lh | 9ed821d | 2023-04-07 01:36:19 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 1 | /* |
| 2 | * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| 3 | * |
| 4 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
| 5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
| 6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
| 7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
| 8 | */ |
| 9 | |
| 10 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
| 11 | |
| 12 | #include <errno.h> |
| 13 | #include <stdio.h> |
| 14 | #include <stdlib.h> |
| 15 | #include <string.h> |
| 16 | |
| 17 | #include <openssl/crypto.h> |
| 18 | #include <openssl/rand.h> |
| 19 | #include <openssl/rand_drbg.h> |
| 20 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
| 21 | |
| 22 | #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS |
| 23 | # include <unixio.h> |
| 24 | #endif |
| 25 | #include <sys/types.h> |
| 26 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO |
| 27 | # include <sys/stat.h> |
| 28 | # include <fcntl.h> |
| 29 | # if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE) |
| 30 | # include <windows.h> |
| 31 | # include <io.h> |
| 32 | # define stat _stat |
| 33 | # define chmod _chmod |
| 34 | # define open _open |
| 35 | # define fdopen _fdopen |
| 36 | # define fstat _fstat |
| 37 | # define fileno _fileno |
| 38 | # endif |
| 39 | #endif |
| 40 | |
| 41 | /* |
| 42 | * Following should not be needed, and we could have been stricter |
| 43 | * and demand S_IS*. But some systems just don't comply... Formally |
| 44 | * below macros are "anatomically incorrect", because normally they |
| 45 | * would look like ((m) & MASK == TYPE), but since MASK availability |
| 46 | * is as questionable, we settle for this poor-man fallback... |
| 47 | */ |
| 48 | # if !defined(S_ISREG) |
| 49 | # define S_ISREG(m) ((m) & S_IFREG) |
| 50 | # endif |
| 51 | |
| 52 | #define RAND_BUF_SIZE 1024 |
| 53 | #define RFILE ".rnd" |
| 54 | |
| 55 | #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS |
| 56 | /* |
| 57 | * __FILE_ptr32 is a type provided by DEC C headers (types.h specifically) |
| 58 | * to make sure the FILE* is a 32-bit pointer no matter what. We know that |
| 59 | * stdio functions return this type (a study of stdio.h proves it). |
| 60 | * |
| 61 | * This declaration is a nasty hack to get around vms' extension to fopen for |
| 62 | * passing in sharing options being disabled by /STANDARD=ANSI89 |
| 63 | */ |
| 64 | static __FILE_ptr32 (*const vms_fopen)(const char *, const char *, ...) = |
| 65 | (__FILE_ptr32 (*)(const char *, const char *, ...))fopen; |
| 66 | # define VMS_OPEN_ATTRS \ |
| 67 | "shr=get,put,upd,del","ctx=bin,stm","rfm=stm","rat=none","mrs=0" |
| 68 | # define openssl_fopen(fname, mode) vms_fopen((fname), (mode), VMS_OPEN_ATTRS) |
| 69 | #endif |
| 70 | |
| 71 | /* |
| 72 | * Note that these functions are intended for seed files only. Entropy |
| 73 | * devices and EGD sockets are handled in rand_unix.c If |bytes| is |
| 74 | * -1 read the complete file; otherwise read the specified amount. |
| 75 | */ |
| 76 | int RAND_load_file(const char *file, long bytes) |
| 77 | { |
| 78 | /* |
| 79 | * The load buffer size exceeds the chunk size by the comfortable amount |
| 80 | * of 'RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH' bytes (not bits!). This is done on purpose |
| 81 | * to avoid calling RAND_add() with a small final chunk. Instead, such |
| 82 | * a small final chunk will be added together with the previous chunk |
| 83 | * (unless it's the only one). |
| 84 | */ |
| 85 | #define RAND_LOAD_BUF_SIZE (RAND_BUF_SIZE + RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH) |
| 86 | unsigned char buf[RAND_LOAD_BUF_SIZE]; |
| 87 | |
| 88 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO |
| 89 | struct stat sb; |
| 90 | #endif |
| 91 | int i, n, ret = 0; |
| 92 | FILE *in; |
| 93 | |
| 94 | if (bytes == 0) |
| 95 | return 0; |
| 96 | |
| 97 | if ((in = openssl_fopen(file, "rb")) == NULL) { |
| 98 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_LOAD_FILE, RAND_R_CANNOT_OPEN_FILE); |
| 99 | ERR_add_error_data(2, "Filename=", file); |
| 100 | return -1; |
| 101 | } |
| 102 | |
| 103 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO |
| 104 | if (fstat(fileno(in), &sb) < 0) { |
| 105 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_LOAD_FILE, RAND_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 106 | ERR_add_error_data(2, "Filename=", file); |
| 107 | fclose(in); |
| 108 | return -1; |
| 109 | } |
| 110 | |
| 111 | if (bytes < 0) { |
| 112 | if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) |
| 113 | bytes = sb.st_size; |
| 114 | else |
| 115 | bytes = RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH; |
| 116 | } |
| 117 | #endif |
| 118 | /* |
| 119 | * On VMS, setbuf() will only take 32-bit pointers, and a compilation |
| 120 | * with /POINTER_SIZE=64 will give off a MAYLOSEDATA2 warning here. |
| 121 | * However, we trust that the C RTL will never give us a FILE pointer |
| 122 | * above the first 4 GB of memory, so we simply turn off the warning |
| 123 | * temporarily. |
| 124 | */ |
| 125 | #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC) |
| 126 | # pragma environment save |
| 127 | # pragma message disable maylosedata2 |
| 128 | #endif |
| 129 | /* |
| 130 | * Don't buffer, because even if |file| is regular file, we have |
| 131 | * no control over the buffer, so why would we want a copy of its |
| 132 | * contents lying around? |
| 133 | */ |
| 134 | setbuf(in, NULL); |
| 135 | #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC) |
| 136 | # pragma environment restore |
| 137 | #endif |
| 138 | |
| 139 | for ( ; ; ) { |
| 140 | if (bytes > 0) |
| 141 | n = (bytes <= RAND_LOAD_BUF_SIZE) ? (int)bytes : RAND_BUF_SIZE; |
| 142 | else |
| 143 | n = RAND_LOAD_BUF_SIZE; |
| 144 | i = fread(buf, 1, n, in); |
| 145 | #ifdef EINTR |
| 146 | if (ferror(in) && errno == EINTR){ |
| 147 | clearerr(in); |
| 148 | if (i == 0) |
| 149 | continue; |
| 150 | } |
| 151 | #endif |
| 152 | if (i == 0) |
| 153 | break; |
| 154 | |
| 155 | RAND_add(buf, i, (double)i); |
| 156 | ret += i; |
| 157 | |
| 158 | /* If given a bytecount, and we did it, break. */ |
| 159 | if (bytes > 0 && (bytes -= i) <= 0) |
| 160 | break; |
| 161 | } |
| 162 | |
| 163 | OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, sizeof(buf)); |
| 164 | fclose(in); |
| 165 | if (!RAND_status()) { |
| 166 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_LOAD_FILE, RAND_R_RESEED_ERROR); |
| 167 | ERR_add_error_data(2, "Filename=", file); |
| 168 | return -1; |
| 169 | } |
| 170 | |
| 171 | return ret; |
| 172 | } |
| 173 | |
| 174 | int RAND_write_file(const char *file) |
| 175 | { |
| 176 | unsigned char buf[RAND_BUF_SIZE]; |
| 177 | int ret = -1; |
| 178 | FILE *out = NULL; |
| 179 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO |
| 180 | struct stat sb; |
| 181 | |
| 182 | if (stat(file, &sb) >= 0 && !S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) { |
| 183 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_WRITE_FILE, RAND_R_NOT_A_REGULAR_FILE); |
| 184 | ERR_add_error_data(2, "Filename=", file); |
| 185 | return -1; |
| 186 | } |
| 187 | #endif |
| 188 | |
| 189 | /* Collect enough random data. */ |
| 190 | if (RAND_priv_bytes(buf, (int)sizeof(buf)) != 1) |
| 191 | return -1; |
| 192 | |
| 193 | #if defined(O_CREAT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO) && \ |
| 194 | !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) |
| 195 | { |
| 196 | # ifndef O_BINARY |
| 197 | # define O_BINARY 0 |
| 198 | # endif |
| 199 | /* |
| 200 | * chmod(..., 0600) is too late to protect the file, permissions |
| 201 | * should be restrictive from the start |
| 202 | */ |
| 203 | int fd = open(file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_BINARY, 0600); |
| 204 | if (fd != -1) |
| 205 | out = fdopen(fd, "wb"); |
| 206 | } |
| 207 | #endif |
| 208 | |
| 209 | #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS |
| 210 | /* |
| 211 | * VMS NOTE: Prior versions of this routine created a _new_ version of |
| 212 | * the rand file for each call into this routine, then deleted all |
| 213 | * existing versions named ;-1, and finally renamed the current version |
| 214 | * as ';1'. Under concurrent usage, this resulted in an RMS race |
| 215 | * condition in rename() which could orphan files (see vms message help |
| 216 | * for RMS$_REENT). With the fopen() calls below, openssl/VMS now shares |
| 217 | * the top-level version of the rand file. Note that there may still be |
| 218 | * conditions where the top-level rand file is locked. If so, this code |
| 219 | * will then create a new version of the rand file. Without the delete |
| 220 | * and rename code, this can result in ascending file versions that stop |
| 221 | * at version 32767, and this routine will then return an error. The |
| 222 | * remedy for this is to recode the calling application to avoid |
| 223 | * concurrent use of the rand file, or synchronize usage at the |
| 224 | * application level. Also consider whether or not you NEED a persistent |
| 225 | * rand file in a concurrent use situation. |
| 226 | */ |
| 227 | out = openssl_fopen(file, "rb+"); |
| 228 | #endif |
| 229 | |
| 230 | if (out == NULL) |
| 231 | out = openssl_fopen(file, "wb"); |
| 232 | if (out == NULL) { |
| 233 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_WRITE_FILE, RAND_R_CANNOT_OPEN_FILE); |
| 234 | ERR_add_error_data(2, "Filename=", file); |
| 235 | return -1; |
| 236 | } |
| 237 | |
| 238 | #if !defined(NO_CHMOD) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO) |
| 239 | /* |
| 240 | * Yes it's late to do this (see above comment), but better than nothing. |
| 241 | */ |
| 242 | chmod(file, 0600); |
| 243 | #endif |
| 244 | |
| 245 | ret = fwrite(buf, 1, RAND_BUF_SIZE, out); |
| 246 | fclose(out); |
| 247 | OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, RAND_BUF_SIZE); |
| 248 | return ret; |
| 249 | } |
| 250 | |
| 251 | const char *RAND_file_name(char *buf, size_t size) |
| 252 | { |
| 253 | char *s = NULL; |
| 254 | size_t len; |
| 255 | int use_randfile = 1; |
| 256 | |
| 257 | #if defined(_WIN32) && defined(CP_UTF8) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE) |
| 258 | DWORD envlen; |
| 259 | WCHAR *var; |
| 260 | |
| 261 | /* Look up various environment variables. */ |
| 262 | if ((envlen = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var = L"RANDFILE", NULL, 0)) == 0) { |
| 263 | use_randfile = 0; |
| 264 | if ((envlen = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var = L"HOME", NULL, 0)) == 0 |
| 265 | && (envlen = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var = L"USERPROFILE", |
| 266 | NULL, 0)) == 0) |
| 267 | envlen = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var = L"SYSTEMROOT", NULL, 0); |
| 268 | } |
| 269 | |
| 270 | /* If we got a value, allocate space to hold it and then get it. */ |
| 271 | if (envlen != 0) { |
| 272 | int sz; |
| 273 | WCHAR *val = _alloca(envlen * sizeof(WCHAR)); |
| 274 | |
| 275 | if (GetEnvironmentVariableW(var, val, envlen) < envlen |
| 276 | && (sz = WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, val, -1, NULL, 0, |
| 277 | NULL, NULL)) != 0) { |
| 278 | s = _alloca(sz); |
| 279 | if (WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, val, -1, s, sz, |
| 280 | NULL, NULL) == 0) |
| 281 | s = NULL; |
| 282 | } |
| 283 | } |
| 284 | #else |
| 285 | if ((s = ossl_safe_getenv("RANDFILE")) == NULL || *s == '\0') { |
| 286 | use_randfile = 0; |
| 287 | s = ossl_safe_getenv("HOME"); |
| 288 | } |
| 289 | #endif |
| 290 | |
| 291 | #ifdef DEFAULT_HOME |
| 292 | if (!use_randfile && s == NULL) |
| 293 | s = DEFAULT_HOME; |
| 294 | #endif |
| 295 | if (s == NULL || *s == '\0') |
| 296 | return NULL; |
| 297 | |
| 298 | len = strlen(s); |
| 299 | if (use_randfile) { |
| 300 | if (len + 1 >= size) |
| 301 | return NULL; |
| 302 | strcpy(buf, s); |
| 303 | } else { |
| 304 | if (len + 1 + strlen(RFILE) + 1 >= size) |
| 305 | return NULL; |
| 306 | strcpy(buf, s); |
| 307 | #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS |
| 308 | strcat(buf, "/"); |
| 309 | #endif |
| 310 | strcat(buf, RFILE); |
| 311 | } |
| 312 | |
| 313 | return buf; |
| 314 | } |