lh | 9ed821d | 2023-04-07 01:36:19 -0700 | [diff] [blame^] | 1 | /* |
| 2 | * chap_ms.c - Microsoft MS-CHAP compatible implementation. |
| 3 | * |
| 4 | * Copyright (c) 1995 Eric Rosenquist. All rights reserved. |
| 5 | * |
| 6 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| 7 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| 8 | * are met: |
| 9 | * |
| 10 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| 11 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| 12 | * |
| 13 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| 14 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| 15 | * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
| 16 | * distribution. |
| 17 | * |
| 18 | * 3. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to |
| 19 | * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
| 20 | * prior written permission. |
| 21 | * |
| 22 | * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO |
| 23 | * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY |
| 24 | * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY |
| 25 | * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES |
| 26 | * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN |
| 27 | * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING |
| 28 | * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. |
| 29 | */ |
| 30 | |
| 31 | /* |
| 32 | * Modifications by Lauri Pesonen / lpesonen@clinet.fi, april 1997 |
| 33 | * |
| 34 | * Implemented LANManager type password response to MS-CHAP challenges. |
| 35 | * Now pppd provides both NT style and LANMan style blocks, and the |
| 36 | * prefered is set by option "ms-lanman". Default is to use NT. |
| 37 | * The hash text (StdText) was taken from Win95 RASAPI32.DLL. |
| 38 | * |
| 39 | * You should also use DOMAIN\\USERNAME as described in README.MSCHAP80 |
| 40 | */ |
| 41 | |
| 42 | /* |
| 43 | * Modifications by Frank Cusack, frank@google.com, March 2002. |
| 44 | * |
| 45 | * Implemented MS-CHAPv2 functionality, heavily based on sample |
| 46 | * implementation in RFC 2759. Implemented MPPE functionality, |
| 47 | * heavily based on sample implementation in RFC 3079. |
| 48 | * |
| 49 | * Copyright (c) 2002 Google, Inc. All rights reserved. |
| 50 | * |
| 51 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| 52 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| 53 | * are met: |
| 54 | * |
| 55 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| 56 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| 57 | * |
| 58 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| 59 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| 60 | * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
| 61 | * distribution. |
| 62 | * |
| 63 | * 3. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to |
| 64 | * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
| 65 | * prior written permission. |
| 66 | * |
| 67 | * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO |
| 68 | * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY |
| 69 | * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY |
| 70 | * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES |
| 71 | * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN |
| 72 | * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING |
| 73 | * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. |
| 74 | * |
| 75 | */ |
| 76 | |
| 77 | #define RCSID "$Id: chap_ms.c,v 1.38 2007/12/01 20:10:51 carlsonj Exp $" |
| 78 | |
| 79 | #ifdef CHAPMS |
| 80 | |
| 81 | #include <stdio.h> |
| 82 | #include <stdlib.h> |
| 83 | #include <string.h> |
| 84 | #include <ctype.h> |
| 85 | #include <sys/types.h> |
| 86 | #include <sys/time.h> |
| 87 | #include <unistd.h> |
| 88 | |
| 89 | #include "pppd.h" |
| 90 | #include "chap-new.h" |
| 91 | #include "chap_ms.h" |
| 92 | #include "md4.h" |
| 93 | #include "sha1.h" |
| 94 | #include "pppcrypt.h" |
| 95 | #include "magic.h" |
| 96 | |
| 97 | static const char rcsid[] = RCSID; |
| 98 | |
| 99 | |
| 100 | static void ascii2unicode __P((char[], int, u_char[])); |
| 101 | static void NTPasswordHash __P((u_char *, int, u_char[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE])); |
| 102 | static void ChallengeResponse __P((u_char *, u_char *, u_char[24])); |
| 103 | static void ChapMS_NT __P((u_char *, char *, int, u_char[24])); |
| 104 | static void ChapMS2_NT __P((u_char *, u_char[16], char *, char *, int, |
| 105 | u_char[24])); |
| 106 | static void GenerateAuthenticatorResponsePlain |
| 107 | __P((char*, int, u_char[24], u_char[16], u_char *, |
| 108 | char *, u_char[41])); |
| 109 | #ifdef MSLANMAN |
| 110 | static void ChapMS_LANMan __P((u_char *, char *, int, u_char *)); |
| 111 | #endif |
| 112 | |
| 113 | #ifdef MPPE |
| 114 | static void Set_Start_Key __P((u_char *, char *, int)); |
| 115 | static void SetMasterKeys __P((char *, int, u_char[24], int)); |
| 116 | #endif |
| 117 | |
| 118 | #ifdef MSLANMAN |
| 119 | bool ms_lanman = 0; /* Use LanMan password instead of NT */ |
| 120 | /* Has meaning only with MS-CHAP challenges */ |
| 121 | #endif |
| 122 | |
| 123 | #ifdef MPPE |
| 124 | u_char mppe_send_key[MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN]; |
| 125 | u_char mppe_recv_key[MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN]; |
| 126 | int mppe_keys_set = 0; /* Have the MPPE keys been set? */ |
| 127 | |
| 128 | #ifdef DEBUGMPPEKEY |
| 129 | /* For MPPE debug */ |
| 130 | /* Use "[]|}{?/><,`!2&&(" (sans quotes) for RFC 3079 MS-CHAPv2 test value */ |
| 131 | static char *mschap_challenge = NULL; |
| 132 | /* Use "!@\#$%^&*()_+:3|~" (sans quotes, backslash is to escape #) for ... */ |
| 133 | static char *mschap2_peer_challenge = NULL; |
| 134 | #endif |
| 135 | |
| 136 | #include "fsm.h" /* Need to poke MPPE options */ |
| 137 | #include "ccp.h" |
| 138 | #include <net/ppp-comp.h> |
| 139 | #endif |
| 140 | |
| 141 | /* |
| 142 | * Command-line options. |
| 143 | */ |
| 144 | static option_t chapms_option_list[] = { |
| 145 | #ifdef MSLANMAN |
| 146 | { "ms-lanman", o_bool, &ms_lanman, |
| 147 | "Use LanMan passwd when using MS-CHAP", 1 }, |
| 148 | #endif |
| 149 | #ifdef DEBUGMPPEKEY |
| 150 | { "mschap-challenge", o_string, &mschap_challenge, |
| 151 | "specify CHAP challenge" }, |
| 152 | { "mschap2-peer-challenge", o_string, &mschap2_peer_challenge, |
| 153 | "specify CHAP peer challenge" }, |
| 154 | #endif |
| 155 | { NULL } |
| 156 | }; |
| 157 | |
| 158 | /* |
| 159 | * chapms_generate_challenge - generate a challenge for MS-CHAP. |
| 160 | * For MS-CHAP the challenge length is fixed at 8 bytes. |
| 161 | * The length goes in challenge[0] and the actual challenge starts |
| 162 | * at challenge[1]. |
| 163 | */ |
| 164 | static void |
| 165 | chapms_generate_challenge(unsigned char *challenge) |
| 166 | { |
| 167 | *challenge++ = 8; |
| 168 | #ifdef DEBUGMPPEKEY |
| 169 | if (mschap_challenge && strlen(mschap_challenge) == 8) |
| 170 | memcpy(challenge, mschap_challenge, 8); |
| 171 | else |
| 172 | #endif |
| 173 | random_bytes(challenge, 8); |
| 174 | } |
| 175 | |
| 176 | static void |
| 177 | chapms2_generate_challenge(unsigned char *challenge) |
| 178 | { |
| 179 | *challenge++ = 16; |
| 180 | #ifdef DEBUGMPPEKEY |
| 181 | if (mschap_challenge && strlen(mschap_challenge) == 16) |
| 182 | memcpy(challenge, mschap_challenge, 16); |
| 183 | else |
| 184 | #endif |
| 185 | random_bytes(challenge, 16); |
| 186 | } |
| 187 | |
| 188 | static int |
| 189 | chapms_verify_response(int id, char *name, |
| 190 | unsigned char *secret, int secret_len, |
| 191 | unsigned char *challenge, unsigned char *response, |
| 192 | char *message, int message_space) |
| 193 | { |
| 194 | unsigned char md[MS_CHAP_RESPONSE_LEN]; |
| 195 | int diff; |
| 196 | int challenge_len, response_len; |
| 197 | |
| 198 | challenge_len = *challenge++; /* skip length, is 8 */ |
| 199 | response_len = *response++; |
| 200 | if (response_len != MS_CHAP_RESPONSE_LEN) |
| 201 | goto bad; |
| 202 | |
| 203 | #ifndef MSLANMAN |
| 204 | if (!response[MS_CHAP_USENT]) { |
| 205 | /* Should really propagate this into the error packet. */ |
| 206 | warn("Peer request for LANMAN auth not supported"); |
| 207 | goto bad; |
| 208 | } |
| 209 | #endif |
| 210 | |
| 211 | /* Generate the expected response. */ |
| 212 | ChapMS(challenge, (char *)secret, secret_len, md); |
| 213 | |
| 214 | #ifdef MSLANMAN |
| 215 | /* Determine which part of response to verify against */ |
| 216 | if (!response[MS_CHAP_USENT]) |
| 217 | diff = memcmp(&response[MS_CHAP_LANMANRESP], |
| 218 | &md[MS_CHAP_LANMANRESP], MS_CHAP_LANMANRESP_LEN); |
| 219 | else |
| 220 | #endif |
| 221 | diff = memcmp(&response[MS_CHAP_NTRESP], &md[MS_CHAP_NTRESP], |
| 222 | MS_CHAP_NTRESP_LEN); |
| 223 | |
| 224 | if (diff == 0) { |
| 225 | slprintf(message, message_space, "Access granted"); |
| 226 | return 1; |
| 227 | } |
| 228 | |
| 229 | bad: |
| 230 | /* See comments below for MS-CHAP V2 */ |
| 231 | slprintf(message, message_space, "E=691 R=1 C=%0.*B V=0", |
| 232 | challenge_len, challenge); |
| 233 | return 0; |
| 234 | } |
| 235 | |
| 236 | static int |
| 237 | chapms2_verify_response(int id, char *name, |
| 238 | unsigned char *secret, int secret_len, |
| 239 | unsigned char *challenge, unsigned char *response, |
| 240 | char *message, int message_space) |
| 241 | { |
| 242 | unsigned char md[MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN]; |
| 243 | char saresponse[MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH+1]; |
| 244 | int challenge_len, response_len; |
| 245 | |
| 246 | challenge_len = *challenge++; /* skip length, is 16 */ |
| 247 | response_len = *response++; |
| 248 | if (response_len != MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN) |
| 249 | goto bad; /* not even the right length */ |
| 250 | |
| 251 | /* Generate the expected response and our mutual auth. */ |
| 252 | ChapMS2(challenge, &response[MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHALLENGE], name, |
| 253 | (char *)secret, secret_len, md, |
| 254 | (unsigned char *)saresponse, MS_CHAP2_AUTHENTICATOR); |
| 255 | |
| 256 | /* compare MDs and send the appropriate status */ |
| 257 | /* |
| 258 | * Per RFC 2759, success message must be formatted as |
| 259 | * "S=<auth_string> M=<message>" |
| 260 | * where |
| 261 | * <auth_string> is the Authenticator Response (mutual auth) |
| 262 | * <message> is a text message |
| 263 | * |
| 264 | * However, some versions of Windows (win98 tested) do not know |
| 265 | * about the M=<message> part (required per RFC 2759) and flag |
| 266 | * it as an error (reported incorrectly as an encryption error |
| 267 | * to the user). Since the RFC requires it, and it can be |
| 268 | * useful information, we supply it if the peer is a conforming |
| 269 | * system. Luckily (?), win98 sets the Flags field to 0x04 |
| 270 | * (contrary to RFC requirements) so we can use that to |
| 271 | * distinguish between conforming and non-conforming systems. |
| 272 | * |
| 273 | * Special thanks to Alex Swiridov <say@real.kharkov.ua> for |
| 274 | * help debugging this. |
| 275 | */ |
| 276 | if (memcmp(&md[MS_CHAP2_NTRESP], &response[MS_CHAP2_NTRESP], |
| 277 | MS_CHAP2_NTRESP_LEN) == 0) { |
| 278 | if (response[MS_CHAP2_FLAGS]) |
| 279 | slprintf(message, message_space, "S=%s", saresponse); |
| 280 | else |
| 281 | slprintf(message, message_space, "S=%s M=%s", |
| 282 | saresponse, "Access granted"); |
| 283 | return 1; |
| 284 | } |
| 285 | |
| 286 | bad: |
| 287 | /* |
| 288 | * Failure message must be formatted as |
| 289 | * "E=e R=r C=c V=v M=m" |
| 290 | * where |
| 291 | * e = error code (we use 691, ERROR_AUTHENTICATION_FAILURE) |
| 292 | * r = retry (we use 1, ok to retry) |
| 293 | * c = challenge to use for next response, we reuse previous |
| 294 | * v = Change Password version supported, we use 0 |
| 295 | * m = text message |
| 296 | * |
| 297 | * The M=m part is only for MS-CHAPv2. Neither win2k nor |
| 298 | * win98 (others untested) display the message to the user anyway. |
| 299 | * They also both ignore the E=e code. |
| 300 | * |
| 301 | * Note that it's safe to reuse the same challenge as we don't |
| 302 | * actually accept another response based on the error message |
| 303 | * (and no clients try to resend a response anyway). |
| 304 | * |
| 305 | * Basically, this whole bit is useless code, even the small |
| 306 | * implementation here is only because of overspecification. |
| 307 | */ |
| 308 | slprintf(message, message_space, "E=691 R=1 C=%0.*B V=0 M=%s", |
| 309 | challenge_len, challenge, "Access denied"); |
| 310 | return 0; |
| 311 | } |
| 312 | |
| 313 | static void |
| 314 | chapms_make_response(unsigned char *response, int id, char *our_name, |
| 315 | unsigned char *challenge, char *secret, int secret_len, |
| 316 | unsigned char *private) |
| 317 | { |
| 318 | challenge++; /* skip length, should be 8 */ |
| 319 | *response++ = MS_CHAP_RESPONSE_LEN; |
| 320 | ChapMS(challenge, secret, secret_len, response); |
| 321 | } |
| 322 | |
| 323 | static void |
| 324 | chapms2_make_response(unsigned char *response, int id, char *our_name, |
| 325 | unsigned char *challenge, char *secret, int secret_len, |
| 326 | unsigned char *private) |
| 327 | { |
| 328 | challenge++; /* skip length, should be 16 */ |
| 329 | *response++ = MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN; |
| 330 | ChapMS2(challenge, |
| 331 | #ifdef DEBUGMPPEKEY |
| 332 | mschap2_peer_challenge, |
| 333 | #else |
| 334 | NULL, |
| 335 | #endif |
| 336 | our_name, secret, secret_len, response, private, |
| 337 | MS_CHAP2_AUTHENTICATEE); |
| 338 | } |
| 339 | |
| 340 | static int |
| 341 | chapms2_check_success(unsigned char *msg, int len, unsigned char *private) |
| 342 | { |
| 343 | if ((len < MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH + 2) || |
| 344 | strncmp((char *)msg, "S=", 2) != 0) { |
| 345 | /* Packet does not start with "S=" */ |
| 346 | error("MS-CHAPv2 Success packet is badly formed."); |
| 347 | return 0; |
| 348 | } |
| 349 | msg += 2; |
| 350 | len -= 2; |
| 351 | if (len < MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH |
| 352 | || memcmp(msg, private, MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH)) { |
| 353 | /* Authenticator Response did not match expected. */ |
| 354 | error("MS-CHAPv2 mutual authentication failed."); |
| 355 | return 0; |
| 356 | } |
| 357 | /* Authenticator Response matches. */ |
| 358 | msg += MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH; /* Eat it */ |
| 359 | len -= MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH; |
| 360 | if ((len >= 3) && !strncmp((char *)msg, " M=", 3)) { |
| 361 | msg += 3; /* Eat the delimiter */ |
| 362 | } else if (len) { |
| 363 | /* Packet has extra text which does not begin " M=" */ |
| 364 | error("MS-CHAPv2 Success packet is badly formed."); |
| 365 | return 0; |
| 366 | } |
| 367 | return 1; |
| 368 | } |
| 369 | |
| 370 | static void |
| 371 | chapms_handle_failure(unsigned char *inp, int len) |
| 372 | { |
| 373 | int err; |
| 374 | char *p, *msg; |
| 375 | |
| 376 | /* We want a null-terminated string for strxxx(). */ |
| 377 | msg = malloc(len + 1); |
| 378 | if (!msg) { |
| 379 | warn("Out of memory in chapms_handle_failure"); |
| 380 | return; |
| 381 | } |
| 382 | BCOPY(inp, msg, len); |
| 383 | msg[len] = 0; |
| 384 | p = msg; |
| 385 | |
| 386 | /* |
| 387 | * Deal with MS-CHAP formatted failure messages; just print the |
| 388 | * M=<message> part (if any). For MS-CHAP we're not really supposed |
| 389 | * to use M=<message>, but it shouldn't hurt. See |
| 390 | * chapms[2]_verify_response. |
| 391 | */ |
| 392 | if (!strncmp(p, "E=", 2)) |
| 393 | err = strtol(p+2, NULL, 10); /* Remember the error code. */ |
| 394 | else |
| 395 | goto print_msg; /* Message is badly formatted. */ |
| 396 | |
| 397 | if (len && ((p = strstr(p, " M=")) != NULL)) { |
| 398 | /* M=<message> field found. */ |
| 399 | p += 3; |
| 400 | } else { |
| 401 | /* No M=<message>; use the error code. */ |
| 402 | switch (err) { |
| 403 | case MS_CHAP_ERROR_RESTRICTED_LOGON_HOURS: |
| 404 | p = "E=646 Restricted logon hours"; |
| 405 | break; |
| 406 | |
| 407 | case MS_CHAP_ERROR_ACCT_DISABLED: |
| 408 | p = "E=647 Account disabled"; |
| 409 | break; |
| 410 | |
| 411 | case MS_CHAP_ERROR_PASSWD_EXPIRED: |
| 412 | p = "E=648 Password expired"; |
| 413 | break; |
| 414 | |
| 415 | case MS_CHAP_ERROR_NO_DIALIN_PERMISSION: |
| 416 | p = "E=649 No dialin permission"; |
| 417 | break; |
| 418 | |
| 419 | case MS_CHAP_ERROR_AUTHENTICATION_FAILURE: |
| 420 | p = "E=691 Authentication failure"; |
| 421 | break; |
| 422 | |
| 423 | case MS_CHAP_ERROR_CHANGING_PASSWORD: |
| 424 | /* Should never see this, we don't support Change Password. */ |
| 425 | p = "E=709 Error changing password"; |
| 426 | break; |
| 427 | |
| 428 | default: |
| 429 | free(msg); |
| 430 | error("Unknown MS-CHAP authentication failure: %.*v", |
| 431 | len, inp); |
| 432 | return; |
| 433 | } |
| 434 | } |
| 435 | print_msg: |
| 436 | if (p != NULL) |
| 437 | error("MS-CHAP authentication failed: %v", p); |
| 438 | free(msg); |
| 439 | } |
| 440 | |
| 441 | static void |
| 442 | ChallengeResponse(u_char *challenge, |
| 443 | u_char PasswordHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE], |
| 444 | u_char response[24]) |
| 445 | { |
| 446 | u_char ZPasswordHash[21]; |
| 447 | |
| 448 | BZERO(ZPasswordHash, sizeof(ZPasswordHash)); |
| 449 | BCOPY(PasswordHash, ZPasswordHash, MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE); |
| 450 | |
| 451 | #if 0 |
| 452 | warn("ChallengeResponse - ZPasswordHash %.*B", |
| 453 | sizeof(ZPasswordHash), ZPasswordHash); |
| 454 | #endif |
| 455 | |
| 456 | (void) DesSetkey(ZPasswordHash + 0); |
| 457 | DesEncrypt(challenge, response + 0); |
| 458 | (void) DesSetkey(ZPasswordHash + 7); |
| 459 | DesEncrypt(challenge, response + 8); |
| 460 | (void) DesSetkey(ZPasswordHash + 14); |
| 461 | DesEncrypt(challenge, response + 16); |
| 462 | |
| 463 | #if 0 |
| 464 | warn("ChallengeResponse - response %.24B", response); |
| 465 | #endif |
| 466 | } |
| 467 | |
| 468 | void |
| 469 | ChallengeHash(u_char PeerChallenge[16], u_char *rchallenge, |
| 470 | char *username, u_char Challenge[8]) |
| 471 | |
| 472 | { |
| 473 | SHA1_CTX sha1Context; |
| 474 | u_char sha1Hash[SHA1_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; |
| 475 | char *user; |
| 476 | |
| 477 | /* remove domain from "domain\username" */ |
| 478 | if ((user = strrchr(username, '\\')) != NULL) |
| 479 | ++user; |
| 480 | else |
| 481 | user = username; |
| 482 | |
| 483 | SHA1_Init(&sha1Context); |
| 484 | SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, PeerChallenge, 16); |
| 485 | SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, rchallenge, 16); |
| 486 | SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, (unsigned char *)user, strlen(user)); |
| 487 | SHA1_Final(sha1Hash, &sha1Context); |
| 488 | |
| 489 | BCOPY(sha1Hash, Challenge, 8); |
| 490 | } |
| 491 | |
| 492 | /* |
| 493 | * Convert the ASCII version of the password to Unicode. |
| 494 | * This implicitly supports 8-bit ISO8859/1 characters. |
| 495 | * This gives us the little-endian representation, which |
| 496 | * is assumed by all M$ CHAP RFCs. (Unicode byte ordering |
| 497 | * is machine-dependent.) |
| 498 | */ |
| 499 | static void |
| 500 | ascii2unicode(char ascii[], int ascii_len, u_char unicode[]) |
| 501 | { |
| 502 | int i; |
| 503 | |
| 504 | BZERO(unicode, ascii_len * 2); |
| 505 | for (i = 0; i < ascii_len; i++) |
| 506 | unicode[i * 2] = (u_char) ascii[i]; |
| 507 | } |
| 508 | |
| 509 | static void |
| 510 | NTPasswordHash(u_char *secret, int secret_len, u_char hash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]) |
| 511 | { |
| 512 | #ifdef __NetBSD__ |
| 513 | /* NetBSD uses the libc md4 routines which take bytes instead of bits */ |
| 514 | int mdlen = secret_len; |
| 515 | #else |
| 516 | int mdlen = secret_len * 8; |
| 517 | #endif |
| 518 | MD4_CTX md4Context; |
| 519 | |
| 520 | MD4Init(&md4Context); |
| 521 | /* MD4Update can take at most 64 bytes at a time */ |
| 522 | while (mdlen > 512) { |
| 523 | MD4Update(&md4Context, secret, 512); |
| 524 | secret += 64; |
| 525 | mdlen -= 512; |
| 526 | } |
| 527 | MD4Update(&md4Context, secret, mdlen); |
| 528 | MD4Final(hash, &md4Context); |
| 529 | |
| 530 | } |
| 531 | |
| 532 | static void |
| 533 | ChapMS_NT(u_char *rchallenge, char *secret, int secret_len, |
| 534 | u_char NTResponse[24]) |
| 535 | { |
| 536 | u_char unicodePassword[MAX_NT_PASSWORD * 2]; |
| 537 | u_char PasswordHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; |
| 538 | |
| 539 | /* Hash the Unicode version of the secret (== password). */ |
| 540 | ascii2unicode(secret, secret_len, unicodePassword); |
| 541 | NTPasswordHash(unicodePassword, secret_len * 2, PasswordHash); |
| 542 | |
| 543 | ChallengeResponse(rchallenge, PasswordHash, NTResponse); |
| 544 | } |
| 545 | |
| 546 | static void |
| 547 | ChapMS2_NT(u_char *rchallenge, u_char PeerChallenge[16], char *username, |
| 548 | char *secret, int secret_len, u_char NTResponse[24]) |
| 549 | { |
| 550 | u_char unicodePassword[MAX_NT_PASSWORD * 2]; |
| 551 | u_char PasswordHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; |
| 552 | u_char Challenge[8]; |
| 553 | |
| 554 | ChallengeHash(PeerChallenge, rchallenge, username, Challenge); |
| 555 | |
| 556 | /* Hash the Unicode version of the secret (== password). */ |
| 557 | ascii2unicode(secret, secret_len, unicodePassword); |
| 558 | NTPasswordHash(unicodePassword, secret_len * 2, PasswordHash); |
| 559 | |
| 560 | ChallengeResponse(Challenge, PasswordHash, NTResponse); |
| 561 | } |
| 562 | |
| 563 | #ifdef MSLANMAN |
| 564 | static u_char *StdText = (u_char *)"KGS!@#$%"; /* key from rasapi32.dll */ |
| 565 | |
| 566 | static void |
| 567 | ChapMS_LANMan(u_char *rchallenge, char *secret, int secret_len, |
| 568 | unsigned char *response) |
| 569 | { |
| 570 | int i; |
| 571 | u_char UcasePassword[MAX_NT_PASSWORD]; /* max is actually 14 */ |
| 572 | u_char PasswordHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; |
| 573 | |
| 574 | /* LANMan password is case insensitive */ |
| 575 | BZERO(UcasePassword, sizeof(UcasePassword)); |
| 576 | for (i = 0; i < secret_len; i++) |
| 577 | UcasePassword[i] = (u_char)toupper(secret[i]); |
| 578 | (void) DesSetkey(UcasePassword + 0); |
| 579 | DesEncrypt( StdText, PasswordHash + 0 ); |
| 580 | (void) DesSetkey(UcasePassword + 7); |
| 581 | DesEncrypt( StdText, PasswordHash + 8 ); |
| 582 | ChallengeResponse(rchallenge, PasswordHash, &response[MS_CHAP_LANMANRESP]); |
| 583 | } |
| 584 | #endif |
| 585 | |
| 586 | |
| 587 | void |
| 588 | GenerateAuthenticatorResponse(u_char PasswordHashHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE], |
| 589 | u_char NTResponse[24], u_char PeerChallenge[16], |
| 590 | u_char *rchallenge, char *username, |
| 591 | u_char authResponse[MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH+1]) |
| 592 | { |
| 593 | /* |
| 594 | * "Magic" constants used in response generation, from RFC 2759. |
| 595 | */ |
| 596 | u_char Magic1[39] = /* "Magic server to client signing constant" */ |
| 597 | { 0x4D, 0x61, 0x67, 0x69, 0x63, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, |
| 598 | 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x74, 0x6F, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6C, 0x69, 0x65, |
| 599 | 0x6E, 0x74, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x67, 0x6E, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, |
| 600 | 0x20, 0x63, 0x6F, 0x6E, 0x73, 0x74, 0x61, 0x6E, 0x74 }; |
| 601 | u_char Magic2[41] = /* "Pad to make it do more than one iteration" */ |
| 602 | { 0x50, 0x61, 0x64, 0x20, 0x74, 0x6F, 0x20, 0x6D, 0x61, 0x6B, |
| 603 | 0x65, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74, 0x20, 0x64, 0x6F, 0x20, 0x6D, 0x6F, |
| 604 | 0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x61, 0x6E, 0x20, 0x6F, 0x6E, |
| 605 | 0x65, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x61, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6F, |
| 606 | 0x6E }; |
| 607 | |
| 608 | int i; |
| 609 | SHA1_CTX sha1Context; |
| 610 | u_char Digest[SHA1_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; |
| 611 | u_char Challenge[8]; |
| 612 | |
| 613 | SHA1_Init(&sha1Context); |
| 614 | SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, PasswordHashHash, MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE); |
| 615 | SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, NTResponse, 24); |
| 616 | SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, Magic1, sizeof(Magic1)); |
| 617 | SHA1_Final(Digest, &sha1Context); |
| 618 | |
| 619 | ChallengeHash(PeerChallenge, rchallenge, username, Challenge); |
| 620 | |
| 621 | SHA1_Init(&sha1Context); |
| 622 | SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, Digest, sizeof(Digest)); |
| 623 | SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, Challenge, sizeof(Challenge)); |
| 624 | SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, Magic2, sizeof(Magic2)); |
| 625 | SHA1_Final(Digest, &sha1Context); |
| 626 | |
| 627 | /* Convert to ASCII hex string. */ |
| 628 | for (i = 0; i < MAX((MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH / 2), sizeof(Digest)); i++) |
| 629 | sprintf((char *)&authResponse[i * 2], "%02X", Digest[i]); |
| 630 | } |
| 631 | |
| 632 | |
| 633 | static void |
| 634 | GenerateAuthenticatorResponsePlain |
| 635 | (char *secret, int secret_len, |
| 636 | u_char NTResponse[24], u_char PeerChallenge[16], |
| 637 | u_char *rchallenge, char *username, |
| 638 | u_char authResponse[MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH+1]) |
| 639 | { |
| 640 | u_char unicodePassword[MAX_NT_PASSWORD * 2]; |
| 641 | u_char PasswordHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; |
| 642 | u_char PasswordHashHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; |
| 643 | |
| 644 | /* Hash (x2) the Unicode version of the secret (== password). */ |
| 645 | ascii2unicode(secret, secret_len, unicodePassword); |
| 646 | NTPasswordHash(unicodePassword, secret_len * 2, PasswordHash); |
| 647 | NTPasswordHash(PasswordHash, sizeof(PasswordHash), |
| 648 | PasswordHashHash); |
| 649 | |
| 650 | GenerateAuthenticatorResponse(PasswordHashHash, NTResponse, PeerChallenge, |
| 651 | rchallenge, username, authResponse); |
| 652 | } |
| 653 | |
| 654 | |
| 655 | #ifdef MPPE |
| 656 | /* |
| 657 | * Set mppe_xxxx_key from the NTPasswordHashHash. |
| 658 | * RFC 2548 (RADIUS support) requires us to export this function (ugh). |
| 659 | */ |
| 660 | void |
| 661 | mppe_set_keys(u_char *rchallenge, u_char PasswordHashHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]) |
| 662 | { |
| 663 | SHA1_CTX sha1Context; |
| 664 | u_char Digest[SHA1_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; /* >= MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN */ |
| 665 | |
| 666 | SHA1_Init(&sha1Context); |
| 667 | SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, PasswordHashHash, MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE); |
| 668 | SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, PasswordHashHash, MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE); |
| 669 | SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, rchallenge, 8); |
| 670 | SHA1_Final(Digest, &sha1Context); |
| 671 | |
| 672 | /* Same key in both directions. */ |
| 673 | BCOPY(Digest, mppe_send_key, sizeof(mppe_send_key)); |
| 674 | BCOPY(Digest, mppe_recv_key, sizeof(mppe_recv_key)); |
| 675 | |
| 676 | mppe_keys_set = 1; |
| 677 | } |
| 678 | |
| 679 | /* |
| 680 | * Set mppe_xxxx_key from MS-CHAP credentials. (see RFC 3079) |
| 681 | */ |
| 682 | static void |
| 683 | Set_Start_Key(u_char *rchallenge, char *secret, int secret_len) |
| 684 | { |
| 685 | u_char unicodePassword[MAX_NT_PASSWORD * 2]; |
| 686 | u_char PasswordHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; |
| 687 | u_char PasswordHashHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; |
| 688 | |
| 689 | /* Hash (x2) the Unicode version of the secret (== password). */ |
| 690 | ascii2unicode(secret, secret_len, unicodePassword); |
| 691 | NTPasswordHash(unicodePassword, secret_len * 2, PasswordHash); |
| 692 | NTPasswordHash(PasswordHash, sizeof(PasswordHash), PasswordHashHash); |
| 693 | |
| 694 | mppe_set_keys(rchallenge, PasswordHashHash); |
| 695 | } |
| 696 | |
| 697 | /* |
| 698 | * Set mppe_xxxx_key from MS-CHAPv2 credentials. (see RFC 3079) |
| 699 | * |
| 700 | * This helper function used in the Winbind module, which gets the |
| 701 | * NTHashHash from the server. |
| 702 | */ |
| 703 | void |
| 704 | mppe_set_keys2(u_char PasswordHashHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE], |
| 705 | u_char NTResponse[24], int IsServer) |
| 706 | { |
| 707 | SHA1_CTX sha1Context; |
| 708 | u_char MasterKey[SHA1_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; /* >= MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN */ |
| 709 | u_char Digest[SHA1_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; /* >= MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN */ |
| 710 | |
| 711 | u_char SHApad1[40] = |
| 712 | { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, |
| 713 | 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, |
| 714 | 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, |
| 715 | 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }; |
| 716 | u_char SHApad2[40] = |
| 717 | { 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, |
| 718 | 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, |
| 719 | 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, |
| 720 | 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2 }; |
| 721 | |
| 722 | /* "This is the MPPE Master Key" */ |
| 723 | u_char Magic1[27] = |
| 724 | { 0x54, 0x68, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, |
| 725 | 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x4d, 0x50, 0x50, 0x45, 0x20, 0x4d, |
| 726 | 0x61, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x4b, 0x65, 0x79 }; |
| 727 | /* "On the client side, this is the send key; " |
| 728 | "on the server side, it is the receive key." */ |
| 729 | u_char Magic2[84] = |
| 730 | { 0x4f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x69, |
| 731 | 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x64, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x20, |
| 732 | 0x74, 0x68, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, |
| 733 | 0x65, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, |
| 734 | 0x3b, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x73, |
| 735 | 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x64, 0x65, |
| 736 | 0x2c, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, |
| 737 | 0x65, 0x20, 0x72, 0x65, 0x63, 0x65, 0x69, 0x76, 0x65, 0x20, |
| 738 | 0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x2e }; |
| 739 | /* "On the client side, this is the receive key; " |
| 740 | "on the server side, it is the send key." */ |
| 741 | u_char Magic3[84] = |
| 742 | { 0x4f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x69, |
| 743 | 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x64, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x20, |
| 744 | 0x74, 0x68, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, |
| 745 | 0x65, 0x20, 0x72, 0x65, 0x63, 0x65, 0x69, 0x76, 0x65, 0x20, |
| 746 | 0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x3b, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, |
| 747 | 0x65, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x73, |
| 748 | 0x69, 0x64, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, |
| 749 | 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, |
| 750 | 0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x2e }; |
| 751 | u_char *s; |
| 752 | |
| 753 | SHA1_Init(&sha1Context); |
| 754 | SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, PasswordHashHash, MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE); |
| 755 | SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, NTResponse, 24); |
| 756 | SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, Magic1, sizeof(Magic1)); |
| 757 | SHA1_Final(MasterKey, &sha1Context); |
| 758 | |
| 759 | /* |
| 760 | * generate send key |
| 761 | */ |
| 762 | if (IsServer) |
| 763 | s = Magic3; |
| 764 | else |
| 765 | s = Magic2; |
| 766 | SHA1_Init(&sha1Context); |
| 767 | SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, MasterKey, 16); |
| 768 | SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, SHApad1, sizeof(SHApad1)); |
| 769 | SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, s, 84); |
| 770 | SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, SHApad2, sizeof(SHApad2)); |
| 771 | SHA1_Final(Digest, &sha1Context); |
| 772 | |
| 773 | BCOPY(Digest, mppe_send_key, sizeof(mppe_send_key)); |
| 774 | |
| 775 | /* |
| 776 | * generate recv key |
| 777 | */ |
| 778 | if (IsServer) |
| 779 | s = Magic2; |
| 780 | else |
| 781 | s = Magic3; |
| 782 | SHA1_Init(&sha1Context); |
| 783 | SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, MasterKey, 16); |
| 784 | SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, SHApad1, sizeof(SHApad1)); |
| 785 | SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, s, 84); |
| 786 | SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, SHApad2, sizeof(SHApad2)); |
| 787 | SHA1_Final(Digest, &sha1Context); |
| 788 | |
| 789 | BCOPY(Digest, mppe_recv_key, sizeof(mppe_recv_key)); |
| 790 | |
| 791 | mppe_keys_set = 1; |
| 792 | } |
| 793 | |
| 794 | /* |
| 795 | * Set mppe_xxxx_key from MS-CHAPv2 credentials. (see RFC 3079) |
| 796 | */ |
| 797 | static void |
| 798 | SetMasterKeys(char *secret, int secret_len, u_char NTResponse[24], int IsServer) |
| 799 | { |
| 800 | u_char unicodePassword[MAX_NT_PASSWORD * 2]; |
| 801 | u_char PasswordHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; |
| 802 | u_char PasswordHashHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; |
| 803 | /* Hash (x2) the Unicode version of the secret (== password). */ |
| 804 | ascii2unicode(secret, secret_len, unicodePassword); |
| 805 | NTPasswordHash(unicodePassword, secret_len * 2, PasswordHash); |
| 806 | NTPasswordHash(PasswordHash, sizeof(PasswordHash), PasswordHashHash); |
| 807 | mppe_set_keys2(PasswordHashHash, NTResponse, IsServer); |
| 808 | } |
| 809 | |
| 810 | #endif /* MPPE */ |
| 811 | |
| 812 | |
| 813 | void |
| 814 | ChapMS(u_char *rchallenge, char *secret, int secret_len, |
| 815 | unsigned char *response) |
| 816 | { |
| 817 | BZERO(response, MS_CHAP_RESPONSE_LEN); |
| 818 | |
| 819 | ChapMS_NT(rchallenge, secret, secret_len, &response[MS_CHAP_NTRESP]); |
| 820 | |
| 821 | #ifdef MSLANMAN |
| 822 | ChapMS_LANMan(rchallenge, secret, secret_len, |
| 823 | &response[MS_CHAP_LANMANRESP]); |
| 824 | |
| 825 | /* preferred method is set by option */ |
| 826 | response[MS_CHAP_USENT] = !ms_lanman; |
| 827 | #else |
| 828 | response[MS_CHAP_USENT] = 1; |
| 829 | #endif |
| 830 | |
| 831 | #ifdef MPPE |
| 832 | Set_Start_Key(rchallenge, secret, secret_len); |
| 833 | #endif |
| 834 | } |
| 835 | |
| 836 | |
| 837 | /* |
| 838 | * If PeerChallenge is NULL, one is generated and the PeerChallenge |
| 839 | * field of response is filled in. Call this way when generating a response. |
| 840 | * If PeerChallenge is supplied, it is copied into the PeerChallenge field. |
| 841 | * Call this way when verifying a response (or debugging). |
| 842 | * Do not call with PeerChallenge = response. |
| 843 | * |
| 844 | * The PeerChallenge field of response is then used for calculation of the |
| 845 | * Authenticator Response. |
| 846 | */ |
| 847 | void |
| 848 | ChapMS2(u_char *rchallenge, u_char *PeerChallenge, |
| 849 | char *user, char *secret, int secret_len, unsigned char *response, |
| 850 | u_char authResponse[], int authenticator) |
| 851 | { |
| 852 | /* ARGSUSED */ |
| 853 | u_char *p = &response[MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHALLENGE]; |
| 854 | int i; |
| 855 | |
| 856 | BZERO(response, MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN); |
| 857 | |
| 858 | /* Generate the Peer-Challenge if requested, or copy it if supplied. */ |
| 859 | if (!PeerChallenge) |
| 860 | for (i = 0; i < MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHAL_LEN; i++) |
| 861 | *p++ = (u_char) (drand48() * 0xff); |
| 862 | else |
| 863 | BCOPY(PeerChallenge, &response[MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHALLENGE], |
| 864 | MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHAL_LEN); |
| 865 | |
| 866 | /* Generate the NT-Response */ |
| 867 | ChapMS2_NT(rchallenge, &response[MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHALLENGE], user, |
| 868 | secret, secret_len, &response[MS_CHAP2_NTRESP]); |
| 869 | |
| 870 | /* Generate the Authenticator Response. */ |
| 871 | GenerateAuthenticatorResponsePlain(secret, secret_len, |
| 872 | &response[MS_CHAP2_NTRESP], |
| 873 | &response[MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHALLENGE], |
| 874 | rchallenge, user, authResponse); |
| 875 | |
| 876 | #ifdef MPPE |
| 877 | SetMasterKeys(secret, secret_len, |
| 878 | &response[MS_CHAP2_NTRESP], authenticator); |
| 879 | #endif |
| 880 | } |
| 881 | |
| 882 | #ifdef MPPE |
| 883 | /* |
| 884 | * Set MPPE options from plugins. |
| 885 | */ |
| 886 | void |
| 887 | set_mppe_enc_types(int policy, int types) |
| 888 | { |
| 889 | /* Early exit for unknown policies. */ |
| 890 | if (policy != MPPE_ENC_POL_ENC_ALLOWED || |
| 891 | policy != MPPE_ENC_POL_ENC_REQUIRED) |
| 892 | return; |
| 893 | |
| 894 | /* Don't modify MPPE if it's optional and wasn't already configured. */ |
| 895 | if (policy == MPPE_ENC_POL_ENC_ALLOWED && !ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe) |
| 896 | return; |
| 897 | |
| 898 | /* |
| 899 | * Disable undesirable encryption types. Note that we don't ENABLE |
| 900 | * any encryption types, to avoid overriding manual configuration. |
| 901 | */ |
| 902 | switch(types) { |
| 903 | case MPPE_ENC_TYPES_RC4_40: |
| 904 | ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe &= ~MPPE_OPT_128; /* disable 128-bit */ |
| 905 | break; |
| 906 | case MPPE_ENC_TYPES_RC4_128: |
| 907 | ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe &= ~MPPE_OPT_40; /* disable 40-bit */ |
| 908 | break; |
| 909 | default: |
| 910 | break; |
| 911 | } |
| 912 | } |
| 913 | #endif /* MPPE */ |
| 914 | |
| 915 | static struct chap_digest_type chapms_digest = { |
| 916 | CHAP_MICROSOFT, /* code */ |
| 917 | chapms_generate_challenge, |
| 918 | chapms_verify_response, |
| 919 | chapms_make_response, |
| 920 | NULL, /* check_success */ |
| 921 | chapms_handle_failure, |
| 922 | }; |
| 923 | |
| 924 | static struct chap_digest_type chapms2_digest = { |
| 925 | CHAP_MICROSOFT_V2, /* code */ |
| 926 | chapms2_generate_challenge, |
| 927 | chapms2_verify_response, |
| 928 | chapms2_make_response, |
| 929 | chapms2_check_success, |
| 930 | chapms_handle_failure, |
| 931 | }; |
| 932 | |
| 933 | void |
| 934 | chapms_init(void) |
| 935 | { |
| 936 | chap_register_digest(&chapms_digest); |
| 937 | chap_register_digest(&chapms2_digest); |
| 938 | add_options(chapms_option_list); |
| 939 | } |
| 940 | |
| 941 | #endif /* CHAPMS */ |