[T106][ZXW-22]7520V3SCV2.01.01.02P42U09_VEC_V0.8_AP_VEC origin source commit
Change-Id: Ic6e05d89ecd62fc34f82b23dcf306c93764aec4b
diff --git a/ap/os/linux/linux-3.4.x/net/mac80211/key.c b/ap/os/linux/linux-3.4.x/net/mac80211/key.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5bb600d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ap/os/linux/linux-3.4.x/net/mac80211/key.c
@@ -0,0 +1,699 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2005, Instant802 Networks, Inc.
+ * Copyright 2005-2006, Devicescape Software, Inc.
+ * Copyright 2006-2007 Jiri Benc <jbenc@suse.cz>
+ * Copyright 2007-2008 Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/if_ether.h>
+#include <linux/etherdevice.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <net/mac80211.h>
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
+#include "ieee80211_i.h"
+#include "driver-ops.h"
+#include "debugfs_key.h"
+#include "aes_ccm.h"
+#include "aes_cmac.h"
+
+
+/**
+ * DOC: Key handling basics
+ *
+ * Key handling in mac80211 is done based on per-interface (sub_if_data)
+ * keys and per-station keys. Since each station belongs to an interface,
+ * each station key also belongs to that interface.
+ *
+ * Hardware acceleration is done on a best-effort basis for algorithms
+ * that are implemented in software, for each key the hardware is asked
+ * to enable that key for offloading but if it cannot do that the key is
+ * simply kept for software encryption (unless it is for an algorithm
+ * that isn't implemented in software).
+ * There is currently no way of knowing whether a key is handled in SW
+ * or HW except by looking into debugfs.
+ *
+ * All key management is internally protected by a mutex. Within all
+ * other parts of mac80211, key references are, just as STA structure
+ * references, protected by RCU. Note, however, that some things are
+ * unprotected, namely the key->sta dereferences within the hardware
+ * acceleration functions. This means that sta_info_destroy() must
+ * remove the key which waits for an RCU grace period.
+ */
+
+static const u8 bcast_addr[ETH_ALEN] = { 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF };
+
+static void assert_key_lock(struct ieee80211_local *local)
+{
+ lockdep_assert_held(&local->key_mtx);
+}
+
+static void increment_tailroom_need_count(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
+{
+ /*
+ * When this count is zero, SKB resizing for allocating tailroom
+ * for IV or MMIC is skipped. But, this check has created two race
+ * cases in xmit path while transiting from zero count to one:
+ *
+ * 1. SKB resize was skipped because no key was added but just before
+ * the xmit key is added and SW encryption kicks off.
+ *
+ * 2. SKB resize was skipped because all the keys were hw planted but
+ * just before xmit one of the key is deleted and SW encryption kicks
+ * off.
+ *
+ * In both the above case SW encryption will find not enough space for
+ * tailroom and exits with WARN_ON. (See WARN_ONs at wpa.c)
+ *
+ * Solution has been explained at
+ * http://mid.gmane.org/1308590980.4322.19.camel@jlt3.sipsolutions.net
+ */
+
+ if (!sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt++) {
+ /*
+ * Flush all XMIT packets currently using HW encryption or no
+ * encryption at all if the count transition is from 0 -> 1.
+ */
+ synchronize_net();
+ }
+}
+
+static int ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(struct ieee80211_key *key)
+{
+ struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata;
+ struct sta_info *sta;
+ int ret;
+
+ might_sleep();
+
+ if (!key->local->ops->set_key)
+ goto out_unsupported;
+
+ assert_key_lock(key->local);
+
+ sta = key->sta;
+
+ /*
+ * If this is a per-STA GTK, check if it
+ * is supported; if not, return.
+ */
+ if (sta && !(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE) &&
+ !(key->local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_SUPPORTS_PER_STA_GTK))
+ goto out_unsupported;
+
+ if (sta && !sta->uploaded)
+ goto out_unsupported;
+
+ sdata = key->sdata;
+ if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN) {
+ /*
+ * The driver doesn't know anything about VLAN interfaces.
+ * Hence, don't send GTKs for VLAN interfaces to the driver.
+ */
+ if (!(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE))
+ goto out_unsupported;
+ }
+
+ ret = drv_set_key(key->local, SET_KEY, sdata,
+ sta ? &sta->sta : NULL, &key->conf);
+
+ if (!ret) {
+ key->flags |= KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE;
+
+ if (!((key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC) ||
+ (key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) ||
+ (key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)))
+ sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt--;
+
+ WARN_ON((key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) &&
+ (key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV));
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ret != -ENOSPC && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP)
+ wiphy_err(key->local->hw.wiphy,
+ "failed to set key (%d, %pM) to hardware (%d)\n",
+ key->conf.keyidx,
+ sta ? sta->sta.addr : bcast_addr, ret);
+
+ out_unsupported:
+ switch (key->conf.cipher) {
+ case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40:
+ case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104:
+ case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP:
+ case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP:
+ case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC:
+ /* all of these we can do in software */
+ return 0;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+}
+
+static void ieee80211_key_disable_hw_accel(struct ieee80211_key *key)
+{
+ struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata;
+ struct sta_info *sta;
+ int ret;
+
+ might_sleep();
+
+ if (!key || !key->local->ops->set_key)
+ return;
+
+ assert_key_lock(key->local);
+
+ if (!(key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE))
+ return;
+
+ sta = key->sta;
+ sdata = key->sdata;
+
+ if (!((key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC) ||
+ (key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) ||
+ (key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)))
+ increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata);
+
+ ret = drv_set_key(key->local, DISABLE_KEY, sdata,
+ sta ? &sta->sta : NULL, &key->conf);
+
+ if (ret)
+ wiphy_err(key->local->hw.wiphy,
+ "failed to remove key (%d, %pM) from hardware (%d)\n",
+ key->conf.keyidx,
+ sta ? sta->sta.addr : bcast_addr, ret);
+
+ key->flags &= ~KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE;
+}
+
+void ieee80211_key_removed(struct ieee80211_key_conf *key_conf)
+{
+ struct ieee80211_key *key;
+
+ key = container_of(key_conf, struct ieee80211_key, conf);
+
+ might_sleep();
+ assert_key_lock(key->local);
+
+ key->flags &= ~KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE;
+
+ /*
+ * Flush TX path to avoid attempts to use this key
+ * after this function returns. Until then, drivers
+ * must be prepared to handle the key.
+ */
+ synchronize_rcu();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_key_removed);
+
+static void __ieee80211_set_default_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
+ int idx, bool uni, bool multi)
+{
+ struct ieee80211_key *key = NULL;
+
+ assert_key_lock(sdata->local);
+
+ if (idx >= 0 && idx < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS)
+ key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sdata->keys[idx]);
+
+ if (uni)
+ rcu_assign_pointer(sdata->default_unicast_key, key);
+ if (multi)
+ rcu_assign_pointer(sdata->default_multicast_key, key);
+
+ ieee80211_debugfs_key_update_default(sdata);
+}
+
+void ieee80211_set_default_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, int idx,
+ bool uni, bool multi)
+{
+ mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
+ __ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata, idx, uni, multi);
+ mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
+}
+
+static void
+__ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, int idx)
+{
+ struct ieee80211_key *key = NULL;
+
+ assert_key_lock(sdata->local);
+
+ if (idx >= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS &&
+ idx < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS)
+ key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sdata->keys[idx]);
+
+ rcu_assign_pointer(sdata->default_mgmt_key, key);
+
+ ieee80211_debugfs_key_update_default(sdata);
+}
+
+void ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
+ int idx)
+{
+ mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
+ __ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(sdata, idx);
+ mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
+}
+
+
+static void __ieee80211_key_replace(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
+ struct sta_info *sta,
+ bool pairwise,
+ struct ieee80211_key *old,
+ struct ieee80211_key *new)
+{
+ int idx;
+ bool defunikey, defmultikey, defmgmtkey;
+
+ if (new)
+ list_add_tail(&new->list, &sdata->key_list);
+
+ if (sta && pairwise) {
+ rcu_assign_pointer(sta->ptk, new);
+ } else if (sta) {
+ if (old)
+ idx = old->conf.keyidx;
+ else
+ idx = new->conf.keyidx;
+ rcu_assign_pointer(sta->gtk[idx], new);
+ } else {
+ WARN_ON(new && old && new->conf.keyidx != old->conf.keyidx);
+
+ if (old)
+ idx = old->conf.keyidx;
+ else
+ idx = new->conf.keyidx;
+
+ defunikey = old &&
+ old == key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local,
+ sdata->default_unicast_key);
+ defmultikey = old &&
+ old == key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local,
+ sdata->default_multicast_key);
+ defmgmtkey = old &&
+ old == key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local,
+ sdata->default_mgmt_key);
+
+ if (defunikey && !new)
+ __ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata, -1, true, false);
+ if (defmultikey && !new)
+ __ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata, -1, false, true);
+ if (defmgmtkey && !new)
+ __ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(sdata, -1);
+
+ rcu_assign_pointer(sdata->keys[idx], new);
+ if (defunikey && new)
+ __ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata, new->conf.keyidx,
+ true, false);
+ if (defmultikey && new)
+ __ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata, new->conf.keyidx,
+ false, true);
+ if (defmgmtkey && new)
+ __ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(sdata,
+ new->conf.keyidx);
+ }
+
+ if (old)
+ list_del(&old->list);
+}
+
+struct ieee80211_key *ieee80211_key_alloc(u32 cipher, int idx, size_t key_len,
+ const u8 *key_data,
+ size_t seq_len, const u8 *seq)
+{
+ struct ieee80211_key *key;
+ int i, j, err;
+
+ BUG_ON(idx < 0 || idx >= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS);
+
+ key = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ieee80211_key) + key_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!key)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ /*
+ * Default to software encryption; we'll later upload the
+ * key to the hardware if possible.
+ */
+ key->conf.flags = 0;
+ key->flags = 0;
+
+ key->conf.cipher = cipher;
+ key->conf.keyidx = idx;
+ key->conf.keylen = key_len;
+ switch (cipher) {
+ case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40:
+ case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104:
+ key->conf.iv_len = WEP_IV_LEN;
+ key->conf.icv_len = WEP_ICV_LEN;
+ break;
+ case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP:
+ key->conf.iv_len = TKIP_IV_LEN;
+ key->conf.icv_len = TKIP_ICV_LEN;
+ if (seq) {
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES; i++) {
+ key->u.tkip.rx[i].iv32 =
+ get_unaligned_le32(&seq[2]);
+ key->u.tkip.rx[i].iv16 =
+ get_unaligned_le16(seq);
+ }
+ }
+ spin_lock_init(&key->u.tkip.txlock);
+ break;
+ case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP:
+ key->conf.iv_len = CCMP_HDR_LEN;
+ key->conf.icv_len = CCMP_MIC_LEN;
+ if (seq) {
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES + 1; i++)
+ for (j = 0; j < CCMP_PN_LEN; j++)
+ key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[i][j] =
+ seq[CCMP_PN_LEN - j - 1];
+ }
+ /*
+ * Initialize AES key state here as an optimization so that
+ * it does not need to be initialized for every packet.
+ */
+ key->u.ccmp.tfm = ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt(key_data);
+ if (IS_ERR(key->u.ccmp.tfm)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(key->u.ccmp.tfm);
+ kfree(key);
+ return ERR_PTR(err);
+ }
+ break;
+ case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC:
+ key->conf.iv_len = 0;
+ key->conf.icv_len = sizeof(struct ieee80211_mmie);
+ if (seq)
+ for (j = 0; j < 6; j++)
+ key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn[j] = seq[6 - j - 1];
+ /*
+ * Initialize AES key state here as an optimization so that
+ * it does not need to be initialized for every packet.
+ */
+ key->u.aes_cmac.tfm =
+ ieee80211_aes_cmac_key_setup(key_data);
+ if (IS_ERR(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm);
+ kfree(key);
+ return ERR_PTR(err);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ memcpy(key->conf.key, key_data, key_len);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&key->list);
+
+ return key;
+}
+
+static void __ieee80211_key_destroy(struct ieee80211_key *key)
+{
+ if (!key)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Synchronize so the TX path can no longer be using
+ * this key before we free/remove it.
+ */
+ synchronize_rcu();
+
+ if (key->local)
+ ieee80211_key_disable_hw_accel(key);
+
+ if (key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP)
+ ieee80211_aes_key_free(key->u.ccmp.tfm);
+ if (key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC)
+ ieee80211_aes_cmac_key_free(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm);
+ if (key->local) {
+ ieee80211_debugfs_key_remove(key);
+ key->sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt--;
+ }
+
+ kfree(key);
+}
+
+int ieee80211_key_link(struct ieee80211_key *key,
+ struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
+ struct sta_info *sta)
+{
+ struct ieee80211_key *old_key;
+ int idx, ret;
+ bool pairwise;
+
+ BUG_ON(!sdata);
+ BUG_ON(!key);
+
+ pairwise = key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE;
+ idx = key->conf.keyidx;
+ key->local = sdata->local;
+ key->sdata = sdata;
+ key->sta = sta;
+
+ if (sta) {
+ /*
+ * some hardware cannot handle TKIP with QoS, so
+ * we indicate whether QoS could be in use.
+ */
+ if (test_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_WME))
+ key->conf.flags |= IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_WMM_STA;
+ } else {
+ if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION) {
+ struct sta_info *ap;
+
+ /*
+ * We're getting a sta pointer in, so must be under
+ * appropriate locking for sta_info_get().
+ */
+
+ /* same here, the AP could be using QoS */
+ ap = sta_info_get(key->sdata, key->sdata->u.mgd.bssid);
+ if (ap) {
+ if (test_sta_flag(ap, WLAN_STA_WME))
+ key->conf.flags |=
+ IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_WMM_STA;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
+
+ if (sta && pairwise)
+ old_key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sta->ptk);
+ else if (sta)
+ old_key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sta->gtk[idx]);
+ else
+ old_key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sdata->keys[idx]);
+
+ increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata);
+
+ __ieee80211_key_replace(sdata, sta, pairwise, old_key, key);
+ __ieee80211_key_destroy(old_key);
+
+ ieee80211_debugfs_key_add(key);
+
+ ret = ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(key);
+
+ mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void __ieee80211_key_free(struct ieee80211_key *key)
+{
+ if (!key)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Replace key with nothingness if it was ever used.
+ */
+ if (key->sdata)
+ __ieee80211_key_replace(key->sdata, key->sta,
+ key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE,
+ key, NULL);
+ __ieee80211_key_destroy(key);
+}
+
+void ieee80211_key_free(struct ieee80211_local *local,
+ struct ieee80211_key *key)
+{
+ mutex_lock(&local->key_mtx);
+ __ieee80211_key_free(key);
+ mutex_unlock(&local->key_mtx);
+}
+
+void ieee80211_enable_keys(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
+{
+ struct ieee80211_key *key;
+
+ ASSERT_RTNL();
+
+ if (WARN_ON(!ieee80211_sdata_running(sdata)))
+ return;
+
+ mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
+
+ sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt = 0;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(key, &sdata->key_list, list) {
+ increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata);
+ ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(key);
+ }
+
+ mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
+}
+
+void ieee80211_iter_keys(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
+ struct ieee80211_vif *vif,
+ void (*iter)(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
+ struct ieee80211_vif *vif,
+ struct ieee80211_sta *sta,
+ struct ieee80211_key_conf *key,
+ void *data),
+ void *iter_data)
+{
+ struct ieee80211_local *local = hw_to_local(hw);
+ struct ieee80211_key *key;
+ struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata;
+
+ ASSERT_RTNL();
+
+ mutex_lock(&local->key_mtx);
+ if (vif) {
+ sdata = vif_to_sdata(vif);
+ list_for_each_entry(key, &sdata->key_list, list)
+ iter(hw, &sdata->vif,
+ key->sta ? &key->sta->sta : NULL,
+ &key->conf, iter_data);
+ } else {
+ list_for_each_entry(sdata, &local->interfaces, list)
+ list_for_each_entry(key, &sdata->key_list, list)
+ iter(hw, &sdata->vif,
+ key->sta ? &key->sta->sta : NULL,
+ &key->conf, iter_data);
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&local->key_mtx);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_iter_keys);
+
+void ieee80211_disable_keys(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
+{
+ struct ieee80211_key *key;
+
+ ASSERT_RTNL();
+
+ mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
+
+ list_for_each_entry(key, &sdata->key_list, list)
+ ieee80211_key_disable_hw_accel(key);
+
+ mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
+}
+
+void ieee80211_free_keys(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
+{
+ struct ieee80211_key *key, *tmp;
+
+ mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
+
+ ieee80211_debugfs_key_remove_mgmt_default(sdata);
+
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(key, tmp, &sdata->key_list, list)
+ __ieee80211_key_free(key);
+
+ ieee80211_debugfs_key_update_default(sdata);
+
+ mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
+}
+
+
+void ieee80211_gtk_rekey_notify(struct ieee80211_vif *vif, const u8 *bssid,
+ const u8 *replay_ctr, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = vif_to_sdata(vif);
+
+ trace_api_gtk_rekey_notify(sdata, bssid, replay_ctr);
+
+ cfg80211_gtk_rekey_notify(sdata->dev, bssid, replay_ctr, gfp);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_gtk_rekey_notify);
+
+void ieee80211_get_key_tx_seq(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf,
+ struct ieee80211_key_seq *seq)
+{
+ struct ieee80211_key *key;
+ u64 pn64;
+
+ if (WARN_ON(!(keyconf->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV)))
+ return;
+
+ key = container_of(keyconf, struct ieee80211_key, conf);
+
+ switch (key->conf.cipher) {
+ case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP:
+ seq->tkip.iv32 = key->u.tkip.tx.iv32;
+ seq->tkip.iv16 = key->u.tkip.tx.iv16;
+ break;
+ case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP:
+ pn64 = atomic64_read(&key->u.ccmp.tx_pn);
+ seq->ccmp.pn[5] = pn64;
+ seq->ccmp.pn[4] = pn64 >> 8;
+ seq->ccmp.pn[3] = pn64 >> 16;
+ seq->ccmp.pn[2] = pn64 >> 24;
+ seq->ccmp.pn[1] = pn64 >> 32;
+ seq->ccmp.pn[0] = pn64 >> 40;
+ break;
+ case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC:
+ pn64 = atomic64_read(&key->u.aes_cmac.tx_pn);
+ seq->ccmp.pn[5] = pn64;
+ seq->ccmp.pn[4] = pn64 >> 8;
+ seq->ccmp.pn[3] = pn64 >> 16;
+ seq->ccmp.pn[2] = pn64 >> 24;
+ seq->ccmp.pn[1] = pn64 >> 32;
+ seq->ccmp.pn[0] = pn64 >> 40;
+ break;
+ default:
+ WARN_ON(1);
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_get_key_tx_seq);
+
+void ieee80211_get_key_rx_seq(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf,
+ int tid, struct ieee80211_key_seq *seq)
+{
+ struct ieee80211_key *key;
+ const u8 *pn;
+
+ key = container_of(keyconf, struct ieee80211_key, conf);
+
+ switch (key->conf.cipher) {
+ case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP:
+ if (WARN_ON(tid < 0 || tid >= NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES))
+ return;
+ seq->tkip.iv32 = key->u.tkip.rx[tid].iv32;
+ seq->tkip.iv16 = key->u.tkip.rx[tid].iv16;
+ break;
+ case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP:
+ if (WARN_ON(tid < -1 || tid >= NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES))
+ return;
+ if (tid < 0)
+ pn = key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES];
+ else
+ pn = key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[tid];
+ memcpy(seq->ccmp.pn, pn, CCMP_PN_LEN);
+ break;
+ case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC:
+ if (WARN_ON(tid != 0))
+ return;
+ pn = key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn;
+ memcpy(seq->aes_cmac.pn, pn, CMAC_PN_LEN);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_get_key_rx_seq);