[T106][ZXW-22]7520V3SCV2.01.01.02P42U09_VEC_V0.8_AP_VEC origin source commit
Change-Id: Ic6e05d89ecd62fc34f82b23dcf306c93764aec4b
diff --git a/ap/os/linux/linux-3.4.x/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/ap/os/linux/linux-3.4.x/net/bluetooth/smp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..61e2494
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/os/linux/linux-3.4.x/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1021 @@
+/*
+ BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux
+ Copyright (C) 2011 Nokia Corporation and/or its subsidiary(-ies).
+
+ This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ published by the Free Software Foundation;
+
+ THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
+ OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+ FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS.
+ IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER(S) AND AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ CLAIM, OR ANY SPECIAL INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, OR ANY DAMAGES
+ WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+
+ ALL LIABILITY, INCLUDING LIABILITY FOR INFRINGEMENT OF ANY PATENTS,
+ COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS OR OTHER RIGHTS, RELATING TO USE OF THIS
+ SOFTWARE IS DISCLAIMED.
+*/
+
+#include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h>
+#include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h>
+#include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h>
+#include <net/bluetooth/mgmt.h>
+#include <net/bluetooth/smp.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include <crypto/b128ops.h>
+
+#define SMP_TIMEOUT msecs_to_jiffies(30000)
+
+#define AUTH_REQ_MASK 0x07
+
+static inline void swap128(u8 src[16], u8 dst[16])
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ dst[15 - i] = src[i];
+}
+
+static inline void swap56(u8 src[7], u8 dst[7])
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < 7; i++)
+ dst[6 - i] = src[i];
+}
+
+static int smp_e(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, const u8 *k, u8 *r)
+{
+ struct blkcipher_desc desc;
+ struct scatterlist sg;
+ int err, iv_len;
+ unsigned char iv[128];
+
+ if (tfm == NULL) {
+ BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ desc.tfm = tfm;
+ desc.flags = 0;
+
+ err = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(tfm, k, 16);
+ if (err) {
+ BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ sg_init_one(&sg, r, 16);
+
+ iv_len = crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm);
+ if (iv_len) {
+ memset(&iv, 0xff, iv_len);
+ crypto_blkcipher_set_iv(tfm, iv, iv_len);
+ }
+
+ err = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, &sg, &sg, 16);
+ if (err)
+ BT_ERR("Encrypt data error %d", err);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int smp_c1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 k[16], u8 r[16],
+ u8 preq[7], u8 pres[7], u8 _iat, bdaddr_t *ia,
+ u8 _rat, bdaddr_t *ra, u8 res[16])
+{
+ u8 p1[16], p2[16];
+ int err;
+
+ memset(p1, 0, 16);
+
+ /* p1 = pres || preq || _rat || _iat */
+ swap56(pres, p1);
+ swap56(preq, p1 + 7);
+ p1[14] = _rat;
+ p1[15] = _iat;
+
+ memset(p2, 0, 16);
+
+ /* p2 = padding || ia || ra */
+ baswap((bdaddr_t *) (p2 + 4), ia);
+ baswap((bdaddr_t *) (p2 + 10), ra);
+
+ /* res = r XOR p1 */
+ u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) r, (u128 *) p1);
+
+ /* res = e(k, res) */
+ err = smp_e(tfm, k, res);
+ if (err) {
+ BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ /* res = res XOR p2 */
+ u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) res, (u128 *) p2);
+
+ /* res = e(k, res) */
+ err = smp_e(tfm, k, res);
+ if (err)
+ BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int smp_s1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 k[16],
+ u8 r1[16], u8 r2[16], u8 _r[16])
+{
+ int err;
+
+ /* Just least significant octets from r1 and r2 are considered */
+ memcpy(_r, r1 + 8, 8);
+ memcpy(_r + 8, r2 + 8, 8);
+
+ err = smp_e(tfm, k, _r);
+ if (err)
+ BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int smp_rand(u8 *buf)
+{
+ get_random_bytes(buf, 16);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct sk_buff *smp_build_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code,
+ u16 dlen, void *data)
+{
+ struct sk_buff *skb;
+ struct l2cap_hdr *lh;
+ int len;
+
+ len = L2CAP_HDR_SIZE + sizeof(code) + dlen;
+
+ if (len > conn->mtu)
+ return NULL;
+
+ skb = bt_skb_alloc(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!skb)
+ return NULL;
+
+ lh = (struct l2cap_hdr *) skb_put(skb, L2CAP_HDR_SIZE);
+ lh->len = cpu_to_le16(sizeof(code) + dlen);
+ lh->cid = cpu_to_le16(L2CAP_CID_SMP);
+
+ memcpy(skb_put(skb, sizeof(code)), &code, sizeof(code));
+
+ memcpy(skb_put(skb, dlen), data, dlen);
+
+ return skb;
+}
+
+static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
+{
+ struct sk_buff *skb = smp_build_cmd(conn, code, len, data);
+
+ BT_DBG("code 0x%2.2x", code);
+
+ if (!skb)
+ return;
+
+ skb->priority = HCI_PRIO_MAX;
+ hci_send_acl(conn->hchan, skb, 0);
+
+ cancel_delayed_work_sync(&conn->security_timer);
+ schedule_delayed_work(&conn->security_timer, SMP_TIMEOUT);
+}
+
+static __u8 authreq_to_seclevel(__u8 authreq)
+{
+ if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_MITM)
+ return BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
+ else
+ return BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
+}
+
+static __u8 seclevel_to_authreq(__u8 sec_level)
+{
+ switch (sec_level) {
+ case BT_SECURITY_HIGH:
+ return SMP_AUTH_MITM | SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
+ case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM:
+ return SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
+ default:
+ return SMP_AUTH_NONE;
+ }
+}
+
+static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing *req,
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp,
+ __u8 authreq)
+{
+ u8 dist_keys = 0;
+
+ if (test_bit(HCI_PAIRABLE, &conn->hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) {
+ dist_keys = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
+ authreq |= SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
+ } else {
+ authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
+ }
+
+ if (rsp == NULL) {
+ req->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
+ req->oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
+ req->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+ req->init_key_dist = 0;
+ req->resp_key_dist = dist_keys;
+ req->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ rsp->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
+ rsp->oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
+ rsp->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+ rsp->init_key_dist = 0;
+ rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & dist_keys;
+ rsp->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK);
+}
+
+static u8 check_enc_key_size(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 max_key_size)
+{
+ struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+
+ if ((max_key_size > SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE) ||
+ (max_key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE))
+ return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+
+ smp->enc_key_size = max_key_size;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void smp_failure(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 reason, u8 send)
+{
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+
+ if (send)
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(reason),
+ &reason);
+
+ clear_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &conn->hcon->flags);
+ mgmt_auth_failed(conn->hcon->hdev, conn->dst, hcon->type,
+ hcon->dst_type, reason);
+
+ cancel_delayed_work_sync(&conn->security_timer);
+
+ if (test_and_clear_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &conn->hcon->flags))
+ smp_chan_destroy(conn);
+}
+
+#define JUST_WORKS 0x00
+#define JUST_CFM 0x01
+#define REQ_PASSKEY 0x02
+#define CFM_PASSKEY 0x03
+#define REQ_OOB 0x04
+#define OVERLAP 0xFF
+
+static const u8 gen_method[5][5] = {
+ { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
+ { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
+ { CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
+ { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, JUST_WORKS, JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM },
+ { CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, OVERLAP },
+};
+
+static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
+ u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
+{
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+ u8 method;
+ u32 passkey = 0;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ /* Initialize key for JUST WORKS */
+ memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
+ clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags);
+
+ BT_DBG("tk_request: auth:%d lcl:%d rem:%d", auth, local_io, remote_io);
+
+ /* If neither side wants MITM, use JUST WORKS */
+ /* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST WORKS */
+ /* Otherwise, look up method from the table */
+ if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_MITM) ||
+ local_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY ||
+ remote_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY)
+ method = JUST_WORKS;
+ else
+ method = gen_method[remote_io][local_io];
+
+ /* If not bonding, don't ask user to confirm a Zero TK */
+ if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING) && method == JUST_CFM)
+ method = JUST_WORKS;
+
+ /* If Just Works, Continue with Zero TK */
+ if (method == JUST_WORKS) {
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Not Just Works/Confirm results in MITM Authentication */
+ if (method != JUST_CFM) {
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, &smp->smp_flags);
+ if (hcon->pending_sec_level < BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
+ hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
+ }
+
+ /* If both devices have Keyoard-Display I/O, the master
+ * Confirms and the slave Enters the passkey.
+ */
+ if (method == OVERLAP) {
+ if (hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER)
+ method = CFM_PASSKEY;
+ else
+ method = REQ_PASSKEY;
+ }
+
+ /* Generate random passkey. Not valid until confirmed. */
+ if (method == CFM_PASSKEY) {
+ u8 key[16];
+
+ memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
+ get_random_bytes(&passkey, sizeof(passkey));
+ passkey %= 1000000;
+ put_unaligned_le32(passkey, key);
+ swap128(key, smp->tk);
+ BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", passkey);
+ }
+
+ hci_dev_lock(hcon->hdev);
+
+ if (method == REQ_PASSKEY)
+ ret = mgmt_user_passkey_request(hcon->hdev, conn->dst,
+ hcon->type, hcon->dst_type);
+ else
+ ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, conn->dst,
+ hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
+ cpu_to_le32(passkey), 0);
+
+ hci_dev_unlock(hcon->hdev);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void confirm_work(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+ struct smp_chan *smp = container_of(work, struct smp_chan, confirm);
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+ struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp;
+ int ret;
+ u8 res[16], reason;
+
+ BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ reason = SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ smp->tfm = tfm;
+
+ if (conn->hcon->out)
+ ret = smp_c1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp, 0,
+ conn->src, conn->hcon->dst_type, conn->dst, res);
+ else
+ ret = smp_c1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
+ conn->hcon->dst_type, conn->dst, 0, conn->src,
+ res);
+ if (ret) {
+ reason = SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->smp_flags);
+
+ swap128(res, cp.confirm_val);
+ smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+
+ return;
+
+error:
+ smp_failure(conn, reason, 1);
+}
+
+static void random_work(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+ struct smp_chan *smp = container_of(work, struct smp_chan, random);
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = smp->tfm;
+ u8 reason, confirm[16], res[16], key[16];
+ int ret;
+
+ if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(tfm)) {
+ reason = SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
+
+ if (hcon->out)
+ ret = smp_c1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp, 0,
+ conn->src, hcon->dst_type, conn->dst, res);
+ else
+ ret = smp_c1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
+ hcon->dst_type, conn->dst, 0, conn->src, res);
+ if (ret) {
+ reason = SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ swap128(res, confirm);
+
+ if (memcmp(smp->pcnf, confirm, sizeof(smp->pcnf)) != 0) {
+ BT_ERR("Pairing failed (confirmation values mismatch)");
+ reason = SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ if (hcon->out) {
+ u8 stk[16], rand[8];
+ __le16 ediv;
+
+ memset(rand, 0, sizeof(rand));
+ ediv = 0;
+
+ smp_s1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, key);
+ swap128(key, stk);
+
+ memset(stk + smp->enc_key_size, 0,
+ SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE - smp->enc_key_size);
+
+ if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags)) {
+ reason = SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ hci_le_start_enc(hcon, ediv, rand, stk);
+ hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size;
+ } else {
+ u8 stk[16], r[16], rand[8];
+ __le16 ediv;
+
+ memset(rand, 0, sizeof(rand));
+ ediv = 0;
+
+ swap128(smp->prnd, r);
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(r), r);
+
+ smp_s1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, key);
+ swap128(key, stk);
+
+ memset(stk + smp->enc_key_size, 0,
+ SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE - smp->enc_key_size);
+
+ hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, conn->dst, hcon->dst_type,
+ HCI_SMP_STK_SLAVE, 0, 0, stk, smp->enc_key_size,
+ ediv, rand);
+ }
+
+ return;
+
+error:
+ smp_failure(conn, reason, 1);
+}
+
+static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
+{
+ struct smp_chan *smp;
+
+ smp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smp_chan), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!smp)
+ return NULL;
+
+ INIT_WORK(&smp->confirm, confirm_work);
+ INIT_WORK(&smp->random, random_work);
+
+ smp->conn = conn;
+ conn->smp_chan = smp;
+ conn->hcon->smp_conn = conn;
+
+ hci_conn_hold(conn->hcon);
+
+ return smp;
+}
+
+void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
+{
+ struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+
+ BUG_ON(!smp);
+
+ if (smp->tfm)
+ crypto_free_blkcipher(smp->tfm);
+
+ kfree(smp);
+ conn->smp_chan = NULL;
+ conn->hcon->smp_conn = NULL;
+ hci_conn_put(conn->hcon);
+}
+
+int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
+{
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->smp_conn;
+ struct smp_chan *smp;
+ u32 value;
+ u8 key[16];
+
+ BT_DBG("");
+
+ if (!conn)
+ return -ENOTCONN;
+
+ smp = conn->smp_chan;
+
+ switch (mgmt_op) {
+ case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
+ value = le32_to_cpu(passkey);
+ memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
+ BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", value);
+ put_unaligned_le32(value, key);
+ swap128(key, smp->tk);
+ /* Fall Through */
+ case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_REPLY:
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags);
+ break;
+ case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY:
+ case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY:
+ smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED, 1);
+ return 0;
+ default:
+ smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED, 1);
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
+
+ /* If it is our turn to send Pairing Confirm, do so now */
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->smp_flags))
+ queue_work(hcon->hdev->workqueue, &smp->confirm);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data;
+ struct smp_chan *smp;
+ u8 key_size;
+ u8 auth = SMP_AUTH_NONE;
+ int ret;
+
+ BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+
+ if (conn->hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER)
+ return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
+
+ if (!test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &conn->hcon->flags))
+ smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
+
+ smp = conn->smp_chan;
+
+ smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
+ memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req));
+ skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req));
+
+ /* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */
+ if (req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING)
+ auth = req->auth_req;
+
+ conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
+
+ build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, auth);
+
+ key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
+ if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
+ return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+
+ ret = smp_rand(smp->prnd);
+ if (ret)
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
+ memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp));
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
+
+ /* Request setup of TK */
+ ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp.io_capability, req->io_capability);
+ if (ret)
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp = (void *) skb->data;
+ struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
+ u8 key_size, auth = SMP_AUTH_NONE;
+ int ret;
+
+ BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+
+ if (!(conn->hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER))
+ return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
+
+ skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rsp));
+
+ req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
+
+ key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp->max_key_size);
+ if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
+ return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+
+ ret = smp_rand(smp->prnd);
+ if (ret)
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
+ memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], rsp, sizeof(*rsp));
+
+ if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING) &&
+ (rsp->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
+ auth = SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
+
+ auth |= (req->auth_req | rsp->auth_req) & SMP_AUTH_MITM;
+
+ ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp->io_capability, req->io_capability);
+ if (ret)
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->smp_flags);
+
+ /* Can't compose response until we have been confirmed */
+ if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags))
+ return 0;
+
+ queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &smp->confirm);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
+
+ BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
+
+ memcpy(smp->pcnf, skb->data, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
+ skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
+
+ if (conn->hcon->out) {
+ u8 random[16];
+
+ swap128(smp->prnd, random);
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(random),
+ random);
+ } else if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags)) {
+ queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &smp->confirm);
+ } else {
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->smp_flags);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
+
+ BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+
+ swap128(skb->data, smp->rrnd);
+ skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
+
+ queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &smp->random);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static u8 smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
+{
+ struct smp_ltk *key;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+
+ key = hci_find_ltk_by_addr(hcon->hdev, conn->dst, hcon->dst_type);
+ if (!key)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags))
+ return 1;
+
+ hci_le_start_enc(hcon, key->ediv, key->rand, key->val);
+ hcon->enc_key_size = key->enc_size;
+
+ return 1;
+
+}
+static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct smp_cmd_security_req *rp = (void *) skb->data;
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ struct smp_chan *smp;
+
+ BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+
+ hcon->pending_sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(rp->auth_req);
+
+ if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags))
+ return 0;
+
+ smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
+
+ skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
+
+ memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
+ build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, rp->auth_req);
+
+ smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
+ memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
+{
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
+ struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+ __u8 authreq;
+
+ BT_DBG("conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, hcon, sec_level);
+
+ if (!lmp_host_le_capable(hcon->hdev))
+ return 1;
+
+ if (sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (hcon->sec_level >= sec_level)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER)
+ if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn))
+ goto done;
+
+ if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags))
+ return 0;
+
+ smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
+ if (!smp)
+ return 1;
+
+ authreq = seclevel_to_authreq(sec_level);
+
+ if (hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER) {
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
+
+ build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, authreq);
+ smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
+ memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+ } else {
+ struct smp_cmd_security_req cp;
+ cp.auth_req = authreq;
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+ }
+
+done:
+ hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info *rp = (void *) skb->data;
+ struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+
+ skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
+
+ memcpy(smp->tk, rp->ltk, sizeof(smp->tk));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct smp_cmd_master_ident *rp = (void *) skb->data;
+ struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ u8 authenticated;
+
+ skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
+
+ hci_dev_lock(hdev);
+ authenticated = (conn->hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH);
+ hci_add_ltk(conn->hcon->hdev, conn->dst, hcon->dst_type,
+ HCI_SMP_LTK, 1, authenticated, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size,
+ rp->ediv, rp->rand);
+ smp_distribute_keys(conn, 1);
+ hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ __u8 code = skb->data[0];
+ __u8 reason;
+ int err = 0;
+
+ if (!lmp_host_le_capable(conn->hcon->hdev)) {
+ err = -ENOTSUPP;
+ reason = SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ skb_pull(skb, sizeof(code));
+
+ /*
+ * The SMP context must be initialized for all other PDUs except
+ * pairing and security requests. If we get any other PDU when
+ * not initialized simply disconnect (done if this function
+ * returns an error).
+ */
+ if (code != SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ && code != SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ &&
+ !conn->smp_chan) {
+ BT_ERR("Unexpected SMP command 0x%02x. Disconnecting.", code);
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+ return -ENOTSUPP;
+ }
+
+ switch (code) {
+ case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ:
+ reason = smp_cmd_pairing_req(conn, skb);
+ break;
+
+ case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL:
+ smp_failure(conn, skb->data[0], 0);
+ reason = 0;
+ err = -EPERM;
+ break;
+
+ case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP:
+ reason = smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(conn, skb);
+ break;
+
+ case SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ:
+ reason = smp_cmd_security_req(conn, skb);
+ break;
+
+ case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM:
+ reason = smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(conn, skb);
+ break;
+
+ case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM:
+ reason = smp_cmd_pairing_random(conn, skb);
+ break;
+
+ case SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO:
+ reason = smp_cmd_encrypt_info(conn, skb);
+ break;
+
+ case SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT:
+ reason = smp_cmd_master_ident(conn, skb);
+ break;
+
+ case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO:
+ case SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO:
+ case SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO:
+ /* Just ignored */
+ reason = 0;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ BT_DBG("Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code);
+
+ reason = SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
+ err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+done:
+ if (reason)
+ smp_failure(conn, reason, 1);
+
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+ return err;
+}
+
+int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 force)
+{
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
+ struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+ __u8 *keydist;
+
+ BT_DBG("conn %p force %d", conn, force);
+
+ if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &conn->hcon->flags))
+ return 0;
+
+ rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
+
+ /* The responder sends its keys first */
+ if (!force && conn->hcon->out && (rsp->resp_key_dist & 0x07))
+ return 0;
+
+ req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
+
+ if (conn->hcon->out) {
+ keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist;
+ *keydist &= req->init_key_dist;
+ } else {
+ keydist = &rsp->resp_key_dist;
+ *keydist &= req->resp_key_dist;
+ }
+
+
+ BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", *keydist);
+
+ if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) {
+ struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc;
+ struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ u8 authenticated;
+ __le16 ediv;
+
+ get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, sizeof(enc.ltk));
+ get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv));
+ get_random_bytes(ident.rand, sizeof(ident.rand));
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc);
+
+ authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
+ hci_add_ltk(conn->hcon->hdev, conn->dst, hcon->dst_type,
+ HCI_SMP_LTK_SLAVE, 1, authenticated,
+ enc.ltk, smp->enc_key_size, ediv, ident.rand);
+
+ ident.ediv = cpu_to_le16(ediv);
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT, sizeof(ident), &ident);
+
+ *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
+ }
+
+ if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) {
+ struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info addrinfo;
+ struct smp_cmd_ident_info idinfo;
+
+ /* Send a dummy key */
+ get_random_bytes(idinfo.irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk));
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO, sizeof(idinfo), &idinfo);
+
+ /* Just public address */
+ memset(&addrinfo, 0, sizeof(addrinfo));
+ bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, conn->src);
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO, sizeof(addrinfo),
+ &addrinfo);
+
+ *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
+ }
+
+ if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) {
+ struct smp_cmd_sign_info sign;
+
+ /* Send a dummy key */
+ get_random_bytes(sign.csrk, sizeof(sign.csrk));
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign);
+
+ *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
+ }
+
+ if (conn->hcon->out || force) {
+ clear_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &conn->hcon->flags);
+ cancel_delayed_work_sync(&conn->security_timer);
+ smp_chan_destroy(conn);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}