[T106][ZXW-22]7520V3SCV2.01.01.02P42U09_VEC_V0.8_AP_VEC origin source commit
Change-Id: Ic6e05d89ecd62fc34f82b23dcf306c93764aec4b
diff --git a/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/test/ecdsatest.c b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/test/ecdsatest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ad2f404
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/lib/libssl/openssl-1.1.1o/test/ecdsatest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,339 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h> /* To see if OPENSSL_NO_EC is defined */
+#include "testutil.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/bn.h>
+# include <openssl/ec.h>
+# include <openssl/rand.h>
+# include "internal/nelem.h"
+# include "ecdsatest.h"
+
+/* functions to change the RAND_METHOD */
+static int fbytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
+
+static RAND_METHOD fake_rand;
+static const RAND_METHOD *old_rand;
+static int use_fake = 0;
+static const char *numbers[2];
+static size_t crv_len = 0;
+static EC_builtin_curve *curves = NULL;
+
+static int change_rand(void)
+{
+ /* save old rand method */
+ if (!TEST_ptr(old_rand = RAND_get_rand_method()))
+ return 0;
+
+ fake_rand = *old_rand;
+ /* use own random function */
+ fake_rand.bytes = fbytes;
+ /* set new RAND_METHOD */
+ if (!TEST_true(RAND_set_rand_method(&fake_rand)))
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int restore_rand(void)
+{
+ if (!TEST_true(RAND_set_rand_method(old_rand)))
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int fbytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ static int fbytes_counter = 0;
+ BIGNUM *tmp = NULL;
+
+ if (use_fake == 0)
+ return old_rand->bytes(buf, num);
+
+ use_fake = 0;
+
+ if (!TEST_ptr(tmp = BN_new())
+ || !TEST_int_lt(fbytes_counter, OSSL_NELEM(numbers))
+ || !TEST_true(BN_hex2bn(&tmp, numbers[fbytes_counter]))
+ /* tmp might need leading zeros so pad it out */
+ || !TEST_int_le(BN_num_bytes(tmp), num)
+ || !TEST_true(BN_bn2binpad(tmp, buf, num)))
+ goto err;
+
+ fbytes_counter = (fbytes_counter + 1) % OSSL_NELEM(numbers);
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ BN_free(tmp);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * This function hijacks the RNG to feed it the chosen ECDSA key and nonce.
+ * The ECDSA KATs are from:
+ * - the X9.62 draft (4)
+ * - NIST CAVP (720)
+ *
+ * It uses the low-level ECDSA_sign_setup instead of EVP to control the RNG.
+ * NB: This is not how applications should use ECDSA; this is only for testing.
+ *
+ * Tests the library can successfully:
+ * - generate public keys that matches those KATs
+ * - create ECDSA signatures that match those KATs
+ * - accept those signatures as valid
+ */
+static int x9_62_tests(int n)
+{
+ int nid, md_nid, ret = 0;
+ const char *r_in = NULL, *s_in = NULL, *tbs = NULL;
+ unsigned char *pbuf = NULL, *qbuf = NULL, *message = NULL;
+ unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned int dgst_len = 0;
+ long q_len, msg_len = 0;
+ size_t p_len;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
+ EC_KEY *key = NULL;
+ ECDSA_SIG *signature = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *rp = NULL;
+ const BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
+
+ nid = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].nid;
+ md_nid = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].md_nid;
+ r_in = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].r;
+ s_in = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].s;
+ tbs = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].msg;
+ numbers[0] = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].d;
+ numbers[1] = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].k;
+
+ TEST_info("ECDSA KATs for curve %s", OBJ_nid2sn(nid));
+
+ if (!TEST_ptr(mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new())
+ /* get the message digest */
+ || !TEST_ptr(message = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(tbs, &msg_len))
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid), NULL))
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, message, msg_len))
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, digest, &dgst_len))
+ /* create the key */
+ || !TEST_ptr(key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid))
+ /* load KAT variables */
+ || !TEST_ptr(r = BN_new())
+ || !TEST_ptr(s = BN_new())
+ || !TEST_true(BN_hex2bn(&r, r_in))
+ || !TEST_true(BN_hex2bn(&s, s_in))
+ /* swap the RNG source */
+ || !TEST_true(change_rand()))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* public key must match KAT */
+ use_fake = 1;
+ if (!TEST_true(EC_KEY_generate_key(key))
+ || !TEST_true(p_len = EC_KEY_key2buf(key, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ &pbuf, NULL))
+ || !TEST_ptr(qbuf = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].Q, &q_len))
+ || !TEST_int_eq(q_len, p_len)
+ || !TEST_mem_eq(qbuf, q_len, pbuf, p_len))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* create the signature via ECDSA_sign_setup to avoid use of ECDSA nonces */
+ use_fake = 1;
+ if (!TEST_true(ECDSA_sign_setup(key, NULL, &kinv, &rp))
+ || !TEST_ptr(signature = ECDSA_do_sign_ex(digest, dgst_len,
+ kinv, rp, key))
+ /* verify the signature */
+ || !TEST_int_eq(ECDSA_do_verify(digest, dgst_len, signature, key), 1))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* compare the created signature with the expected signature */
+ ECDSA_SIG_get0(signature, &sig_r, &sig_s);
+ if (!TEST_BN_eq(sig_r, r)
+ || !TEST_BN_eq(sig_s, s))
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+ /* restore the RNG source */
+ if (!TEST_true(restore_rand()))
+ ret = 0;
+
+ OPENSSL_free(message);
+ OPENSSL_free(pbuf);
+ OPENSSL_free(qbuf);
+ EC_KEY_free(key);
+ ECDSA_SIG_free(signature);
+ BN_free(r);
+ BN_free(s);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
+ BN_clear_free(kinv);
+ BN_clear_free(rp);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Positive and negative ECDSA testing through EVP interface:
+ * - EVP_DigestSign (this is the one-shot version)
+ * - EVP_DigestVerify
+ *
+ * Tests the library can successfully:
+ * - create a key
+ * - create a signature
+ * - accept that signature
+ * - reject that signature with a different public key
+ * - reject that signature if its length is not correct
+ * - reject that signature after modifying the message
+ * - accept that signature after un-modifying the message
+ * - reject that signature after modifying the signature
+ * - accept that signature after un-modifying the signature
+ */
+static int test_builtin(int n)
+{
+ EC_KEY *eckey_neg = NULL, *eckey = NULL;
+ unsigned char dirt, offset, tbs[128];
+ unsigned char *sig = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey_neg = NULL, *pkey = NULL;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
+ size_t sig_len;
+ int nid, ret = 0;
+
+ nid = curves[n].nid;
+
+ /* skip built-in curves where ord(G) is not prime */
+ if (nid == NID_ipsec4 || nid == NID_ipsec3) {
+ TEST_info("skipped: ECDSA unsupported for curve %s", OBJ_nid2sn(nid));
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ TEST_info("testing ECDSA for curve %s", OBJ_nid2sn(nid));
+
+ if (!TEST_ptr(mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new())
+ /* get some random message data */
+ || !TEST_true(RAND_bytes(tbs, sizeof(tbs)))
+ /* real key */
+ || !TEST_ptr(eckey = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid))
+ || !TEST_true(EC_KEY_generate_key(eckey))
+ || !TEST_ptr(pkey = EVP_PKEY_new())
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, eckey))
+ /* fake key for negative testing */
+ || !TEST_ptr(eckey_neg = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid))
+ || !TEST_true(EC_KEY_generate_key(eckey_neg))
+ || !TEST_ptr(pkey_neg = EVP_PKEY_new())
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey_neg, eckey_neg)))
+ goto err;
+
+ sig_len = ECDSA_size(eckey);
+
+ if (!TEST_ptr(sig = OPENSSL_malloc(sig_len))
+ /* create a signature */
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey))
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &sig_len, tbs, sizeof(tbs)))
+ || !TEST_int_le(sig_len, ECDSA_size(eckey))
+ /* negative test, verify with wrong key, 0 return */
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx))
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey_neg))
+ || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, sig, sig_len, tbs, sizeof(tbs)), 0)
+ /* negative test, verify with wrong signature length, -1 return */
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx))
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey))
+ || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, sig, sig_len - 1, tbs, sizeof(tbs)), -1)
+ /* positive test, verify with correct key, 1 return */
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx))
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey))
+ || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, sig, sig_len, tbs, sizeof(tbs)), 1))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* muck with the message, test it fails with 0 return */
+ tbs[0] ^= 1;
+ if (!TEST_true(EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx))
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey))
+ || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, sig, sig_len, tbs, sizeof(tbs)), 0))
+ goto err;
+ /* un-muck and test it verifies */
+ tbs[0] ^= 1;
+ if (!TEST_true(EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx))
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey))
+ || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, sig, sig_len, tbs, sizeof(tbs)), 1))
+ goto err;
+
+ /*-
+ * Muck with the ECDSA signature. The DER encoding is one of:
+ * - 30 LL 02 ..
+ * - 30 81 LL 02 ..
+ *
+ * - Sometimes this mucks with the high level DER sequence wrapper:
+ * in that case, DER-parsing of the whole signature should fail.
+ *
+ * - Sometimes this mucks with the DER-encoding of ECDSA.r:
+ * in that case, DER-parsing of ECDSA.r should fail.
+ *
+ * - Sometimes this mucks with the DER-encoding of ECDSA.s:
+ * in that case, DER-parsing of ECDSA.s should fail.
+ *
+ * - Sometimes this mucks with ECDSA.r:
+ * in that case, the signature verification should fail.
+ *
+ * - Sometimes this mucks with ECDSA.s:
+ * in that case, the signature verification should fail.
+ *
+ * The usual case is changing the integer value of ECDSA.r or ECDSA.s.
+ * Because the ratio of DER overhead to signature bytes is small.
+ * So most of the time it will be one of the last two cases.
+ *
+ * In any case, EVP_PKEY_verify should not return 1 for valid.
+ */
+ offset = tbs[0] % sig_len;
+ dirt = tbs[1] ? tbs[1] : 1;
+ sig[offset] ^= dirt;
+ if (!TEST_true(EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx))
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey))
+ || !TEST_int_ne(EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, sig, sig_len, tbs, sizeof(tbs)), 1))
+ goto err;
+ /* un-muck and test it verifies */
+ sig[offset] ^= dirt;
+ if (!TEST_true(EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx))
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey))
+ || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, sig, sig_len, tbs, sizeof(tbs)), 1))
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey_neg);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(sig);
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+int setup_tests(void)
+{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ TEST_note("Elliptic curves are disabled.");
+#else
+ /* get a list of all internal curves */
+ crv_len = EC_get_builtin_curves(NULL, 0);
+ if (!TEST_ptr(curves = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*curves) * crv_len))
+ || !TEST_true(EC_get_builtin_curves(curves, crv_len)))
+ return 0;
+ ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_builtin, crv_len);
+ ADD_ALL_TESTS(x9_62_tests, OSSL_NELEM(ecdsa_cavs_kats));
+#endif
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void cleanup_tests(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ OPENSSL_free(curves);
+#endif
+}