[T106][ZXW-22]7520V3SCV2.01.01.02P42U09_VEC_V0.8_AP_VEC origin source commit
Change-Id: Ic6e05d89ecd62fc34f82b23dcf306c93764aec4b
diff --git a/ap/os/linux/linux-3.4.x/fs/cifs/sess.c b/ap/os/linux/linux-3.4.x/fs/cifs/sess.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..de9b1c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/os/linux/linux-3.4.x/fs/cifs/sess.c
@@ -0,0 +1,958 @@
+/*
+ * fs/cifs/sess.c
+ *
+ * SMB/CIFS session setup handling routines
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) International Business Machines Corp., 2006, 2009
+ * Author(s): Steve French (sfrench@us.ibm.com)
+ *
+ * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published
+ * by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See
+ * the GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
+ * along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
+ */
+
+#include "cifspdu.h"
+#include "cifsglob.h"
+#include "cifsproto.h"
+#include "cifs_unicode.h"
+#include "cifs_debug.h"
+#include "ntlmssp.h"
+#include "nterr.h"
+#include <linux/utsname.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include "cifs_spnego.h"
+
+/*
+ * Checks if this is the first smb session to be reconnected after
+ * the socket has been reestablished (so we know whether to use vc 0).
+ * Called while holding the cifs_tcp_ses_lock, so do not block
+ */
+static bool is_first_ses_reconnect(struct cifs_ses *ses)
+{
+ struct list_head *tmp;
+ struct cifs_ses *tmp_ses;
+
+ list_for_each(tmp, &ses->server->smb_ses_list) {
+ tmp_ses = list_entry(tmp, struct cifs_ses,
+ smb_ses_list);
+ if (tmp_ses->need_reconnect == false)
+ return false;
+ }
+ /* could not find a session that was already connected,
+ this must be the first one we are reconnecting */
+ return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * vc number 0 is treated specially by some servers, and should be the
+ * first one we request. After that we can use vcnumbers up to maxvcs,
+ * one for each smb session (some Windows versions set maxvcs incorrectly
+ * so maxvc=1 can be ignored). If we have too many vcs, we can reuse
+ * any vc but zero (some servers reset the connection on vcnum zero)
+ *
+ */
+static __le16 get_next_vcnum(struct cifs_ses *ses)
+{
+ __u16 vcnum = 0;
+ struct list_head *tmp;
+ struct cifs_ses *tmp_ses;
+ __u16 max_vcs = ses->server->max_vcs;
+ __u16 i;
+ int free_vc_found = 0;
+
+ /* Quoting the MS-SMB specification: "Windows-based SMB servers set this
+ field to one but do not enforce this limit, which allows an SMB client
+ to establish more virtual circuits than allowed by this value ... but
+ other server implementations can enforce this limit." */
+ if (max_vcs < 2)
+ max_vcs = 0xFFFF;
+
+ spin_lock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
+ if ((ses->need_reconnect) && is_first_ses_reconnect(ses))
+ goto get_vc_num_exit; /* vcnum will be zero */
+ for (i = ses->server->srv_count - 1; i < max_vcs; i++) {
+ if (i == 0) /* this is the only connection, use vc 0 */
+ break;
+
+ free_vc_found = 1;
+
+ list_for_each(tmp, &ses->server->smb_ses_list) {
+ tmp_ses = list_entry(tmp, struct cifs_ses,
+ smb_ses_list);
+ if (tmp_ses->vcnum == i) {
+ free_vc_found = 0;
+ break; /* found duplicate, try next vcnum */
+ }
+ }
+ if (free_vc_found)
+ break; /* we found a vcnumber that will work - use it */
+ }
+
+ if (i == 0)
+ vcnum = 0; /* for most common case, ie if one smb session, use
+ vc zero. Also for case when no free vcnum, zero
+ is safest to send (some clients only send zero) */
+ else if (free_vc_found == 0)
+ vcnum = 1; /* we can not reuse vc=0 safely, since some servers
+ reset all uids on that, but 1 is ok. */
+ else
+ vcnum = i;
+ ses->vcnum = vcnum;
+get_vc_num_exit:
+ spin_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
+
+ return cpu_to_le16(vcnum);
+}
+
+static __u32 cifs_ssetup_hdr(struct cifs_ses *ses, SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *pSMB)
+{
+ __u32 capabilities = 0;
+
+ /* init fields common to all four types of SessSetup */
+ /* Note that offsets for first seven fields in req struct are same */
+ /* in CIFS Specs so does not matter which of 3 forms of struct */
+ /* that we use in next few lines */
+ /* Note that header is initialized to zero in header_assemble */
+ pSMB->req.AndXCommand = 0xFF;
+ pSMB->req.MaxBufferSize = cpu_to_le16(min_t(u32,
+ CIFSMaxBufSize + MAX_CIFS_HDR_SIZE - 4,
+ USHRT_MAX));
+ pSMB->req.MaxMpxCount = cpu_to_le16(ses->server->maxReq);
+ pSMB->req.VcNumber = get_next_vcnum(ses);
+
+ /* Now no need to set SMBFLG_CASELESS or obsolete CANONICAL PATH */
+
+ /* BB verify whether signing required on neg or just on auth frame
+ (and NTLM case) */
+
+ capabilities = CAP_LARGE_FILES | CAP_NT_SMBS | CAP_LEVEL_II_OPLOCKS |
+ CAP_LARGE_WRITE_X | CAP_LARGE_READ_X;
+
+ if (ses->server->sec_mode &
+ (SECMODE_SIGN_REQUIRED | SECMODE_SIGN_ENABLED))
+ pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_SECURITY_SIGNATURE;
+
+ if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNICODE) {
+ pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_UNICODE;
+ capabilities |= CAP_UNICODE;
+ }
+ if (ses->capabilities & CAP_STATUS32) {
+ pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_ERR_STATUS;
+ capabilities |= CAP_STATUS32;
+ }
+ if (ses->capabilities & CAP_DFS) {
+ pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_DFS;
+ capabilities |= CAP_DFS;
+ }
+ if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNIX)
+ capabilities |= CAP_UNIX;
+
+ return capabilities;
+}
+
+static void
+unicode_oslm_strings(char **pbcc_area, const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
+{
+ char *bcc_ptr = *pbcc_area;
+ int bytes_ret = 0;
+
+ /* Copy OS version */
+ bytes_ret = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)bcc_ptr, "Linux version ", 32,
+ nls_cp);
+ bcc_ptr += 2 * bytes_ret;
+ bytes_ret = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *) bcc_ptr, init_utsname()->release,
+ 32, nls_cp);
+ bcc_ptr += 2 * bytes_ret;
+ bcc_ptr += 2; /* trailing null */
+
+ bytes_ret = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *) bcc_ptr, CIFS_NETWORK_OPSYS,
+ 32, nls_cp);
+ bcc_ptr += 2 * bytes_ret;
+ bcc_ptr += 2; /* trailing null */
+
+ *pbcc_area = bcc_ptr;
+}
+
+static void unicode_domain_string(char **pbcc_area, struct cifs_ses *ses,
+ const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
+{
+ char *bcc_ptr = *pbcc_area;
+ int bytes_ret = 0;
+
+ /* copy domain */
+ if (ses->domainName == NULL) {
+ /* Sending null domain better than using a bogus domain name (as
+ we did briefly in 2.6.18) since server will use its default */
+ *bcc_ptr = 0;
+ *(bcc_ptr+1) = 0;
+ bytes_ret = 0;
+ } else
+ bytes_ret = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *) bcc_ptr, ses->domainName,
+ CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN, nls_cp);
+ bcc_ptr += 2 * bytes_ret;
+ bcc_ptr += 2; /* account for null terminator */
+
+ *pbcc_area = bcc_ptr;
+}
+
+
+static void unicode_ssetup_strings(char **pbcc_area, struct cifs_ses *ses,
+ const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
+{
+ char *bcc_ptr = *pbcc_area;
+ int bytes_ret = 0;
+
+ /* BB FIXME add check that strings total less
+ than 335 or will need to send them as arrays */
+
+ /* unicode strings, must be word aligned before the call */
+/* if ((long) bcc_ptr % 2) {
+ *bcc_ptr = 0;
+ bcc_ptr++;
+ } */
+ /* copy user */
+ if (ses->user_name == NULL) {
+ /* null user mount */
+ *bcc_ptr = 0;
+ *(bcc_ptr+1) = 0;
+ } else {
+ bytes_ret = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *) bcc_ptr, ses->user_name,
+ MAX_USERNAME_SIZE, nls_cp);
+ }
+ bcc_ptr += 2 * bytes_ret;
+ bcc_ptr += 2; /* account for null termination */
+
+ unicode_domain_string(&bcc_ptr, ses, nls_cp);
+ unicode_oslm_strings(&bcc_ptr, nls_cp);
+
+ *pbcc_area = bcc_ptr;
+}
+
+static void ascii_ssetup_strings(char **pbcc_area, struct cifs_ses *ses,
+ const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
+{
+ char *bcc_ptr = *pbcc_area;
+
+ /* copy user */
+ /* BB what about null user mounts - check that we do this BB */
+ /* copy user */
+ if (ses->user_name != NULL) {
+ strncpy(bcc_ptr, ses->user_name, MAX_USERNAME_SIZE);
+ bcc_ptr += strnlen(ses->user_name, MAX_USERNAME_SIZE);
+ }
+ /* else null user mount */
+ *bcc_ptr = 0;
+ bcc_ptr++; /* account for null termination */
+
+ /* copy domain */
+ if (ses->domainName != NULL) {
+ strncpy(bcc_ptr, ses->domainName, CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN);
+ bcc_ptr += strnlen(ses->domainName, CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN);
+ } /* else we will send a null domain name
+ so the server will default to its own domain */
+ *bcc_ptr = 0;
+ bcc_ptr++;
+
+ /* BB check for overflow here */
+
+ strcpy(bcc_ptr, "Linux version ");
+ bcc_ptr += strlen("Linux version ");
+ strcpy(bcc_ptr, init_utsname()->release);
+ bcc_ptr += strlen(init_utsname()->release) + 1;
+
+ strcpy(bcc_ptr, CIFS_NETWORK_OPSYS);
+ bcc_ptr += strlen(CIFS_NETWORK_OPSYS) + 1;
+
+ *pbcc_area = bcc_ptr;
+}
+
+static void
+decode_unicode_ssetup(char **pbcc_area, int bleft, struct cifs_ses *ses,
+ const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
+{
+ int len;
+ char *data = *pbcc_area;
+
+ cFYI(1, "bleft %d", bleft);
+
+ kfree(ses->serverOS);
+ ses->serverOS = cifs_strndup_from_utf16(data, bleft, true, nls_cp);
+ cFYI(1, "serverOS=%s", ses->serverOS);
+ len = (UniStrnlen((wchar_t *) data, bleft / 2) * 2) + 2;
+ data += len;
+ bleft -= len;
+ if (bleft <= 0)
+ return;
+
+ kfree(ses->serverNOS);
+ ses->serverNOS = cifs_strndup_from_utf16(data, bleft, true, nls_cp);
+ cFYI(1, "serverNOS=%s", ses->serverNOS);
+ len = (UniStrnlen((wchar_t *) data, bleft / 2) * 2) + 2;
+ data += len;
+ bleft -= len;
+ if (bleft <= 0)
+ return;
+
+ kfree(ses->serverDomain);
+ ses->serverDomain = cifs_strndup_from_utf16(data, bleft, true, nls_cp);
+ cFYI(1, "serverDomain=%s", ses->serverDomain);
+
+ return;
+}
+
+static int decode_ascii_ssetup(char **pbcc_area, __u16 bleft,
+ struct cifs_ses *ses,
+ const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ int len;
+ char *bcc_ptr = *pbcc_area;
+
+ cFYI(1, "decode sessetup ascii. bleft %d", bleft);
+
+ len = strnlen(bcc_ptr, bleft);
+ if (len >= bleft)
+ return rc;
+
+ kfree(ses->serverOS);
+
+ ses->serverOS = kzalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (ses->serverOS)
+ strncpy(ses->serverOS, bcc_ptr, len);
+ if (strncmp(ses->serverOS, "OS/2", 4) == 0) {
+ cFYI(1, "OS/2 server");
+ ses->flags |= CIFS_SES_OS2;
+ }
+
+ bcc_ptr += len + 1;
+ bleft -= len + 1;
+
+ len = strnlen(bcc_ptr, bleft);
+ if (len >= bleft)
+ return rc;
+
+ kfree(ses->serverNOS);
+
+ ses->serverNOS = kzalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (ses->serverNOS)
+ strncpy(ses->serverNOS, bcc_ptr, len);
+
+ bcc_ptr += len + 1;
+ bleft -= len + 1;
+
+ len = strnlen(bcc_ptr, bleft);
+ if (len > bleft)
+ return rc;
+
+ /* No domain field in LANMAN case. Domain is
+ returned by old servers in the SMB negprot response */
+ /* BB For newer servers which do not support Unicode,
+ but thus do return domain here we could add parsing
+ for it later, but it is not very important */
+ cFYI(1, "ascii: bytes left %d", bleft);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int decode_ntlmssp_challenge(char *bcc_ptr, int blob_len,
+ struct cifs_ses *ses)
+{
+ unsigned int tioffset; /* challenge message target info area */
+ unsigned int tilen; /* challenge message target info area length */
+
+ CHALLENGE_MESSAGE *pblob = (CHALLENGE_MESSAGE *)bcc_ptr;
+
+ if (blob_len < sizeof(CHALLENGE_MESSAGE)) {
+ cERROR(1, "challenge blob len %d too small", blob_len);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(pblob->Signature, "NTLMSSP", 8)) {
+ cERROR(1, "blob signature incorrect %s", pblob->Signature);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (pblob->MessageType != NtLmChallenge) {
+ cERROR(1, "Incorrect message type %d", pblob->MessageType);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(ses->ntlmssp->cryptkey, pblob->Challenge, CIFS_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE);
+ /* BB we could decode pblob->NegotiateFlags; some may be useful */
+ /* In particular we can examine sign flags */
+ /* BB spec says that if AvId field of MsvAvTimestamp is populated then
+ we must set the MIC field of the AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE */
+ ses->ntlmssp->server_flags = le32_to_cpu(pblob->NegotiateFlags);
+ tioffset = le32_to_cpu(pblob->TargetInfoArray.BufferOffset);
+ tilen = le16_to_cpu(pblob->TargetInfoArray.Length);
+ if (tioffset > blob_len || tioffset + tilen > blob_len) {
+ cERROR(1, "tioffset + tilen too high %u + %u", tioffset, tilen);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (tilen) {
+ ses->auth_key.response = kmalloc(tilen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ses->auth_key.response) {
+ cERROR(1, "Challenge target info allocation failure");
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ memcpy(ses->auth_key.response, bcc_ptr + tioffset, tilen);
+ ses->auth_key.len = tilen;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* BB Move to ntlmssp.c eventually */
+
+/* We do not malloc the blob, it is passed in pbuffer, because
+ it is fixed size, and small, making this approach cleaner */
+static void build_ntlmssp_negotiate_blob(unsigned char *pbuffer,
+ struct cifs_ses *ses)
+{
+ NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE *sec_blob = (NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE *)pbuffer;
+ __u32 flags;
+
+ memset(pbuffer, 0, sizeof(NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE));
+ memcpy(sec_blob->Signature, NTLMSSP_SIGNATURE, 8);
+ sec_blob->MessageType = NtLmNegotiate;
+
+ /* BB is NTLMV2 session security format easier to use here? */
+ flags = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56 | NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET |
+ NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE |
+ NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SEC;
+ if (ses->server->sec_mode &
+ (SECMODE_SIGN_REQUIRED | SECMODE_SIGN_ENABLED)) {
+ flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
+ if (!ses->server->session_estab)
+ flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH;
+ }
+
+ sec_blob->NegotiateFlags = cpu_to_le32(flags);
+
+ sec_blob->WorkstationName.BufferOffset = 0;
+ sec_blob->WorkstationName.Length = 0;
+ sec_blob->WorkstationName.MaximumLength = 0;
+
+ /* Domain name is sent on the Challenge not Negotiate NTLMSSP request */
+ sec_blob->DomainName.BufferOffset = 0;
+ sec_blob->DomainName.Length = 0;
+ sec_blob->DomainName.MaximumLength = 0;
+}
+
+/* We do not malloc the blob, it is passed in pbuffer, because its
+ maximum possible size is fixed and small, making this approach cleaner.
+ This function returns the length of the data in the blob */
+static int build_ntlmssp_auth_blob(unsigned char *pbuffer,
+ u16 *buflen,
+ struct cifs_ses *ses,
+ const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
+{
+ int rc;
+ AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE *sec_blob = (AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE *)pbuffer;
+ __u32 flags;
+ unsigned char *tmp;
+
+ memcpy(sec_blob->Signature, NTLMSSP_SIGNATURE, 8);
+ sec_blob->MessageType = NtLmAuthenticate;
+
+ flags = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56 |
+ NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_TARGET_INFO |
+ NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE |
+ NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SEC;
+ if (ses->server->sec_mode &
+ (SECMODE_SIGN_REQUIRED | SECMODE_SIGN_ENABLED)) {
+ flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
+ if (!ses->server->session_estab)
+ flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH;
+ }
+
+ tmp = pbuffer + sizeof(AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE);
+ sec_blob->NegotiateFlags = cpu_to_le32(flags);
+
+ sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.BufferOffset =
+ cpu_to_le32(sizeof(AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE));
+ sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.Length = 0;
+ sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.MaximumLength = 0;
+
+ sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - pbuffer);
+ rc = setup_ntlmv2_rsp(ses, nls_cp);
+ if (rc) {
+ cERROR(1, "Error %d during NTLMSSP authentication", rc);
+ goto setup_ntlmv2_ret;
+ }
+ memcpy(tmp, ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE,
+ ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+ tmp += ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE;
+
+ sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.Length =
+ cpu_to_le16(ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+ sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.MaximumLength =
+ cpu_to_le16(ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+
+ if (ses->domainName == NULL) {
+ sec_blob->DomainName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - pbuffer);
+ sec_blob->DomainName.Length = 0;
+ sec_blob->DomainName.MaximumLength = 0;
+ tmp += 2;
+ } else {
+ int len;
+ len = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)tmp, ses->domainName,
+ MAX_USERNAME_SIZE, nls_cp);
+ len *= 2; /* unicode is 2 bytes each */
+ sec_blob->DomainName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - pbuffer);
+ sec_blob->DomainName.Length = cpu_to_le16(len);
+ sec_blob->DomainName.MaximumLength = cpu_to_le16(len);
+ tmp += len;
+ }
+
+ if (ses->user_name == NULL) {
+ sec_blob->UserName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - pbuffer);
+ sec_blob->UserName.Length = 0;
+ sec_blob->UserName.MaximumLength = 0;
+ tmp += 2;
+ } else {
+ int len;
+ len = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)tmp, ses->user_name,
+ MAX_USERNAME_SIZE, nls_cp);
+ len *= 2; /* unicode is 2 bytes each */
+ sec_blob->UserName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - pbuffer);
+ sec_blob->UserName.Length = cpu_to_le16(len);
+ sec_blob->UserName.MaximumLength = cpu_to_le16(len);
+ tmp += len;
+ }
+
+ sec_blob->WorkstationName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - pbuffer);
+ sec_blob->WorkstationName.Length = 0;
+ sec_blob->WorkstationName.MaximumLength = 0;
+ tmp += 2;
+
+ if (((ses->ntlmssp->server_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH) ||
+ (ses->ntlmssp->server_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SEC))
+ && !calc_seckey(ses)) {
+ memcpy(tmp, ses->ntlmssp->ciphertext, CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
+ sec_blob->SessionKey.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - pbuffer);
+ sec_blob->SessionKey.Length = cpu_to_le16(CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
+ sec_blob->SessionKey.MaximumLength =
+ cpu_to_le16(CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
+ tmp += CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE;
+ } else {
+ sec_blob->SessionKey.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - pbuffer);
+ sec_blob->SessionKey.Length = 0;
+ sec_blob->SessionKey.MaximumLength = 0;
+ }
+
+setup_ntlmv2_ret:
+ *buflen = tmp - pbuffer;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int
+CIFS_SessSetup(unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses,
+ const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ int wct;
+ struct smb_hdr *smb_buf;
+ char *bcc_ptr;
+ char *str_area;
+ SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *pSMB;
+ __u32 capabilities;
+ __u16 count;
+ int resp_buf_type;
+ struct kvec iov[3];
+ enum securityEnum type;
+ __u16 action, bytes_remaining;
+ struct key *spnego_key = NULL;
+ __le32 phase = NtLmNegotiate; /* NTLMSSP, if needed, is multistage */
+ u16 blob_len;
+ char *ntlmsspblob = NULL;
+
+ if (ses == NULL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ type = ses->server->secType;
+ cFYI(1, "sess setup type %d", type);
+ if (type == RawNTLMSSP) {
+ /* if memory allocation is successful, caller of this function
+ * frees it.
+ */
+ ses->ntlmssp = kmalloc(sizeof(struct ntlmssp_auth), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ses->ntlmssp)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ssetup_ntlmssp_authenticate:
+ if (phase == NtLmChallenge)
+ phase = NtLmAuthenticate; /* if ntlmssp, now final phase */
+
+ if (type == LANMAN) {
+#ifndef CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH
+ /* LANMAN and plaintext are less secure and off by default.
+ So we make this explicitly be turned on in kconfig (in the
+ build) and turned on at runtime (changed from the default)
+ in proc/fs/cifs or via mount parm. Unfortunately this is
+ needed for old Win (e.g. Win95), some obscure NAS and OS/2 */
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+#endif
+ wct = 10; /* lanman 2 style sessionsetup */
+ } else if ((type == NTLM) || (type == NTLMv2)) {
+ /* For NTLMv2 failures eventually may need to retry NTLM */
+ wct = 13; /* old style NTLM sessionsetup */
+ } else /* same size: negotiate or auth, NTLMSSP or extended security */
+ wct = 12;
+
+ rc = small_smb_init_no_tc(SMB_COM_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX, wct, ses,
+ (void **)&smb_buf);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ pSMB = (SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *)smb_buf;
+
+ capabilities = cifs_ssetup_hdr(ses, pSMB);
+
+ /* we will send the SMB in three pieces:
+ a fixed length beginning part, an optional
+ SPNEGO blob (which can be zero length), and a
+ last part which will include the strings
+ and rest of bcc area. This allows us to avoid
+ a large buffer 17K allocation */
+ iov[0].iov_base = (char *)pSMB;
+ iov[0].iov_len = be32_to_cpu(smb_buf->smb_buf_length) + 4;
+
+ /* setting this here allows the code at the end of the function
+ to free the request buffer if there's an error */
+ resp_buf_type = CIFS_SMALL_BUFFER;
+
+ /* 2000 big enough to fit max user, domain, NOS name etc. */
+ str_area = kmalloc(2000, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (str_area == NULL) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto ssetup_exit;
+ }
+ bcc_ptr = str_area;
+
+ ses->flags &= ~CIFS_SES_LANMAN;
+
+ iov[1].iov_base = NULL;
+ iov[1].iov_len = 0;
+
+ if (type == LANMAN) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH
+ char lnm_session_key[CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE];
+
+ pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 &= ~SMBFLG2_UNICODE;
+
+ /* no capabilities flags in old lanman negotiation */
+
+ pSMB->old_req.PasswordLength = cpu_to_le16(CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
+
+ /* Calculate hash with password and copy into bcc_ptr.
+ * Encryption Key (stored as in cryptkey) gets used if the
+ * security mode bit in Negottiate Protocol response states
+ * to use challenge/response method (i.e. Password bit is 1).
+ */
+
+ rc = calc_lanman_hash(ses->password, ses->server->cryptkey,
+ ses->server->sec_mode & SECMODE_PW_ENCRYPT ?
+ true : false, lnm_session_key);
+
+ ses->flags |= CIFS_SES_LANMAN;
+ memcpy(bcc_ptr, (char *)lnm_session_key, CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
+ bcc_ptr += CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE;
+
+ /* can not sign if LANMAN negotiated so no need
+ to calculate signing key? but what if server
+ changed to do higher than lanman dialect and
+ we reconnected would we ever calc signing_key? */
+
+ cFYI(1, "Negotiating LANMAN setting up strings");
+ /* Unicode not allowed for LANMAN dialects */
+ ascii_ssetup_strings(&bcc_ptr, ses, nls_cp);
+#endif
+ } else if (type == NTLM) {
+ pSMB->req_no_secext.Capabilities = cpu_to_le32(capabilities);
+ pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseInsensitivePasswordLength =
+ cpu_to_le16(CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
+ pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseSensitivePasswordLength =
+ cpu_to_le16(CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
+
+ /* calculate ntlm response and session key */
+ rc = setup_ntlm_response(ses, nls_cp);
+ if (rc) {
+ cERROR(1, "Error %d during NTLM authentication", rc);
+ goto ssetup_exit;
+ }
+
+ /* copy ntlm response */
+ memcpy(bcc_ptr, ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE,
+ CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
+ bcc_ptr += CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE;
+ memcpy(bcc_ptr, ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE,
+ CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
+ bcc_ptr += CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE;
+
+ if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNICODE) {
+ /* unicode strings must be word aligned */
+ if (iov[0].iov_len % 2) {
+ *bcc_ptr = 0;
+ bcc_ptr++;
+ }
+ unicode_ssetup_strings(&bcc_ptr, ses, nls_cp);
+ } else
+ ascii_ssetup_strings(&bcc_ptr, ses, nls_cp);
+ } else if (type == NTLMv2) {
+ pSMB->req_no_secext.Capabilities = cpu_to_le32(capabilities);
+
+ /* LM2 password would be here if we supported it */
+ pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseInsensitivePasswordLength = 0;
+
+ /* calculate nlmv2 response and session key */
+ rc = setup_ntlmv2_rsp(ses, nls_cp);
+ if (rc) {
+ cERROR(1, "Error %d during NTLMv2 authentication", rc);
+ goto ssetup_exit;
+ }
+ memcpy(bcc_ptr, ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE,
+ ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+ bcc_ptr += ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE;
+
+ /* set case sensitive password length after tilen may get
+ * assigned, tilen is 0 otherwise.
+ */
+ pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseSensitivePasswordLength =
+ cpu_to_le16(ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+
+ if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNICODE) {
+ if (iov[0].iov_len % 2) {
+ *bcc_ptr = 0;
+ bcc_ptr++;
+ }
+ unicode_ssetup_strings(&bcc_ptr, ses, nls_cp);
+ } else
+ ascii_ssetup_strings(&bcc_ptr, ses, nls_cp);
+ } else if (type == Kerberos) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_UPCALL
+ struct cifs_spnego_msg *msg;
+
+ spnego_key = cifs_get_spnego_key(ses);
+ if (IS_ERR(spnego_key)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(spnego_key);
+ spnego_key = NULL;
+ goto ssetup_exit;
+ }
+
+ msg = spnego_key->payload.data;
+ /* check version field to make sure that cifs.upcall is
+ sending us a response in an expected form */
+ if (msg->version != CIFS_SPNEGO_UPCALL_VERSION) {
+ cERROR(1, "incorrect version of cifs.upcall (expected"
+ " %d but got %d)",
+ CIFS_SPNEGO_UPCALL_VERSION, msg->version);
+ rc = -EKEYREJECTED;
+ goto ssetup_exit;
+ }
+
+ ses->auth_key.response = kmalloc(msg->sesskey_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ses->auth_key.response) {
+ cERROR(1, "Kerberos can't allocate (%u bytes) memory",
+ msg->sesskey_len);
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto ssetup_exit;
+ }
+ memcpy(ses->auth_key.response, msg->data, msg->sesskey_len);
+ ses->auth_key.len = msg->sesskey_len;
+
+ pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_EXT_SEC;
+ capabilities |= CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY;
+ pSMB->req.Capabilities = cpu_to_le32(capabilities);
+ iov[1].iov_base = msg->data + msg->sesskey_len;
+ iov[1].iov_len = msg->secblob_len;
+ pSMB->req.SecurityBlobLength = cpu_to_le16(iov[1].iov_len);
+
+ if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNICODE) {
+ /* unicode strings must be word aligned */
+ if ((iov[0].iov_len + iov[1].iov_len) % 2) {
+ *bcc_ptr = 0;
+ bcc_ptr++;
+ }
+ unicode_oslm_strings(&bcc_ptr, nls_cp);
+ unicode_domain_string(&bcc_ptr, ses, nls_cp);
+ } else
+ /* BB: is this right? */
+ ascii_ssetup_strings(&bcc_ptr, ses, nls_cp);
+#else /* ! CONFIG_CIFS_UPCALL */
+ cERROR(1, "Kerberos negotiated but upcall support disabled!");
+ rc = -ENOSYS;
+ goto ssetup_exit;
+#endif /* CONFIG_CIFS_UPCALL */
+ } else if (type == RawNTLMSSP) {
+ if ((pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 & SMBFLG2_UNICODE) == 0) {
+ cERROR(1, "NTLMSSP requires Unicode support");
+ rc = -ENOSYS;
+ goto ssetup_exit;
+ }
+
+ cFYI(1, "ntlmssp session setup phase %d", phase);
+ pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_EXT_SEC;
+ capabilities |= CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY;
+ pSMB->req.Capabilities |= cpu_to_le32(capabilities);
+ switch(phase) {
+ case NtLmNegotiate:
+ build_ntlmssp_negotiate_blob(
+ pSMB->req.SecurityBlob, ses);
+ iov[1].iov_len = sizeof(NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE);
+ iov[1].iov_base = pSMB->req.SecurityBlob;
+ pSMB->req.SecurityBlobLength =
+ cpu_to_le16(sizeof(NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE));
+ break;
+ case NtLmAuthenticate:
+ /*
+ * 5 is an empirical value, large enough to hold
+ * authenticate message plus max 10 of av paris,
+ * domain, user, workstation names, flags, etc.
+ */
+ ntlmsspblob = kzalloc(
+ 5*sizeof(struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ntlmsspblob) {
+ cERROR(1, "Can't allocate NTLMSSP blob");
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto ssetup_exit;
+ }
+
+ rc = build_ntlmssp_auth_blob(ntlmsspblob,
+ &blob_len, ses, nls_cp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto ssetup_exit;
+ iov[1].iov_len = blob_len;
+ iov[1].iov_base = ntlmsspblob;
+ pSMB->req.SecurityBlobLength = cpu_to_le16(blob_len);
+ /*
+ * Make sure that we tell the server that we are using
+ * the uid that it just gave us back on the response
+ * (challenge)
+ */
+ smb_buf->Uid = ses->Suid;
+ break;
+ default:
+ cERROR(1, "invalid phase %d", phase);
+ rc = -ENOSYS;
+ goto ssetup_exit;
+ }
+ /* unicode strings must be word aligned */
+ if ((iov[0].iov_len + iov[1].iov_len) % 2) {
+ *bcc_ptr = 0;
+ bcc_ptr++;
+ }
+ unicode_oslm_strings(&bcc_ptr, nls_cp);
+ } else {
+ cERROR(1, "secType %d not supported!", type);
+ rc = -ENOSYS;
+ goto ssetup_exit;
+ }
+
+ iov[2].iov_base = str_area;
+ iov[2].iov_len = (long) bcc_ptr - (long) str_area;
+
+ count = iov[1].iov_len + iov[2].iov_len;
+ smb_buf->smb_buf_length =
+ cpu_to_be32(be32_to_cpu(smb_buf->smb_buf_length) + count);
+
+ put_bcc(count, smb_buf);
+
+ rc = SendReceive2(xid, ses, iov, 3 /* num_iovecs */, &resp_buf_type,
+ CIFS_LOG_ERROR);
+ /* SMB request buf freed in SendReceive2 */
+
+ pSMB = (SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *)iov[0].iov_base;
+ smb_buf = (struct smb_hdr *)iov[0].iov_base;
+
+ if ((type == RawNTLMSSP) && (smb_buf->Status.CifsError ==
+ cpu_to_le32(NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED))) {
+ if (phase != NtLmNegotiate) {
+ cERROR(1, "Unexpected more processing error");
+ goto ssetup_exit;
+ }
+ /* NTLMSSP Negotiate sent now processing challenge (response) */
+ phase = NtLmChallenge; /* process ntlmssp challenge */
+ rc = 0; /* MORE_PROC rc is not an error here, but expected */
+ }
+ if (rc)
+ goto ssetup_exit;
+
+ if ((smb_buf->WordCount != 3) && (smb_buf->WordCount != 4)) {
+ rc = -EIO;
+ cERROR(1, "bad word count %d", smb_buf->WordCount);
+ goto ssetup_exit;
+ }
+ action = le16_to_cpu(pSMB->resp.Action);
+ if (action & GUEST_LOGIN)
+ cFYI(1, "Guest login"); /* BB mark SesInfo struct? */
+ ses->Suid = smb_buf->Uid; /* UID left in wire format (le) */
+ cFYI(1, "UID = %d ", ses->Suid);
+ /* response can have either 3 or 4 word count - Samba sends 3 */
+ /* and lanman response is 3 */
+ bytes_remaining = get_bcc(smb_buf);
+ bcc_ptr = pByteArea(smb_buf);
+
+ if (smb_buf->WordCount == 4) {
+ blob_len = le16_to_cpu(pSMB->resp.SecurityBlobLength);
+ if (blob_len > bytes_remaining) {
+ cERROR(1, "bad security blob length %d", blob_len);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto ssetup_exit;
+ }
+ if (phase == NtLmChallenge) {
+ rc = decode_ntlmssp_challenge(bcc_ptr, blob_len, ses);
+ /* now goto beginning for ntlmssp authenticate phase */
+ if (rc)
+ goto ssetup_exit;
+ }
+ bcc_ptr += blob_len;
+ bytes_remaining -= blob_len;
+ }
+
+ /* BB check if Unicode and decode strings */
+ if (bytes_remaining == 0) {
+ /* no string area to decode, do nothing */
+ } else if (smb_buf->Flags2 & SMBFLG2_UNICODE) {
+ /* unicode string area must be word-aligned */
+ if (((unsigned long) bcc_ptr - (unsigned long) smb_buf) % 2) {
+ ++bcc_ptr;
+ --bytes_remaining;
+ }
+ decode_unicode_ssetup(&bcc_ptr, bytes_remaining, ses, nls_cp);
+ } else {
+ rc = decode_ascii_ssetup(&bcc_ptr, bytes_remaining,
+ ses, nls_cp);
+ }
+
+ssetup_exit:
+ if (spnego_key) {
+ key_revoke(spnego_key);
+ key_put(spnego_key);
+ }
+ kfree(str_area);
+ kfree(ntlmsspblob);
+ ntlmsspblob = NULL;
+ if (resp_buf_type == CIFS_SMALL_BUFFER) {
+ cFYI(1, "ssetup freeing small buf %p", iov[0].iov_base);
+ cifs_small_buf_release(iov[0].iov_base);
+ } else if (resp_buf_type == CIFS_LARGE_BUFFER)
+ cifs_buf_release(iov[0].iov_base);
+
+ /* if ntlmssp, and negotiate succeeded, proceed to authenticate phase */
+ if ((phase == NtLmChallenge) && (rc == 0))
+ goto ssetup_ntlmssp_authenticate;
+
+ return rc;
+}