ASR_BASE
Change-Id: Icf3719cc0afe3eeb3edc7fa80a2eb5199ca9dda1
diff --git a/marvell/linux/drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c b/marvell/linux/drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ca090fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/marvell/linux/drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1543 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * pkey device driver
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2017,2019
+ * Author(s): Harald Freudenberger
+ */
+
+#define KMSG_COMPONENT "pkey"
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KMSG_COMPONENT ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/kallsyms.h>
+#include <linux/debugfs.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/zcrypt.h>
+#include <asm/cpacf.h>
+#include <asm/pkey.h>
+#include <crypto/aes.h>
+
+#include "zcrypt_api.h"
+#include "zcrypt_ccamisc.h"
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("IBM Corporation");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("s390 protected key interface");
+
+#define KEYBLOBBUFSIZE 8192 /* key buffer size used for internal processing */
+#define MAXAPQNSINLIST 64 /* max 64 apqns within a apqn list */
+
+/*
+ * debug feature data and functions
+ */
+
+static debug_info_t *debug_info;
+
+#define DEBUG_DBG(...) debug_sprintf_event(debug_info, 6, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#define DEBUG_INFO(...) debug_sprintf_event(debug_info, 5, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#define DEBUG_WARN(...) debug_sprintf_event(debug_info, 4, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#define DEBUG_ERR(...) debug_sprintf_event(debug_info, 3, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+
+static void __init pkey_debug_init(void)
+{
+ /* 5 arguments per dbf entry (including the format string ptr) */
+ debug_info = debug_register("pkey", 1, 1, 5 * sizeof(long));
+ debug_register_view(debug_info, &debug_sprintf_view);
+ debug_set_level(debug_info, 3);
+}
+
+static void __exit pkey_debug_exit(void)
+{
+ debug_unregister(debug_info);
+}
+
+/* inside view of a protected key token (only type 0x00 version 0x01) */
+struct protaeskeytoken {
+ u8 type; /* 0x00 for PAES specific key tokens */
+ u8 res0[3];
+ u8 version; /* should be 0x01 for protected AES key token */
+ u8 res1[3];
+ u32 keytype; /* key type, one of the PKEY_KEYTYPE values */
+ u32 len; /* bytes actually stored in protkey[] */
+ u8 protkey[MAXPROTKEYSIZE]; /* the protected key blob */
+} __packed;
+
+/*
+ * Create a protected key from a clear key value.
+ */
+static int pkey_clr2protkey(u32 keytype,
+ const struct pkey_clrkey *clrkey,
+ struct pkey_protkey *protkey)
+{
+ /* mask of available pckmo subfunctions */
+ static cpacf_mask_t pckmo_functions;
+
+ long fc;
+ int keysize;
+ u8 paramblock[64];
+
+ switch (keytype) {
+ case PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128:
+ keysize = 16;
+ fc = CPACF_PCKMO_ENC_AES_128_KEY;
+ break;
+ case PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192:
+ keysize = 24;
+ fc = CPACF_PCKMO_ENC_AES_192_KEY;
+ break;
+ case PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256:
+ keysize = 32;
+ fc = CPACF_PCKMO_ENC_AES_256_KEY;
+ break;
+ default:
+ DEBUG_ERR("%s unknown/unsupported keytype %d\n",
+ __func__, keytype);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* Did we already check for PCKMO ? */
+ if (!pckmo_functions.bytes[0]) {
+ /* no, so check now */
+ if (!cpacf_query(CPACF_PCKMO, &pckmo_functions))
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+ /* check for the pckmo subfunction we need now */
+ if (!cpacf_test_func(&pckmo_functions, fc)) {
+ DEBUG_ERR("%s pckmo functions not available\n", __func__);
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+
+ /* prepare param block */
+ memset(paramblock, 0, sizeof(paramblock));
+ memcpy(paramblock, clrkey->clrkey, keysize);
+
+ /* call the pckmo instruction */
+ cpacf_pckmo(fc, paramblock);
+
+ /* copy created protected key */
+ protkey->type = keytype;
+ protkey->len = keysize + 32;
+ memcpy(protkey->protkey, paramblock, keysize + 32);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find card and transform secure key into protected key.
+ */
+static int pkey_skey2pkey(const u8 *key, struct pkey_protkey *pkey)
+{
+ int rc, verify;
+ u16 cardnr, domain;
+ struct keytoken_header *hdr = (struct keytoken_header *)key;
+
+ /*
+ * The cca_xxx2protkey call may fail when a card has been
+ * addressed where the master key was changed after last fetch
+ * of the mkvp into the cache. Try 3 times: First witout verify
+ * then with verify and last round with verify and old master
+ * key verification pattern match not ignored.
+ */
+ for (verify = 0; verify < 3; verify++) {
+ rc = cca_findcard(key, &cardnr, &domain, verify);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ continue;
+ if (rc > 0 && verify < 2)
+ continue;
+ switch (hdr->version) {
+ case TOKVER_CCA_AES:
+ rc = cca_sec2protkey(cardnr, domain,
+ key, pkey->protkey,
+ &pkey->len, &pkey->type);
+ break;
+ case TOKVER_CCA_VLSC:
+ rc = cca_cipher2protkey(cardnr, domain,
+ key, pkey->protkey,
+ &pkey->len, &pkey->type);
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (rc == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (rc)
+ DEBUG_DBG("%s failed rc=%d\n", __func__, rc);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify key and give back some info about the key.
+ */
+static int pkey_verifykey(const struct pkey_seckey *seckey,
+ u16 *pcardnr, u16 *pdomain,
+ u16 *pkeysize, u32 *pattributes)
+{
+ struct secaeskeytoken *t = (struct secaeskeytoken *) seckey;
+ u16 cardnr, domain;
+ int rc;
+
+ /* check the secure key for valid AES secure key */
+ rc = cca_check_secaeskeytoken(debug_info, 3, (u8 *) seckey, 0);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ if (pattributes)
+ *pattributes = PKEY_VERIFY_ATTR_AES;
+ if (pkeysize)
+ *pkeysize = t->bitsize;
+
+ /* try to find a card which can handle this key */
+ rc = cca_findcard(seckey->seckey, &cardnr, &domain, 1);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (rc > 0) {
+ /* key mkvp matches to old master key mkvp */
+ DEBUG_DBG("%s secure key has old mkvp\n", __func__);
+ if (pattributes)
+ *pattributes |= PKEY_VERIFY_ATTR_OLD_MKVP;
+ rc = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (pcardnr)
+ *pcardnr = cardnr;
+ if (pdomain)
+ *pdomain = domain;
+
+out:
+ DEBUG_DBG("%s rc=%d\n", __func__, rc);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate a random protected key
+ */
+static int pkey_genprotkey(u32 keytype, struct pkey_protkey *protkey)
+{
+ struct pkey_clrkey clrkey;
+ int keysize;
+ int rc;
+
+ switch (keytype) {
+ case PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128:
+ keysize = 16;
+ break;
+ case PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192:
+ keysize = 24;
+ break;
+ case PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256:
+ keysize = 32;
+ break;
+ default:
+ DEBUG_ERR("%s unknown/unsupported keytype %d\n", __func__,
+ keytype);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* generate a dummy random clear key */
+ get_random_bytes(clrkey.clrkey, keysize);
+
+ /* convert it to a dummy protected key */
+ rc = pkey_clr2protkey(keytype, &clrkey, protkey);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /* replace the key part of the protected key with random bytes */
+ get_random_bytes(protkey->protkey, keysize);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify if a protected key is still valid
+ */
+static int pkey_verifyprotkey(const struct pkey_protkey *protkey)
+{
+ unsigned long fc;
+ struct {
+ u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ u8 key[MAXPROTKEYSIZE];
+ } param;
+ u8 null_msg[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ u8 dest_buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ unsigned int k;
+
+ switch (protkey->type) {
+ case PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128:
+ fc = CPACF_KMC_PAES_128;
+ break;
+ case PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192:
+ fc = CPACF_KMC_PAES_192;
+ break;
+ case PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256:
+ fc = CPACF_KMC_PAES_256;
+ break;
+ default:
+ DEBUG_ERR("%s unknown/unsupported keytype %d\n", __func__,
+ protkey->type);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ memset(null_msg, 0, sizeof(null_msg));
+
+ memset(param.iv, 0, sizeof(param.iv));
+ memcpy(param.key, protkey->protkey, sizeof(param.key));
+
+ k = cpacf_kmc(fc | CPACF_ENCRYPT, ¶m, null_msg, dest_buf,
+ sizeof(null_msg));
+ if (k != sizeof(null_msg)) {
+ DEBUG_ERR("%s protected key is not valid\n", __func__);
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Transform a non-CCA key token into a protected key
+ */
+static int pkey_nonccatok2pkey(const u8 *key, u32 keylen,
+ struct pkey_protkey *protkey)
+{
+ struct keytoken_header *hdr = (struct keytoken_header *)key;
+ struct protaeskeytoken *t;
+
+ switch (hdr->version) {
+ case TOKVER_PROTECTED_KEY:
+ if (keylen != sizeof(struct protaeskeytoken))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ t = (struct protaeskeytoken *)key;
+ protkey->len = t->len;
+ protkey->type = t->keytype;
+ memcpy(protkey->protkey, t->protkey,
+ sizeof(protkey->protkey));
+
+ return pkey_verifyprotkey(protkey);
+ default:
+ DEBUG_ERR("%s unknown/unsupported non-CCA token version %d\n",
+ __func__, hdr->version);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Transform a CCA internal key token into a protected key
+ */
+static int pkey_ccainttok2pkey(const u8 *key, u32 keylen,
+ struct pkey_protkey *protkey)
+{
+ struct keytoken_header *hdr = (struct keytoken_header *)key;
+
+ switch (hdr->version) {
+ case TOKVER_CCA_AES:
+ if (keylen != sizeof(struct secaeskeytoken))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case TOKVER_CCA_VLSC:
+ if (keylen < hdr->len || keylen > MAXCCAVLSCTOKENSIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ DEBUG_ERR("%s unknown/unsupported CCA internal token version %d\n",
+ __func__, hdr->version);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return pkey_skey2pkey(key, protkey);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Transform a key blob (of any type) into a protected key
+ */
+int pkey_keyblob2pkey(const u8 *key, u32 keylen,
+ struct pkey_protkey *protkey)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct keytoken_header *hdr = (struct keytoken_header *)key;
+
+ if (keylen < sizeof(struct keytoken_header)) {
+ DEBUG_ERR("%s invalid keylen %d\n", __func__, keylen);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ switch (hdr->type) {
+ case TOKTYPE_NON_CCA:
+ rc = pkey_nonccatok2pkey(key, keylen, protkey);
+ break;
+ case TOKTYPE_CCA_INTERNAL:
+ rc = pkey_ccainttok2pkey(key, keylen, protkey);
+ break;
+ default:
+ DEBUG_ERR("%s unknown/unsupported blob type %d\n",
+ __func__, hdr->type);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ DEBUG_DBG("%s rc=%d\n", __func__, rc);
+ return rc;
+
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_keyblob2pkey);
+
+static int pkey_genseckey2(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t nr_apqns,
+ enum pkey_key_type ktype, enum pkey_key_size ksize,
+ u32 kflags, u8 *keybuf, size_t *keybufsize)
+{
+ int i, card, dom, rc;
+
+ /* check for at least one apqn given */
+ if (!apqns || !nr_apqns)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* check key type and size */
+ switch (ktype) {
+ case PKEY_TYPE_CCA_DATA:
+ case PKEY_TYPE_CCA_CIPHER:
+ if (*keybufsize < SECKEYBLOBSIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ switch (ksize) {
+ case PKEY_SIZE_AES_128:
+ case PKEY_SIZE_AES_192:
+ case PKEY_SIZE_AES_256:
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* simple try all apqns from the list */
+ for (i = 0, rc = -ENODEV; i < nr_apqns; i++) {
+ card = apqns[i].card;
+ dom = apqns[i].domain;
+ if (ktype == PKEY_TYPE_CCA_DATA) {
+ rc = cca_genseckey(card, dom, ksize, keybuf);
+ *keybufsize = (rc ? 0 : SECKEYBLOBSIZE);
+ } else /* TOKVER_CCA_VLSC */
+ rc = cca_gencipherkey(card, dom, ksize, kflags,
+ keybuf, keybufsize);
+ if (rc == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int pkey_clr2seckey2(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t nr_apqns,
+ enum pkey_key_type ktype, enum pkey_key_size ksize,
+ u32 kflags, const u8 *clrkey,
+ u8 *keybuf, size_t *keybufsize)
+{
+ int i, card, dom, rc;
+
+ /* check for at least one apqn given */
+ if (!apqns || !nr_apqns)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* check key type and size */
+ switch (ktype) {
+ case PKEY_TYPE_CCA_DATA:
+ case PKEY_TYPE_CCA_CIPHER:
+ if (*keybufsize < SECKEYBLOBSIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ switch (ksize) {
+ case PKEY_SIZE_AES_128:
+ case PKEY_SIZE_AES_192:
+ case PKEY_SIZE_AES_256:
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* simple try all apqns from the list */
+ for (i = 0, rc = -ENODEV; i < nr_apqns; i++) {
+ card = apqns[i].card;
+ dom = apqns[i].domain;
+ if (ktype == PKEY_TYPE_CCA_DATA) {
+ rc = cca_clr2seckey(card, dom, ksize,
+ clrkey, keybuf);
+ *keybufsize = (rc ? 0 : SECKEYBLOBSIZE);
+ } else /* TOKVER_CCA_VLSC */
+ rc = cca_clr2cipherkey(card, dom, ksize, kflags,
+ clrkey, keybuf, keybufsize);
+ if (rc == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int pkey_verifykey2(const u8 *key, size_t keylen,
+ u16 *cardnr, u16 *domain,
+ enum pkey_key_type *ktype,
+ enum pkey_key_size *ksize, u32 *flags)
+{
+ int rc;
+ u32 _nr_apqns, *_apqns = NULL;
+ struct keytoken_header *hdr = (struct keytoken_header *)key;
+
+ if (keylen < sizeof(struct keytoken_header) ||
+ hdr->type != TOKTYPE_CCA_INTERNAL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (hdr->version == TOKVER_CCA_AES) {
+ struct secaeskeytoken *t = (struct secaeskeytoken *)key;
+
+ rc = cca_check_secaeskeytoken(debug_info, 3, key, 0);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ if (ktype)
+ *ktype = PKEY_TYPE_CCA_DATA;
+ if (ksize)
+ *ksize = (enum pkey_key_size) t->bitsize;
+
+ rc = cca_findcard2(&_apqns, &_nr_apqns, *cardnr, *domain,
+ ZCRYPT_CEX3C, t->mkvp, 0, 1);
+ if (rc == 0 && flags)
+ *flags = PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP;
+ if (rc == -ENODEV) {
+ rc = cca_findcard2(&_apqns, &_nr_apqns,
+ *cardnr, *domain,
+ ZCRYPT_CEX3C, 0, t->mkvp, 1);
+ if (rc == 0 && flags)
+ *flags = PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP;
+ }
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ *cardnr = ((struct pkey_apqn *)_apqns)->card;
+ *domain = ((struct pkey_apqn *)_apqns)->domain;
+
+ } else if (hdr->version == TOKVER_CCA_VLSC) {
+ struct cipherkeytoken *t = (struct cipherkeytoken *)key;
+
+ rc = cca_check_secaescipherkey(debug_info, 3, key, 0, 1);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ if (ktype)
+ *ktype = PKEY_TYPE_CCA_CIPHER;
+ if (ksize) {
+ *ksize = PKEY_SIZE_UNKNOWN;
+ if (!t->plfver && t->wpllen == 512)
+ *ksize = PKEY_SIZE_AES_128;
+ else if (!t->plfver && t->wpllen == 576)
+ *ksize = PKEY_SIZE_AES_192;
+ else if (!t->plfver && t->wpllen == 640)
+ *ksize = PKEY_SIZE_AES_256;
+ }
+
+ rc = cca_findcard2(&_apqns, &_nr_apqns, *cardnr, *domain,
+ ZCRYPT_CEX6, t->mkvp0, 0, 1);
+ if (rc == 0 && flags)
+ *flags = PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP;
+ if (rc == -ENODEV) {
+ rc = cca_findcard2(&_apqns, &_nr_apqns,
+ *cardnr, *domain,
+ ZCRYPT_CEX6, 0, t->mkvp0, 1);
+ if (rc == 0 && flags)
+ *flags = PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP;
+ }
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ *cardnr = ((struct pkey_apqn *)_apqns)->card;
+ *domain = ((struct pkey_apqn *)_apqns)->domain;
+
+ } else
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+
+out:
+ kfree(_apqns);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int pkey_keyblob2pkey2(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t nr_apqns,
+ const u8 *key, size_t keylen,
+ struct pkey_protkey *pkey)
+{
+ int i, card, dom, rc;
+ struct keytoken_header *hdr = (struct keytoken_header *)key;
+
+ /* check for at least one apqn given */
+ if (!apqns || !nr_apqns)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (keylen < sizeof(struct keytoken_header))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ switch (hdr->type) {
+ case TOKTYPE_NON_CCA:
+ return pkey_nonccatok2pkey(key, keylen, pkey);
+ case TOKTYPE_CCA_INTERNAL:
+ switch (hdr->version) {
+ case TOKVER_CCA_AES:
+ if (keylen != sizeof(struct secaeskeytoken))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (cca_check_secaeskeytoken(debug_info, 3, key, 0))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case TOKVER_CCA_VLSC:
+ if (keylen < hdr->len || keylen > MAXCCAVLSCTOKENSIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (cca_check_secaescipherkey(debug_info, 3, key, 0, 1))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ DEBUG_ERR("%s unknown CCA internal token version %d\n",
+ __func__, hdr->version);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ DEBUG_ERR("%s unknown/unsupported blob type %d\n",
+ __func__, hdr->type);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* simple try all apqns from the list */
+ for (i = 0, rc = -ENODEV; i < nr_apqns; i++) {
+ card = apqns[i].card;
+ dom = apqns[i].domain;
+ if (hdr->version == TOKVER_CCA_AES)
+ rc = cca_sec2protkey(card, dom, key, pkey->protkey,
+ &pkey->len, &pkey->type);
+ else /* TOKVER_CCA_VLSC */
+ rc = cca_cipher2protkey(card, dom, key, pkey->protkey,
+ &pkey->len, &pkey->type);
+ if (rc == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int pkey_apqns4key(const u8 *key, size_t keylen, u32 flags,
+ struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t *nr_apqns)
+{
+ int rc = EINVAL;
+ u32 _nr_apqns, *_apqns = NULL;
+ struct keytoken_header *hdr = (struct keytoken_header *)key;
+
+ if (keylen < sizeof(struct keytoken_header) ||
+ hdr->type != TOKTYPE_CCA_INTERNAL ||
+ flags == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (hdr->version == TOKVER_CCA_AES || hdr->version == TOKVER_CCA_VLSC) {
+ int minhwtype = ZCRYPT_CEX3C;
+ u64 cur_mkvp = 0, old_mkvp = 0;
+
+ if (hdr->version == TOKVER_CCA_AES) {
+ struct secaeskeytoken *t = (struct secaeskeytoken *)key;
+
+ if (flags & PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP)
+ cur_mkvp = t->mkvp;
+ if (flags & PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP)
+ old_mkvp = t->mkvp;
+ } else {
+ struct cipherkeytoken *t = (struct cipherkeytoken *)key;
+
+ minhwtype = ZCRYPT_CEX6;
+ if (flags & PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP)
+ cur_mkvp = t->mkvp0;
+ if (flags & PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP)
+ old_mkvp = t->mkvp0;
+ }
+ rc = cca_findcard2(&_apqns, &_nr_apqns, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF,
+ minhwtype, cur_mkvp, old_mkvp, 1);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ if (apqns) {
+ if (*nr_apqns < _nr_apqns)
+ rc = -ENOSPC;
+ else
+ memcpy(apqns, _apqns, _nr_apqns * sizeof(u32));
+ }
+ *nr_apqns = _nr_apqns;
+ }
+
+out:
+ kfree(_apqns);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int pkey_apqns4keytype(enum pkey_key_type ktype,
+ u8 cur_mkvp[32], u8 alt_mkvp[32], u32 flags,
+ struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t *nr_apqns)
+{
+ int rc = -EINVAL;
+ u32 _nr_apqns, *_apqns = NULL;
+
+ if (ktype == PKEY_TYPE_CCA_DATA || ktype == PKEY_TYPE_CCA_CIPHER) {
+ u64 cur_mkvp = 0, old_mkvp = 0;
+ int minhwtype = ZCRYPT_CEX3C;
+
+ if (flags & PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP)
+ cur_mkvp = *((u64 *) cur_mkvp);
+ if (flags & PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP)
+ old_mkvp = *((u64 *) alt_mkvp);
+ if (ktype == PKEY_TYPE_CCA_CIPHER)
+ minhwtype = ZCRYPT_CEX6;
+ rc = cca_findcard2(&_apqns, &_nr_apqns, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF,
+ minhwtype, cur_mkvp, old_mkvp, 1);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ if (apqns) {
+ if (*nr_apqns < _nr_apqns)
+ rc = -ENOSPC;
+ else
+ memcpy(apqns, _apqns, _nr_apqns * sizeof(u32));
+ }
+ *nr_apqns = _nr_apqns;
+ }
+
+out:
+ kfree(_apqns);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * File io functions
+ */
+
+static void *_copy_key_from_user(void __user *ukey, size_t keylen)
+{
+ void *kkey;
+
+ if (!ukey || keylen < MINKEYBLOBSIZE || keylen > KEYBLOBBUFSIZE)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ kkey = kmalloc(keylen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!kkey)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ if (copy_from_user(kkey, ukey, keylen)) {
+ kfree(kkey);
+ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+ }
+
+ return kkey;
+}
+
+static void *_copy_apqns_from_user(void __user *uapqns, size_t nr_apqns)
+{
+ void *kapqns = NULL;
+ size_t nbytes;
+
+ if (uapqns && nr_apqns > 0) {
+ nbytes = nr_apqns * sizeof(struct pkey_apqn);
+ kapqns = kmalloc(nbytes, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!kapqns)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ if (copy_from_user(kapqns, uapqns, nbytes)) {
+ kfree(kapqns);
+ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return kapqns;
+}
+
+static long pkey_unlocked_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd,
+ unsigned long arg)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case PKEY_GENSECK: {
+ struct pkey_genseck __user *ugs = (void __user *) arg;
+ struct pkey_genseck kgs;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&kgs, ugs, sizeof(kgs)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ rc = cca_genseckey(kgs.cardnr, kgs.domain,
+ kgs.keytype, kgs.seckey.seckey);
+ DEBUG_DBG("%s cca_genseckey()=%d\n", __func__, rc);
+ if (rc)
+ break;
+ if (copy_to_user(ugs, &kgs, sizeof(kgs)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ break;
+ }
+ case PKEY_CLR2SECK: {
+ struct pkey_clr2seck __user *ucs = (void __user *) arg;
+ struct pkey_clr2seck kcs;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&kcs, ucs, sizeof(kcs)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ rc = cca_clr2seckey(kcs.cardnr, kcs.domain, kcs.keytype,
+ kcs.clrkey.clrkey, kcs.seckey.seckey);
+ DEBUG_DBG("%s cca_clr2seckey()=%d\n", __func__, rc);
+ if (rc)
+ break;
+ if (copy_to_user(ucs, &kcs, sizeof(kcs)))
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ memzero_explicit(&kcs, sizeof(kcs));
+ break;
+ }
+ case PKEY_SEC2PROTK: {
+ struct pkey_sec2protk __user *usp = (void __user *) arg;
+ struct pkey_sec2protk ksp;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&ksp, usp, sizeof(ksp)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ rc = cca_sec2protkey(ksp.cardnr, ksp.domain,
+ ksp.seckey.seckey, ksp.protkey.protkey,
+ &ksp.protkey.len, &ksp.protkey.type);
+ DEBUG_DBG("%s cca_sec2protkey()=%d\n", __func__, rc);
+ if (rc)
+ break;
+ if (copy_to_user(usp, &ksp, sizeof(ksp)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ break;
+ }
+ case PKEY_CLR2PROTK: {
+ struct pkey_clr2protk __user *ucp = (void __user *) arg;
+ struct pkey_clr2protk kcp;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&kcp, ucp, sizeof(kcp)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ rc = pkey_clr2protkey(kcp.keytype,
+ &kcp.clrkey, &kcp.protkey);
+ DEBUG_DBG("%s pkey_clr2protkey()=%d\n", __func__, rc);
+ if (rc)
+ break;
+ if (copy_to_user(ucp, &kcp, sizeof(kcp)))
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ memzero_explicit(&kcp, sizeof(kcp));
+ break;
+ }
+ case PKEY_FINDCARD: {
+ struct pkey_findcard __user *ufc = (void __user *) arg;
+ struct pkey_findcard kfc;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&kfc, ufc, sizeof(kfc)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ rc = cca_findcard(kfc.seckey.seckey,
+ &kfc.cardnr, &kfc.domain, 1);
+ DEBUG_DBG("%s cca_findcard()=%d\n", __func__, rc);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ break;
+ if (copy_to_user(ufc, &kfc, sizeof(kfc)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ break;
+ }
+ case PKEY_SKEY2PKEY: {
+ struct pkey_skey2pkey __user *usp = (void __user *) arg;
+ struct pkey_skey2pkey ksp;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&ksp, usp, sizeof(ksp)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ rc = pkey_skey2pkey(ksp.seckey.seckey, &ksp.protkey);
+ DEBUG_DBG("%s pkey_skey2pkey()=%d\n", __func__, rc);
+ if (rc)
+ break;
+ if (copy_to_user(usp, &ksp, sizeof(ksp)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ break;
+ }
+ case PKEY_VERIFYKEY: {
+ struct pkey_verifykey __user *uvk = (void __user *) arg;
+ struct pkey_verifykey kvk;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&kvk, uvk, sizeof(kvk)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ rc = pkey_verifykey(&kvk.seckey, &kvk.cardnr, &kvk.domain,
+ &kvk.keysize, &kvk.attributes);
+ DEBUG_DBG("%s pkey_verifykey()=%d\n", __func__, rc);
+ if (rc)
+ break;
+ if (copy_to_user(uvk, &kvk, sizeof(kvk)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ break;
+ }
+ case PKEY_GENPROTK: {
+ struct pkey_genprotk __user *ugp = (void __user *) arg;
+ struct pkey_genprotk kgp;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&kgp, ugp, sizeof(kgp)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ rc = pkey_genprotkey(kgp.keytype, &kgp.protkey);
+ DEBUG_DBG("%s pkey_genprotkey()=%d\n", __func__, rc);
+ if (rc)
+ break;
+ if (copy_to_user(ugp, &kgp, sizeof(kgp)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ break;
+ }
+ case PKEY_VERIFYPROTK: {
+ struct pkey_verifyprotk __user *uvp = (void __user *) arg;
+ struct pkey_verifyprotk kvp;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&kvp, uvp, sizeof(kvp)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ rc = pkey_verifyprotkey(&kvp.protkey);
+ DEBUG_DBG("%s pkey_verifyprotkey()=%d\n", __func__, rc);
+ break;
+ }
+ case PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK: {
+ struct pkey_kblob2pkey __user *utp = (void __user *) arg;
+ struct pkey_kblob2pkey ktp;
+ u8 *kkey;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&ktp, utp, sizeof(ktp)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ kkey = _copy_key_from_user(ktp.key, ktp.keylen);
+ if (IS_ERR(kkey))
+ return PTR_ERR(kkey);
+ rc = pkey_keyblob2pkey(kkey, ktp.keylen, &ktp.protkey);
+ DEBUG_DBG("%s pkey_keyblob2pkey()=%d\n", __func__, rc);
+ kfree(kkey);
+ if (rc)
+ break;
+ if (copy_to_user(utp, &ktp, sizeof(ktp)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ break;
+ }
+ case PKEY_GENSECK2: {
+ struct pkey_genseck2 __user *ugs = (void __user *) arg;
+ struct pkey_genseck2 kgs;
+ struct pkey_apqn *apqns;
+ size_t klen = KEYBLOBBUFSIZE;
+ u8 *kkey;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&kgs, ugs, sizeof(kgs)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ apqns = _copy_apqns_from_user(kgs.apqns, kgs.apqn_entries);
+ if (IS_ERR(apqns))
+ return PTR_ERR(apqns);
+ kkey = kmalloc(klen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!kkey) {
+ kfree(apqns);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ rc = pkey_genseckey2(apqns, kgs.apqn_entries,
+ kgs.type, kgs.size, kgs.keygenflags,
+ kkey, &klen);
+ DEBUG_DBG("%s pkey_genseckey2()=%d\n", __func__, rc);
+ kfree(apqns);
+ if (rc) {
+ kfree(kkey);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (kgs.key) {
+ if (kgs.keylen < klen) {
+ kfree(kkey);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (copy_to_user(kgs.key, kkey, klen)) {
+ kfree(kkey);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ }
+ kgs.keylen = klen;
+ if (copy_to_user(ugs, &kgs, sizeof(kgs)))
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ kfree(kkey);
+ break;
+ }
+ case PKEY_CLR2SECK2: {
+ struct pkey_clr2seck2 __user *ucs = (void __user *) arg;
+ struct pkey_clr2seck2 kcs;
+ struct pkey_apqn *apqns;
+ size_t klen = KEYBLOBBUFSIZE;
+ u8 *kkey;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&kcs, ucs, sizeof(kcs)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ apqns = _copy_apqns_from_user(kcs.apqns, kcs.apqn_entries);
+ if (IS_ERR(apqns))
+ return PTR_ERR(apqns);
+ kkey = kmalloc(klen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!kkey) {
+ kfree(apqns);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ rc = pkey_clr2seckey2(apqns, kcs.apqn_entries,
+ kcs.type, kcs.size, kcs.keygenflags,
+ kcs.clrkey.clrkey, kkey, &klen);
+ DEBUG_DBG("%s pkey_clr2seckey2()=%d\n", __func__, rc);
+ kfree(apqns);
+ if (rc) {
+ kfree(kkey);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (kcs.key) {
+ if (kcs.keylen < klen) {
+ kfree(kkey);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (copy_to_user(kcs.key, kkey, klen)) {
+ kfree(kkey);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ }
+ kcs.keylen = klen;
+ if (copy_to_user(ucs, &kcs, sizeof(kcs)))
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ memzero_explicit(&kcs, sizeof(kcs));
+ kfree(kkey);
+ break;
+ }
+ case PKEY_VERIFYKEY2: {
+ struct pkey_verifykey2 __user *uvk = (void __user *) arg;
+ struct pkey_verifykey2 kvk;
+ u8 *kkey;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&kvk, uvk, sizeof(kvk)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ kkey = _copy_key_from_user(kvk.key, kvk.keylen);
+ if (IS_ERR(kkey))
+ return PTR_ERR(kkey);
+ rc = pkey_verifykey2(kkey, kvk.keylen,
+ &kvk.cardnr, &kvk.domain,
+ &kvk.type, &kvk.size, &kvk.flags);
+ DEBUG_DBG("%s pkey_verifykey2()=%d\n", __func__, rc);
+ kfree(kkey);
+ if (rc)
+ break;
+ if (copy_to_user(uvk, &kvk, sizeof(kvk)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ break;
+ }
+ case PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK2: {
+ struct pkey_kblob2pkey2 __user *utp = (void __user *) arg;
+ struct pkey_kblob2pkey2 ktp;
+ struct pkey_apqn *apqns = NULL;
+ u8 *kkey;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&ktp, utp, sizeof(ktp)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ apqns = _copy_apqns_from_user(ktp.apqns, ktp.apqn_entries);
+ if (IS_ERR(apqns))
+ return PTR_ERR(apqns);
+ kkey = _copy_key_from_user(ktp.key, ktp.keylen);
+ if (IS_ERR(kkey)) {
+ kfree(apqns);
+ return PTR_ERR(kkey);
+ }
+ rc = pkey_keyblob2pkey2(apqns, ktp.apqn_entries,
+ kkey, ktp.keylen, &ktp.protkey);
+ DEBUG_DBG("%s pkey_keyblob2pkey2()=%d\n", __func__, rc);
+ kfree(apqns);
+ kfree(kkey);
+ if (rc)
+ break;
+ if (copy_to_user(utp, &ktp, sizeof(ktp)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ break;
+ }
+ case PKEY_APQNS4K: {
+ struct pkey_apqns4key __user *uak = (void __user *) arg;
+ struct pkey_apqns4key kak;
+ struct pkey_apqn *apqns = NULL;
+ size_t nr_apqns, len;
+ u8 *kkey;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&kak, uak, sizeof(kak)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ nr_apqns = kak.apqn_entries;
+ if (nr_apqns) {
+ apqns = kmalloc_array(nr_apqns,
+ sizeof(struct pkey_apqn),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!apqns)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ kkey = _copy_key_from_user(kak.key, kak.keylen);
+ if (IS_ERR(kkey)) {
+ kfree(apqns);
+ return PTR_ERR(kkey);
+ }
+ rc = pkey_apqns4key(kkey, kak.keylen, kak.flags,
+ apqns, &nr_apqns);
+ DEBUG_DBG("%s pkey_apqns4key()=%d\n", __func__, rc);
+ kfree(kkey);
+ if (rc && rc != -ENOSPC) {
+ kfree(apqns);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!rc && kak.apqns) {
+ if (nr_apqns > kak.apqn_entries) {
+ kfree(apqns);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ len = nr_apqns * sizeof(struct pkey_apqn);
+ if (len) {
+ if (copy_to_user(kak.apqns, apqns, len)) {
+ kfree(apqns);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ kak.apqn_entries = nr_apqns;
+ if (copy_to_user(uak, &kak, sizeof(kak)))
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ kfree(apqns);
+ break;
+ }
+ case PKEY_APQNS4KT: {
+ struct pkey_apqns4keytype __user *uat = (void __user *) arg;
+ struct pkey_apqns4keytype kat;
+ struct pkey_apqn *apqns = NULL;
+ size_t nr_apqns, len;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&kat, uat, sizeof(kat)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ nr_apqns = kat.apqn_entries;
+ if (nr_apqns) {
+ apqns = kmalloc_array(nr_apqns,
+ sizeof(struct pkey_apqn),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!apqns)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ rc = pkey_apqns4keytype(kat.type, kat.cur_mkvp, kat.alt_mkvp,
+ kat.flags, apqns, &nr_apqns);
+ DEBUG_DBG("%s pkey_apqns4keytype()=%d\n", __func__, rc);
+ if (rc && rc != -ENOSPC) {
+ kfree(apqns);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!rc && kat.apqns) {
+ if (nr_apqns > kat.apqn_entries) {
+ kfree(apqns);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ len = nr_apqns * sizeof(struct pkey_apqn);
+ if (len) {
+ if (copy_to_user(kat.apqns, apqns, len)) {
+ kfree(apqns);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ kat.apqn_entries = nr_apqns;
+ if (copy_to_user(uat, &kat, sizeof(kat)))
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ kfree(apqns);
+ break;
+ }
+ default:
+ /* unknown/unsupported ioctl cmd */
+ return -ENOTTY;
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sysfs and file io operations
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Sysfs attribute read function for all protected key binary attributes.
+ * The implementation can not deal with partial reads, because a new random
+ * protected key blob is generated with each read. In case of partial reads
+ * (i.e. off != 0 or count < key blob size) -EINVAL is returned.
+ */
+static ssize_t pkey_protkey_aes_attr_read(u32 keytype, bool is_xts, char *buf,
+ loff_t off, size_t count)
+{
+ struct protaeskeytoken protkeytoken;
+ struct pkey_protkey protkey;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (off != 0 || count < sizeof(protkeytoken))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (is_xts)
+ if (count < 2 * sizeof(protkeytoken))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ memset(&protkeytoken, 0, sizeof(protkeytoken));
+ protkeytoken.type = TOKTYPE_NON_CCA;
+ protkeytoken.version = TOKVER_PROTECTED_KEY;
+ protkeytoken.keytype = keytype;
+
+ rc = pkey_genprotkey(protkeytoken.keytype, &protkey);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ protkeytoken.len = protkey.len;
+ memcpy(&protkeytoken.protkey, &protkey.protkey, protkey.len);
+
+ memcpy(buf, &protkeytoken, sizeof(protkeytoken));
+
+ if (is_xts) {
+ rc = pkey_genprotkey(protkeytoken.keytype, &protkey);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ protkeytoken.len = protkey.len;
+ memcpy(&protkeytoken.protkey, &protkey.protkey, protkey.len);
+
+ memcpy(buf + sizeof(protkeytoken), &protkeytoken,
+ sizeof(protkeytoken));
+
+ return 2 * sizeof(protkeytoken);
+ }
+
+ return sizeof(protkeytoken);
+}
+
+static ssize_t protkey_aes_128_read(struct file *filp,
+ struct kobject *kobj,
+ struct bin_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf, loff_t off,
+ size_t count)
+{
+ return pkey_protkey_aes_attr_read(PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128, false, buf,
+ off, count);
+}
+
+static ssize_t protkey_aes_192_read(struct file *filp,
+ struct kobject *kobj,
+ struct bin_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf, loff_t off,
+ size_t count)
+{
+ return pkey_protkey_aes_attr_read(PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192, false, buf,
+ off, count);
+}
+
+static ssize_t protkey_aes_256_read(struct file *filp,
+ struct kobject *kobj,
+ struct bin_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf, loff_t off,
+ size_t count)
+{
+ return pkey_protkey_aes_attr_read(PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256, false, buf,
+ off, count);
+}
+
+static ssize_t protkey_aes_128_xts_read(struct file *filp,
+ struct kobject *kobj,
+ struct bin_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf, loff_t off,
+ size_t count)
+{
+ return pkey_protkey_aes_attr_read(PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128, true, buf,
+ off, count);
+}
+
+static ssize_t protkey_aes_256_xts_read(struct file *filp,
+ struct kobject *kobj,
+ struct bin_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf, loff_t off,
+ size_t count)
+{
+ return pkey_protkey_aes_attr_read(PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256, true, buf,
+ off, count);
+}
+
+static BIN_ATTR_RO(protkey_aes_128, sizeof(struct protaeskeytoken));
+static BIN_ATTR_RO(protkey_aes_192, sizeof(struct protaeskeytoken));
+static BIN_ATTR_RO(protkey_aes_256, sizeof(struct protaeskeytoken));
+static BIN_ATTR_RO(protkey_aes_128_xts, 2 * sizeof(struct protaeskeytoken));
+static BIN_ATTR_RO(protkey_aes_256_xts, 2 * sizeof(struct protaeskeytoken));
+
+static struct bin_attribute *protkey_attrs[] = {
+ &bin_attr_protkey_aes_128,
+ &bin_attr_protkey_aes_192,
+ &bin_attr_protkey_aes_256,
+ &bin_attr_protkey_aes_128_xts,
+ &bin_attr_protkey_aes_256_xts,
+ NULL
+};
+
+static struct attribute_group protkey_attr_group = {
+ .name = "protkey",
+ .bin_attrs = protkey_attrs,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Sysfs attribute read function for all secure key ccadata binary attributes.
+ * The implementation can not deal with partial reads, because a new random
+ * protected key blob is generated with each read. In case of partial reads
+ * (i.e. off != 0 or count < key blob size) -EINVAL is returned.
+ */
+static ssize_t pkey_ccadata_aes_attr_read(u32 keytype, bool is_xts, char *buf,
+ loff_t off, size_t count)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct pkey_seckey *seckey = (struct pkey_seckey *) buf;
+
+ if (off != 0 || count < sizeof(struct secaeskeytoken))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (is_xts)
+ if (count < 2 * sizeof(struct secaeskeytoken))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ rc = cca_genseckey(-1, -1, keytype, seckey->seckey);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (is_xts) {
+ seckey++;
+ rc = cca_genseckey(-1, -1, keytype, seckey->seckey);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 2 * sizeof(struct secaeskeytoken);
+ }
+
+ return sizeof(struct secaeskeytoken);
+}
+
+static ssize_t ccadata_aes_128_read(struct file *filp,
+ struct kobject *kobj,
+ struct bin_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf, loff_t off,
+ size_t count)
+{
+ return pkey_ccadata_aes_attr_read(PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128, false, buf,
+ off, count);
+}
+
+static ssize_t ccadata_aes_192_read(struct file *filp,
+ struct kobject *kobj,
+ struct bin_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf, loff_t off,
+ size_t count)
+{
+ return pkey_ccadata_aes_attr_read(PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192, false, buf,
+ off, count);
+}
+
+static ssize_t ccadata_aes_256_read(struct file *filp,
+ struct kobject *kobj,
+ struct bin_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf, loff_t off,
+ size_t count)
+{
+ return pkey_ccadata_aes_attr_read(PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256, false, buf,
+ off, count);
+}
+
+static ssize_t ccadata_aes_128_xts_read(struct file *filp,
+ struct kobject *kobj,
+ struct bin_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf, loff_t off,
+ size_t count)
+{
+ return pkey_ccadata_aes_attr_read(PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128, true, buf,
+ off, count);
+}
+
+static ssize_t ccadata_aes_256_xts_read(struct file *filp,
+ struct kobject *kobj,
+ struct bin_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf, loff_t off,
+ size_t count)
+{
+ return pkey_ccadata_aes_attr_read(PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256, true, buf,
+ off, count);
+}
+
+static BIN_ATTR_RO(ccadata_aes_128, sizeof(struct secaeskeytoken));
+static BIN_ATTR_RO(ccadata_aes_192, sizeof(struct secaeskeytoken));
+static BIN_ATTR_RO(ccadata_aes_256, sizeof(struct secaeskeytoken));
+static BIN_ATTR_RO(ccadata_aes_128_xts, 2 * sizeof(struct secaeskeytoken));
+static BIN_ATTR_RO(ccadata_aes_256_xts, 2 * sizeof(struct secaeskeytoken));
+
+static struct bin_attribute *ccadata_attrs[] = {
+ &bin_attr_ccadata_aes_128,
+ &bin_attr_ccadata_aes_192,
+ &bin_attr_ccadata_aes_256,
+ &bin_attr_ccadata_aes_128_xts,
+ &bin_attr_ccadata_aes_256_xts,
+ NULL
+};
+
+static struct attribute_group ccadata_attr_group = {
+ .name = "ccadata",
+ .bin_attrs = ccadata_attrs,
+};
+
+#define CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE (sizeof(struct cipherkeytoken) + 80)
+
+/*
+ * Sysfs attribute read function for all secure key ccacipher binary attributes.
+ * The implementation can not deal with partial reads, because a new random
+ * secure key blob is generated with each read. In case of partial reads
+ * (i.e. off != 0 or count < key blob size) -EINVAL is returned.
+ */
+static ssize_t pkey_ccacipher_aes_attr_read(enum pkey_key_size keybits,
+ bool is_xts, char *buf, loff_t off,
+ size_t count)
+{
+ size_t keysize;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (off != 0 || count < CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (is_xts)
+ if (count < 2 * CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ keysize = CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE;
+ rc = cca_gencipherkey(-1, -1, keybits, 0, buf, &keysize);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ memset(buf + keysize, 0, CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE - keysize);
+
+ if (is_xts) {
+ keysize = CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE;
+ rc = cca_gencipherkey(-1, -1, keybits, 0,
+ buf + CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE, &keysize);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ memset(buf + CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE + keysize, 0,
+ CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE - keysize);
+
+ return 2 * CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE;
+ }
+
+ return CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE;
+}
+
+static ssize_t ccacipher_aes_128_read(struct file *filp,
+ struct kobject *kobj,
+ struct bin_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf, loff_t off,
+ size_t count)
+{
+ return pkey_ccacipher_aes_attr_read(PKEY_SIZE_AES_128, false, buf,
+ off, count);
+}
+
+static ssize_t ccacipher_aes_192_read(struct file *filp,
+ struct kobject *kobj,
+ struct bin_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf, loff_t off,
+ size_t count)
+{
+ return pkey_ccacipher_aes_attr_read(PKEY_SIZE_AES_192, false, buf,
+ off, count);
+}
+
+static ssize_t ccacipher_aes_256_read(struct file *filp,
+ struct kobject *kobj,
+ struct bin_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf, loff_t off,
+ size_t count)
+{
+ return pkey_ccacipher_aes_attr_read(PKEY_SIZE_AES_256, false, buf,
+ off, count);
+}
+
+static ssize_t ccacipher_aes_128_xts_read(struct file *filp,
+ struct kobject *kobj,
+ struct bin_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf, loff_t off,
+ size_t count)
+{
+ return pkey_ccacipher_aes_attr_read(PKEY_SIZE_AES_128, true, buf,
+ off, count);
+}
+
+static ssize_t ccacipher_aes_256_xts_read(struct file *filp,
+ struct kobject *kobj,
+ struct bin_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf, loff_t off,
+ size_t count)
+{
+ return pkey_ccacipher_aes_attr_read(PKEY_SIZE_AES_256, true, buf,
+ off, count);
+}
+
+static BIN_ATTR_RO(ccacipher_aes_128, CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE);
+static BIN_ATTR_RO(ccacipher_aes_192, CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE);
+static BIN_ATTR_RO(ccacipher_aes_256, CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE);
+static BIN_ATTR_RO(ccacipher_aes_128_xts, 2 * CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE);
+static BIN_ATTR_RO(ccacipher_aes_256_xts, 2 * CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE);
+
+static struct bin_attribute *ccacipher_attrs[] = {
+ &bin_attr_ccacipher_aes_128,
+ &bin_attr_ccacipher_aes_192,
+ &bin_attr_ccacipher_aes_256,
+ &bin_attr_ccacipher_aes_128_xts,
+ &bin_attr_ccacipher_aes_256_xts,
+ NULL
+};
+
+static struct attribute_group ccacipher_attr_group = {
+ .name = "ccacipher",
+ .bin_attrs = ccacipher_attrs,
+};
+
+static const struct attribute_group *pkey_attr_groups[] = {
+ &protkey_attr_group,
+ &ccadata_attr_group,
+ &ccacipher_attr_group,
+ NULL,
+};
+
+static const struct file_operations pkey_fops = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .open = nonseekable_open,
+ .llseek = no_llseek,
+ .unlocked_ioctl = pkey_unlocked_ioctl,
+};
+
+static struct miscdevice pkey_dev = {
+ .name = "pkey",
+ .minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR,
+ .mode = 0666,
+ .fops = &pkey_fops,
+ .groups = pkey_attr_groups,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Module init
+ */
+static int __init pkey_init(void)
+{
+ cpacf_mask_t func_mask;
+
+ /*
+ * The pckmo instruction should be available - even if we don't
+ * actually invoke it. This instruction comes with MSA 3 which
+ * is also the minimum level for the kmc instructions which
+ * are able to work with protected keys.
+ */
+ if (!cpacf_query(CPACF_PCKMO, &func_mask))
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ /* check for kmc instructions available */
+ if (!cpacf_query(CPACF_KMC, &func_mask))
+ return -ENODEV;
+ if (!cpacf_test_func(&func_mask, CPACF_KMC_PAES_128) ||
+ !cpacf_test_func(&func_mask, CPACF_KMC_PAES_192) ||
+ !cpacf_test_func(&func_mask, CPACF_KMC_PAES_256))
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ pkey_debug_init();
+
+ return misc_register(&pkey_dev);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Module exit
+ */
+static void __exit pkey_exit(void)
+{
+ misc_deregister(&pkey_dev);
+ pkey_debug_exit();
+}
+
+module_cpu_feature_match(MSA, pkey_init);
+module_exit(pkey_exit);