| // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only | 
 | /* | 
 |  * Module and Firmware Pinning Security Module | 
 |  * | 
 |  * Copyright 2011-2016 Google Inc. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * Author: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 
 |  */ | 
 |  | 
 | #define pr_fmt(fmt) "LoadPin: " fmt | 
 |  | 
 | #include <linux/module.h> | 
 | #include <linux/fs.h> | 
 | #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> | 
 | #include <linux/mount.h> | 
 | #include <linux/path.h> | 
 | #include <linux/sched.h>	/* current */ | 
 | #include <linux/string_helpers.h> | 
 |  | 
 | static void report_load(const char *origin, struct file *file, char *operation) | 
 | { | 
 | 	char *cmdline, *pathname; | 
 |  | 
 | 	pathname = kstrdup_quotable_file(file, GFP_KERNEL); | 
 | 	cmdline = kstrdup_quotable_cmdline(current, GFP_KERNEL); | 
 |  | 
 | 	pr_notice("%s %s obj=%s%s%s pid=%d cmdline=%s%s%s\n", | 
 | 		  origin, operation, | 
 | 		  (pathname && pathname[0] != '<') ? "\"" : "", | 
 | 		  pathname, | 
 | 		  (pathname && pathname[0] != '<') ? "\"" : "", | 
 | 		  task_pid_nr(current), | 
 | 		  cmdline ? "\"" : "", cmdline, cmdline ? "\"" : ""); | 
 |  | 
 | 	kfree(cmdline); | 
 | 	kfree(pathname); | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | static int enforce = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENFORCE); | 
 | static char *exclude_read_files[READING_MAX_ID]; | 
 | static int ignore_read_file_id[READING_MAX_ID] __ro_after_init; | 
 | static struct super_block *pinned_root; | 
 | static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pinned_root_spinlock); | 
 |  | 
 | #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL | 
 |  | 
 | static struct ctl_path loadpin_sysctl_path[] = { | 
 | 	{ .procname = "kernel", }, | 
 | 	{ .procname = "loadpin", }, | 
 | 	{ } | 
 | }; | 
 |  | 
 | static struct ctl_table loadpin_sysctl_table[] = { | 
 | 	{ | 
 | 		.procname       = "enforce", | 
 | 		.data           = &enforce, | 
 | 		.maxlen         = sizeof(int), | 
 | 		.mode           = 0644, | 
 | 		.proc_handler   = proc_dointvec_minmax, | 
 | 		.extra1         = SYSCTL_ZERO, | 
 | 		.extra2         = SYSCTL_ONE, | 
 | 	}, | 
 | 	{ } | 
 | }; | 
 |  | 
 | /* | 
 |  * This must be called after early kernel init, since then the rootdev | 
 |  * is available. | 
 |  */ | 
 | static void check_pinning_enforcement(struct super_block *mnt_sb) | 
 | { | 
 | 	bool ro = false; | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * If load pinning is not enforced via a read-only block | 
 | 	 * device, allow sysctl to change modes for testing. | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	if (mnt_sb->s_bdev) { | 
 | 		char bdev[BDEVNAME_SIZE]; | 
 |  | 
 | 		ro = bdev_read_only(mnt_sb->s_bdev); | 
 | 		bdevname(mnt_sb->s_bdev, bdev); | 
 | 		pr_info("%s (%u:%u): %s\n", bdev, | 
 | 			MAJOR(mnt_sb->s_bdev->bd_dev), | 
 | 			MINOR(mnt_sb->s_bdev->bd_dev), | 
 | 			ro ? "read-only" : "writable"); | 
 | 	} else | 
 | 		pr_info("mnt_sb lacks block device, treating as: writable\n"); | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (!ro) { | 
 | 		if (!register_sysctl_paths(loadpin_sysctl_path, | 
 | 					   loadpin_sysctl_table)) | 
 | 			pr_notice("sysctl registration failed!\n"); | 
 | 		else | 
 | 			pr_info("enforcement can be disabled.\n"); | 
 | 	} else | 
 | 		pr_info("load pinning engaged.\n"); | 
 | } | 
 | #else | 
 | static void check_pinning_enforcement(struct super_block *mnt_sb) | 
 | { | 
 | 	pr_info("load pinning engaged.\n"); | 
 | } | 
 | #endif | 
 |  | 
 | static void loadpin_sb_free_security(struct super_block *mnt_sb) | 
 | { | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * When unmounting the filesystem we were using for load | 
 | 	 * pinning, we acknowledge the superblock release, but make sure | 
 | 	 * no other modules or firmware can be loaded. | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(pinned_root) && mnt_sb == pinned_root) { | 
 | 		pinned_root = ERR_PTR(-EIO); | 
 | 		pr_info("umount pinned fs: refusing further loads\n"); | 
 | 	} | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id) | 
 | { | 
 | 	struct super_block *load_root; | 
 | 	const char *origin = kernel_read_file_id_str(id); | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* If the file id is excluded, ignore the pinning. */ | 
 | 	if ((unsigned int)id < ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id) && | 
 | 	    ignore_read_file_id[id]) { | 
 | 		report_load(origin, file, "pinning-excluded"); | 
 | 		return 0; | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* This handles the older init_module API that has a NULL file. */ | 
 | 	if (!file) { | 
 | 		if (!enforce) { | 
 | 			report_load(origin, NULL, "old-api-pinning-ignored"); | 
 | 			return 0; | 
 | 		} | 
 |  | 
 | 		report_load(origin, NULL, "old-api-denied"); | 
 | 		return -EPERM; | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	load_root = file->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb; | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* First loaded module/firmware defines the root for all others. */ | 
 | 	spin_lock(&pinned_root_spinlock); | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * pinned_root is only NULL at startup. Otherwise, it is either | 
 | 	 * a valid reference, or an ERR_PTR. | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	if (!pinned_root) { | 
 | 		pinned_root = load_root; | 
 | 		/* | 
 | 		 * Unlock now since it's only pinned_root we care about. | 
 | 		 * In the worst case, we will (correctly) report pinning | 
 | 		 * failures before we have announced that pinning is | 
 | 		 * enforcing. This would be purely cosmetic. | 
 | 		 */ | 
 | 		spin_unlock(&pinned_root_spinlock); | 
 | 		check_pinning_enforcement(pinned_root); | 
 | 		report_load(origin, file, "pinned"); | 
 | 	} else { | 
 | 		spin_unlock(&pinned_root_spinlock); | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(pinned_root) || load_root != pinned_root) { | 
 | 		if (unlikely(!enforce)) { | 
 | 			report_load(origin, file, "pinning-ignored"); | 
 | 			return 0; | 
 | 		} | 
 |  | 
 | 		report_load(origin, file, "denied"); | 
 | 		return -EPERM; | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	return 0; | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) | 
 | { | 
 | 	return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id); | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { | 
 | 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security), | 
 | 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file), | 
 | 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, loadpin_load_data), | 
 | }; | 
 |  | 
 | static void __init parse_exclude(void) | 
 | { | 
 | 	int i, j; | 
 | 	char *cur; | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * Make sure all the arrays stay within expected sizes. This | 
 | 	 * is slightly weird because kernel_read_file_str[] includes | 
 | 	 * READING_MAX_ID, which isn't actually meaningful here. | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(exclude_read_files) != | 
 | 		     ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id)); | 
 | 	BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(kernel_read_file_str) < | 
 | 		     ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id)); | 
 |  | 
 | 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(exclude_read_files); i++) { | 
 | 		cur = exclude_read_files[i]; | 
 | 		if (!cur) | 
 | 			break; | 
 | 		if (*cur == '\0') | 
 | 			continue; | 
 |  | 
 | 		for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id); j++) { | 
 | 			if (strcmp(cur, kernel_read_file_str[j]) == 0) { | 
 | 				pr_info("excluding: %s\n", | 
 | 					kernel_read_file_str[j]); | 
 | 				ignore_read_file_id[j] = 1; | 
 | 				/* | 
 | 				 * Can not break, because one read_file_str | 
 | 				 * may map to more than on read_file_id. | 
 | 				 */ | 
 | 			} | 
 | 		} | 
 | 	} | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | static int __init loadpin_init(void) | 
 | { | 
 | 	pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n", | 
 | 		enforce ? "" : "not "); | 
 | 	parse_exclude(); | 
 | 	security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin"); | 
 | 	return 0; | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | DEFINE_LSM(loadpin) = { | 
 | 	.name = "loadpin", | 
 | 	.init = loadpin_init, | 
 | }; | 
 |  | 
 | /* Should not be mutable after boot, so not listed in sysfs (perm == 0). */ | 
 | module_param(enforce, int, 0); | 
 | MODULE_PARM_DESC(enforce, "Enforce module/firmware pinning"); | 
 | module_param_array_named(exclude, exclude_read_files, charp, NULL, 0); | 
 | MODULE_PARM_DESC(exclude, "Exclude pinning specific read file types"); |