size_t listlen)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ for (i = 0; i < listlen; i++)
+ if (list[i] == id)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
+ * if there is no match.
+ * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
+ * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
+ * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
+ */
+uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
+{
+ const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
+ size_t num_pref, num_supp, i;
+ int k;
+
+ /* Can't do anything on client side */
+ if (s->server == 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (nmatch == -2) {
+ if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
+ /*
+ * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
+ * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
+ */
+ unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
+
+ if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
+ return TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
+ if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
+ return TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
+ /* Should never happen */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
+ nmatch = 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
+ * otherwise peer decides.
+ */
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
+ tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
+ tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
+ } else {
+ tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
+ tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
+ }
+
+ for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
+ uint16_t id = pref[i];
+
+ if (!tls1_in_list(id, supp, num_supp)
+ || !tls_curve_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
+ continue;
+ if (nmatch == k)
+ return id;
+ k++;
+ }
+ if (nmatch == -1)
+ return k;
+ /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
+ int *groups, size_t ngroups)
+{
+ uint16_t *glist;
+ size_t i;
+ /*
+ * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
+ * ids < 32
+ */
+ unsigned long dup_list = 0;
+
+ if (ngroups == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist))) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
+ unsigned long idmask;
+ uint16_t id;
+ /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
+ id = tls1_nid2group_id(groups[i]);
+ idmask = 1L << id;
+ if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(glist);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ dup_list |= idmask;
+ glist[i] = id;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(*pext);
+ *pext = glist;
+ *pextlen = ngroups;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+# define MAX_CURVELIST OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)
+
+typedef struct {
+ size_t nidcnt;
+ int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
+} nid_cb_st;
+
+static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
+{
+ nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
+ size_t i;
+ int nid;
+ char etmp[20];
+ if (elem == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
+ return 0;
+ if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
+ return 0;
+ memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
+ etmp[len] = 0;
+ nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
+ if (nid == NID_undef)
+ nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
+ if (nid == NID_undef)
+ nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
+ if (nid == NID_undef)
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
+ if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
+ return 0;
+ narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
+int tls1_set_groups_list(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
+{
+ nid_cb_st ncb;
+ ncb.nidcnt = 0;
+ if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
+ return 0;
+ if (pext == NULL)
+ return 1;
+ return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
+}
+/* Return group id of a key */
+static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
+ const EC_GROUP *grp;
+
+ if (ec == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
+ return tls1_nid2group_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp));
+}
+
+/* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
+static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ const EC_KEY *ec;
+ const EC_GROUP *grp;
+ unsigned char comp_id;
+ size_t i;
+
+ /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
+ return 1;
+ ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
+ grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
+
+ /* Get required compression id */
+ if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
+ comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
+ } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ /*
+ * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
+ * this check.
+ */
+ return 1;
+ } else {
+ int field_type = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(grp));
+
+ if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
+ comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
+ else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
+ comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
+ else
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
+ * supported (see RFC4492).
+ */
+ if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len; i++) {
+ if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats[i] == comp_id)
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check a group id matches preferences */
+int tls1_check_group_id(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int check_own_groups)
+ {
+ const uint16_t *groups;
+ size_t groups_len;
+
+ if (group_id == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Check for Suite B compliance */
+ if (tls1_suiteb(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
+ unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
+
+ if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
+ if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
+ return 0;
+ } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
+ if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ /* Should never happen */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (check_own_groups) {
+ /* Check group is one of our preferences */
+ tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
+ if (!tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* For clients, nothing more to check */
+ if (!s->server)
+ return 1;
+
+ /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
+ tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
+
+ /*
+ * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
+ * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
+ * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
+ * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
+ */
+ if (groups_len == 0)
+ return 1;
+ return tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len);
+}
+
+void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
+ size_t *num_formats)
+{
+ /*
+ * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
+ */
+ if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
+ *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
+ *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
+ } else {
+ *pformats = ecformats_default;
+ /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
+ if (tls1_suiteb(s))
+ *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
+ else
+ *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
+ * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
+ */
+static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
+{
+ uint16_t group_id;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+ pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
+ if (pkey == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ /* If not EC nothing to do */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
+ return 1;
+ /* Check compression */
+ if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey))
+ return 0;
+ group_id = tls1_get_group_id(pkey);
+ /*
+ * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
+ * groups.
+ */
+ if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, group_id, !s->server))
+ return 0;
+ /*
+ * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
+ * SHA384+P-384.
+ */
+ if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
+ int check_md;
+ size_t i;
+
+ /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
+ if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
+ check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
+ else if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
+ check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
+ else
+ return 0; /* Should never happen */
+ for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
+ if (check_md == s->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
+ return 1;;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
+ * @s: SSL connection
+ * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
+ *
+ * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
+ * is compatible with the client extensions.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
+ */
+int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
+{
+ /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
+ if (!tls1_suiteb(s))
+ return tls1_shared_group(s, 0) != 0;
+ /*
+ * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
+ * curves permitted.
+ */
+ if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
+ return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_256, 1);
+ if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
+ return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_384, 1);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#else
+
+static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+/* Default sigalg schemes */
+static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
+#endif
+
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
+
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
+#endif
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
+
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
+#endif
+};
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
+};
+#endif
+
+static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
+ NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
+ NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
+ {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
+ NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
+ NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1},
+ {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
+ NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
+ NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1},
+ {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
+ NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
+ NID_undef, NID_undef},
+ {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
+ NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448, SSL_PKEY_ED448,
+ NID_undef, NID_undef},
+ {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
+ NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
+ NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef},
+ {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
+ NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
+ NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef},
+#endif
+ {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
+ NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
+ NID_undef, NID_undef},
+ {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
+ NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
+ NID_undef, NID_undef},
+ {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
+ NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
+ NID_undef, NID_undef},
+ {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
+ NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
+ NID_undef, NID_undef},
+ {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
+ NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
+ NID_undef, NID_undef},
+ {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
+ NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
+ NID_undef, NID_undef},
+ {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
+ NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
+ NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
+ {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
+ NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
+ NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
+ {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
+ NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
+ NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
+ {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
+ NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
+ NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
+ {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
+ NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
+ NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
+ NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
+ NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef},
+ {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
+ NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
+ NID_undef, NID_undef},
+ {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
+ NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
+ NID_undef, NID_undef},
+ {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
+ NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
+ NID_undef, NID_undef},
+ {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
+ NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
+ NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+ {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
+ NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
+ NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
+ NID_undef, NID_undef},
+ {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
+ NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
+ NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
+ NID_undef, NID_undef},
+ {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
+ NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
+ NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
+ NID_undef, NID_undef}
+#endif
+};
+/* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
+static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
+ "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
+ NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
+ EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
+ NID_undef, NID_undef
+};
+
+/*
+ * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
+ * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
+ */
+static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
+ 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
+ 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
+ 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
+};
+
+/* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
+static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
+
+ for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
+ i++, s++) {
+ if (s->sigalg == sigalg)
+ return s;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+/* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
+int tls1_lookup_md(const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
+{
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ if (lu == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
+ if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
+ md = NULL;
+ } else {
+ md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx);
+ if (md == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (pmd)
+ *pmd = md;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
+ *
+ * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
+ * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
+ * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
+ */
+#define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2)
+static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(const RSA *rsa, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
+{
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+
+ if (rsa == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md) || md == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (RSA_size(rsa) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
+ * signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
+ * type. |idx| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When |idx| is -1 the
+ * certificate type from |s| will be used.
+ * Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
+ */
+static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx)
+{
+ if (idx == -1) {
+ if (s->server) {
+ size_t i;
+
+ /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+ const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i);
+
+ if (clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
+ idx = i;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
+ * */
+ if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST01 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aGOST01) {
+ int real_idx;
+
+ for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
+ real_idx--) {
+ if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
+ idx = real_idx;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
+ }
+ }
+ if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
+ return NULL;
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
+
+ if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
+ return NULL;
+ if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
+ return NULL;
+ return lu;
+ }
+ if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, &legacy_rsa_sigalg))
+ return NULL;
+ return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
+}
+/* Set peer sigalg based key type */
+int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ size_t idx;
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
+
+ if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
+ if (lu == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
+{
+ /*
+ * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
+ * preferences.
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
+ case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
+ *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
+ return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
+
+ case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
+ *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
+ return 1;
+
+ case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
+ *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
+ return 1;
+ }
+#endif
+ /*
+ * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
+ * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
+ * determining which shared algorithm to use.
+ */
+ if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
+ *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
+ return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
+ } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
+ *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
+ return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
+ } else {
+ *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
+ return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
+ }
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+/*
+ * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
+ * specified EC curve.
+ */
+int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL *s, int curve)
+{
+ const uint16_t *sigs;
+ size_t siglen, i;
+
+ if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
+ sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
+ siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
+ } else {
+ sigs = tls12_sigalgs;
+ siglen = OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < siglen; i++) {
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sigs[i]);
+
+ if (lu == NULL)
+ continue;
+ if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC
+ && lu->curve != NID_undef
+ && curve == lu->curve)
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Return the number of security bits for the signature algorithm, or 0 on
+ * error.
+ */
+static int sigalg_security_bits(const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
+{
+ const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+ int secbits = 0;
+
+ if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md))
+ return 0;
+ if (md != NULL)
+ {
+ /* Security bits: half digest bits */
+ secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
+ } else {
+ /* Values from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-8.5 */
+ if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519)
+ secbits = 128;
+ else if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448)
+ secbits = 224;
+ }
+ return secbits;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
+ * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
+ * s.
+ */
+int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
+ const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+ char sigalgstr[2];
+ size_t sent_sigslen, i, cidx;
+ int pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
+ int secbits = 0;
+
+ /* Should never happen */
+ if (pkeyid == -1)
+ return -1;
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
+ if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
+ if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+ pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
+ }
+ lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig);
+ /*
+ * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
+ * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
+ */
+ if (lu == NULL
+ || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224))
+ || (pkeyid != lu->sig
+ && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
+ if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_id(pkey), &cidx)
+ || lu->sig_idx != (int)cidx) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+
+ /* Check point compression is permitted */
+ if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+ SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
+ SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || tls1_suiteb(s)) {
+ EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
+ int curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
+
+ if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+ SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ /* Check curve matches extensions */
+ if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, tls1_get_group_id(pkey), 1)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+ SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
+ /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
+ if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
+ && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
+ sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
+ for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
+ if (sig == *sent_sigs)
+ break;
+ }
+ /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
+ if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
+ || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
+ SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
+ * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
+ */
+ sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
+ sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
+ secbits = sigalg_security_bits(lu);
+ if (secbits == 0 ||
+ !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits,
+ md != NULL ? EVP_MD_type(md) : NID_undef,
+ (void *)sigalgstr)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
+ s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
+{
+ if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ *pnid = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
+{
+ if (s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ *pnid = s->s3->tmp.sigalg->sig;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
+ * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
+ * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
+ *
+ * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
+ * by the client.
+ *
+ * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
+ */
+int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
+{
+ s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
+ s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
+ ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
+ if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver,
+ &s->s3->tmp.max_ver, NULL) != 0)
+ return 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
+ if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
+ s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
+ s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
+ s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
+ s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
+ }
+#endif
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
+ * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
+ * @c: cipher to check
+ * @op: Security check that you want to do
+ * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
+ *
+ * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
+ */
+int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
+{
+ if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
+ || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
+ return 1;
+ if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
+ return 1;
+ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ int min_tls = c->min_tls;
+
+ /*
+ * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
+ * in SSLv3 if we are a client
+ */
+ if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
+ && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
+ min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
+
+ if ((min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver))
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
+ || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
+ return 1;
+
+ return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
+}
+
+int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
+{
+ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
+ return 0;
+ return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
+}
+
+int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
+ OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
+ s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
+ s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
+ /* Clear certificate validity flags */
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+ s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
+ /*
+ * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
+ * the default algorithm for each certificate type
+ */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs == NULL
+ && s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
+ const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
+ size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
+ size_t j;
+
+ if (lu == NULL)
+ continue;
+ /* Check default matches a type we sent */
+ for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
+ if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
+ s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (s->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
+ SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
+ *
+ * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
+ * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
+ * point to the resulting session.
+ */
+SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
+ SSL_SESSION **ret)
+{
+ size_t size;
+ RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
+
+ *ret = NULL;
+ s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
+ * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
+ * resumption.
+ */
+ if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
+ return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
+
+ ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
+ if (!ticketext->present)
+ return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
+
+ size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
+
+ return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
+ hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
+ *
+ * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
+ * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
+ * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
+ * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
+ *
+ * Side effects:
+ * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
+ * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
+ * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
+ * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
+ * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
+ * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
+ *
+ * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
+ * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
+ * sess_id: points at the session ID.
+ * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
+ * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
+ * point to the resulting session.
+ */
+SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
+ size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
+ size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
+{
+ SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
+ unsigned char *sdec;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
+ SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
+ size_t mlen;
+ unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
+
+ if (eticklen == 0) {
+ /*
+ * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
+ * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
+ */
+ ret = SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
+ /*
+ * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
+ * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
+ * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
+ * calculate the master secret later.
+ */
+ ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* Need at least keyname + iv */
+ if (eticklen < TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
+ ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
+ hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
+ if (hctx == NULL) {
+ ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
+ unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
+ int rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick,
+ nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
+ ctx, hctx, 0);
+ if (rv < 0) {
+ ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (rv == 0) {
+ ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (rv == 2)
+ renew_ticket = 1;
+ } else {
+ /* Check key name matches */
+ if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) != 0) {
+ ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
+ sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
+ EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
+ tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
+ etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) <= 0) {
+ ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
+ renew_ticket = 1;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
+ * checks on ticket.
+ */
+ mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
+ if (mlen == 0) {
+ ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
+ if (eticklen <=
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
+ ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ eticklen -= mlen;
+ /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
+ if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
+ || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
+ ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
+ ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
+ /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
+ p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
+ eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
+ sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
+ if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
+ (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
+ OPENSSL_free(sdec);
+ ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
+ OPENSSL_free(sdec);
+ ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ slen += declen;
+ p = sdec;
+
+ sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
+ slen -= p - sdec;
+ OPENSSL_free(sdec);
+ if (sess) {
+ /* Some additional consistency checks */
+ if (slen != 0) {
+ SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+ sess = NULL;
+ ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ /*
+ * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
+ * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
+ * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
+ * standard.
+ */
+ if (sesslen) {
+ memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
+ sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
+ }
+ if (renew_ticket)
+ ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
+ else
+ ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ /*
+ * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
+ */
+ ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
+
+ end:
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+ HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
+
+ /*
+ * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
+ * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
+ * performs any action
+ */
+ if (s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb != NULL
+ && (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
+ || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
+ || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
+ || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)) {
+ size_t keyname_len = eticklen;
+ int retcb;
+
+ if (keyname_len > TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH)
+ keyname_len = TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH;
+ retcb = s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb(s, sess, etick, keyname_len,
+ ret,
+ s->session_ctx->ticket_cb_data);
+ switch (retcb) {
+ case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT:
+ ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE:
+ ret = SSL_TICKET_NONE;
+ SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+ sess = NULL;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW:
+ if (ret != SSL_TICKET_EMPTY && ret != SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
+ ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
+ /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
+ SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+ sess = NULL;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE:
+ case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW:
+ if (ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
+ && ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)
+ ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
+ else if (retcb == SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE)
+ ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
+ else
+ ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (s->ext.session_secret_cb == NULL || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ switch (ret) {
+ case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
+ case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
+ case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY:
+ s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *psess = sess;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
+static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
+{
+ unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
+ int secbits;
+
+ /* See if sigalgs is recognised and if hash is enabled */
+ if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
+ return 0;
+ /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
+ return 0;
+ /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */
+ if (!s->server && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
+ && (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
+ || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
+ || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
+ if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(lu->sig_idx))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
+ || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
+ || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
+ /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
+ if (s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
+ return 0;
+ if (!s->server
+ && s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
+ && s->s3->tmp.max_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ int i, num;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+
+ /*
+ * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
+ * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
+ * ciphersuites enabled.
+ */
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
+ return 0;
+
+ sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
+ num = sk != NULL ? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) : 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+
+ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
+ /* Skip disabled ciphers */
+ if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
+ continue;
+
+ if ((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kGOST) != 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (i == num)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
+ secbits = sigalg_security_bits(lu);
+ sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
+ sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
+ return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
+ * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
+ * disabled.
+ */
+
+void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
+{
+ const uint16_t *sigalgs;
+ size_t i, sigalgslen;
+ uint32_t disabled_mask = SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS | SSL_aECDSA;
+ /*
+ * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
+ * in disabled_mask.
+ */
+ sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
+ for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++, sigalgs++) {
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*sigalgs);
+ const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
+
+ if (lu == NULL)
+ continue;
+
+ clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
+ if (clu == NULL)
+ continue;
+
+ /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
+ if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0
+ && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
+ disabled_mask &= ~clu->amask;
+ }
+ *pmask_a |= disabled_mask;
+}
+
+int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ int rv = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
+
+ if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
+ continue;
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
+ return 0;
+ /*
+ * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
+ * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
+ */
+ if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ || (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA
+ && lu->hash != NID_sha1
+ && lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
+ rv = 1;
+ }
+ if (rv == 0)
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_COPY_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
+static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
+ const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
+ const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
+{
+ const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
+ size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
+ for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*ptmp);
+
+ /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
+ if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
+ continue;
+ for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
+ if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
+ nmatch++;
+ if (shsig)
+ *shsig++ = lu;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return nmatch;
+}
+
+/* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
+static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
+{
+ const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
+ size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
+ size_t nmatch;
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
+ CERT *c = s->cert;
+ unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
+ s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
+ s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
+ /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
+ if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
+ conf = c->client_sigalgs;
+ conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
+ } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
+ conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
+ conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
+ } else
+ conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
+ pref = conf;
+ preflen = conflen;
+ allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
+ allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
+ } else {
+ allow = conf;
+ allowlen = conflen;
+ pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
+ preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
+ }
+ nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
+ if (nmatch) {
+ if ((salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs))) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SHARED_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
+ } else {
+ salgs = NULL;
+ }
+ s->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
+ s->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen)
+{
+ unsigned int stmp;
+ size_t size, i;
+ uint16_t *buf;
+
+ size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
+
+ /* Invalid data length */
+ if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ size >>= 1;
+
+ if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf))) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SAVE_U16, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
+ buf[i] = stmp;
+
+ if (i != size) {
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
+ *pdest = buf;
+ *pdestlen = size;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int cert)
+{
+ /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
+ if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
+ return 1;
+ /* Should never happen */
+ if (s->cert == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (cert)
+ return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs,
+ &s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen);
+ else
+ return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs,
+ &s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
+
+}
+
+/* Set preferred digest for each key type */
+
+int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
+
+ if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
+ return 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+ pvalid[i] = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
+ int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
+
+ /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+ continue;
+ /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
+ if (pvalid[idx] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(idx))
+ pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
+ int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
+ unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
+{
+ uint16_t *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
+ size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
+ if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
+ return 0;
+ if (idx >= 0) {
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
+
+ if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
+ return 0;
+ psig += idx;
+ if (rhash != NULL)
+ *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
+ if (rsig != NULL)
+ *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
+ lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
+ if (psign != NULL)
+ *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
+ if (phash != NULL)
+ *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
+ if (psignhash != NULL)
+ *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
+ }
+ return (int)numsigalgs;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
+ int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
+ unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
+{
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
+ if (s->shared_sigalgs == NULL
+ || idx < 0
+ || idx >= (int)s->shared_sigalgslen
+ || s->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
+ return 0;
+ shsigalgs = s->shared_sigalgs[idx];
+ if (phash != NULL)
+ *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
+ if (psign != NULL)
+ *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
+ if (psignhash != NULL)
+ *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
+ if (rsig != NULL)
+ *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
+ if (rhash != NULL)
+ *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
+ return (int)s->shared_sigalgslen;
+}
+
+/* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
+#define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
+
+typedef struct {
+ size_t sigalgcnt;
+ /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
+ uint16_t sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
+} sig_cb_st;
+
+static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
+{
+ if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
+ *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
+ } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
+ *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
+ } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
+ *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
+ } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
+ *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
+ } else {
+ *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
+ if (*phash == NID_undef)
+ *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
+ }
+}
+/* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
+#define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
+
+static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
+{
+ sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
+ size_t i;
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
+ char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
+ int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
+ if (elem == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
+ return 0;
+ if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
+ return 0;
+ memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
+ etmp[len] = 0;
+ p = strchr(etmp, '+');
+ /*
+ * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
+ * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
+ * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
+ * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
+ * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
+ * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
+ * in the table.
+ */
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
+ i++, s++) {
+ if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
+ sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ *p = 0;
+ p++;
+ if (*p == 0)
+ return 0;
+ get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
+ get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
+ if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
+ i++, s++) {
+ if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) {
+ sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Reject duplicates */
+ for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt - 1; i++) {
+ if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt - 1]) {
+ sarg->sigalgcnt--;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
+ * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
+ */
+int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
+{
+ sig_cb_st sig;
+ sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
+ if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
+ return 0;
+ if (c == NULL)
+ return 1;
+ return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
+}
+
+int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT *c, const uint16_t *psigs, size_t salglen,
+ int client)
+{
+ uint16_t *sigalgs;
+
+ if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_RAW_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(sigalgs, psigs, salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs));
+
+ if (client) {
+ OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
+ c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
+ c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
+ } else {
+ OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
+ c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
+ c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
+{
+ uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
+ size_t i;
+
+ if (salglen & 1)
+ return 0;
+ if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
+ size_t j;
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
+ int md_id = *psig_nids++;
+ int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
+
+ for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
+ j++, curr++) {
+ if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
+ *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (client) {
+ OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
+ c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
+ c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
+ } else {
+ OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
+ c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
+ c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, int default_nid)
+{
+ int sig_nid, use_pc_sigalgs = 0;
+ size_t i;
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigalg;
+ size_t sigalgslen;
+ if (default_nid == -1)
+ return 1;
+ sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
+ if (default_nid)
+ return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
+
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
+ * chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
+ * otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
+ */
+ sigalgslen = s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen;
+ use_pc_sigalgs = 1;
+ } else {
+ sigalgslen = s->shared_sigalgslen;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++) {
+ sigalg = use_pc_sigalgs
+ ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i])
+ : s->shared_sigalgs[i];
+ if (sigalg != NULL && sig_nid == sigalg->sigandhash)
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
+static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
+{
+ X509_NAME *nm;
+ int i;
+ nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
+ if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
+ * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
+ * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
+ * attempting to use them.
+ */
+
+/* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
+
+#define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
+ (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
+/* Strict mode flags */
+#define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
+ (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
+ | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
+
+int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
+ int idx)
+{
+ int i;
+ int rv = 0;
+ int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
+ CERT *c = s->cert;
+ uint32_t *pvalid;
+ unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
+ /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
+ if (idx != -1) {
+ /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
+ if (idx == -2) {
+ cpk = c->key;
+ idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
+ } else
+ cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
+ pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
+ x = cpk->x509;
+ pk = cpk->privatekey;
+ chain = cpk->chain;
+ strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
+ /* If no cert or key, forget it */
+ if (!x || !pk)
+ goto end;
+ } else {
+ size_t certidx;
+
+ if (!x || !pk)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ idx = certidx;
+ pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
+
+ if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
+ check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
+ else
+ check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
+ strict_mode = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (suiteb_flags) {
+ int ok;
+ if (check_flags)
+ check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
+ ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
+ if (ok == X509_V_OK)
+ rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
+ else if (!check_flags)
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
+ * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
+ */
+ if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
+ int default_nid;
+ int rsign = 0;
+ if (s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL
+ || s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
+ default_nid = 0;
+ /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
+ } else {
+ switch (idx) {
+ case SSL_PKEY_RSA:
+ rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
+ default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
+ rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
+ default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
+ rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
+ default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
+ rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
+ default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
+ rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
+ default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
+ rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
+ default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ default_nid = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
+ * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
+ */
+ if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
+ size_t j;
+ const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
+ for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*p);
+
+ if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
+ if (check_flags)
+ goto skip_sigs;
+ else
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ /*
+ * We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
+ * so check_flags is always set.
+ */
+ if (find_sig_alg(s, x, pk) != NULL)
+ rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
+ } else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, x, default_nid)) {
+ if (!check_flags)
+ goto end;
+ } else
+ rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
+ rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
+ if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
+ if (check_flags) {
+ rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
+ break;
+ } else
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
+ else if (check_flags)
+ rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
+ skip_sigs:
+ /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
+ if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
+ rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
+ else if (!check_flags)
+ goto end;
+ if (!s->server)
+ rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
+ /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
+ else if (strict_mode) {
+ rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
+ X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+ if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
+ if (check_flags) {
+ rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
+ break;
+ } else
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
+ int check_type = 0;
+ switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
+ case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+ check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
+ break;
+ case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
+ check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
+ break;
+ case EVP_PKEY_EC:
+ check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (check_type) {
+ const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3->tmp.ctype;
+ size_t j;
+
+ for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
+ if (*ctypes == check_type) {
+ rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
+ goto end;
+ } else {
+ rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
+ }
+
+ ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names;
+
+ if (ca_dn == NULL
+ || sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn) == 0
+ || ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
+ rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
+ else
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
+ X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+
+ if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
+ rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
+ goto end;
+ } else
+ rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
+
+ if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
+ rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
+
+ end:
+
+ if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+ rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
+ else
+ rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+
+ /*
+ * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
+ * chain is invalid.
+ */
+ if (!check_flags) {
+ if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
+ *pvalid = rv;
+ } else {
+ /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
+ *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
+void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
+{
+ tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
+ tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN);
+ tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
+ tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
+ tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
+ tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
+ tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
+ tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519);
+ tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED448);
+}
+
+/* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
+int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+{
+ return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
+{
+ DH *dhp = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL;
+ int dh_secbits = 80, sec_level_bits;
+
+ if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 2) {
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
+ dh_secbits = 128;
+ else
+ dh_secbits = 80;
+ } else {
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey);
+ }
+ }
+
+ dhp = DH_new();
+ if (dhp == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ g = BN_new();
+ if (g == NULL || !BN_set_word(g, 2)) {
+ DH_free(dhp);
+ BN_free(g);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Do not pick a prime that is too weak for the current security level */
+ sec_level_bits = ssl_get_security_level_bits(s, NULL, NULL);
+ if (dh_secbits < sec_level_bits)
+ dh_secbits = sec_level_bits;
+
+ if (dh_secbits >= 192)
+ p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
+ else if (dh_secbits >= 152)
+ p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(NULL);
+ else if (dh_secbits >= 128)
+ p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
+ else if (dh_secbits >= 112)
+ p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(NULL);
+ else
+ p = BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(NULL);
+ if (p == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
+ DH_free(dhp);
+ BN_free(p);
+ BN_free(g);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return dhp;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
+{
+ int secbits = -1;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
+ if (pkey) {
+ /*
+ * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
+ * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
+ * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
+ * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
+ */
+ secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
+ }
+ if (s)
+ return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
+ else
+ return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
+}
+
+static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
+{
+ /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
+ int secbits, nid, pknid;
+ /* Don't check signature if self signed */
+ if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
+ return 1;
+ if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL))
+ secbits = -1;
+ /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
+ if (nid == NID_undef)
+ nid = pknid;
+ if (s)
+ return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
+ else
+ return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
+}
+
+int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
+{
+ if (vfy)
+ vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
+ if (is_ee) {
+ if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
+ return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
+ } else {
+ if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
+ return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+ if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
+ return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
+ * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
+ * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
+ */
+
+int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
+{
+ int rv, start_idx, i;
+ if (x == NULL) {
+ x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ start_idx = 1;
+ } else
+ start_idx = 0;
+
+ rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
+ if (rv != 1)
+ return rv;
+
+ for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
+ x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
+ rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
+ if (rv != 1)
+ return rv;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
+ * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
+ */
+
+static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
+{
+ int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
+ const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx);
+
+ /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
+ if (clu == NULL
+ || (clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0
+ || (clu->nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
+ && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA) != 0))
+ return -1;
+
+ return s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
+ * the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
+ * the key.
+ * Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
+ */
+static int check_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
+ int mdnid, pknid, default_mdnid;
+ size_t i;
+
+ /* If the EVP_PKEY reports a mandatory digest, allow nothing else. */
+ ERR_set_mark();
+ if (EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &default_mdnid) == 2 &&
+ sig->hash != default_mdnid)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* If it didn't report a mandatory NID, for whatever reasons,
+ * just clear the error and allow all hashes to be used. */
+ ERR_pop_to_mark();
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
+ for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen; i++) {
+ lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
+ if (lu == NULL
+ || !X509_get_signature_info(x, &mdnid, &pknid, NULL, NULL))
+ continue;
+ /*
+ * TODO this does not differentiate between the
+ * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
+ * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
+ * signing certificate.
+ */
+ if (mdnid == lu->hash && pknid == lu->sig)
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
+ * with signature scheme |sig|.
+ * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
+ * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
+ * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
+ */
+static int has_usable_cert(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx)
+{
+ /* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
+ if (idx == -1)
+ idx = sig->sig_idx;
+ if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
+ return 0;
+
+ return check_cert_usable(s, sig, s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509,
+ s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if the supplied cert |x| and key |pkey| is usable with the
+ * specified signature scheme |sig|, or false otherwise.
+ */
+static int is_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ size_t idx;
+
+ if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
+ if ((int)idx != sig->sig_idx)
+ return 0;
+
+ return check_cert_usable(s, sig, x, pkey);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate |x| and key
+ * |pkey|. |x| and |pkey| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
+ * available certs/keys to find one that works.
+ */
+static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
+ size_t i;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ int curve = -1;
+#endif
+ EVP_PKEY *tmppkey;
+
+ /* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
+ for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
+ lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
+
+ /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
+ if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
+ || lu->hash == NID_sha224
+ || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
+ || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+ continue;
+ /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
+ if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
+ continue;
+ if ((pkey == NULL && !has_usable_cert(s, lu, -1))
+ || (pkey != NULL && !is_cert_usable(s, lu, x, pkey)))
+ continue;
+
+ tmppkey = (pkey != NULL) ? pkey
+ : s->cert->pkeys[lu->sig_idx].privatekey;
+
+ if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (curve == -1) {
+ EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(tmppkey);
+ curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
+ }
+ if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve)
+ continue;
+#else
+ continue;
+#endif
+ } else if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
+ /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
+ if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(tmppkey), lu))
+ continue;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return lu;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
+ * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
+ *
+ * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
+ * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
+ *
+ * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
+ * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
+ * to the server. In this case no error is set.
+ */
+int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs)
+{
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
+ int sig_idx = -1;
+
+ s->s3->tmp.cert = NULL;
+ s->s3->tmp.sigalg = NULL;
+
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ lu = find_sig_alg(s, NULL, NULL);
+ if (lu == NULL) {
+ if (!fatalerrs)
+ return 1;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
+ SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
+ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
+ return 1;
+ if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys))
+ return 1;
+
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+ size_t i;
+ if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ int curve;
+
+ /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
+ if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
+ EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
+ curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
+ } else {
+ curve = -1;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
+ * cert type
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
+ lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
+
+ if (s->server) {
+ if ((sig_idx = tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s, lu)) == -1)
+ continue;
+ } else {
+ int cc_idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
+
+ sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
+ if (cc_idx != sig_idx)
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
+ if (!has_usable_cert(s, lu, sig_idx))
+ continue;
+ if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
+ /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx].privatekey;
+
+ if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey), lu))
+ continue;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve)
+#endif
+ break;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+ /*
+ * Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
+ * in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
+ * we have to assume GOST support.
+ */
+ if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) {
+ if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
+ if (!fatalerrs)
+ return 1;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
+ SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ i = 0;
+ sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen) {
+ if (!fatalerrs)
+ return 1;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
+ SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * If we have no sigalg use defaults
+ */
+ const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
+ size_t sent_sigslen;
+
+ if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
+ if (!fatalerrs)
+ return 1;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
+ sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
+ for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
+ if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs
+ && has_usable_cert(s, lu, lu->sig_idx))
+ break;
+ }
+ if (i == sent_sigslen) {
+ if (!fatalerrs)
+ return 1;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
+ if (!fatalerrs)
+ return 1;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (sig_idx == -1)
+ sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
+ s->s3->tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx];
+ s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
+ s->s3->tmp.sigalg = lu;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint8_t mode)
+{
+ if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
+ && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
+ SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ctx->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL *ssl, uint8_t mode)
+{
+ if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
+ && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
+ SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ssl->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION *session)
+{
+ return session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode;
+}