ASR_BASE
Change-Id: Icf3719cc0afe3eeb3edc7fa80a2eb5199ca9dda1
diff --git a/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/Makefile b/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4a29f4c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Makefile for Linux kernel rpcsec_gss implementation
+#
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_SUNRPC_GSS) += auth_rpcgss.o
+
+auth_rpcgss-y := auth_gss.o gss_generic_token.o \
+ gss_mech_switch.o svcauth_gss.o \
+ gss_rpc_upcall.o gss_rpc_xdr.o trace.o
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_KRB5) += rpcsec_gss_krb5.o
+
+rpcsec_gss_krb5-y := gss_krb5_mech.o gss_krb5_seal.o gss_krb5_unseal.o \
+ gss_krb5_seqnum.o gss_krb5_wrap.o gss_krb5_crypto.o gss_krb5_keys.o
diff --git a/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c b/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a1aa4f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2261 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+/*
+ * linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c
+ *
+ * RPCSEC_GSS client authentication.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 The Regents of the University of Michigan.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Dug Song <dugsong@monkey.org>
+ * Andy Adamson <andros@umich.edu>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/clnt.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/auth.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/auth_gss.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/svcauth_gss.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_err.h>
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/rpc_pipe_fs.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_api.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/hashtable.h>
+
+#include "auth_gss_internal.h"
+#include "../netns.h"
+
+#include <trace/events/rpcgss.h>
+
+static const struct rpc_authops authgss_ops;
+
+static const struct rpc_credops gss_credops;
+static const struct rpc_credops gss_nullops;
+
+#define GSS_RETRY_EXPIRED 5
+static unsigned int gss_expired_cred_retry_delay = GSS_RETRY_EXPIRED;
+
+#define GSS_KEY_EXPIRE_TIMEO 240
+static unsigned int gss_key_expire_timeo = GSS_KEY_EXPIRE_TIMEO;
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG)
+# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH
+#endif
+
+#define GSS_CRED_SLACK (RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE * 2)
+/* length of a krb5 verifier (48), plus data added before arguments when
+ * using integrity (two 4-byte integers): */
+#define GSS_VERF_SLACK 100
+
+static DEFINE_HASHTABLE(gss_auth_hash_table, 4);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(gss_auth_hash_lock);
+
+struct gss_pipe {
+ struct rpc_pipe_dir_object pdo;
+ struct rpc_pipe *pipe;
+ struct rpc_clnt *clnt;
+ const char *name;
+ struct kref kref;
+};
+
+struct gss_auth {
+ struct kref kref;
+ struct hlist_node hash;
+ struct rpc_auth rpc_auth;
+ struct gss_api_mech *mech;
+ enum rpc_gss_svc service;
+ struct rpc_clnt *client;
+ struct net *net;
+ /*
+ * There are two upcall pipes; dentry[1], named "gssd", is used
+ * for the new text-based upcall; dentry[0] is named after the
+ * mechanism (for example, "krb5") and exists for
+ * backwards-compatibility with older gssd's.
+ */
+ struct gss_pipe *gss_pipe[2];
+ const char *target_name;
+};
+
+/* pipe_version >= 0 if and only if someone has a pipe open. */
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pipe_version_lock);
+static struct rpc_wait_queue pipe_version_rpc_waitqueue;
+static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(pipe_version_waitqueue);
+static void gss_put_auth(struct gss_auth *gss_auth);
+
+static void gss_free_ctx(struct gss_cl_ctx *);
+static const struct rpc_pipe_ops gss_upcall_ops_v0;
+static const struct rpc_pipe_ops gss_upcall_ops_v1;
+
+static inline struct gss_cl_ctx *
+gss_get_ctx(struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ refcount_inc(&ctx->count);
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+static inline void
+gss_put_ctx(struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ if (refcount_dec_and_test(&ctx->count))
+ gss_free_ctx(ctx);
+}
+
+/* gss_cred_set_ctx:
+ * called by gss_upcall_callback and gss_create_upcall in order
+ * to set the gss context. The actual exchange of an old context
+ * and a new one is protected by the pipe->lock.
+ */
+static void
+gss_cred_set_ctx(struct rpc_cred *cred, struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ struct gss_cred *gss_cred = container_of(cred, struct gss_cred, gc_base);
+
+ if (!test_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_NEW, &cred->cr_flags))
+ return;
+ gss_get_ctx(ctx);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(gss_cred->gc_ctx, ctx);
+ set_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE, &cred->cr_flags);
+ smp_mb__before_atomic();
+ clear_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_NEW, &cred->cr_flags);
+}
+
+static struct gss_cl_ctx *
+gss_cred_get_ctx(struct rpc_cred *cred)
+{
+ struct gss_cred *gss_cred = container_of(cred, struct gss_cred, gc_base);
+ struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx = NULL;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ ctx = rcu_dereference(gss_cred->gc_ctx);
+ if (ctx)
+ gss_get_ctx(ctx);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+static struct gss_cl_ctx *
+gss_alloc_context(void)
+{
+ struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx;
+
+ ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_NOFS);
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ ctx->gc_proc = RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA;
+ ctx->gc_seq = 1; /* NetApp 6.4R1 doesn't accept seq. no. 0 */
+ spin_lock_init(&ctx->gc_seq_lock);
+ refcount_set(&ctx->count,1);
+ }
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+#define GSSD_MIN_TIMEOUT (60 * 60)
+static const void *
+gss_fill_context(const void *p, const void *end, struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx, struct gss_api_mech *gm)
+{
+ const void *q;
+ unsigned int seclen;
+ unsigned int timeout;
+ unsigned long now = jiffies;
+ u32 window_size;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* First unsigned int gives the remaining lifetime in seconds of the
+ * credential - e.g. the remaining TGT lifetime for Kerberos or
+ * the -t value passed to GSSD.
+ */
+ p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &timeout, sizeof(timeout));
+ if (IS_ERR(p))
+ goto err;
+ if (timeout == 0)
+ timeout = GSSD_MIN_TIMEOUT;
+ ctx->gc_expiry = now + ((unsigned long)timeout * HZ);
+ /* Sequence number window. Determines the maximum number of
+ * simultaneous requests
+ */
+ p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &window_size, sizeof(window_size));
+ if (IS_ERR(p))
+ goto err;
+ ctx->gc_win = window_size;
+ /* gssd signals an error by passing ctx->gc_win = 0: */
+ if (ctx->gc_win == 0) {
+ /*
+ * in which case, p points to an error code. Anything other
+ * than -EKEYEXPIRED gets converted to -EACCES.
+ */
+ p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &ret, sizeof(ret));
+ if (!IS_ERR(p))
+ p = (ret == -EKEYEXPIRED) ? ERR_PTR(-EKEYEXPIRED) :
+ ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* copy the opaque wire context */
+ p = simple_get_netobj(p, end, &ctx->gc_wire_ctx);
+ if (IS_ERR(p))
+ goto err;
+ /* import the opaque security context */
+ p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &seclen, sizeof(seclen));
+ if (IS_ERR(p))
+ goto err;
+ q = (const void *)((const char *)p + seclen);
+ if (unlikely(q > end || q < p)) {
+ p = ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = gss_import_sec_context(p, seclen, gm, &ctx->gc_gss_ctx, NULL, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ trace_rpcgss_import_ctx(ret);
+ p = ERR_PTR(ret);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* is there any trailing data? */
+ if (q == end) {
+ p = q;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* pull in acceptor name (if there is one) */
+ p = simple_get_netobj(q, end, &ctx->gc_acceptor);
+ if (IS_ERR(p))
+ goto err;
+done:
+ trace_rpcgss_context(ctx->gc_expiry, now, timeout,
+ ctx->gc_acceptor.len, ctx->gc_acceptor.data);
+err:
+ return p;
+}
+
+/* XXX: Need some documentation about why UPCALL_BUF_LEN is so small.
+ * Is user space expecting no more than UPCALL_BUF_LEN bytes?
+ * Note that there are now _two_ NI_MAXHOST sized data items
+ * being passed in this string.
+ */
+#define UPCALL_BUF_LEN 256
+
+struct gss_upcall_msg {
+ refcount_t count;
+ kuid_t uid;
+ const char *service_name;
+ struct rpc_pipe_msg msg;
+ struct list_head list;
+ struct gss_auth *auth;
+ struct rpc_pipe *pipe;
+ struct rpc_wait_queue rpc_waitqueue;
+ wait_queue_head_t waitqueue;
+ struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx;
+ char databuf[UPCALL_BUF_LEN];
+};
+
+static int get_pipe_version(struct net *net)
+{
+ struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+ int ret;
+
+ spin_lock(&pipe_version_lock);
+ if (sn->pipe_version >= 0) {
+ atomic_inc(&sn->pipe_users);
+ ret = sn->pipe_version;
+ } else
+ ret = -EAGAIN;
+ spin_unlock(&pipe_version_lock);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void put_pipe_version(struct net *net)
+{
+ struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+
+ if (atomic_dec_and_lock(&sn->pipe_users, &pipe_version_lock)) {
+ sn->pipe_version = -1;
+ spin_unlock(&pipe_version_lock);
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+gss_release_msg(struct gss_upcall_msg *gss_msg)
+{
+ struct net *net = gss_msg->auth->net;
+ if (!refcount_dec_and_test(&gss_msg->count))
+ return;
+ put_pipe_version(net);
+ BUG_ON(!list_empty(&gss_msg->list));
+ if (gss_msg->ctx != NULL)
+ gss_put_ctx(gss_msg->ctx);
+ rpc_destroy_wait_queue(&gss_msg->rpc_waitqueue);
+ gss_put_auth(gss_msg->auth);
+ kfree_const(gss_msg->service_name);
+ kfree(gss_msg);
+}
+
+static struct gss_upcall_msg *
+__gss_find_upcall(struct rpc_pipe *pipe, kuid_t uid, const struct gss_auth *auth)
+{
+ struct gss_upcall_msg *pos;
+ list_for_each_entry(pos, &pipe->in_downcall, list) {
+ if (!uid_eq(pos->uid, uid))
+ continue;
+ if (pos->auth->service != auth->service)
+ continue;
+ refcount_inc(&pos->count);
+ return pos;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Try to add an upcall to the pipefs queue.
+ * If an upcall owned by our uid already exists, then we return a reference
+ * to that upcall instead of adding the new upcall.
+ */
+static inline struct gss_upcall_msg *
+gss_add_msg(struct gss_upcall_msg *gss_msg)
+{
+ struct rpc_pipe *pipe = gss_msg->pipe;
+ struct gss_upcall_msg *old;
+
+ spin_lock(&pipe->lock);
+ old = __gss_find_upcall(pipe, gss_msg->uid, gss_msg->auth);
+ if (old == NULL) {
+ refcount_inc(&gss_msg->count);
+ list_add(&gss_msg->list, &pipe->in_downcall);
+ } else
+ gss_msg = old;
+ spin_unlock(&pipe->lock);
+ return gss_msg;
+}
+
+static void
+__gss_unhash_msg(struct gss_upcall_msg *gss_msg)
+{
+ list_del_init(&gss_msg->list);
+ rpc_wake_up_status(&gss_msg->rpc_waitqueue, gss_msg->msg.errno);
+ wake_up_all(&gss_msg->waitqueue);
+ refcount_dec(&gss_msg->count);
+}
+
+static void
+gss_unhash_msg(struct gss_upcall_msg *gss_msg)
+{
+ struct rpc_pipe *pipe = gss_msg->pipe;
+
+ if (list_empty(&gss_msg->list))
+ return;
+ spin_lock(&pipe->lock);
+ if (!list_empty(&gss_msg->list))
+ __gss_unhash_msg(gss_msg);
+ spin_unlock(&pipe->lock);
+}
+
+static void
+gss_handle_downcall_result(struct gss_cred *gss_cred, struct gss_upcall_msg *gss_msg)
+{
+ switch (gss_msg->msg.errno) {
+ case 0:
+ if (gss_msg->ctx == NULL)
+ break;
+ clear_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_NEGATIVE, &gss_cred->gc_base.cr_flags);
+ gss_cred_set_ctx(&gss_cred->gc_base, gss_msg->ctx);
+ break;
+ case -EKEYEXPIRED:
+ set_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_NEGATIVE, &gss_cred->gc_base.cr_flags);
+ }
+ gss_cred->gc_upcall_timestamp = jiffies;
+ gss_cred->gc_upcall = NULL;
+ rpc_wake_up_status(&gss_msg->rpc_waitqueue, gss_msg->msg.errno);
+}
+
+static void
+gss_upcall_callback(struct rpc_task *task)
+{
+ struct gss_cred *gss_cred = container_of(task->tk_rqstp->rq_cred,
+ struct gss_cred, gc_base);
+ struct gss_upcall_msg *gss_msg = gss_cred->gc_upcall;
+ struct rpc_pipe *pipe = gss_msg->pipe;
+
+ spin_lock(&pipe->lock);
+ gss_handle_downcall_result(gss_cred, gss_msg);
+ spin_unlock(&pipe->lock);
+ task->tk_status = gss_msg->msg.errno;
+ gss_release_msg(gss_msg);
+}
+
+static void gss_encode_v0_msg(struct gss_upcall_msg *gss_msg,
+ const struct cred *cred)
+{
+ struct user_namespace *userns = cred->user_ns;
+
+ uid_t uid = from_kuid_munged(userns, gss_msg->uid);
+ memcpy(gss_msg->databuf, &uid, sizeof(uid));
+ gss_msg->msg.data = gss_msg->databuf;
+ gss_msg->msg.len = sizeof(uid);
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(uid) > sizeof(gss_msg->databuf));
+}
+
+static ssize_t
+gss_v0_upcall(struct file *file, struct rpc_pipe_msg *msg,
+ char __user *buf, size_t buflen)
+{
+ struct gss_upcall_msg *gss_msg = container_of(msg,
+ struct gss_upcall_msg,
+ msg);
+ if (msg->copied == 0)
+ gss_encode_v0_msg(gss_msg, file->f_cred);
+ return rpc_pipe_generic_upcall(file, msg, buf, buflen);
+}
+
+static int gss_encode_v1_msg(struct gss_upcall_msg *gss_msg,
+ const char *service_name,
+ const char *target_name,
+ const struct cred *cred)
+{
+ struct user_namespace *userns = cred->user_ns;
+ struct gss_api_mech *mech = gss_msg->auth->mech;
+ char *p = gss_msg->databuf;
+ size_t buflen = sizeof(gss_msg->databuf);
+ int len;
+
+ len = scnprintf(p, buflen, "mech=%s uid=%d", mech->gm_name,
+ from_kuid_munged(userns, gss_msg->uid));
+ buflen -= len;
+ p += len;
+ gss_msg->msg.len = len;
+
+ /*
+ * target= is a full service principal that names the remote
+ * identity that we are authenticating to.
+ */
+ if (target_name) {
+ len = scnprintf(p, buflen, " target=%s", target_name);
+ buflen -= len;
+ p += len;
+ gss_msg->msg.len += len;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * gssd uses service= and srchost= to select a matching key from
+ * the system's keytab to use as the source principal.
+ *
+ * service= is the service name part of the source principal,
+ * or "*" (meaning choose any).
+ *
+ * srchost= is the hostname part of the source principal. When
+ * not provided, gssd uses the local hostname.
+ */
+ if (service_name) {
+ char *c = strchr(service_name, '@');
+
+ if (!c)
+ len = scnprintf(p, buflen, " service=%s",
+ service_name);
+ else
+ len = scnprintf(p, buflen,
+ " service=%.*s srchost=%s",
+ (int)(c - service_name),
+ service_name, c + 1);
+ buflen -= len;
+ p += len;
+ gss_msg->msg.len += len;
+ }
+
+ if (mech->gm_upcall_enctypes) {
+ len = scnprintf(p, buflen, " enctypes=%s",
+ mech->gm_upcall_enctypes);
+ buflen -= len;
+ p += len;
+ gss_msg->msg.len += len;
+ }
+ trace_rpcgss_upcall_msg(gss_msg->databuf);
+ len = scnprintf(p, buflen, "\n");
+ if (len == 0)
+ goto out_overflow;
+ gss_msg->msg.len += len;
+ gss_msg->msg.data = gss_msg->databuf;
+ return 0;
+out_overflow:
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+static ssize_t
+gss_v1_upcall(struct file *file, struct rpc_pipe_msg *msg,
+ char __user *buf, size_t buflen)
+{
+ struct gss_upcall_msg *gss_msg = container_of(msg,
+ struct gss_upcall_msg,
+ msg);
+ int err;
+ if (msg->copied == 0) {
+ err = gss_encode_v1_msg(gss_msg,
+ gss_msg->service_name,
+ gss_msg->auth->target_name,
+ file->f_cred);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+ return rpc_pipe_generic_upcall(file, msg, buf, buflen);
+}
+
+static struct gss_upcall_msg *
+gss_alloc_msg(struct gss_auth *gss_auth,
+ kuid_t uid, const char *service_name)
+{
+ struct gss_upcall_msg *gss_msg;
+ int vers;
+ int err = -ENOMEM;
+
+ gss_msg = kzalloc(sizeof(*gss_msg), GFP_NOFS);
+ if (gss_msg == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ vers = get_pipe_version(gss_auth->net);
+ err = vers;
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto err_free_msg;
+ gss_msg->pipe = gss_auth->gss_pipe[vers]->pipe;
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&gss_msg->list);
+ rpc_init_wait_queue(&gss_msg->rpc_waitqueue, "RPCSEC_GSS upcall waitq");
+ init_waitqueue_head(&gss_msg->waitqueue);
+ refcount_set(&gss_msg->count, 1);
+ gss_msg->uid = uid;
+ gss_msg->auth = gss_auth;
+ kref_get(&gss_auth->kref);
+ if (service_name) {
+ gss_msg->service_name = kstrdup_const(service_name, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!gss_msg->service_name) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err_put_pipe_version;
+ }
+ }
+ return gss_msg;
+err_put_pipe_version:
+ put_pipe_version(gss_auth->net);
+err_free_msg:
+ kfree(gss_msg);
+err:
+ return ERR_PTR(err);
+}
+
+static struct gss_upcall_msg *
+gss_setup_upcall(struct gss_auth *gss_auth, struct rpc_cred *cred)
+{
+ struct gss_cred *gss_cred = container_of(cred,
+ struct gss_cred, gc_base);
+ struct gss_upcall_msg *gss_new, *gss_msg;
+ kuid_t uid = cred->cr_cred->fsuid;
+
+ gss_new = gss_alloc_msg(gss_auth, uid, gss_cred->gc_principal);
+ if (IS_ERR(gss_new))
+ return gss_new;
+ gss_msg = gss_add_msg(gss_new);
+ if (gss_msg == gss_new) {
+ int res;
+ refcount_inc(&gss_msg->count);
+ res = rpc_queue_upcall(gss_new->pipe, &gss_new->msg);
+ if (res) {
+ gss_unhash_msg(gss_new);
+ refcount_dec(&gss_msg->count);
+ gss_release_msg(gss_new);
+ gss_msg = ERR_PTR(res);
+ }
+ } else
+ gss_release_msg(gss_new);
+ return gss_msg;
+}
+
+static void warn_gssd(void)
+{
+ dprintk("AUTH_GSS upcall failed. Please check user daemon is running.\n");
+}
+
+static inline int
+gss_refresh_upcall(struct rpc_task *task)
+{
+ struct rpc_cred *cred = task->tk_rqstp->rq_cred;
+ struct gss_auth *gss_auth = container_of(cred->cr_auth,
+ struct gss_auth, rpc_auth);
+ struct gss_cred *gss_cred = container_of(cred,
+ struct gss_cred, gc_base);
+ struct gss_upcall_msg *gss_msg;
+ struct rpc_pipe *pipe;
+ int err = 0;
+
+ gss_msg = gss_setup_upcall(gss_auth, cred);
+ if (PTR_ERR(gss_msg) == -EAGAIN) {
+ /* XXX: warning on the first, under the assumption we
+ * shouldn't normally hit this case on a refresh. */
+ warn_gssd();
+ rpc_sleep_on_timeout(&pipe_version_rpc_waitqueue,
+ task, NULL, jiffies + (15 * HZ));
+ err = -EAGAIN;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (IS_ERR(gss_msg)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(gss_msg);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ pipe = gss_msg->pipe;
+ spin_lock(&pipe->lock);
+ if (gss_cred->gc_upcall != NULL)
+ rpc_sleep_on(&gss_cred->gc_upcall->rpc_waitqueue, task, NULL);
+ else if (gss_msg->ctx == NULL && gss_msg->msg.errno >= 0) {
+ gss_cred->gc_upcall = gss_msg;
+ /* gss_upcall_callback will release the reference to gss_upcall_msg */
+ refcount_inc(&gss_msg->count);
+ rpc_sleep_on(&gss_msg->rpc_waitqueue, task, gss_upcall_callback);
+ } else {
+ gss_handle_downcall_result(gss_cred, gss_msg);
+ err = gss_msg->msg.errno;
+ }
+ spin_unlock(&pipe->lock);
+ gss_release_msg(gss_msg);
+out:
+ trace_rpcgss_upcall_result(from_kuid(&init_user_ns,
+ cred->cr_cred->fsuid), err);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static inline int
+gss_create_upcall(struct gss_auth *gss_auth, struct gss_cred *gss_cred)
+{
+ struct net *net = gss_auth->net;
+ struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+ struct rpc_pipe *pipe;
+ struct rpc_cred *cred = &gss_cred->gc_base;
+ struct gss_upcall_msg *gss_msg;
+ DEFINE_WAIT(wait);
+ int err;
+
+retry:
+ err = 0;
+ /* if gssd is down, just skip upcalling altogether */
+ if (!gssd_running(net)) {
+ warn_gssd();
+ err = -EACCES;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ gss_msg = gss_setup_upcall(gss_auth, cred);
+ if (PTR_ERR(gss_msg) == -EAGAIN) {
+ err = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(pipe_version_waitqueue,
+ sn->pipe_version >= 0, 15 * HZ);
+ if (sn->pipe_version < 0) {
+ warn_gssd();
+ err = -EACCES;
+ }
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto out;
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ if (IS_ERR(gss_msg)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(gss_msg);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ pipe = gss_msg->pipe;
+ for (;;) {
+ prepare_to_wait(&gss_msg->waitqueue, &wait, TASK_KILLABLE);
+ spin_lock(&pipe->lock);
+ if (gss_msg->ctx != NULL || gss_msg->msg.errno < 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+ spin_unlock(&pipe->lock);
+ if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
+ err = -ERESTARTSYS;
+ goto out_intr;
+ }
+ schedule();
+ }
+ if (gss_msg->ctx)
+ gss_cred_set_ctx(cred, gss_msg->ctx);
+ else
+ err = gss_msg->msg.errno;
+ spin_unlock(&pipe->lock);
+out_intr:
+ finish_wait(&gss_msg->waitqueue, &wait);
+ gss_release_msg(gss_msg);
+out:
+ trace_rpcgss_upcall_result(from_kuid(&init_user_ns,
+ cred->cr_cred->fsuid), err);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static struct gss_upcall_msg *
+gss_find_downcall(struct rpc_pipe *pipe, kuid_t uid)
+{
+ struct gss_upcall_msg *pos;
+ list_for_each_entry(pos, &pipe->in_downcall, list) {
+ if (!uid_eq(pos->uid, uid))
+ continue;
+ if (!rpc_msg_is_inflight(&pos->msg))
+ continue;
+ refcount_inc(&pos->count);
+ return pos;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+#define MSG_BUF_MAXSIZE 1024
+
+static ssize_t
+gss_pipe_downcall(struct file *filp, const char __user *src, size_t mlen)
+{
+ const void *p, *end;
+ void *buf;
+ struct gss_upcall_msg *gss_msg;
+ struct rpc_pipe *pipe = RPC_I(file_inode(filp))->pipe;
+ struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx;
+ uid_t id;
+ kuid_t uid;
+ ssize_t err = -EFBIG;
+
+ if (mlen > MSG_BUF_MAXSIZE)
+ goto out;
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ buf = kmalloc(mlen, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!buf)
+ goto out;
+
+ err = -EFAULT;
+ if (copy_from_user(buf, src, mlen))
+ goto err;
+
+ end = (const void *)((char *)buf + mlen);
+ p = simple_get_bytes(buf, end, &id, sizeof(id));
+ if (IS_ERR(p)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(p);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), id);
+ if (!uid_valid(uid)) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ ctx = gss_alloc_context();
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ err = -ENOENT;
+ /* Find a matching upcall */
+ spin_lock(&pipe->lock);
+ gss_msg = gss_find_downcall(pipe, uid);
+ if (gss_msg == NULL) {
+ spin_unlock(&pipe->lock);
+ goto err_put_ctx;
+ }
+ list_del_init(&gss_msg->list);
+ spin_unlock(&pipe->lock);
+
+ p = gss_fill_context(p, end, ctx, gss_msg->auth->mech);
+ if (IS_ERR(p)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(p);
+ switch (err) {
+ case -EACCES:
+ case -EKEYEXPIRED:
+ gss_msg->msg.errno = err;
+ err = mlen;
+ break;
+ case -EFAULT:
+ case -ENOMEM:
+ case -EINVAL:
+ case -ENOSYS:
+ gss_msg->msg.errno = -EAGAIN;
+ break;
+ default:
+ printk(KERN_CRIT "%s: bad return from "
+ "gss_fill_context: %zd\n", __func__, err);
+ gss_msg->msg.errno = -EIO;
+ }
+ goto err_release_msg;
+ }
+ gss_msg->ctx = gss_get_ctx(ctx);
+ err = mlen;
+
+err_release_msg:
+ spin_lock(&pipe->lock);
+ __gss_unhash_msg(gss_msg);
+ spin_unlock(&pipe->lock);
+ gss_release_msg(gss_msg);
+err_put_ctx:
+ gss_put_ctx(ctx);
+err:
+ kfree(buf);
+out:
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int gss_pipe_open(struct inode *inode, int new_version)
+{
+ struct net *net = inode->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+ struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ spin_lock(&pipe_version_lock);
+ if (sn->pipe_version < 0) {
+ /* First open of any gss pipe determines the version: */
+ sn->pipe_version = new_version;
+ rpc_wake_up(&pipe_version_rpc_waitqueue);
+ wake_up(&pipe_version_waitqueue);
+ } else if (sn->pipe_version != new_version) {
+ /* Trying to open a pipe of a different version */
+ ret = -EBUSY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ atomic_inc(&sn->pipe_users);
+out:
+ spin_unlock(&pipe_version_lock);
+ return ret;
+
+}
+
+static int gss_pipe_open_v0(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ return gss_pipe_open(inode, 0);
+}
+
+static int gss_pipe_open_v1(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ return gss_pipe_open(inode, 1);
+}
+
+static void
+gss_pipe_release(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct net *net = inode->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+ struct rpc_pipe *pipe = RPC_I(inode)->pipe;
+ struct gss_upcall_msg *gss_msg;
+
+restart:
+ spin_lock(&pipe->lock);
+ list_for_each_entry(gss_msg, &pipe->in_downcall, list) {
+
+ if (!list_empty(&gss_msg->msg.list))
+ continue;
+ gss_msg->msg.errno = -EPIPE;
+ refcount_inc(&gss_msg->count);
+ __gss_unhash_msg(gss_msg);
+ spin_unlock(&pipe->lock);
+ gss_release_msg(gss_msg);
+ goto restart;
+ }
+ spin_unlock(&pipe->lock);
+
+ put_pipe_version(net);
+}
+
+static void
+gss_pipe_destroy_msg(struct rpc_pipe_msg *msg)
+{
+ struct gss_upcall_msg *gss_msg = container_of(msg, struct gss_upcall_msg, msg);
+
+ if (msg->errno < 0) {
+ refcount_inc(&gss_msg->count);
+ gss_unhash_msg(gss_msg);
+ if (msg->errno == -ETIMEDOUT)
+ warn_gssd();
+ gss_release_msg(gss_msg);
+ }
+ gss_release_msg(gss_msg);
+}
+
+static void gss_pipe_dentry_destroy(struct dentry *dir,
+ struct rpc_pipe_dir_object *pdo)
+{
+ struct gss_pipe *gss_pipe = pdo->pdo_data;
+ struct rpc_pipe *pipe = gss_pipe->pipe;
+
+ if (pipe->dentry != NULL) {
+ rpc_unlink(pipe->dentry);
+ pipe->dentry = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+static int gss_pipe_dentry_create(struct dentry *dir,
+ struct rpc_pipe_dir_object *pdo)
+{
+ struct gss_pipe *p = pdo->pdo_data;
+ struct dentry *dentry;
+
+ dentry = rpc_mkpipe_dentry(dir, p->name, p->clnt, p->pipe);
+ if (IS_ERR(dentry))
+ return PTR_ERR(dentry);
+ p->pipe->dentry = dentry;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct rpc_pipe_dir_object_ops gss_pipe_dir_object_ops = {
+ .create = gss_pipe_dentry_create,
+ .destroy = gss_pipe_dentry_destroy,
+};
+
+static struct gss_pipe *gss_pipe_alloc(struct rpc_clnt *clnt,
+ const char *name,
+ const struct rpc_pipe_ops *upcall_ops)
+{
+ struct gss_pipe *p;
+ int err = -ENOMEM;
+
+ p = kmalloc(sizeof(*p), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (p == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ p->pipe = rpc_mkpipe_data(upcall_ops, RPC_PIPE_WAIT_FOR_OPEN);
+ if (IS_ERR(p->pipe)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(p->pipe);
+ goto err_free_gss_pipe;
+ }
+ p->name = name;
+ p->clnt = clnt;
+ kref_init(&p->kref);
+ rpc_init_pipe_dir_object(&p->pdo,
+ &gss_pipe_dir_object_ops,
+ p);
+ return p;
+err_free_gss_pipe:
+ kfree(p);
+err:
+ return ERR_PTR(err);
+}
+
+struct gss_alloc_pdo {
+ struct rpc_clnt *clnt;
+ const char *name;
+ const struct rpc_pipe_ops *upcall_ops;
+};
+
+static int gss_pipe_match_pdo(struct rpc_pipe_dir_object *pdo, void *data)
+{
+ struct gss_pipe *gss_pipe;
+ struct gss_alloc_pdo *args = data;
+
+ if (pdo->pdo_ops != &gss_pipe_dir_object_ops)
+ return 0;
+ gss_pipe = container_of(pdo, struct gss_pipe, pdo);
+ if (strcmp(gss_pipe->name, args->name) != 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (!kref_get_unless_zero(&gss_pipe->kref))
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static struct rpc_pipe_dir_object *gss_pipe_alloc_pdo(void *data)
+{
+ struct gss_pipe *gss_pipe;
+ struct gss_alloc_pdo *args = data;
+
+ gss_pipe = gss_pipe_alloc(args->clnt, args->name, args->upcall_ops);
+ if (!IS_ERR(gss_pipe))
+ return &gss_pipe->pdo;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static struct gss_pipe *gss_pipe_get(struct rpc_clnt *clnt,
+ const char *name,
+ const struct rpc_pipe_ops *upcall_ops)
+{
+ struct net *net = rpc_net_ns(clnt);
+ struct rpc_pipe_dir_object *pdo;
+ struct gss_alloc_pdo args = {
+ .clnt = clnt,
+ .name = name,
+ .upcall_ops = upcall_ops,
+ };
+
+ pdo = rpc_find_or_alloc_pipe_dir_object(net,
+ &clnt->cl_pipedir_objects,
+ gss_pipe_match_pdo,
+ gss_pipe_alloc_pdo,
+ &args);
+ if (pdo != NULL)
+ return container_of(pdo, struct gss_pipe, pdo);
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+}
+
+static void __gss_pipe_free(struct gss_pipe *p)
+{
+ struct rpc_clnt *clnt = p->clnt;
+ struct net *net = rpc_net_ns(clnt);
+
+ rpc_remove_pipe_dir_object(net,
+ &clnt->cl_pipedir_objects,
+ &p->pdo);
+ rpc_destroy_pipe_data(p->pipe);
+ kfree(p);
+}
+
+static void __gss_pipe_release(struct kref *kref)
+{
+ struct gss_pipe *p = container_of(kref, struct gss_pipe, kref);
+
+ __gss_pipe_free(p);
+}
+
+static void gss_pipe_free(struct gss_pipe *p)
+{
+ if (p != NULL)
+ kref_put(&p->kref, __gss_pipe_release);
+}
+
+/*
+ * NOTE: we have the opportunity to use different
+ * parameters based on the input flavor (which must be a pseudoflavor)
+ */
+static struct gss_auth *
+gss_create_new(const struct rpc_auth_create_args *args, struct rpc_clnt *clnt)
+{
+ rpc_authflavor_t flavor = args->pseudoflavor;
+ struct gss_auth *gss_auth;
+ struct gss_pipe *gss_pipe;
+ struct rpc_auth * auth;
+ int err = -ENOMEM; /* XXX? */
+
+ if (!try_module_get(THIS_MODULE))
+ return ERR_PTR(err);
+ if (!(gss_auth = kmalloc(sizeof(*gss_auth), GFP_KERNEL)))
+ goto out_dec;
+ INIT_HLIST_NODE(&gss_auth->hash);
+ gss_auth->target_name = NULL;
+ if (args->target_name) {
+ gss_auth->target_name = kstrdup(args->target_name, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (gss_auth->target_name == NULL)
+ goto err_free;
+ }
+ gss_auth->client = clnt;
+ gss_auth->net = get_net(rpc_net_ns(clnt));
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ gss_auth->mech = gss_mech_get_by_pseudoflavor(flavor);
+ if (!gss_auth->mech)
+ goto err_put_net;
+ gss_auth->service = gss_pseudoflavor_to_service(gss_auth->mech, flavor);
+ if (gss_auth->service == 0)
+ goto err_put_mech;
+ if (!gssd_running(gss_auth->net))
+ goto err_put_mech;
+ auth = &gss_auth->rpc_auth;
+ auth->au_cslack = GSS_CRED_SLACK >> 2;
+ auth->au_rslack = GSS_KRB5_MAX_SLACK_NEEDED >> 2;
+ auth->au_verfsize = GSS_VERF_SLACK >> 2;
+ auth->au_ralign = GSS_VERF_SLACK >> 2;
+ auth->au_flags = 0;
+ auth->au_ops = &authgss_ops;
+ auth->au_flavor = flavor;
+ if (gss_pseudoflavor_to_datatouch(gss_auth->mech, flavor))
+ auth->au_flags |= RPCAUTH_AUTH_DATATOUCH;
+ refcount_set(&auth->au_count, 1);
+ kref_init(&gss_auth->kref);
+
+ err = rpcauth_init_credcache(auth);
+ if (err)
+ goto err_put_mech;
+ /*
+ * Note: if we created the old pipe first, then someone who
+ * examined the directory at the right moment might conclude
+ * that we supported only the old pipe. So we instead create
+ * the new pipe first.
+ */
+ gss_pipe = gss_pipe_get(clnt, "gssd", &gss_upcall_ops_v1);
+ if (IS_ERR(gss_pipe)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(gss_pipe);
+ goto err_destroy_credcache;
+ }
+ gss_auth->gss_pipe[1] = gss_pipe;
+
+ gss_pipe = gss_pipe_get(clnt, gss_auth->mech->gm_name,
+ &gss_upcall_ops_v0);
+ if (IS_ERR(gss_pipe)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(gss_pipe);
+ goto err_destroy_pipe_1;
+ }
+ gss_auth->gss_pipe[0] = gss_pipe;
+
+ return gss_auth;
+err_destroy_pipe_1:
+ gss_pipe_free(gss_auth->gss_pipe[1]);
+err_destroy_credcache:
+ rpcauth_destroy_credcache(auth);
+err_put_mech:
+ gss_mech_put(gss_auth->mech);
+err_put_net:
+ put_net(gss_auth->net);
+err_free:
+ kfree(gss_auth->target_name);
+ kfree(gss_auth);
+out_dec:
+ module_put(THIS_MODULE);
+ trace_rpcgss_createauth(flavor, err);
+ return ERR_PTR(err);
+}
+
+static void
+gss_free(struct gss_auth *gss_auth)
+{
+ gss_pipe_free(gss_auth->gss_pipe[0]);
+ gss_pipe_free(gss_auth->gss_pipe[1]);
+ gss_mech_put(gss_auth->mech);
+ put_net(gss_auth->net);
+ kfree(gss_auth->target_name);
+
+ kfree(gss_auth);
+ module_put(THIS_MODULE);
+}
+
+static void
+gss_free_callback(struct kref *kref)
+{
+ struct gss_auth *gss_auth = container_of(kref, struct gss_auth, kref);
+
+ gss_free(gss_auth);
+}
+
+static void
+gss_put_auth(struct gss_auth *gss_auth)
+{
+ kref_put(&gss_auth->kref, gss_free_callback);
+}
+
+static void
+gss_destroy(struct rpc_auth *auth)
+{
+ struct gss_auth *gss_auth = container_of(auth,
+ struct gss_auth, rpc_auth);
+
+ if (hash_hashed(&gss_auth->hash)) {
+ spin_lock(&gss_auth_hash_lock);
+ hash_del(&gss_auth->hash);
+ spin_unlock(&gss_auth_hash_lock);
+ }
+
+ gss_pipe_free(gss_auth->gss_pipe[0]);
+ gss_auth->gss_pipe[0] = NULL;
+ gss_pipe_free(gss_auth->gss_pipe[1]);
+ gss_auth->gss_pipe[1] = NULL;
+ rpcauth_destroy_credcache(auth);
+
+ gss_put_auth(gss_auth);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Auths may be shared between rpc clients that were cloned from a
+ * common client with the same xprt, if they also share the flavor and
+ * target_name.
+ *
+ * The auth is looked up from the oldest parent sharing the same
+ * cl_xprt, and the auth itself references only that common parent
+ * (which is guaranteed to last as long as any of its descendants).
+ */
+static struct gss_auth *
+gss_auth_find_or_add_hashed(const struct rpc_auth_create_args *args,
+ struct rpc_clnt *clnt,
+ struct gss_auth *new)
+{
+ struct gss_auth *gss_auth;
+ unsigned long hashval = (unsigned long)clnt;
+
+ spin_lock(&gss_auth_hash_lock);
+ hash_for_each_possible(gss_auth_hash_table,
+ gss_auth,
+ hash,
+ hashval) {
+ if (gss_auth->client != clnt)
+ continue;
+ if (gss_auth->rpc_auth.au_flavor != args->pseudoflavor)
+ continue;
+ if (gss_auth->target_name != args->target_name) {
+ if (gss_auth->target_name == NULL)
+ continue;
+ if (args->target_name == NULL)
+ continue;
+ if (strcmp(gss_auth->target_name, args->target_name))
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&gss_auth->rpc_auth.au_count))
+ continue;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (new)
+ hash_add(gss_auth_hash_table, &new->hash, hashval);
+ gss_auth = new;
+out:
+ spin_unlock(&gss_auth_hash_lock);
+ return gss_auth;
+}
+
+static struct gss_auth *
+gss_create_hashed(const struct rpc_auth_create_args *args,
+ struct rpc_clnt *clnt)
+{
+ struct gss_auth *gss_auth;
+ struct gss_auth *new;
+
+ gss_auth = gss_auth_find_or_add_hashed(args, clnt, NULL);
+ if (gss_auth != NULL)
+ goto out;
+ new = gss_create_new(args, clnt);
+ if (IS_ERR(new))
+ return new;
+ gss_auth = gss_auth_find_or_add_hashed(args, clnt, new);
+ if (gss_auth != new)
+ gss_destroy(&new->rpc_auth);
+out:
+ return gss_auth;
+}
+
+static struct rpc_auth *
+gss_create(const struct rpc_auth_create_args *args, struct rpc_clnt *clnt)
+{
+ struct gss_auth *gss_auth;
+ struct rpc_xprt_switch *xps = rcu_access_pointer(clnt->cl_xpi.xpi_xpswitch);
+
+ while (clnt != clnt->cl_parent) {
+ struct rpc_clnt *parent = clnt->cl_parent;
+ /* Find the original parent for this transport */
+ if (rcu_access_pointer(parent->cl_xpi.xpi_xpswitch) != xps)
+ break;
+ clnt = parent;
+ }
+
+ gss_auth = gss_create_hashed(args, clnt);
+ if (IS_ERR(gss_auth))
+ return ERR_CAST(gss_auth);
+ return &gss_auth->rpc_auth;
+}
+
+static struct gss_cred *
+gss_dup_cred(struct gss_auth *gss_auth, struct gss_cred *gss_cred)
+{
+ struct gss_cred *new;
+
+ /* Make a copy of the cred so that we can reference count it */
+ new = kzalloc(sizeof(*gss_cred), GFP_NOFS);
+ if (new) {
+ struct auth_cred acred = {
+ .cred = gss_cred->gc_base.cr_cred,
+ };
+ struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx =
+ rcu_dereference_protected(gss_cred->gc_ctx, 1);
+
+ rpcauth_init_cred(&new->gc_base, &acred,
+ &gss_auth->rpc_auth,
+ &gss_nullops);
+ new->gc_base.cr_flags = 1UL << RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE;
+ new->gc_service = gss_cred->gc_service;
+ new->gc_principal = gss_cred->gc_principal;
+ kref_get(&gss_auth->kref);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(new->gc_ctx, ctx);
+ gss_get_ctx(ctx);
+ }
+ return new;
+}
+
+/*
+ * gss_send_destroy_context will cause the RPCSEC_GSS to send a NULL RPC call
+ * to the server with the GSS control procedure field set to
+ * RPC_GSS_PROC_DESTROY. This should normally cause the server to release
+ * all RPCSEC_GSS state associated with that context.
+ */
+static void
+gss_send_destroy_context(struct rpc_cred *cred)
+{
+ struct gss_cred *gss_cred = container_of(cred, struct gss_cred, gc_base);
+ struct gss_auth *gss_auth = container_of(cred->cr_auth, struct gss_auth, rpc_auth);
+ struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx = rcu_dereference_protected(gss_cred->gc_ctx, 1);
+ struct gss_cred *new;
+ struct rpc_task *task;
+
+ new = gss_dup_cred(gss_auth, gss_cred);
+ if (new) {
+ ctx->gc_proc = RPC_GSS_PROC_DESTROY;
+
+ task = rpc_call_null(gss_auth->client, &new->gc_base,
+ RPC_TASK_ASYNC|RPC_TASK_SOFT);
+ if (!IS_ERR(task))
+ rpc_put_task(task);
+
+ put_rpccred(&new->gc_base);
+ }
+}
+
+/* gss_destroy_cred (and gss_free_ctx) are used to clean up after failure
+ * to create a new cred or context, so they check that things have been
+ * allocated before freeing them. */
+static void
+gss_do_free_ctx(struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ gss_delete_sec_context(&ctx->gc_gss_ctx);
+ kfree(ctx->gc_wire_ctx.data);
+ kfree(ctx->gc_acceptor.data);
+ kfree(ctx);
+}
+
+static void
+gss_free_ctx_callback(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+ struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx = container_of(head, struct gss_cl_ctx, gc_rcu);
+ gss_do_free_ctx(ctx);
+}
+
+static void
+gss_free_ctx(struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ call_rcu(&ctx->gc_rcu, gss_free_ctx_callback);
+}
+
+static void
+gss_free_cred(struct gss_cred *gss_cred)
+{
+ kfree(gss_cred);
+}
+
+static void
+gss_free_cred_callback(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+ struct gss_cred *gss_cred = container_of(head, struct gss_cred, gc_base.cr_rcu);
+ gss_free_cred(gss_cred);
+}
+
+static void
+gss_destroy_nullcred(struct rpc_cred *cred)
+{
+ struct gss_cred *gss_cred = container_of(cred, struct gss_cred, gc_base);
+ struct gss_auth *gss_auth = container_of(cred->cr_auth, struct gss_auth, rpc_auth);
+ struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx = rcu_dereference_protected(gss_cred->gc_ctx, 1);
+
+ RCU_INIT_POINTER(gss_cred->gc_ctx, NULL);
+ put_cred(cred->cr_cred);
+ call_rcu(&cred->cr_rcu, gss_free_cred_callback);
+ if (ctx)
+ gss_put_ctx(ctx);
+ gss_put_auth(gss_auth);
+}
+
+static void
+gss_destroy_cred(struct rpc_cred *cred)
+{
+
+ if (test_and_clear_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE, &cred->cr_flags) != 0)
+ gss_send_destroy_context(cred);
+ gss_destroy_nullcred(cred);
+}
+
+static int
+gss_hash_cred(struct auth_cred *acred, unsigned int hashbits)
+{
+ return hash_64(from_kuid(&init_user_ns, acred->cred->fsuid), hashbits);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Lookup RPCSEC_GSS cred for the current process
+ */
+static struct rpc_cred *
+gss_lookup_cred(struct rpc_auth *auth, struct auth_cred *acred, int flags)
+{
+ return rpcauth_lookup_credcache(auth, acred, flags, GFP_NOFS);
+}
+
+static struct rpc_cred *
+gss_create_cred(struct rpc_auth *auth, struct auth_cred *acred, int flags, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ struct gss_auth *gss_auth = container_of(auth, struct gss_auth, rpc_auth);
+ struct gss_cred *cred = NULL;
+ int err = -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (!(cred = kzalloc(sizeof(*cred), gfp)))
+ goto out_err;
+
+ rpcauth_init_cred(&cred->gc_base, acred, auth, &gss_credops);
+ /*
+ * Note: in order to force a call to call_refresh(), we deliberately
+ * fail to flag the credential as RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE.
+ */
+ cred->gc_base.cr_flags = 1UL << RPCAUTH_CRED_NEW;
+ cred->gc_service = gss_auth->service;
+ cred->gc_principal = acred->principal;
+ kref_get(&gss_auth->kref);
+ return &cred->gc_base;
+
+out_err:
+ return ERR_PTR(err);
+}
+
+static int
+gss_cred_init(struct rpc_auth *auth, struct rpc_cred *cred)
+{
+ struct gss_auth *gss_auth = container_of(auth, struct gss_auth, rpc_auth);
+ struct gss_cred *gss_cred = container_of(cred,struct gss_cred, gc_base);
+ int err;
+
+ do {
+ err = gss_create_upcall(gss_auth, gss_cred);
+ } while (err == -EAGAIN);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static char *
+gss_stringify_acceptor(struct rpc_cred *cred)
+{
+ char *string = NULL;
+ struct gss_cred *gss_cred = container_of(cred, struct gss_cred, gc_base);
+ struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx;
+ unsigned int len;
+ struct xdr_netobj *acceptor;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ ctx = rcu_dereference(gss_cred->gc_ctx);
+ if (!ctx)
+ goto out;
+
+ len = ctx->gc_acceptor.len;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ /* no point if there's no string */
+ if (!len)
+ return NULL;
+realloc:
+ string = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!string)
+ return NULL;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ ctx = rcu_dereference(gss_cred->gc_ctx);
+
+ /* did the ctx disappear or was it replaced by one with no acceptor? */
+ if (!ctx || !ctx->gc_acceptor.len) {
+ kfree(string);
+ string = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ acceptor = &ctx->gc_acceptor;
+
+ /*
+ * Did we find a new acceptor that's longer than the original? Allocate
+ * a longer buffer and try again.
+ */
+ if (len < acceptor->len) {
+ len = acceptor->len;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ kfree(string);
+ goto realloc;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(string, acceptor->data, acceptor->len);
+ string[acceptor->len] = '\0';
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return string;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns -EACCES if GSS context is NULL or will expire within the
+ * timeout (miliseconds)
+ */
+static int
+gss_key_timeout(struct rpc_cred *rc)
+{
+ struct gss_cred *gss_cred = container_of(rc, struct gss_cred, gc_base);
+ struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx;
+ unsigned long timeout = jiffies + (gss_key_expire_timeo * HZ);
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ ctx = rcu_dereference(gss_cred->gc_ctx);
+ if (!ctx || time_after(timeout, ctx->gc_expiry))
+ ret = -EACCES;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+gss_match(struct auth_cred *acred, struct rpc_cred *rc, int flags)
+{
+ struct gss_cred *gss_cred = container_of(rc, struct gss_cred, gc_base);
+ struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (test_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_NEW, &rc->cr_flags))
+ goto out;
+ /* Don't match with creds that have expired. */
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ ctx = rcu_dereference(gss_cred->gc_ctx);
+ if (!ctx || time_after(jiffies, ctx->gc_expiry)) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ if (!test_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE, &rc->cr_flags))
+ return 0;
+out:
+ if (acred->principal != NULL) {
+ if (gss_cred->gc_principal == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ ret = strcmp(acred->principal, gss_cred->gc_principal) == 0;
+ } else {
+ if (gss_cred->gc_principal != NULL)
+ return 0;
+ ret = uid_eq(rc->cr_cred->fsuid, acred->cred->fsuid);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Marshal credentials.
+ *
+ * The expensive part is computing the verifier. We can't cache a
+ * pre-computed version of the verifier because the seqno, which
+ * is different every time, is included in the MIC.
+ */
+static int gss_marshal(struct rpc_task *task, struct xdr_stream *xdr)
+{
+ struct rpc_rqst *req = task->tk_rqstp;
+ struct rpc_cred *cred = req->rq_cred;
+ struct gss_cred *gss_cred = container_of(cred, struct gss_cred,
+ gc_base);
+ struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx = gss_cred_get_ctx(cred);
+ __be32 *p, *cred_len;
+ u32 maj_stat = 0;
+ struct xdr_netobj mic;
+ struct kvec iov;
+ struct xdr_buf verf_buf;
+ int status;
+
+ /* Credential */
+
+ p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 7 * sizeof(*p) +
+ ctx->gc_wire_ctx.len);
+ if (!p)
+ goto marshal_failed;
+ *p++ = rpc_auth_gss;
+ cred_len = p++;
+
+ spin_lock(&ctx->gc_seq_lock);
+ req->rq_seqno = (ctx->gc_seq < MAXSEQ) ? ctx->gc_seq++ : MAXSEQ;
+ spin_unlock(&ctx->gc_seq_lock);
+ if (req->rq_seqno == MAXSEQ)
+ goto expired;
+ trace_rpcgss_seqno(task);
+
+ *p++ = cpu_to_be32(RPC_GSS_VERSION);
+ *p++ = cpu_to_be32(ctx->gc_proc);
+ *p++ = cpu_to_be32(req->rq_seqno);
+ *p++ = cpu_to_be32(gss_cred->gc_service);
+ p = xdr_encode_netobj(p, &ctx->gc_wire_ctx);
+ *cred_len = cpu_to_be32((p - (cred_len + 1)) << 2);
+
+ /* Verifier */
+
+ /* We compute the checksum for the verifier over the xdr-encoded bytes
+ * starting with the xid and ending at the end of the credential: */
+ iov.iov_base = req->rq_snd_buf.head[0].iov_base;
+ iov.iov_len = (u8 *)p - (u8 *)iov.iov_base;
+ xdr_buf_from_iov(&iov, &verf_buf);
+
+ p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, sizeof(*p));
+ if (!p)
+ goto marshal_failed;
+ *p++ = rpc_auth_gss;
+ mic.data = (u8 *)(p + 1);
+ maj_stat = gss_get_mic(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, &verf_buf, &mic);
+ if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED)
+ goto expired;
+ else if (maj_stat != 0)
+ goto bad_mic;
+ if (xdr_stream_encode_opaque_inline(xdr, (void **)&p, mic.len) < 0)
+ goto marshal_failed;
+ status = 0;
+out:
+ gss_put_ctx(ctx);
+ return status;
+expired:
+ clear_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE, &cred->cr_flags);
+ status = -EKEYEXPIRED;
+ goto out;
+marshal_failed:
+ status = -EMSGSIZE;
+ goto out;
+bad_mic:
+ trace_rpcgss_get_mic(task, maj_stat);
+ status = -EIO;
+ goto out;
+}
+
+static int gss_renew_cred(struct rpc_task *task)
+{
+ struct rpc_cred *oldcred = task->tk_rqstp->rq_cred;
+ struct gss_cred *gss_cred = container_of(oldcred,
+ struct gss_cred,
+ gc_base);
+ struct rpc_auth *auth = oldcred->cr_auth;
+ struct auth_cred acred = {
+ .cred = oldcred->cr_cred,
+ .principal = gss_cred->gc_principal,
+ };
+ struct rpc_cred *new;
+
+ new = gss_lookup_cred(auth, &acred, RPCAUTH_LOOKUP_NEW);
+ if (IS_ERR(new))
+ return PTR_ERR(new);
+ task->tk_rqstp->rq_cred = new;
+ put_rpccred(oldcred);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int gss_cred_is_negative_entry(struct rpc_cred *cred)
+{
+ if (test_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_NEGATIVE, &cred->cr_flags)) {
+ unsigned long now = jiffies;
+ unsigned long begin, expire;
+ struct gss_cred *gss_cred;
+
+ gss_cred = container_of(cred, struct gss_cred, gc_base);
+ begin = gss_cred->gc_upcall_timestamp;
+ expire = begin + gss_expired_cred_retry_delay * HZ;
+
+ if (time_in_range_open(now, begin, expire))
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+* Refresh credentials. XXX - finish
+*/
+static int
+gss_refresh(struct rpc_task *task)
+{
+ struct rpc_cred *cred = task->tk_rqstp->rq_cred;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (gss_cred_is_negative_entry(cred))
+ return -EKEYEXPIRED;
+
+ if (!test_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_NEW, &cred->cr_flags) &&
+ !test_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE, &cred->cr_flags)) {
+ ret = gss_renew_cred(task);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+ cred = task->tk_rqstp->rq_cred;
+ }
+
+ if (test_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_NEW, &cred->cr_flags))
+ ret = gss_refresh_upcall(task);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Dummy refresh routine: used only when destroying the context */
+static int
+gss_refresh_null(struct rpc_task *task)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+gss_validate(struct rpc_task *task, struct xdr_stream *xdr)
+{
+ struct rpc_cred *cred = task->tk_rqstp->rq_cred;
+ struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx = gss_cred_get_ctx(cred);
+ __be32 *p, *seq = NULL;
+ struct kvec iov;
+ struct xdr_buf verf_buf;
+ struct xdr_netobj mic;
+ u32 len, maj_stat;
+ int status;
+
+ p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 2 * sizeof(*p));
+ if (!p)
+ goto validate_failed;
+ if (*p++ != rpc_auth_gss)
+ goto validate_failed;
+ len = be32_to_cpup(p);
+ if (len > RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE)
+ goto validate_failed;
+ p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, len);
+ if (!p)
+ goto validate_failed;
+
+ seq = kmalloc(4, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!seq)
+ goto validate_failed;
+ *seq = cpu_to_be32(task->tk_rqstp->rq_seqno);
+ iov.iov_base = seq;
+ iov.iov_len = 4;
+ xdr_buf_from_iov(&iov, &verf_buf);
+ mic.data = (u8 *)p;
+ mic.len = len;
+ maj_stat = gss_verify_mic(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, &verf_buf, &mic);
+ if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED)
+ clear_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE, &cred->cr_flags);
+ if (maj_stat)
+ goto bad_mic;
+
+ /* We leave it to unwrap to calculate au_rslack. For now we just
+ * calculate the length of the verifier: */
+ cred->cr_auth->au_verfsize = XDR_QUADLEN(len) + 2;
+ status = 0;
+out:
+ gss_put_ctx(ctx);
+ kfree(seq);
+ return status;
+
+validate_failed:
+ status = -EIO;
+ goto out;
+bad_mic:
+ trace_rpcgss_verify_mic(task, maj_stat);
+ status = -EACCES;
+ goto out;
+}
+
+static int gss_wrap_req_integ(struct rpc_cred *cred, struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx,
+ struct rpc_task *task, struct xdr_stream *xdr)
+{
+ struct rpc_rqst *rqstp = task->tk_rqstp;
+ struct xdr_buf integ_buf, *snd_buf = &rqstp->rq_snd_buf;
+ struct xdr_netobj mic;
+ __be32 *p, *integ_len;
+ u32 offset, maj_stat;
+
+ p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 2 * sizeof(*p));
+ if (!p)
+ goto wrap_failed;
+ integ_len = p++;
+ *p = cpu_to_be32(rqstp->rq_seqno);
+
+ if (rpcauth_wrap_req_encode(task, xdr))
+ goto wrap_failed;
+
+ offset = (u8 *)p - (u8 *)snd_buf->head[0].iov_base;
+ if (xdr_buf_subsegment(snd_buf, &integ_buf,
+ offset, snd_buf->len - offset))
+ goto wrap_failed;
+ *integ_len = cpu_to_be32(integ_buf.len);
+
+ p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 0);
+ if (!p)
+ goto wrap_failed;
+ mic.data = (u8 *)(p + 1);
+ maj_stat = gss_get_mic(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, &integ_buf, &mic);
+ if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED)
+ clear_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE, &cred->cr_flags);
+ else if (maj_stat)
+ goto bad_mic;
+ /* Check that the trailing MIC fit in the buffer, after the fact */
+ if (xdr_stream_encode_opaque_inline(xdr, (void **)&p, mic.len) < 0)
+ goto wrap_failed;
+ return 0;
+wrap_failed:
+ return -EMSGSIZE;
+bad_mic:
+ trace_rpcgss_get_mic(task, maj_stat);
+ return -EIO;
+}
+
+static void
+priv_release_snd_buf(struct rpc_rqst *rqstp)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i=0; i < rqstp->rq_enc_pages_num; i++)
+ __free_page(rqstp->rq_enc_pages[i]);
+ kfree(rqstp->rq_enc_pages);
+ rqstp->rq_release_snd_buf = NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+alloc_enc_pages(struct rpc_rqst *rqstp)
+{
+ struct xdr_buf *snd_buf = &rqstp->rq_snd_buf;
+ int first, last, i;
+
+ if (rqstp->rq_release_snd_buf)
+ rqstp->rq_release_snd_buf(rqstp);
+
+ if (snd_buf->page_len == 0) {
+ rqstp->rq_enc_pages_num = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ first = snd_buf->page_base >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ last = (snd_buf->page_base + snd_buf->page_len - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ rqstp->rq_enc_pages_num = last - first + 1 + 1;
+ rqstp->rq_enc_pages
+ = kmalloc_array(rqstp->rq_enc_pages_num,
+ sizeof(struct page *),
+ GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!rqstp->rq_enc_pages)
+ goto out;
+ for (i=0; i < rqstp->rq_enc_pages_num; i++) {
+ rqstp->rq_enc_pages[i] = alloc_page(GFP_NOFS);
+ if (rqstp->rq_enc_pages[i] == NULL)
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+ rqstp->rq_release_snd_buf = priv_release_snd_buf;
+ return 0;
+out_free:
+ rqstp->rq_enc_pages_num = i;
+ priv_release_snd_buf(rqstp);
+out:
+ return -EAGAIN;
+}
+
+static int gss_wrap_req_priv(struct rpc_cred *cred, struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx,
+ struct rpc_task *task, struct xdr_stream *xdr)
+{
+ struct rpc_rqst *rqstp = task->tk_rqstp;
+ struct xdr_buf *snd_buf = &rqstp->rq_snd_buf;
+ u32 pad, offset, maj_stat;
+ int status;
+ __be32 *p, *opaque_len;
+ struct page **inpages;
+ int first;
+ struct kvec *iov;
+
+ status = -EIO;
+ p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 2 * sizeof(*p));
+ if (!p)
+ goto wrap_failed;
+ opaque_len = p++;
+ *p = cpu_to_be32(rqstp->rq_seqno);
+
+ if (rpcauth_wrap_req_encode(task, xdr))
+ goto wrap_failed;
+
+ status = alloc_enc_pages(rqstp);
+ if (unlikely(status))
+ goto wrap_failed;
+ first = snd_buf->page_base >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ inpages = snd_buf->pages + first;
+ snd_buf->pages = rqstp->rq_enc_pages;
+ snd_buf->page_base -= first << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ /*
+ * Move the tail into its own page, in case gss_wrap needs
+ * more space in the head when wrapping.
+ *
+ * Still... Why can't gss_wrap just slide the tail down?
+ */
+ if (snd_buf->page_len || snd_buf->tail[0].iov_len) {
+ char *tmp;
+
+ tmp = page_address(rqstp->rq_enc_pages[rqstp->rq_enc_pages_num - 1]);
+ memcpy(tmp, snd_buf->tail[0].iov_base, snd_buf->tail[0].iov_len);
+ snd_buf->tail[0].iov_base = tmp;
+ }
+ offset = (u8 *)p - (u8 *)snd_buf->head[0].iov_base;
+ maj_stat = gss_wrap(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, offset, snd_buf, inpages);
+ /* slack space should prevent this ever happening: */
+ if (unlikely(snd_buf->len > snd_buf->buflen)) {
+ status = -EIO;
+ goto wrap_failed;
+ }
+ /* We're assuming that when GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED, the encryption was
+ * done anyway, so it's safe to put the request on the wire: */
+ if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED)
+ clear_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE, &cred->cr_flags);
+ else if (maj_stat)
+ goto bad_wrap;
+
+ *opaque_len = cpu_to_be32(snd_buf->len - offset);
+ /* guess whether the pad goes into the head or the tail: */
+ if (snd_buf->page_len || snd_buf->tail[0].iov_len)
+ iov = snd_buf->tail;
+ else
+ iov = snd_buf->head;
+ p = iov->iov_base + iov->iov_len;
+ pad = 3 - ((snd_buf->len - offset - 1) & 3);
+ memset(p, 0, pad);
+ iov->iov_len += pad;
+ snd_buf->len += pad;
+
+ return 0;
+wrap_failed:
+ return status;
+bad_wrap:
+ trace_rpcgss_wrap(task, maj_stat);
+ return -EIO;
+}
+
+static int gss_wrap_req(struct rpc_task *task, struct xdr_stream *xdr)
+{
+ struct rpc_cred *cred = task->tk_rqstp->rq_cred;
+ struct gss_cred *gss_cred = container_of(cred, struct gss_cred,
+ gc_base);
+ struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx = gss_cred_get_ctx(cred);
+ int status;
+
+ status = -EIO;
+ if (ctx->gc_proc != RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA) {
+ /* The spec seems a little ambiguous here, but I think that not
+ * wrapping context destruction requests makes the most sense.
+ */
+ status = rpcauth_wrap_req_encode(task, xdr);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ switch (gss_cred->gc_service) {
+ case RPC_GSS_SVC_NONE:
+ status = rpcauth_wrap_req_encode(task, xdr);
+ break;
+ case RPC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY:
+ status = gss_wrap_req_integ(cred, ctx, task, xdr);
+ break;
+ case RPC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY:
+ status = gss_wrap_req_priv(cred, ctx, task, xdr);
+ break;
+ default:
+ status = -EIO;
+ }
+out:
+ gss_put_ctx(ctx);
+ return status;
+}
+
+static int
+gss_unwrap_resp_auth(struct rpc_cred *cred)
+{
+ struct rpc_auth *auth = cred->cr_auth;
+
+ auth->au_rslack = auth->au_verfsize;
+ auth->au_ralign = auth->au_verfsize;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * RFC 2203, Section 5.3.2.2
+ *
+ * struct rpc_gss_integ_data {
+ * opaque databody_integ<>;
+ * opaque checksum<>;
+ * };
+ *
+ * struct rpc_gss_data_t {
+ * unsigned int seq_num;
+ * proc_req_arg_t arg;
+ * };
+ */
+static int
+gss_unwrap_resp_integ(struct rpc_task *task, struct rpc_cred *cred,
+ struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx, struct rpc_rqst *rqstp,
+ struct xdr_stream *xdr)
+{
+ struct xdr_buf gss_data, *rcv_buf = &rqstp->rq_rcv_buf;
+ struct rpc_auth *auth = cred->cr_auth;
+ u32 len, offset, seqno, maj_stat;
+ struct xdr_netobj mic;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = -EIO;
+ mic.data = NULL;
+
+ /* opaque databody_integ<>; */
+ if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(xdr, &len))
+ goto unwrap_failed;
+ if (len & 3)
+ goto unwrap_failed;
+ offset = rcv_buf->len - xdr_stream_remaining(xdr);
+ if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(xdr, &seqno))
+ goto unwrap_failed;
+ if (seqno != rqstp->rq_seqno)
+ goto bad_seqno;
+ if (xdr_buf_subsegment(rcv_buf, &gss_data, offset, len))
+ goto unwrap_failed;
+
+ /*
+ * The xdr_stream now points to the beginning of the
+ * upper layer payload, to be passed below to
+ * rpcauth_unwrap_resp_decode(). The checksum, which
+ * follows the upper layer payload in @rcv_buf, is
+ * located and parsed without updating the xdr_stream.
+ */
+
+ /* opaque checksum<>; */
+ offset += len;
+ if (xdr_decode_word(rcv_buf, offset, &len))
+ goto unwrap_failed;
+ offset += sizeof(__be32);
+ if (offset + len > rcv_buf->len)
+ goto unwrap_failed;
+ mic.len = len;
+ mic.data = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!mic.data)
+ goto unwrap_failed;
+ if (read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(rcv_buf, offset, mic.data, mic.len))
+ goto unwrap_failed;
+
+ maj_stat = gss_verify_mic(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, &gss_data, &mic);
+ if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED)
+ clear_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE, &cred->cr_flags);
+ if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ goto bad_mic;
+
+ auth->au_rslack = auth->au_verfsize + 2 + 1 + XDR_QUADLEN(mic.len);
+ auth->au_ralign = auth->au_verfsize + 2;
+ ret = 0;
+
+out:
+ kfree(mic.data);
+ return ret;
+
+unwrap_failed:
+ trace_rpcgss_unwrap_failed(task);
+ goto out;
+bad_seqno:
+ trace_rpcgss_bad_seqno(task, rqstp->rq_seqno, seqno);
+ goto out;
+bad_mic:
+ trace_rpcgss_verify_mic(task, maj_stat);
+ goto out;
+}
+
+static int
+gss_unwrap_resp_priv(struct rpc_task *task, struct rpc_cred *cred,
+ struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx, struct rpc_rqst *rqstp,
+ struct xdr_stream *xdr)
+{
+ struct xdr_buf *rcv_buf = &rqstp->rq_rcv_buf;
+ struct kvec *head = rqstp->rq_rcv_buf.head;
+ struct rpc_auth *auth = cred->cr_auth;
+ u32 offset, opaque_len, maj_stat;
+ __be32 *p;
+
+ p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 2 * sizeof(*p));
+ if (unlikely(!p))
+ goto unwrap_failed;
+ opaque_len = be32_to_cpup(p++);
+ offset = (u8 *)(p) - (u8 *)head->iov_base;
+ if (offset + opaque_len > rcv_buf->len)
+ goto unwrap_failed;
+
+ maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, offset,
+ offset + opaque_len, rcv_buf);
+ if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED)
+ clear_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE, &cred->cr_flags);
+ if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ goto bad_unwrap;
+ /* gss_unwrap decrypted the sequence number */
+ if (be32_to_cpup(p++) != rqstp->rq_seqno)
+ goto bad_seqno;
+
+ /* gss_unwrap redacts the opaque blob from the head iovec.
+ * rcv_buf has changed, thus the stream needs to be reset.
+ */
+ xdr_init_decode(xdr, rcv_buf, p, rqstp);
+
+ auth->au_rslack = auth->au_verfsize + 2 + ctx->gc_gss_ctx->slack;
+ auth->au_ralign = auth->au_verfsize + 2 + ctx->gc_gss_ctx->align;
+
+ return 0;
+unwrap_failed:
+ trace_rpcgss_unwrap_failed(task);
+ return -EIO;
+bad_seqno:
+ trace_rpcgss_bad_seqno(task, rqstp->rq_seqno, be32_to_cpup(--p));
+ return -EIO;
+bad_unwrap:
+ trace_rpcgss_unwrap(task, maj_stat);
+ return -EIO;
+}
+
+static bool
+gss_seq_is_newer(u32 new, u32 old)
+{
+ return (s32)(new - old) > 0;
+}
+
+static bool
+gss_xmit_need_reencode(struct rpc_task *task)
+{
+ struct rpc_rqst *req = task->tk_rqstp;
+ struct rpc_cred *cred = req->rq_cred;
+ struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx = gss_cred_get_ctx(cred);
+ u32 win, seq_xmit = 0;
+ bool ret = true;
+
+ if (!ctx)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (gss_seq_is_newer(req->rq_seqno, READ_ONCE(ctx->gc_seq)))
+ goto out_ctx;
+
+ seq_xmit = READ_ONCE(ctx->gc_seq_xmit);
+ while (gss_seq_is_newer(req->rq_seqno, seq_xmit)) {
+ u32 tmp = seq_xmit;
+
+ seq_xmit = cmpxchg(&ctx->gc_seq_xmit, tmp, req->rq_seqno);
+ if (seq_xmit == tmp) {
+ ret = false;
+ goto out_ctx;
+ }
+ }
+
+ win = ctx->gc_win;
+ if (win > 0)
+ ret = !gss_seq_is_newer(req->rq_seqno, seq_xmit - win);
+
+out_ctx:
+ gss_put_ctx(ctx);
+out:
+ trace_rpcgss_need_reencode(task, seq_xmit, ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+gss_unwrap_resp(struct rpc_task *task, struct xdr_stream *xdr)
+{
+ struct rpc_rqst *rqstp = task->tk_rqstp;
+ struct rpc_cred *cred = rqstp->rq_cred;
+ struct gss_cred *gss_cred = container_of(cred, struct gss_cred,
+ gc_base);
+ struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx = gss_cred_get_ctx(cred);
+ int status = -EIO;
+
+ if (ctx->gc_proc != RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA)
+ goto out_decode;
+ switch (gss_cred->gc_service) {
+ case RPC_GSS_SVC_NONE:
+ status = gss_unwrap_resp_auth(cred);
+ break;
+ case RPC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY:
+ status = gss_unwrap_resp_integ(task, cred, ctx, rqstp, xdr);
+ break;
+ case RPC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY:
+ status = gss_unwrap_resp_priv(task, cred, ctx, rqstp, xdr);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (status)
+ goto out;
+
+out_decode:
+ status = rpcauth_unwrap_resp_decode(task, xdr);
+out:
+ gss_put_ctx(ctx);
+ return status;
+}
+
+static const struct rpc_authops authgss_ops = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .au_flavor = RPC_AUTH_GSS,
+ .au_name = "RPCSEC_GSS",
+ .create = gss_create,
+ .destroy = gss_destroy,
+ .hash_cred = gss_hash_cred,
+ .lookup_cred = gss_lookup_cred,
+ .crcreate = gss_create_cred,
+ .list_pseudoflavors = gss_mech_list_pseudoflavors,
+ .info2flavor = gss_mech_info2flavor,
+ .flavor2info = gss_mech_flavor2info,
+};
+
+static const struct rpc_credops gss_credops = {
+ .cr_name = "AUTH_GSS",
+ .crdestroy = gss_destroy_cred,
+ .cr_init = gss_cred_init,
+ .crmatch = gss_match,
+ .crmarshal = gss_marshal,
+ .crrefresh = gss_refresh,
+ .crvalidate = gss_validate,
+ .crwrap_req = gss_wrap_req,
+ .crunwrap_resp = gss_unwrap_resp,
+ .crkey_timeout = gss_key_timeout,
+ .crstringify_acceptor = gss_stringify_acceptor,
+ .crneed_reencode = gss_xmit_need_reencode,
+};
+
+static const struct rpc_credops gss_nullops = {
+ .cr_name = "AUTH_GSS",
+ .crdestroy = gss_destroy_nullcred,
+ .crmatch = gss_match,
+ .crmarshal = gss_marshal,
+ .crrefresh = gss_refresh_null,
+ .crvalidate = gss_validate,
+ .crwrap_req = gss_wrap_req,
+ .crunwrap_resp = gss_unwrap_resp,
+ .crstringify_acceptor = gss_stringify_acceptor,
+};
+
+static const struct rpc_pipe_ops gss_upcall_ops_v0 = {
+ .upcall = gss_v0_upcall,
+ .downcall = gss_pipe_downcall,
+ .destroy_msg = gss_pipe_destroy_msg,
+ .open_pipe = gss_pipe_open_v0,
+ .release_pipe = gss_pipe_release,
+};
+
+static const struct rpc_pipe_ops gss_upcall_ops_v1 = {
+ .upcall = gss_v1_upcall,
+ .downcall = gss_pipe_downcall,
+ .destroy_msg = gss_pipe_destroy_msg,
+ .open_pipe = gss_pipe_open_v1,
+ .release_pipe = gss_pipe_release,
+};
+
+static __net_init int rpcsec_gss_init_net(struct net *net)
+{
+ return gss_svc_init_net(net);
+}
+
+static __net_exit void rpcsec_gss_exit_net(struct net *net)
+{
+ gss_svc_shutdown_net(net);
+}
+
+static struct pernet_operations rpcsec_gss_net_ops = {
+ .init = rpcsec_gss_init_net,
+ .exit = rpcsec_gss_exit_net,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Initialize RPCSEC_GSS module
+ */
+static int __init init_rpcsec_gss(void)
+{
+ int err = 0;
+
+ err = rpcauth_register(&authgss_ops);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ err = gss_svc_init();
+ if (err)
+ goto out_unregister;
+ err = register_pernet_subsys(&rpcsec_gss_net_ops);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_svc_exit;
+ rpc_init_wait_queue(&pipe_version_rpc_waitqueue, "gss pipe version");
+ return 0;
+out_svc_exit:
+ gss_svc_shutdown();
+out_unregister:
+ rpcauth_unregister(&authgss_ops);
+out:
+ return err;
+}
+
+static void __exit exit_rpcsec_gss(void)
+{
+ unregister_pernet_subsys(&rpcsec_gss_net_ops);
+ gss_svc_shutdown();
+ rpcauth_unregister(&authgss_ops);
+ rcu_barrier(); /* Wait for completion of call_rcu()'s */
+}
+
+MODULE_ALIAS("rpc-auth-6");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+module_param_named(expired_cred_retry_delay,
+ gss_expired_cred_retry_delay,
+ uint, 0644);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(expired_cred_retry_delay, "Timeout (in seconds) until "
+ "the RPC engine retries an expired credential");
+
+module_param_named(key_expire_timeo,
+ gss_key_expire_timeo,
+ uint, 0644);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(key_expire_timeo, "Time (in seconds) at the end of a "
+ "credential keys lifetime where the NFS layer cleans up "
+ "prior to key expiration");
+
+module_init(init_rpcsec_gss)
+module_exit(exit_rpcsec_gss)
diff --git a/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss_internal.h b/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss_internal.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f6d9631
--- /dev/null
+++ b/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss_internal.h
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+/*
+ * linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss_internal.h
+ *
+ * Internal definitions for RPCSEC_GSS client authentication
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 The Regents of the University of Michigan.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ */
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/xdr.h>
+
+static inline const void *
+simple_get_bytes(const void *p, const void *end, void *res, size_t len)
+{
+ const void *q = (const void *)((const char *)p + len);
+ if (unlikely(q > end || q < p))
+ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+ memcpy(res, p, len);
+ return q;
+}
+
+static inline const void *
+simple_get_netobj(const void *p, const void *end, struct xdr_netobj *dest)
+{
+ const void *q;
+ unsigned int len;
+
+ p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &len, sizeof(len));
+ if (IS_ERR(p))
+ return p;
+ q = (const void *)((const char *)p + len);
+ if (unlikely(q > end || q < p))
+ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+ if (len) {
+ dest->data = kmemdup(p, len, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (unlikely(dest->data == NULL))
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ } else
+ dest->data = NULL;
+ dest->len = len;
+ return q;
+}
diff --git a/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_generic_token.c b/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_generic_token.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fe97f31
--- /dev/null
+++ b/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_generic_token.c
@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
+/*
+ * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_generic_token.c
+ *
+ * Adapted from MIT Kerberos 5-1.2.1 lib/gssapi/generic/util_token.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 The Regents of the University of Michigan.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Andy Adamson <andros@umich.edu>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright 1993 by OpenVision Technologies, Inc.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, distribute, and sell this software
+ * and its documentation for any purpose is hereby granted without fee,
+ * provided that the above copyright notice appears in all copies and
+ * that both that copyright notice and this permission notice appear in
+ * supporting documentation, and that the name of OpenVision not be used
+ * in advertising or publicity pertaining to distribution of the software
+ * without specific, written prior permission. OpenVision makes no
+ * representations about the suitability of this software for any
+ * purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied warranty.
+ *
+ * OPENVISION DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE,
+ * INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS, IN NO
+ * EVENT SHALL OPENVISION BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF
+ * USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR
+ * OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR
+ * PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_asn1.h>
+
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG)
+# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH
+#endif
+
+
+/* TWRITE_STR from gssapiP_generic.h */
+#define TWRITE_STR(ptr, str, len) \
+ memcpy((ptr), (char *) (str), (len)); \
+ (ptr) += (len);
+
+/* XXXX this code currently makes the assumption that a mech oid will
+ never be longer than 127 bytes. This assumption is not inherent in
+ the interfaces, so the code can be fixed if the OSI namespace
+ balloons unexpectedly. */
+
+/* Each token looks like this:
+
+0x60 tag for APPLICATION 0, SEQUENCE
+ (constructed, definite-length)
+ <length> possible multiple bytes, need to parse/generate
+ 0x06 tag for OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ <moid_length> compile-time constant string (assume 1 byte)
+ <moid_bytes> compile-time constant string
+ <inner_bytes> the ANY containing the application token
+ bytes 0,1 are the token type
+ bytes 2,n are the token data
+
+For the purposes of this abstraction, the token "header" consists of
+the sequence tag and length octets, the mech OID DER encoding, and the
+first two inner bytes, which indicate the token type. The token
+"body" consists of everything else.
+
+*/
+
+static int
+der_length_size( int length)
+{
+ if (length < (1<<7))
+ return 1;
+ else if (length < (1<<8))
+ return 2;
+#if (SIZEOF_INT == 2)
+ else
+ return 3;
+#else
+ else if (length < (1<<16))
+ return 3;
+ else if (length < (1<<24))
+ return 4;
+ else
+ return 5;
+#endif
+}
+
+static void
+der_write_length(unsigned char **buf, int length)
+{
+ if (length < (1<<7)) {
+ *(*buf)++ = (unsigned char) length;
+ } else {
+ *(*buf)++ = (unsigned char) (der_length_size(length)+127);
+#if (SIZEOF_INT > 2)
+ if (length >= (1<<24))
+ *(*buf)++ = (unsigned char) (length>>24);
+ if (length >= (1<<16))
+ *(*buf)++ = (unsigned char) ((length>>16)&0xff);
+#endif
+ if (length >= (1<<8))
+ *(*buf)++ = (unsigned char) ((length>>8)&0xff);
+ *(*buf)++ = (unsigned char) (length&0xff);
+ }
+}
+
+/* returns decoded length, or < 0 on failure. Advances buf and
+ decrements bufsize */
+
+static int
+der_read_length(unsigned char **buf, int *bufsize)
+{
+ unsigned char sf;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (*bufsize < 1)
+ return -1;
+ sf = *(*buf)++;
+ (*bufsize)--;
+ if (sf & 0x80) {
+ if ((sf &= 0x7f) > ((*bufsize)-1))
+ return -1;
+ if (sf > SIZEOF_INT)
+ return -1;
+ ret = 0;
+ for (; sf; sf--) {
+ ret = (ret<<8) + (*(*buf)++);
+ (*bufsize)--;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ret = sf;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* returns the length of a token, given the mech oid and the body size */
+
+int
+g_token_size(struct xdr_netobj *mech, unsigned int body_size)
+{
+ /* set body_size to sequence contents size */
+ body_size += 2 + (int) mech->len; /* NEED overflow check */
+ return 1 + der_length_size(body_size) + body_size;
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(g_token_size);
+
+/* fills in a buffer with the token header. The buffer is assumed to
+ be the right size. buf is advanced past the token header */
+
+void
+g_make_token_header(struct xdr_netobj *mech, int body_size, unsigned char **buf)
+{
+ *(*buf)++ = 0x60;
+ der_write_length(buf, 2 + mech->len + body_size);
+ *(*buf)++ = 0x06;
+ *(*buf)++ = (unsigned char) mech->len;
+ TWRITE_STR(*buf, mech->data, ((int) mech->len));
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(g_make_token_header);
+
+/*
+ * Given a buffer containing a token, reads and verifies the token,
+ * leaving buf advanced past the token header, and setting body_size
+ * to the number of remaining bytes. Returns 0 on success,
+ * G_BAD_TOK_HEADER for a variety of errors, and G_WRONG_MECH if the
+ * mechanism in the token does not match the mech argument. buf and
+ * *body_size are left unmodified on error.
+ */
+u32
+g_verify_token_header(struct xdr_netobj *mech, int *body_size,
+ unsigned char **buf_in, int toksize)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf = *buf_in;
+ int seqsize;
+ struct xdr_netobj toid;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if ((toksize-=1) < 0)
+ return G_BAD_TOK_HEADER;
+ if (*buf++ != 0x60)
+ return G_BAD_TOK_HEADER;
+
+ if ((seqsize = der_read_length(&buf, &toksize)) < 0)
+ return G_BAD_TOK_HEADER;
+
+ if (seqsize != toksize)
+ return G_BAD_TOK_HEADER;
+
+ if ((toksize-=1) < 0)
+ return G_BAD_TOK_HEADER;
+ if (*buf++ != 0x06)
+ return G_BAD_TOK_HEADER;
+
+ if ((toksize-=1) < 0)
+ return G_BAD_TOK_HEADER;
+ toid.len = *buf++;
+
+ if ((toksize-=toid.len) < 0)
+ return G_BAD_TOK_HEADER;
+ toid.data = buf;
+ buf+=toid.len;
+
+ if (! g_OID_equal(&toid, mech))
+ ret = G_WRONG_MECH;
+
+ /* G_WRONG_MECH is not returned immediately because it's more important
+ to return G_BAD_TOK_HEADER if the token header is in fact bad */
+
+ if ((toksize-=2) < 0)
+ return G_BAD_TOK_HEADER;
+
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (!ret) {
+ *buf_in = buf;
+ *body_size = toksize;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(g_verify_token_header);
diff --git a/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c b/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e7180da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1086 @@
+/*
+ * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_crypto.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2008 The Regents of the University of Michigan.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Andy Adamson <andros@umich.edu>
+ * Bruce Fields <bfields@umich.edu>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 1998 by the FundsXpress, INC.
+ *
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Export of this software from the United States of America may require
+ * a specific license from the United States Government. It is the
+ * responsibility of any person or organization contemplating export to
+ * obtain such a license before exporting.
+ *
+ * WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and
+ * distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and
+ * without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright
+ * notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and
+ * this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that
+ * the name of FundsXpress. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining
+ * to distribution of the software without specific, written prior
+ * permission. FundsXpress makes no representations about the suitability of
+ * this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express
+ * or implied warranty.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include <linux/highmem.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/xdr.h>
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG)
+# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH
+#endif
+
+u32
+krb5_encrypt(
+ struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm,
+ void * iv,
+ void * in,
+ void * out,
+ int length)
+{
+ u32 ret = -EINVAL;
+ struct scatterlist sg[1];
+ u8 local_iv[GSS_KRB5_MAX_BLOCKSIZE] = {0};
+ SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, tfm);
+
+ if (length % crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(tfm) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (crypto_sync_skcipher_ivsize(tfm) > GSS_KRB5_MAX_BLOCKSIZE) {
+ dprintk("RPC: gss_k5encrypt: tfm iv size too large %d\n",
+ crypto_sync_skcipher_ivsize(tfm));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (iv)
+ memcpy(local_iv, iv, crypto_sync_skcipher_ivsize(tfm));
+
+ memcpy(out, in, length);
+ sg_init_one(sg, out, length);
+
+ skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, tfm);
+ skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
+ skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, length, local_iv);
+
+ ret = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
+ skcipher_request_zero(req);
+out:
+ dprintk("RPC: krb5_encrypt returns %d\n", ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+u32
+krb5_decrypt(
+ struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm,
+ void * iv,
+ void * in,
+ void * out,
+ int length)
+{
+ u32 ret = -EINVAL;
+ struct scatterlist sg[1];
+ u8 local_iv[GSS_KRB5_MAX_BLOCKSIZE] = {0};
+ SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, tfm);
+
+ if (length % crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(tfm) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (crypto_sync_skcipher_ivsize(tfm) > GSS_KRB5_MAX_BLOCKSIZE) {
+ dprintk("RPC: gss_k5decrypt: tfm iv size too large %d\n",
+ crypto_sync_skcipher_ivsize(tfm));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (iv)
+ memcpy(local_iv, iv, crypto_sync_skcipher_ivsize(tfm));
+
+ memcpy(out, in, length);
+ sg_init_one(sg, out, length);
+
+ skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, tfm);
+ skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
+ skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, length, local_iv);
+
+ ret = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
+ skcipher_request_zero(req);
+out:
+ dprintk("RPC: gss_k5decrypt returns %d\n",ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+checksummer(struct scatterlist *sg, void *data)
+{
+ struct ahash_request *req = data;
+
+ ahash_request_set_crypt(req, sg, NULL, sg->length);
+
+ return crypto_ahash_update(req);
+}
+
+static int
+arcfour_hmac_md5_usage_to_salt(unsigned int usage, u8 salt[4])
+{
+ unsigned int ms_usage;
+
+ switch (usage) {
+ case KG_USAGE_SIGN:
+ ms_usage = 15;
+ break;
+ case KG_USAGE_SEAL:
+ ms_usage = 13;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ salt[0] = (ms_usage >> 0) & 0xff;
+ salt[1] = (ms_usage >> 8) & 0xff;
+ salt[2] = (ms_usage >> 16) & 0xff;
+ salt[3] = (ms_usage >> 24) & 0xff;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static u32
+make_checksum_hmac_md5(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen,
+ struct xdr_buf *body, int body_offset, u8 *cksumkey,
+ unsigned int usage, struct xdr_netobj *cksumout)
+{
+ struct scatterlist sg[1];
+ int err = -1;
+ u8 *checksumdata;
+ u8 *rc4salt;
+ struct crypto_ahash *md5;
+ struct crypto_ahash *hmac_md5;
+ struct ahash_request *req;
+
+ if (cksumkey == NULL)
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+ if (cksumout->len < kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) {
+ dprintk("%s: checksum buffer length, %u, too small for %s\n",
+ __func__, cksumout->len, kctx->gk5e->name);
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ rc4salt = kmalloc_array(4, sizeof(*rc4salt), GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!rc4salt)
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+ if (arcfour_hmac_md5_usage_to_salt(usage, rc4salt)) {
+ dprintk("%s: invalid usage value %u\n", __func__, usage);
+ goto out_free_rc4salt;
+ }
+
+ checksumdata = kmalloc(GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!checksumdata)
+ goto out_free_rc4salt;
+
+ md5 = crypto_alloc_ahash("md5", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(md5))
+ goto out_free_cksum;
+
+ hmac_md5 = crypto_alloc_ahash(kctx->gk5e->cksum_name, 0,
+ CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(hmac_md5))
+ goto out_free_md5;
+
+ req = ahash_request_alloc(md5, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!req)
+ goto out_free_hmac_md5;
+
+ ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, NULL, NULL);
+
+ err = crypto_ahash_init(req);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ sg_init_one(sg, rc4salt, 4);
+ ahash_request_set_crypt(req, sg, NULL, 4);
+ err = crypto_ahash_update(req);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ sg_init_one(sg, header, hdrlen);
+ ahash_request_set_crypt(req, sg, NULL, hdrlen);
+ err = crypto_ahash_update(req);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ err = xdr_process_buf(body, body_offset, body->len - body_offset,
+ checksummer, req);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ ahash_request_set_crypt(req, NULL, checksumdata, 0);
+ err = crypto_ahash_final(req);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ ahash_request_free(req);
+ req = ahash_request_alloc(hmac_md5, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!req)
+ goto out_free_hmac_md5;
+
+ ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, NULL, NULL);
+
+ err = crypto_ahash_setkey(hmac_md5, cksumkey, kctx->gk5e->keylength);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ sg_init_one(sg, checksumdata, crypto_ahash_digestsize(md5));
+ ahash_request_set_crypt(req, sg, checksumdata,
+ crypto_ahash_digestsize(md5));
+ err = crypto_ahash_digest(req);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ memcpy(cksumout->data, checksumdata, kctx->gk5e->cksumlength);
+ cksumout->len = kctx->gk5e->cksumlength;
+out:
+ ahash_request_free(req);
+out_free_hmac_md5:
+ crypto_free_ahash(hmac_md5);
+out_free_md5:
+ crypto_free_ahash(md5);
+out_free_cksum:
+ kfree(checksumdata);
+out_free_rc4salt:
+ kfree(rc4salt);
+ return err ? GSS_S_FAILURE : 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * checksum the plaintext data and hdrlen bytes of the token header
+ * The checksum is performed over the first 8 bytes of the
+ * gss token header and then over the data body
+ */
+u32
+make_checksum(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen,
+ struct xdr_buf *body, int body_offset, u8 *cksumkey,
+ unsigned int usage, struct xdr_netobj *cksumout)
+{
+ struct crypto_ahash *tfm;
+ struct ahash_request *req;
+ struct scatterlist sg[1];
+ int err = -1;
+ u8 *checksumdata;
+ unsigned int checksumlen;
+
+ if (kctx->gk5e->ctype == CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5_ARCFOUR)
+ return make_checksum_hmac_md5(kctx, header, hdrlen,
+ body, body_offset,
+ cksumkey, usage, cksumout);
+
+ if (cksumout->len < kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) {
+ dprintk("%s: checksum buffer length, %u, too small for %s\n",
+ __func__, cksumout->len, kctx->gk5e->name);
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ checksumdata = kmalloc(GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (checksumdata == NULL)
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(kctx->gk5e->cksum_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+ goto out_free_cksum;
+
+ req = ahash_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!req)
+ goto out_free_ahash;
+
+ ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, NULL, NULL);
+
+ checksumlen = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm);
+
+ if (cksumkey != NULL) {
+ err = crypto_ahash_setkey(tfm, cksumkey,
+ kctx->gk5e->keylength);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ err = crypto_ahash_init(req);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ sg_init_one(sg, header, hdrlen);
+ ahash_request_set_crypt(req, sg, NULL, hdrlen);
+ err = crypto_ahash_update(req);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ err = xdr_process_buf(body, body_offset, body->len - body_offset,
+ checksummer, req);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ ahash_request_set_crypt(req, NULL, checksumdata, 0);
+ err = crypto_ahash_final(req);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ switch (kctx->gk5e->ctype) {
+ case CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5:
+ err = kctx->gk5e->encrypt(kctx->seq, NULL, checksumdata,
+ checksumdata, checksumlen);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ memcpy(cksumout->data,
+ checksumdata + checksumlen - kctx->gk5e->cksumlength,
+ kctx->gk5e->cksumlength);
+ break;
+ case CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_DES3:
+ memcpy(cksumout->data, checksumdata, kctx->gk5e->cksumlength);
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ break;
+ }
+ cksumout->len = kctx->gk5e->cksumlength;
+out:
+ ahash_request_free(req);
+out_free_ahash:
+ crypto_free_ahash(tfm);
+out_free_cksum:
+ kfree(checksumdata);
+ return err ? GSS_S_FAILURE : 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * checksum the plaintext data and hdrlen bytes of the token header
+ * Per rfc4121, sec. 4.2.4, the checksum is performed over the data
+ * body then over the first 16 octets of the MIC token
+ * Inclusion of the header data in the calculation of the
+ * checksum is optional.
+ */
+u32
+make_checksum_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen,
+ struct xdr_buf *body, int body_offset, u8 *cksumkey,
+ unsigned int usage, struct xdr_netobj *cksumout)
+{
+ struct crypto_ahash *tfm;
+ struct ahash_request *req;
+ struct scatterlist sg[1];
+ int err = -1;
+ u8 *checksumdata;
+
+ if (kctx->gk5e->keyed_cksum == 0) {
+ dprintk("%s: expected keyed hash for %s\n",
+ __func__, kctx->gk5e->name);
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+ if (cksumkey == NULL) {
+ dprintk("%s: no key supplied for %s\n",
+ __func__, kctx->gk5e->name);
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ checksumdata = kmalloc(GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!checksumdata)
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(kctx->gk5e->cksum_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+ goto out_free_cksum;
+
+ req = ahash_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!req)
+ goto out_free_ahash;
+
+ ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, NULL, NULL);
+
+ err = crypto_ahash_setkey(tfm, cksumkey, kctx->gk5e->keylength);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ err = crypto_ahash_init(req);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ err = xdr_process_buf(body, body_offset, body->len - body_offset,
+ checksummer, req);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ if (header != NULL) {
+ sg_init_one(sg, header, hdrlen);
+ ahash_request_set_crypt(req, sg, NULL, hdrlen);
+ err = crypto_ahash_update(req);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ahash_request_set_crypt(req, NULL, checksumdata, 0);
+ err = crypto_ahash_final(req);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ cksumout->len = kctx->gk5e->cksumlength;
+
+ switch (kctx->gk5e->ctype) {
+ case CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128:
+ case CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256:
+ /* note that this truncates the hash */
+ memcpy(cksumout->data, checksumdata, kctx->gk5e->cksumlength);
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ break;
+ }
+out:
+ ahash_request_free(req);
+out_free_ahash:
+ crypto_free_ahash(tfm);
+out_free_cksum:
+ kfree(checksumdata);
+ return err ? GSS_S_FAILURE : 0;
+}
+
+struct encryptor_desc {
+ u8 iv[GSS_KRB5_MAX_BLOCKSIZE];
+ struct skcipher_request *req;
+ int pos;
+ struct xdr_buf *outbuf;
+ struct page **pages;
+ struct scatterlist infrags[4];
+ struct scatterlist outfrags[4];
+ int fragno;
+ int fraglen;
+};
+
+static int
+encryptor(struct scatterlist *sg, void *data)
+{
+ struct encryptor_desc *desc = data;
+ struct xdr_buf *outbuf = desc->outbuf;
+ struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm =
+ crypto_sync_skcipher_reqtfm(desc->req);
+ struct page *in_page;
+ int thislen = desc->fraglen + sg->length;
+ int fraglen, ret;
+ int page_pos;
+
+ /* Worst case is 4 fragments: head, end of page 1, start
+ * of page 2, tail. Anything more is a bug. */
+ BUG_ON(desc->fragno > 3);
+
+ page_pos = desc->pos - outbuf->head[0].iov_len;
+ if (page_pos >= 0 && page_pos < outbuf->page_len) {
+ /* pages are not in place: */
+ int i = (page_pos + outbuf->page_base) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ in_page = desc->pages[i];
+ } else {
+ in_page = sg_page(sg);
+ }
+ sg_set_page(&desc->infrags[desc->fragno], in_page, sg->length,
+ sg->offset);
+ sg_set_page(&desc->outfrags[desc->fragno], sg_page(sg), sg->length,
+ sg->offset);
+ desc->fragno++;
+ desc->fraglen += sg->length;
+ desc->pos += sg->length;
+
+ fraglen = thislen & (crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(tfm) - 1);
+ thislen -= fraglen;
+
+ if (thislen == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ sg_mark_end(&desc->infrags[desc->fragno - 1]);
+ sg_mark_end(&desc->outfrags[desc->fragno - 1]);
+
+ skcipher_request_set_crypt(desc->req, desc->infrags, desc->outfrags,
+ thislen, desc->iv);
+
+ ret = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(desc->req);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ sg_init_table(desc->infrags, 4);
+ sg_init_table(desc->outfrags, 4);
+
+ if (fraglen) {
+ sg_set_page(&desc->outfrags[0], sg_page(sg), fraglen,
+ sg->offset + sg->length - fraglen);
+ desc->infrags[0] = desc->outfrags[0];
+ sg_assign_page(&desc->infrags[0], in_page);
+ desc->fragno = 1;
+ desc->fraglen = fraglen;
+ } else {
+ desc->fragno = 0;
+ desc->fraglen = 0;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+gss_encrypt_xdr_buf(struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm, struct xdr_buf *buf,
+ int offset, struct page **pages)
+{
+ int ret;
+ struct encryptor_desc desc;
+ SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, tfm);
+
+ BUG_ON((buf->len - offset) % crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(tfm) != 0);
+
+ skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, tfm);
+ skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
+
+ memset(desc.iv, 0, sizeof(desc.iv));
+ desc.req = req;
+ desc.pos = offset;
+ desc.outbuf = buf;
+ desc.pages = pages;
+ desc.fragno = 0;
+ desc.fraglen = 0;
+
+ sg_init_table(desc.infrags, 4);
+ sg_init_table(desc.outfrags, 4);
+
+ ret = xdr_process_buf(buf, offset, buf->len - offset, encryptor, &desc);
+ skcipher_request_zero(req);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+struct decryptor_desc {
+ u8 iv[GSS_KRB5_MAX_BLOCKSIZE];
+ struct skcipher_request *req;
+ struct scatterlist frags[4];
+ int fragno;
+ int fraglen;
+};
+
+static int
+decryptor(struct scatterlist *sg, void *data)
+{
+ struct decryptor_desc *desc = data;
+ int thislen = desc->fraglen + sg->length;
+ struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm =
+ crypto_sync_skcipher_reqtfm(desc->req);
+ int fraglen, ret;
+
+ /* Worst case is 4 fragments: head, end of page 1, start
+ * of page 2, tail. Anything more is a bug. */
+ BUG_ON(desc->fragno > 3);
+ sg_set_page(&desc->frags[desc->fragno], sg_page(sg), sg->length,
+ sg->offset);
+ desc->fragno++;
+ desc->fraglen += sg->length;
+
+ fraglen = thislen & (crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(tfm) - 1);
+ thislen -= fraglen;
+
+ if (thislen == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ sg_mark_end(&desc->frags[desc->fragno - 1]);
+
+ skcipher_request_set_crypt(desc->req, desc->frags, desc->frags,
+ thislen, desc->iv);
+
+ ret = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(desc->req);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ sg_init_table(desc->frags, 4);
+
+ if (fraglen) {
+ sg_set_page(&desc->frags[0], sg_page(sg), fraglen,
+ sg->offset + sg->length - fraglen);
+ desc->fragno = 1;
+ desc->fraglen = fraglen;
+ } else {
+ desc->fragno = 0;
+ desc->fraglen = 0;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+gss_decrypt_xdr_buf(struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm, struct xdr_buf *buf,
+ int offset)
+{
+ int ret;
+ struct decryptor_desc desc;
+ SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, tfm);
+
+ /* XXXJBF: */
+ BUG_ON((buf->len - offset) % crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(tfm) != 0);
+
+ skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, tfm);
+ skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
+
+ memset(desc.iv, 0, sizeof(desc.iv));
+ desc.req = req;
+ desc.fragno = 0;
+ desc.fraglen = 0;
+
+ sg_init_table(desc.frags, 4);
+
+ ret = xdr_process_buf(buf, offset, buf->len - offset, decryptor, &desc);
+ skcipher_request_zero(req);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function makes the assumption that it was ultimately called
+ * from gss_wrap().
+ *
+ * The client auth_gss code moves any existing tail data into a
+ * separate page before calling gss_wrap.
+ * The server svcauth_gss code ensures that both the head and the
+ * tail have slack space of RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE before calling gss_wrap.
+ *
+ * Even with that guarantee, this function may be called more than
+ * once in the processing of gss_wrap(). The best we can do is
+ * verify at compile-time (see GSS_KRB5_SLACK_CHECK) that the
+ * largest expected shift will fit within RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE.
+ * At run-time we can verify that a single invocation of this
+ * function doesn't attempt to use more the RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE.
+ */
+
+int
+xdr_extend_head(struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int base, unsigned int shiftlen)
+{
+ u8 *p;
+
+ if (shiftlen == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(GSS_KRB5_MAX_SLACK_NEEDED > RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE);
+ BUG_ON(shiftlen > RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE);
+
+ p = buf->head[0].iov_base + base;
+
+ memmove(p + shiftlen, p, buf->head[0].iov_len - base);
+
+ buf->head[0].iov_len += shiftlen;
+ buf->len += shiftlen;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static u32
+gss_krb5_cts_crypt(struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher, struct xdr_buf *buf,
+ u32 offset, u8 *iv, struct page **pages, int encrypt)
+{
+ u32 ret;
+ struct scatterlist sg[1];
+ SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, cipher);
+ u8 *data;
+ struct page **save_pages;
+ u32 len = buf->len - offset;
+
+ if (len > GSS_KRB5_MAX_BLOCKSIZE * 2) {
+ WARN_ON(0);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ data = kmalloc(GSS_KRB5_MAX_BLOCKSIZE * 2, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /*
+ * For encryption, we want to read from the cleartext
+ * page cache pages, and write the encrypted data to
+ * the supplied xdr_buf pages.
+ */
+ save_pages = buf->pages;
+ if (encrypt)
+ buf->pages = pages;
+
+ ret = read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, offset, data, len);
+ buf->pages = save_pages;
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ sg_init_one(sg, data, len);
+
+ skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, cipher);
+ skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
+ skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, len, iv);
+
+ if (encrypt)
+ ret = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
+ else
+ ret = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
+
+ skcipher_request_zero(req);
+
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = write_bytes_to_xdr_buf(buf, offset, data, len);
+
+out:
+ kfree(data);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+u32
+gss_krb5_aes_encrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset,
+ struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages)
+{
+ u32 err;
+ struct xdr_netobj hmac;
+ u8 *cksumkey;
+ u8 *ecptr;
+ struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher, *aux_cipher;
+ int blocksize;
+ struct page **save_pages;
+ int nblocks, nbytes;
+ struct encryptor_desc desc;
+ u32 cbcbytes;
+ unsigned int usage;
+
+ if (kctx->initiate) {
+ cipher = kctx->initiator_enc;
+ aux_cipher = kctx->initiator_enc_aux;
+ cksumkey = kctx->initiator_integ;
+ usage = KG_USAGE_INITIATOR_SEAL;
+ } else {
+ cipher = kctx->acceptor_enc;
+ aux_cipher = kctx->acceptor_enc_aux;
+ cksumkey = kctx->acceptor_integ;
+ usage = KG_USAGE_ACCEPTOR_SEAL;
+ }
+ blocksize = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(cipher);
+
+ /* hide the gss token header and insert the confounder */
+ offset += GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN;
+ if (xdr_extend_head(buf, offset, kctx->gk5e->conflen))
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ gss_krb5_make_confounder(buf->head[0].iov_base + offset, kctx->gk5e->conflen);
+ offset -= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN;
+
+ if (buf->tail[0].iov_base != NULL) {
+ ecptr = buf->tail[0].iov_base + buf->tail[0].iov_len;
+ } else {
+ buf->tail[0].iov_base = buf->head[0].iov_base
+ + buf->head[0].iov_len;
+ buf->tail[0].iov_len = 0;
+ ecptr = buf->tail[0].iov_base;
+ }
+
+ /* copy plaintext gss token header after filler (if any) */
+ memcpy(ecptr, buf->head[0].iov_base + offset, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN);
+ buf->tail[0].iov_len += GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN;
+ buf->len += GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN;
+
+ /* Do the HMAC */
+ hmac.len = GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN;
+ hmac.data = buf->tail[0].iov_base + buf->tail[0].iov_len;
+
+ /*
+ * When we are called, pages points to the real page cache
+ * data -- which we can't go and encrypt! buf->pages points
+ * to scratch pages which we are going to send off to the
+ * client/server. Swap in the plaintext pages to calculate
+ * the hmac.
+ */
+ save_pages = buf->pages;
+ buf->pages = pages;
+
+ err = make_checksum_v2(kctx, NULL, 0, buf,
+ offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN,
+ cksumkey, usage, &hmac);
+ buf->pages = save_pages;
+ if (err)
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+ nbytes = buf->len - offset - GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN;
+ nblocks = (nbytes + blocksize - 1) / blocksize;
+ cbcbytes = 0;
+ if (nblocks > 2)
+ cbcbytes = (nblocks - 2) * blocksize;
+
+ memset(desc.iv, 0, sizeof(desc.iv));
+
+ if (cbcbytes) {
+ SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, aux_cipher);
+
+ desc.pos = offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN;
+ desc.fragno = 0;
+ desc.fraglen = 0;
+ desc.pages = pages;
+ desc.outbuf = buf;
+ desc.req = req;
+
+ skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, aux_cipher);
+ skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
+
+ sg_init_table(desc.infrags, 4);
+ sg_init_table(desc.outfrags, 4);
+
+ err = xdr_process_buf(buf, offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN,
+ cbcbytes, encryptor, &desc);
+ skcipher_request_zero(req);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+
+ /* Make sure IV carries forward from any CBC results. */
+ err = gss_krb5_cts_crypt(cipher, buf,
+ offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + cbcbytes,
+ desc.iv, pages, 1);
+ if (err) {
+ err = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+
+ /* Now update buf to account for HMAC */
+ buf->tail[0].iov_len += kctx->gk5e->cksumlength;
+ buf->len += kctx->gk5e->cksumlength;
+
+out_err:
+ if (err)
+ err = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ return err;
+}
+
+u32
+gss_krb5_aes_decrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, u32 len,
+ struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 *headskip, u32 *tailskip)
+{
+ struct xdr_buf subbuf;
+ u32 ret = 0;
+ u8 *cksum_key;
+ struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher, *aux_cipher;
+ struct xdr_netobj our_hmac_obj;
+ u8 our_hmac[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN];
+ u8 pkt_hmac[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN];
+ int nblocks, blocksize, cbcbytes;
+ struct decryptor_desc desc;
+ unsigned int usage;
+
+ if (kctx->initiate) {
+ cipher = kctx->acceptor_enc;
+ aux_cipher = kctx->acceptor_enc_aux;
+ cksum_key = kctx->acceptor_integ;
+ usage = KG_USAGE_ACCEPTOR_SEAL;
+ } else {
+ cipher = kctx->initiator_enc;
+ aux_cipher = kctx->initiator_enc_aux;
+ cksum_key = kctx->initiator_integ;
+ usage = KG_USAGE_INITIATOR_SEAL;
+ }
+ blocksize = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(cipher);
+
+
+ /* create a segment skipping the header and leaving out the checksum */
+ xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, &subbuf, offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN,
+ (len - offset - GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN -
+ kctx->gk5e->cksumlength));
+
+ nblocks = (subbuf.len + blocksize - 1) / blocksize;
+
+ cbcbytes = 0;
+ if (nblocks > 2)
+ cbcbytes = (nblocks - 2) * blocksize;
+
+ memset(desc.iv, 0, sizeof(desc.iv));
+
+ if (cbcbytes) {
+ SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, aux_cipher);
+
+ desc.fragno = 0;
+ desc.fraglen = 0;
+ desc.req = req;
+
+ skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, aux_cipher);
+ skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
+
+ sg_init_table(desc.frags, 4);
+
+ ret = xdr_process_buf(&subbuf, 0, cbcbytes, decryptor, &desc);
+ skcipher_request_zero(req);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+
+ /* Make sure IV carries forward from any CBC results. */
+ ret = gss_krb5_cts_crypt(cipher, &subbuf, cbcbytes, desc.iv, NULL, 0);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_err;
+
+
+ /* Calculate our hmac over the plaintext data */
+ our_hmac_obj.len = sizeof(our_hmac);
+ our_hmac_obj.data = our_hmac;
+
+ ret = make_checksum_v2(kctx, NULL, 0, &subbuf, 0,
+ cksum_key, usage, &our_hmac_obj);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_err;
+
+ /* Get the packet's hmac value */
+ ret = read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, len - kctx->gk5e->cksumlength,
+ pkt_hmac, kctx->gk5e->cksumlength);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_err;
+
+ if (crypto_memneq(pkt_hmac, our_hmac, kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) != 0) {
+ ret = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+ *headskip = kctx->gk5e->conflen;
+ *tailskip = kctx->gk5e->cksumlength;
+out_err:
+ if (ret && ret != GSS_S_BAD_SIG)
+ ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute Kseq given the initial session key and the checksum.
+ * Set the key of the given cipher.
+ */
+int
+krb5_rc4_setup_seq_key(struct krb5_ctx *kctx,
+ struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher,
+ unsigned char *cksum)
+{
+ struct crypto_shash *hmac;
+ struct shash_desc *desc;
+ u8 Kseq[GSS_KRB5_MAX_KEYLEN];
+ u32 zeroconstant = 0;
+ int err;
+
+ dprintk("%s: entered\n", __func__);
+
+ hmac = crypto_alloc_shash(kctx->gk5e->cksum_name, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(hmac)) {
+ dprintk("%s: error %ld, allocating hash '%s'\n",
+ __func__, PTR_ERR(hmac), kctx->gk5e->cksum_name);
+ return PTR_ERR(hmac);
+ }
+
+ desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(hmac),
+ GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!desc) {
+ dprintk("%s: failed to allocate shash descriptor for '%s'\n",
+ __func__, kctx->gk5e->cksum_name);
+ crypto_free_shash(hmac);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ desc->tfm = hmac;
+
+ /* Compute intermediate Kseq from session key */
+ err = crypto_shash_setkey(hmac, kctx->Ksess, kctx->gk5e->keylength);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_err;
+
+ err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, (u8 *)&zeroconstant, 4, Kseq);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_err;
+
+ /* Compute final Kseq from the checksum and intermediate Kseq */
+ err = crypto_shash_setkey(hmac, Kseq, kctx->gk5e->keylength);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_err;
+
+ err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, cksum, 8, Kseq);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_err;
+
+ err = crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(cipher, Kseq, kctx->gk5e->keylength);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_err;
+
+ err = 0;
+
+out_err:
+ kzfree(desc);
+ crypto_free_shash(hmac);
+ dprintk("%s: returning %d\n", __func__, err);
+ return err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute Kcrypt given the initial session key and the plaintext seqnum.
+ * Set the key of cipher kctx->enc.
+ */
+int
+krb5_rc4_setup_enc_key(struct krb5_ctx *kctx,
+ struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher,
+ s32 seqnum)
+{
+ struct crypto_shash *hmac;
+ struct shash_desc *desc;
+ u8 Kcrypt[GSS_KRB5_MAX_KEYLEN];
+ u8 zeroconstant[4] = {0};
+ u8 seqnumarray[4];
+ int err, i;
+
+ dprintk("%s: entered, seqnum %u\n", __func__, seqnum);
+
+ hmac = crypto_alloc_shash(kctx->gk5e->cksum_name, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(hmac)) {
+ dprintk("%s: error %ld, allocating hash '%s'\n",
+ __func__, PTR_ERR(hmac), kctx->gk5e->cksum_name);
+ return PTR_ERR(hmac);
+ }
+
+ desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(hmac),
+ GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!desc) {
+ dprintk("%s: failed to allocate shash descriptor for '%s'\n",
+ __func__, kctx->gk5e->cksum_name);
+ crypto_free_shash(hmac);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ desc->tfm = hmac;
+
+ /* Compute intermediate Kcrypt from session key */
+ for (i = 0; i < kctx->gk5e->keylength; i++)
+ Kcrypt[i] = kctx->Ksess[i] ^ 0xf0;
+
+ err = crypto_shash_setkey(hmac, Kcrypt, kctx->gk5e->keylength);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_err;
+
+ err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, zeroconstant, 4, Kcrypt);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_err;
+
+ /* Compute final Kcrypt from the seqnum and intermediate Kcrypt */
+ err = crypto_shash_setkey(hmac, Kcrypt, kctx->gk5e->keylength);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_err;
+
+ seqnumarray[0] = (unsigned char) ((seqnum >> 24) & 0xff);
+ seqnumarray[1] = (unsigned char) ((seqnum >> 16) & 0xff);
+ seqnumarray[2] = (unsigned char) ((seqnum >> 8) & 0xff);
+ seqnumarray[3] = (unsigned char) ((seqnum >> 0) & 0xff);
+
+ err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, seqnumarray, 4, Kcrypt);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_err;
+
+ err = crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(cipher, Kcrypt,
+ kctx->gk5e->keylength);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_err;
+
+ err = 0;
+
+out_err:
+ kzfree(desc);
+ crypto_free_shash(hmac);
+ dprintk("%s: returning %d\n", __func__, err);
+ return err;
+}
diff --git a/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_keys.c b/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_keys.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f77ea3d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_keys.c
@@ -0,0 +1,322 @@
+/*
+ * COPYRIGHT (c) 2008
+ * The Regents of the University of Michigan
+ * ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
+ *
+ * Permission is granted to use, copy, create derivative works
+ * and redistribute this software and such derivative works
+ * for any purpose, so long as the name of The University of
+ * Michigan is not used in any advertising or publicity
+ * pertaining to the use of distribution of this software
+ * without specific, written prior authorization. If the
+ * above copyright notice or any other identification of the
+ * University of Michigan is included in any copy of any
+ * portion of this software, then the disclaimer below must
+ * also be included.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED AS IS, WITHOUT REPRESENTATION
+ * FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AS TO ITS FITNESS FOR ANY
+ * PURPOSE, AND WITHOUT WARRANTY BY THE UNIVERSITY OF
+ * MICHIGAN OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
+ * WITHOUT LIMITATION THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE
+ * REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN SHALL NOT BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DAMAGES, INCLUDING SPECIAL, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, WITH RESPECT TO ANY CLAIM ARISING
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OF THE SOFTWARE, EVEN
+ * IF IT HAS BEEN OR IS HEREAFTER ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGES.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 1998 by the FundsXpress, INC.
+ *
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Export of this software from the United States of America may require
+ * a specific license from the United States Government. It is the
+ * responsibility of any person or organization contemplating export to
+ * obtain such a license before exporting.
+ *
+ * WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and
+ * distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and
+ * without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright
+ * notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and
+ * this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that
+ * the name of FundsXpress. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining
+ * to distribution of the software without specific, written prior
+ * permission. FundsXpress makes no representations about the suitability of
+ * this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express
+ * or implied warranty.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/xdr.h>
+#include <linux/lcm.h>
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG)
+# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * This is the n-fold function as described in rfc3961, sec 5.1
+ * Taken from MIT Kerberos and modified.
+ */
+
+static void krb5_nfold(u32 inbits, const u8 *in,
+ u32 outbits, u8 *out)
+{
+ unsigned long ulcm;
+ int byte, i, msbit;
+
+ /* the code below is more readable if I make these bytes
+ instead of bits */
+
+ inbits >>= 3;
+ outbits >>= 3;
+
+ /* first compute lcm(n,k) */
+ ulcm = lcm(inbits, outbits);
+
+ /* now do the real work */
+
+ memset(out, 0, outbits);
+ byte = 0;
+
+ /* this will end up cycling through k lcm(k,n)/k times, which
+ is correct */
+ for (i = ulcm-1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ /* compute the msbit in k which gets added into this byte */
+ msbit = (
+ /* first, start with the msbit in the first,
+ * unrotated byte */
+ ((inbits << 3) - 1)
+ /* then, for each byte, shift to the right
+ * for each repetition */
+ + (((inbits << 3) + 13) * (i/inbits))
+ /* last, pick out the correct byte within
+ * that shifted repetition */
+ + ((inbits - (i % inbits)) << 3)
+ ) % (inbits << 3);
+
+ /* pull out the byte value itself */
+ byte += (((in[((inbits - 1) - (msbit >> 3)) % inbits] << 8)|
+ (in[((inbits) - (msbit >> 3)) % inbits]))
+ >> ((msbit & 7) + 1)) & 0xff;
+
+ /* do the addition */
+ byte += out[i % outbits];
+ out[i % outbits] = byte & 0xff;
+
+ /* keep around the carry bit, if any */
+ byte >>= 8;
+
+ }
+
+ /* if there's a carry bit left over, add it back in */
+ if (byte) {
+ for (i = outbits - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ /* do the addition */
+ byte += out[i];
+ out[i] = byte & 0xff;
+
+ /* keep around the carry bit, if any */
+ byte >>= 8;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is the DK (derive_key) function as described in rfc3961, sec 5.1
+ * Taken from MIT Kerberos and modified.
+ */
+
+u32 krb5_derive_key(const struct gss_krb5_enctype *gk5e,
+ const struct xdr_netobj *inkey,
+ struct xdr_netobj *outkey,
+ const struct xdr_netobj *in_constant,
+ gfp_t gfp_mask)
+{
+ size_t blocksize, keybytes, keylength, n;
+ unsigned char *inblockdata, *outblockdata, *rawkey;
+ struct xdr_netobj inblock, outblock;
+ struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher;
+ u32 ret = EINVAL;
+
+ blocksize = gk5e->blocksize;
+ keybytes = gk5e->keybytes;
+ keylength = gk5e->keylength;
+
+ if ((inkey->len != keylength) || (outkey->len != keylength))
+ goto err_return;
+
+ cipher = crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher(gk5e->encrypt_name, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(cipher))
+ goto err_return;
+ if (crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(cipher, inkey->data, inkey->len))
+ goto err_free_cipher;
+
+ /* allocate and set up buffers */
+
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ inblockdata = kmalloc(blocksize, gfp_mask);
+ if (inblockdata == NULL)
+ goto err_free_cipher;
+
+ outblockdata = kmalloc(blocksize, gfp_mask);
+ if (outblockdata == NULL)
+ goto err_free_in;
+
+ rawkey = kmalloc(keybytes, gfp_mask);
+ if (rawkey == NULL)
+ goto err_free_out;
+
+ inblock.data = (char *) inblockdata;
+ inblock.len = blocksize;
+
+ outblock.data = (char *) outblockdata;
+ outblock.len = blocksize;
+
+ /* initialize the input block */
+
+ if (in_constant->len == inblock.len) {
+ memcpy(inblock.data, in_constant->data, inblock.len);
+ } else {
+ krb5_nfold(in_constant->len * 8, in_constant->data,
+ inblock.len * 8, inblock.data);
+ }
+
+ /* loop encrypting the blocks until enough key bytes are generated */
+
+ n = 0;
+ while (n < keybytes) {
+ (*(gk5e->encrypt))(cipher, NULL, inblock.data,
+ outblock.data, inblock.len);
+
+ if ((keybytes - n) <= outblock.len) {
+ memcpy(rawkey + n, outblock.data, (keybytes - n));
+ break;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(rawkey + n, outblock.data, outblock.len);
+ memcpy(inblock.data, outblock.data, outblock.len);
+ n += outblock.len;
+ }
+
+ /* postprocess the key */
+
+ inblock.data = (char *) rawkey;
+ inblock.len = keybytes;
+
+ BUG_ON(gk5e->mk_key == NULL);
+ ret = (*(gk5e->mk_key))(gk5e, &inblock, outkey);
+ if (ret) {
+ dprintk("%s: got %d from mk_key function for '%s'\n",
+ __func__, ret, gk5e->encrypt_name);
+ goto err_free_raw;
+ }
+
+ /* clean memory, free resources and exit */
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+err_free_raw:
+ kzfree(rawkey);
+err_free_out:
+ kzfree(outblockdata);
+err_free_in:
+ kzfree(inblockdata);
+err_free_cipher:
+ crypto_free_sync_skcipher(cipher);
+err_return:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#define smask(step) ((1<<step)-1)
+#define pstep(x, step) (((x)&smask(step))^(((x)>>step)&smask(step)))
+#define parity_char(x) pstep(pstep(pstep((x), 4), 2), 1)
+
+static void mit_des_fixup_key_parity(u8 key[8])
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+ key[i] &= 0xfe;
+ key[i] |= 1^parity_char(key[i]);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is the des3 key derivation postprocess function
+ */
+u32 gss_krb5_des3_make_key(const struct gss_krb5_enctype *gk5e,
+ struct xdr_netobj *randombits,
+ struct xdr_netobj *key)
+{
+ int i;
+ u32 ret = EINVAL;
+
+ if (key->len != 24) {
+ dprintk("%s: key->len is %d\n", __func__, key->len);
+ goto err_out;
+ }
+ if (randombits->len != 21) {
+ dprintk("%s: randombits->len is %d\n",
+ __func__, randombits->len);
+ goto err_out;
+ }
+
+ /* take the seven bytes, move them around into the top 7 bits of the
+ 8 key bytes, then compute the parity bits. Do this three times. */
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+ memcpy(key->data + i*8, randombits->data + i*7, 7);
+ key->data[i*8+7] = (((key->data[i*8]&1)<<1) |
+ ((key->data[i*8+1]&1)<<2) |
+ ((key->data[i*8+2]&1)<<3) |
+ ((key->data[i*8+3]&1)<<4) |
+ ((key->data[i*8+4]&1)<<5) |
+ ((key->data[i*8+5]&1)<<6) |
+ ((key->data[i*8+6]&1)<<7));
+
+ mit_des_fixup_key_parity(key->data + i*8);
+ }
+ ret = 0;
+err_out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is the aes key derivation postprocess function
+ */
+u32 gss_krb5_aes_make_key(const struct gss_krb5_enctype *gk5e,
+ struct xdr_netobj *randombits,
+ struct xdr_netobj *key)
+{
+ u32 ret = EINVAL;
+
+ if (key->len != 16 && key->len != 32) {
+ dprintk("%s: key->len is %d\n", __func__, key->len);
+ goto err_out;
+ }
+ if (randombits->len != 16 && randombits->len != 32) {
+ dprintk("%s: randombits->len is %d\n",
+ __func__, randombits->len);
+ goto err_out;
+ }
+ if (randombits->len != key->len) {
+ dprintk("%s: randombits->len is %d, key->len is %d\n",
+ __func__, randombits->len, key->len);
+ goto err_out;
+ }
+ memcpy(key->data, randombits->data, key->len);
+ ret = 0;
+err_out:
+ return ret;
+}
diff --git a/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c b/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..50e1ed6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c
@@ -0,0 +1,749 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+/*
+ * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_mech.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2008 The Regents of the University of Michigan.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Andy Adamson <andros@umich.edu>
+ * J. Bruce Fields <bfields@umich.edu>
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/auth.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/xdr.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5_enctypes.h>
+
+#include "auth_gss_internal.h"
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG)
+# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH
+#endif
+
+static struct gss_api_mech gss_kerberos_mech; /* forward declaration */
+
+static const struct gss_krb5_enctype supported_gss_krb5_enctypes[] = {
+#ifndef CONFIG_SUNRPC_DISABLE_INSECURE_ENCTYPES
+ /*
+ * DES (All DES enctypes are mapped to the same gss functionality)
+ */
+ {
+ .etype = ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW,
+ .ctype = CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5,
+ .name = "des-cbc-crc",
+ .encrypt_name = "cbc(des)",
+ .cksum_name = "md5",
+ .encrypt = krb5_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = krb5_decrypt,
+ .mk_key = NULL,
+ .signalg = SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5,
+ .sealalg = SEAL_ALG_DES,
+ .keybytes = 7,
+ .keylength = 8,
+ .blocksize = 8,
+ .conflen = 8,
+ .cksumlength = 8,
+ .keyed_cksum = 0,
+ },
+#endif /* CONFIG_SUNRPC_DISABLE_INSECURE_ENCTYPES */
+ /*
+ * RC4-HMAC
+ */
+ {
+ .etype = ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
+ .ctype = CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5_ARCFOUR,
+ .name = "rc4-hmac",
+ .encrypt_name = "ecb(arc4)",
+ .cksum_name = "hmac(md5)",
+ .encrypt = krb5_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = krb5_decrypt,
+ .mk_key = NULL,
+ .signalg = SGN_ALG_HMAC_MD5,
+ .sealalg = SEAL_ALG_MICROSOFT_RC4,
+ .keybytes = 16,
+ .keylength = 16,
+ .blocksize = 1,
+ .conflen = 8,
+ .cksumlength = 8,
+ .keyed_cksum = 1,
+ },
+ /*
+ * 3DES
+ */
+ {
+ .etype = ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW,
+ .ctype = CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_DES3,
+ .name = "des3-hmac-sha1",
+ .encrypt_name = "cbc(des3_ede)",
+ .cksum_name = "hmac(sha1)",
+ .encrypt = krb5_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = krb5_decrypt,
+ .mk_key = gss_krb5_des3_make_key,
+ .signalg = SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD,
+ .sealalg = SEAL_ALG_DES3KD,
+ .keybytes = 21,
+ .keylength = 24,
+ .blocksize = 8,
+ .conflen = 8,
+ .cksumlength = 20,
+ .keyed_cksum = 1,
+ },
+ /*
+ * AES128
+ */
+ {
+ .etype = ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
+ .ctype = CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128,
+ .name = "aes128-cts",
+ .encrypt_name = "cts(cbc(aes))",
+ .cksum_name = "hmac(sha1)",
+ .encrypt = krb5_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = krb5_decrypt,
+ .mk_key = gss_krb5_aes_make_key,
+ .encrypt_v2 = gss_krb5_aes_encrypt,
+ .decrypt_v2 = gss_krb5_aes_decrypt,
+ .signalg = -1,
+ .sealalg = -1,
+ .keybytes = 16,
+ .keylength = 16,
+ .blocksize = 16,
+ .conflen = 16,
+ .cksumlength = 12,
+ .keyed_cksum = 1,
+ },
+ /*
+ * AES256
+ */
+ {
+ .etype = ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
+ .ctype = CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256,
+ .name = "aes256-cts",
+ .encrypt_name = "cts(cbc(aes))",
+ .cksum_name = "hmac(sha1)",
+ .encrypt = krb5_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = krb5_decrypt,
+ .mk_key = gss_krb5_aes_make_key,
+ .encrypt_v2 = gss_krb5_aes_encrypt,
+ .decrypt_v2 = gss_krb5_aes_decrypt,
+ .signalg = -1,
+ .sealalg = -1,
+ .keybytes = 32,
+ .keylength = 32,
+ .blocksize = 16,
+ .conflen = 16,
+ .cksumlength = 12,
+ .keyed_cksum = 1,
+ },
+};
+
+static const int num_supported_enctypes =
+ ARRAY_SIZE(supported_gss_krb5_enctypes);
+
+static int
+supported_gss_krb5_enctype(int etype)
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < num_supported_enctypes; i++)
+ if (supported_gss_krb5_enctypes[i].etype == etype)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct gss_krb5_enctype *
+get_gss_krb5_enctype(int etype)
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < num_supported_enctypes; i++)
+ if (supported_gss_krb5_enctypes[i].etype == etype)
+ return &supported_gss_krb5_enctypes[i];
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static inline const void *
+get_key(const void *p, const void *end,
+ struct krb5_ctx *ctx, struct crypto_sync_skcipher **res)
+{
+ struct xdr_netobj key;
+ int alg;
+
+ p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &alg, sizeof(alg));
+ if (IS_ERR(p))
+ goto out_err;
+
+ switch (alg) {
+ case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
+ case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
+ case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
+ /* Map all these key types to ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW */
+ alg = ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!supported_gss_krb5_enctype(alg)) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "gss_kerberos_mech: unsupported "
+ "encryption key algorithm %d\n", alg);
+ p = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+ p = simple_get_netobj(p, end, &key);
+ if (IS_ERR(p))
+ goto out_err;
+
+ *res = crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher(ctx->gk5e->encrypt_name, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(*res)) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "gss_kerberos_mech: unable to initialize "
+ "crypto algorithm %s\n", ctx->gk5e->encrypt_name);
+ *res = NULL;
+ goto out_err_free_key;
+ }
+ if (crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(*res, key.data, key.len)) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "gss_kerberos_mech: error setting key for "
+ "crypto algorithm %s\n", ctx->gk5e->encrypt_name);
+ goto out_err_free_tfm;
+ }
+
+ kfree(key.data);
+ return p;
+
+out_err_free_tfm:
+ crypto_free_sync_skcipher(*res);
+out_err_free_key:
+ kfree(key.data);
+ p = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+out_err:
+ return p;
+}
+
+static int
+gss_import_v1_context(const void *p, const void *end, struct krb5_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ u32 seq_send;
+ int tmp;
+ u32 time32;
+
+ p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &ctx->initiate, sizeof(ctx->initiate));
+ if (IS_ERR(p))
+ goto out_err;
+
+ /* Old format supports only DES! Any other enctype uses new format */
+ ctx->enctype = ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW;
+
+ ctx->gk5e = get_gss_krb5_enctype(ctx->enctype);
+ if (ctx->gk5e == NULL) {
+ p = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+
+ /* The downcall format was designed before we completely understood
+ * the uses of the context fields; so it includes some stuff we
+ * just give some minimal sanity-checking, and some we ignore
+ * completely (like the next twenty bytes): */
+ if (unlikely(p + 20 > end || p + 20 < p)) {
+ p = ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+ p += 20;
+ p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+ if (IS_ERR(p))
+ goto out_err;
+ if (tmp != SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5) {
+ p = ERR_PTR(-ENOSYS);
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+ p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+ if (IS_ERR(p))
+ goto out_err;
+ if (tmp != SEAL_ALG_DES) {
+ p = ERR_PTR(-ENOSYS);
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+ p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &time32, sizeof(time32));
+ if (IS_ERR(p))
+ goto out_err;
+ /* unsigned 32-bit time overflows in year 2106 */
+ ctx->endtime = (time64_t)time32;
+ p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &seq_send, sizeof(seq_send));
+ if (IS_ERR(p))
+ goto out_err;
+ atomic_set(&ctx->seq_send, seq_send);
+ p = simple_get_netobj(p, end, &ctx->mech_used);
+ if (IS_ERR(p))
+ goto out_err;
+ p = get_key(p, end, ctx, &ctx->enc);
+ if (IS_ERR(p))
+ goto out_err_free_mech;
+ p = get_key(p, end, ctx, &ctx->seq);
+ if (IS_ERR(p))
+ goto out_err_free_key1;
+ if (p != end) {
+ p = ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+ goto out_err_free_key2;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+out_err_free_key2:
+ crypto_free_sync_skcipher(ctx->seq);
+out_err_free_key1:
+ crypto_free_sync_skcipher(ctx->enc);
+out_err_free_mech:
+ kfree(ctx->mech_used.data);
+out_err:
+ return PTR_ERR(p);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_sync_skcipher *
+context_v2_alloc_cipher(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, const char *cname, u8 *key)
+{
+ struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cp;
+
+ cp = crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher(cname, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(cp)) {
+ dprintk("gss_kerberos_mech: unable to initialize "
+ "crypto algorithm %s\n", cname);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(cp, key, ctx->gk5e->keylength)) {
+ dprintk("gss_kerberos_mech: error setting key for "
+ "crypto algorithm %s\n", cname);
+ crypto_free_sync_skcipher(cp);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return cp;
+}
+
+static inline void
+set_cdata(u8 cdata[GSS_KRB5_K5CLENGTH], u32 usage, u8 seed)
+{
+ cdata[0] = (usage>>24)&0xff;
+ cdata[1] = (usage>>16)&0xff;
+ cdata[2] = (usage>>8)&0xff;
+ cdata[3] = usage&0xff;
+ cdata[4] = seed;
+}
+
+static int
+context_derive_keys_des3(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask)
+{
+ struct xdr_netobj c, keyin, keyout;
+ u8 cdata[GSS_KRB5_K5CLENGTH];
+ u32 err;
+
+ c.len = GSS_KRB5_K5CLENGTH;
+ c.data = cdata;
+
+ keyin.data = ctx->Ksess;
+ keyin.len = ctx->gk5e->keylength;
+ keyout.len = ctx->gk5e->keylength;
+
+ /* seq uses the raw key */
+ ctx->seq = context_v2_alloc_cipher(ctx, ctx->gk5e->encrypt_name,
+ ctx->Ksess);
+ if (ctx->seq == NULL)
+ goto out_err;
+
+ ctx->enc = context_v2_alloc_cipher(ctx, ctx->gk5e->encrypt_name,
+ ctx->Ksess);
+ if (ctx->enc == NULL)
+ goto out_free_seq;
+
+ /* derive cksum */
+ set_cdata(cdata, KG_USAGE_SIGN, KEY_USAGE_SEED_CHECKSUM);
+ keyout.data = ctx->cksum;
+ err = krb5_derive_key(ctx->gk5e, &keyin, &keyout, &c, gfp_mask);
+ if (err) {
+ dprintk("%s: Error %d deriving cksum key\n",
+ __func__, err);
+ goto out_free_enc;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+out_free_enc:
+ crypto_free_sync_skcipher(ctx->enc);
+out_free_seq:
+ crypto_free_sync_skcipher(ctx->seq);
+out_err:
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note that RC4 depends on deriving keys using the sequence
+ * number or the checksum of a token. Therefore, the final keys
+ * cannot be calculated until the token is being constructed!
+ */
+static int
+context_derive_keys_rc4(struct krb5_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ struct crypto_shash *hmac;
+ char sigkeyconstant[] = "signaturekey";
+ int slen = strlen(sigkeyconstant) + 1; /* include null terminator */
+ struct shash_desc *desc;
+ int err;
+
+ dprintk("RPC: %s: entered\n", __func__);
+ /*
+ * derive cksum (aka Ksign) key
+ */
+ hmac = crypto_alloc_shash(ctx->gk5e->cksum_name, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(hmac)) {
+ dprintk("%s: error %ld allocating hash '%s'\n",
+ __func__, PTR_ERR(hmac), ctx->gk5e->cksum_name);
+ err = PTR_ERR(hmac);
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+
+ err = crypto_shash_setkey(hmac, ctx->Ksess, ctx->gk5e->keylength);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_err_free_hmac;
+
+
+ desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(hmac), GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!desc) {
+ dprintk("%s: failed to allocate hash descriptor for '%s'\n",
+ __func__, ctx->gk5e->cksum_name);
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_err_free_hmac;
+ }
+
+ desc->tfm = hmac;
+
+ err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, sigkeyconstant, slen, ctx->cksum);
+ kzfree(desc);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_err_free_hmac;
+ /*
+ * allocate hash, and skciphers for data and seqnum encryption
+ */
+ ctx->enc = crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher(ctx->gk5e->encrypt_name, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(ctx->enc)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(ctx->enc);
+ goto out_err_free_hmac;
+ }
+
+ ctx->seq = crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher(ctx->gk5e->encrypt_name, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(ctx->seq)) {
+ crypto_free_sync_skcipher(ctx->enc);
+ err = PTR_ERR(ctx->seq);
+ goto out_err_free_hmac;
+ }
+
+ dprintk("RPC: %s: returning success\n", __func__);
+
+ err = 0;
+
+out_err_free_hmac:
+ crypto_free_shash(hmac);
+out_err:
+ dprintk("RPC: %s: returning %d\n", __func__, err);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int
+context_derive_keys_new(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask)
+{
+ struct xdr_netobj c, keyin, keyout;
+ u8 cdata[GSS_KRB5_K5CLENGTH];
+ u32 err;
+
+ c.len = GSS_KRB5_K5CLENGTH;
+ c.data = cdata;
+
+ keyin.data = ctx->Ksess;
+ keyin.len = ctx->gk5e->keylength;
+ keyout.len = ctx->gk5e->keylength;
+
+ /* initiator seal encryption */
+ set_cdata(cdata, KG_USAGE_INITIATOR_SEAL, KEY_USAGE_SEED_ENCRYPTION);
+ keyout.data = ctx->initiator_seal;
+ err = krb5_derive_key(ctx->gk5e, &keyin, &keyout, &c, gfp_mask);
+ if (err) {
+ dprintk("%s: Error %d deriving initiator_seal key\n",
+ __func__, err);
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+ ctx->initiator_enc = context_v2_alloc_cipher(ctx,
+ ctx->gk5e->encrypt_name,
+ ctx->initiator_seal);
+ if (ctx->initiator_enc == NULL)
+ goto out_err;
+
+ /* acceptor seal encryption */
+ set_cdata(cdata, KG_USAGE_ACCEPTOR_SEAL, KEY_USAGE_SEED_ENCRYPTION);
+ keyout.data = ctx->acceptor_seal;
+ err = krb5_derive_key(ctx->gk5e, &keyin, &keyout, &c, gfp_mask);
+ if (err) {
+ dprintk("%s: Error %d deriving acceptor_seal key\n",
+ __func__, err);
+ goto out_free_initiator_enc;
+ }
+ ctx->acceptor_enc = context_v2_alloc_cipher(ctx,
+ ctx->gk5e->encrypt_name,
+ ctx->acceptor_seal);
+ if (ctx->acceptor_enc == NULL)
+ goto out_free_initiator_enc;
+
+ /* initiator sign checksum */
+ set_cdata(cdata, KG_USAGE_INITIATOR_SIGN, KEY_USAGE_SEED_CHECKSUM);
+ keyout.data = ctx->initiator_sign;
+ err = krb5_derive_key(ctx->gk5e, &keyin, &keyout, &c, gfp_mask);
+ if (err) {
+ dprintk("%s: Error %d deriving initiator_sign key\n",
+ __func__, err);
+ goto out_free_acceptor_enc;
+ }
+
+ /* acceptor sign checksum */
+ set_cdata(cdata, KG_USAGE_ACCEPTOR_SIGN, KEY_USAGE_SEED_CHECKSUM);
+ keyout.data = ctx->acceptor_sign;
+ err = krb5_derive_key(ctx->gk5e, &keyin, &keyout, &c, gfp_mask);
+ if (err) {
+ dprintk("%s: Error %d deriving acceptor_sign key\n",
+ __func__, err);
+ goto out_free_acceptor_enc;
+ }
+
+ /* initiator seal integrity */
+ set_cdata(cdata, KG_USAGE_INITIATOR_SEAL, KEY_USAGE_SEED_INTEGRITY);
+ keyout.data = ctx->initiator_integ;
+ err = krb5_derive_key(ctx->gk5e, &keyin, &keyout, &c, gfp_mask);
+ if (err) {
+ dprintk("%s: Error %d deriving initiator_integ key\n",
+ __func__, err);
+ goto out_free_acceptor_enc;
+ }
+
+ /* acceptor seal integrity */
+ set_cdata(cdata, KG_USAGE_ACCEPTOR_SEAL, KEY_USAGE_SEED_INTEGRITY);
+ keyout.data = ctx->acceptor_integ;
+ err = krb5_derive_key(ctx->gk5e, &keyin, &keyout, &c, gfp_mask);
+ if (err) {
+ dprintk("%s: Error %d deriving acceptor_integ key\n",
+ __func__, err);
+ goto out_free_acceptor_enc;
+ }
+
+ switch (ctx->enctype) {
+ case ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
+ case ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
+ ctx->initiator_enc_aux =
+ context_v2_alloc_cipher(ctx, "cbc(aes)",
+ ctx->initiator_seal);
+ if (ctx->initiator_enc_aux == NULL)
+ goto out_free_acceptor_enc;
+ ctx->acceptor_enc_aux =
+ context_v2_alloc_cipher(ctx, "cbc(aes)",
+ ctx->acceptor_seal);
+ if (ctx->acceptor_enc_aux == NULL) {
+ crypto_free_sync_skcipher(ctx->initiator_enc_aux);
+ goto out_free_acceptor_enc;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+out_free_acceptor_enc:
+ crypto_free_sync_skcipher(ctx->acceptor_enc);
+out_free_initiator_enc:
+ crypto_free_sync_skcipher(ctx->initiator_enc);
+out_err:
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int
+gss_import_v2_context(const void *p, const void *end, struct krb5_ctx *ctx,
+ gfp_t gfp_mask)
+{
+ u64 seq_send64;
+ int keylen;
+ u32 time32;
+
+ p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &ctx->flags, sizeof(ctx->flags));
+ if (IS_ERR(p))
+ goto out_err;
+ ctx->initiate = ctx->flags & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_INITIATOR;
+
+ p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &time32, sizeof(time32));
+ if (IS_ERR(p))
+ goto out_err;
+ /* unsigned 32-bit time overflows in year 2106 */
+ ctx->endtime = (time64_t)time32;
+ p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &seq_send64, sizeof(seq_send64));
+ if (IS_ERR(p))
+ goto out_err;
+ atomic64_set(&ctx->seq_send64, seq_send64);
+ /* set seq_send for use by "older" enctypes */
+ atomic_set(&ctx->seq_send, seq_send64);
+ if (seq_send64 != atomic_read(&ctx->seq_send)) {
+ dprintk("%s: seq_send64 %llx, seq_send %x overflow?\n", __func__,
+ seq_send64, atomic_read(&ctx->seq_send));
+ p = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+ p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &ctx->enctype, sizeof(ctx->enctype));
+ if (IS_ERR(p))
+ goto out_err;
+ /* Map ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1 to ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW */
+ if (ctx->enctype == ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1)
+ ctx->enctype = ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW;
+ ctx->gk5e = get_gss_krb5_enctype(ctx->enctype);
+ if (ctx->gk5e == NULL) {
+ dprintk("gss_kerberos_mech: unsupported krb5 enctype %u\n",
+ ctx->enctype);
+ p = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+ keylen = ctx->gk5e->keylength;
+
+ p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, ctx->Ksess, keylen);
+ if (IS_ERR(p))
+ goto out_err;
+
+ if (p != end) {
+ p = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+
+ ctx->mech_used.data = kmemdup(gss_kerberos_mech.gm_oid.data,
+ gss_kerberos_mech.gm_oid.len, gfp_mask);
+ if (unlikely(ctx->mech_used.data == NULL)) {
+ p = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+ ctx->mech_used.len = gss_kerberos_mech.gm_oid.len;
+
+ switch (ctx->enctype) {
+ case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW:
+ return context_derive_keys_des3(ctx, gfp_mask);
+ case ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC:
+ return context_derive_keys_rc4(ctx);
+ case ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
+ case ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
+ return context_derive_keys_new(ctx, gfp_mask);
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+out_err:
+ return PTR_ERR(p);
+}
+
+static int
+gss_import_sec_context_kerberos(const void *p, size_t len,
+ struct gss_ctx *ctx_id,
+ time64_t *endtime,
+ gfp_t gfp_mask)
+{
+ const void *end = (const void *)((const char *)p + len);
+ struct krb5_ctx *ctx;
+ int ret;
+
+ ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), gfp_mask);
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (len == 85)
+ ret = gss_import_v1_context(p, end, ctx);
+ else
+ ret = gss_import_v2_context(p, end, ctx, gfp_mask);
+
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ ctx_id->internal_ctx_id = ctx;
+ if (endtime)
+ *endtime = ctx->endtime;
+ } else
+ kfree(ctx);
+
+ dprintk("RPC: %s: returning %d\n", __func__, ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void
+gss_delete_sec_context_kerberos(void *internal_ctx) {
+ struct krb5_ctx *kctx = internal_ctx;
+
+ crypto_free_sync_skcipher(kctx->seq);
+ crypto_free_sync_skcipher(kctx->enc);
+ crypto_free_sync_skcipher(kctx->acceptor_enc);
+ crypto_free_sync_skcipher(kctx->initiator_enc);
+ crypto_free_sync_skcipher(kctx->acceptor_enc_aux);
+ crypto_free_sync_skcipher(kctx->initiator_enc_aux);
+ kfree(kctx->mech_used.data);
+ kfree(kctx);
+}
+
+static const struct gss_api_ops gss_kerberos_ops = {
+ .gss_import_sec_context = gss_import_sec_context_kerberos,
+ .gss_get_mic = gss_get_mic_kerberos,
+ .gss_verify_mic = gss_verify_mic_kerberos,
+ .gss_wrap = gss_wrap_kerberos,
+ .gss_unwrap = gss_unwrap_kerberos,
+ .gss_delete_sec_context = gss_delete_sec_context_kerberos,
+};
+
+static struct pf_desc gss_kerberos_pfs[] = {
+ [0] = {
+ .pseudoflavor = RPC_AUTH_GSS_KRB5,
+ .qop = GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT,
+ .service = RPC_GSS_SVC_NONE,
+ .name = "krb5",
+ },
+ [1] = {
+ .pseudoflavor = RPC_AUTH_GSS_KRB5I,
+ .qop = GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT,
+ .service = RPC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY,
+ .name = "krb5i",
+ .datatouch = true,
+ },
+ [2] = {
+ .pseudoflavor = RPC_AUTH_GSS_KRB5P,
+ .qop = GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT,
+ .service = RPC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY,
+ .name = "krb5p",
+ .datatouch = true,
+ },
+};
+
+MODULE_ALIAS("rpc-auth-gss-krb5");
+MODULE_ALIAS("rpc-auth-gss-krb5i");
+MODULE_ALIAS("rpc-auth-gss-krb5p");
+MODULE_ALIAS("rpc-auth-gss-390003");
+MODULE_ALIAS("rpc-auth-gss-390004");
+MODULE_ALIAS("rpc-auth-gss-390005");
+MODULE_ALIAS("rpc-auth-gss-1.2.840.113554.1.2.2");
+
+static struct gss_api_mech gss_kerberos_mech = {
+ .gm_name = "krb5",
+ .gm_owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .gm_oid = { 9, "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12\x01\x02\x02" },
+ .gm_ops = &gss_kerberos_ops,
+ .gm_pf_num = ARRAY_SIZE(gss_kerberos_pfs),
+ .gm_pfs = gss_kerberos_pfs,
+ .gm_upcall_enctypes = KRB5_SUPPORTED_ENCTYPES,
+};
+
+static int __init init_kerberos_module(void)
+{
+ int status;
+
+ status = gss_mech_register(&gss_kerberos_mech);
+ if (status)
+ printk("Failed to register kerberos gss mechanism!\n");
+ return status;
+}
+
+static void __exit cleanup_kerberos_module(void)
+{
+ gss_mech_unregister(&gss_kerberos_mech);
+}
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+module_init(init_kerberos_module);
+module_exit(cleanup_kerberos_module);
diff --git a/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c b/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f1d280a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c
@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+/*
+ * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_seal.c
+ *
+ * Adapted from MIT Kerberos 5-1.2.1 lib/gssapi/krb5/k5seal.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2008 The Regents of the University of Michigan.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Andy Adamson <andros@umich.edu>
+ * J. Bruce Fields <bfields@umich.edu>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright 1993 by OpenVision Technologies, Inc.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, distribute, and sell this software
+ * and its documentation for any purpose is hereby granted without fee,
+ * provided that the above copyright notice appears in all copies and
+ * that both that copyright notice and this permission notice appear in
+ * supporting documentation, and that the name of OpenVision not be used
+ * in advertising or publicity pertaining to distribution of the software
+ * without specific, written prior permission. OpenVision makes no
+ * representations about the suitability of this software for any
+ * purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied warranty.
+ *
+ * OPENVISION DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE,
+ * INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS, IN NO
+ * EVENT SHALL OPENVISION BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF
+ * USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR
+ * OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR
+ * PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 1998 by the FundsXpress, INC.
+ *
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Export of this software from the United States of America may require
+ * a specific license from the United States Government. It is the
+ * responsibility of any person or organization contemplating export to
+ * obtain such a license before exporting.
+ *
+ * WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and
+ * distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and
+ * without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright
+ * notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and
+ * this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that
+ * the name of FundsXpress. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining
+ * to distribution of the software without specific, written prior
+ * permission. FundsXpress makes no representations about the suitability of
+ * this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express
+ * or implied warranty.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/jiffies.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG)
+# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH
+#endif
+
+static void *
+setup_token(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, struct xdr_netobj *token)
+{
+ u16 *ptr;
+ void *krb5_hdr;
+ int body_size = GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + ctx->gk5e->cksumlength;
+
+ token->len = g_token_size(&ctx->mech_used, body_size);
+
+ ptr = (u16 *)token->data;
+ g_make_token_header(&ctx->mech_used, body_size, (unsigned char **)&ptr);
+
+ /* ptr now at start of header described in rfc 1964, section 1.2.1: */
+ krb5_hdr = ptr;
+ *ptr++ = KG_TOK_MIC_MSG;
+ /*
+ * signalg is stored as if it were converted from LE to host endian, even
+ * though it's an opaque pair of bytes according to the RFC.
+ */
+ *ptr++ = (__force u16)cpu_to_le16(ctx->gk5e->signalg);
+ *ptr++ = SEAL_ALG_NONE;
+ *ptr = 0xffff;
+
+ return krb5_hdr;
+}
+
+static void *
+setup_token_v2(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, struct xdr_netobj *token)
+{
+ u16 *ptr;
+ void *krb5_hdr;
+ u8 *p, flags = 0x00;
+
+ if ((ctx->flags & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_INITIATOR) == 0)
+ flags |= 0x01;
+ if (ctx->flags & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY)
+ flags |= 0x04;
+
+ /* Per rfc 4121, sec 4.2.6.1, there is no header,
+ * just start the token */
+ krb5_hdr = ptr = (u16 *)token->data;
+
+ *ptr++ = KG2_TOK_MIC;
+ p = (u8 *)ptr;
+ *p++ = flags;
+ *p++ = 0xff;
+ ptr = (u16 *)p;
+ *ptr++ = 0xffff;
+ *ptr = 0xffff;
+
+ token->len = GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + ctx->gk5e->cksumlength;
+ return krb5_hdr;
+}
+
+static u32
+gss_get_mic_v1(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, struct xdr_buf *text,
+ struct xdr_netobj *token)
+{
+ char cksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN];
+ struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = sizeof(cksumdata),
+ .data = cksumdata};
+ void *ptr;
+ time64_t now;
+ u32 seq_send;
+ u8 *cksumkey;
+
+ dprintk("RPC: %s\n", __func__);
+ BUG_ON(ctx == NULL);
+
+ now = ktime_get_real_seconds();
+
+ ptr = setup_token(ctx, token);
+
+ if (ctx->gk5e->keyed_cksum)
+ cksumkey = ctx->cksum;
+ else
+ cksumkey = NULL;
+
+ if (make_checksum(ctx, ptr, 8, text, 0, cksumkey,
+ KG_USAGE_SIGN, &md5cksum))
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+ memcpy(ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len);
+
+ seq_send = atomic_fetch_inc(&ctx->seq_send);
+
+ if (krb5_make_seq_num(ctx, ctx->seq, ctx->initiate ? 0 : 0xff,
+ seq_send, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, ptr + 8))
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+ return (ctx->endtime < now) ? GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED : GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+static u32
+gss_get_mic_v2(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, struct xdr_buf *text,
+ struct xdr_netobj *token)
+{
+ char cksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN];
+ struct xdr_netobj cksumobj = { .len = sizeof(cksumdata),
+ .data = cksumdata};
+ void *krb5_hdr;
+ time64_t now;
+ u8 *cksumkey;
+ unsigned int cksum_usage;
+ __be64 seq_send_be64;
+
+ dprintk("RPC: %s\n", __func__);
+
+ krb5_hdr = setup_token_v2(ctx, token);
+
+ /* Set up the sequence number. Now 64-bits in clear
+ * text and w/o direction indicator */
+ seq_send_be64 = cpu_to_be64(atomic64_fetch_inc(&ctx->seq_send64));
+ memcpy(krb5_hdr + 8, (char *) &seq_send_be64, 8);
+
+ if (ctx->initiate) {
+ cksumkey = ctx->initiator_sign;
+ cksum_usage = KG_USAGE_INITIATOR_SIGN;
+ } else {
+ cksumkey = ctx->acceptor_sign;
+ cksum_usage = KG_USAGE_ACCEPTOR_SIGN;
+ }
+
+ if (make_checksum_v2(ctx, krb5_hdr, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN,
+ text, 0, cksumkey, cksum_usage, &cksumobj))
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+ memcpy(krb5_hdr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, cksumobj.data, cksumobj.len);
+
+ now = ktime_get_real_seconds();
+
+ return (ctx->endtime < now) ? GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED : GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+u32
+gss_get_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gss_ctx, struct xdr_buf *text,
+ struct xdr_netobj *token)
+{
+ struct krb5_ctx *ctx = gss_ctx->internal_ctx_id;
+
+ switch (ctx->enctype) {
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW:
+ case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW:
+ case ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC:
+ return gss_get_mic_v1(ctx, text, token);
+ case ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
+ case ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
+ return gss_get_mic_v2(ctx, text, token);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seqnum.c b/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seqnum.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5071051
--- /dev/null
+++ b/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seqnum.c
@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
+/*
+ * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_seqnum.c
+ *
+ * Adapted from MIT Kerberos 5-1.2.1 lib/gssapi/krb5/util_seqnum.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 The Regents of the University of Michigan.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Andy Adamson <andros@umich.edu>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright 1993 by OpenVision Technologies, Inc.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, distribute, and sell this software
+ * and its documentation for any purpose is hereby granted without fee,
+ * provided that the above copyright notice appears in all copies and
+ * that both that copyright notice and this permission notice appear in
+ * supporting documentation, and that the name of OpenVision not be used
+ * in advertising or publicity pertaining to distribution of the software
+ * without specific, written prior permission. OpenVision makes no
+ * representations about the suitability of this software for any
+ * purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied warranty.
+ *
+ * OPENVISION DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE,
+ * INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS, IN NO
+ * EVENT SHALL OPENVISION BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF
+ * USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR
+ * OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR
+ * PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h>
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG)
+# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH
+#endif
+
+static s32
+krb5_make_rc4_seq_num(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int direction, s32 seqnum,
+ unsigned char *cksum, unsigned char *buf)
+{
+ struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher;
+ unsigned char *plain;
+ s32 code;
+
+ dprintk("RPC: %s:\n", __func__);
+ cipher = crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher(kctx->gk5e->encrypt_name, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(cipher))
+ return PTR_ERR(cipher);
+
+ plain = kmalloc(8, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!plain)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ plain[0] = (unsigned char) ((seqnum >> 24) & 0xff);
+ plain[1] = (unsigned char) ((seqnum >> 16) & 0xff);
+ plain[2] = (unsigned char) ((seqnum >> 8) & 0xff);
+ plain[3] = (unsigned char) ((seqnum >> 0) & 0xff);
+ plain[4] = direction;
+ plain[5] = direction;
+ plain[6] = direction;
+ plain[7] = direction;
+
+ code = krb5_rc4_setup_seq_key(kctx, cipher, cksum);
+ if (code)
+ goto out;
+
+ code = krb5_encrypt(cipher, cksum, plain, buf, 8);
+out:
+ kfree(plain);
+ crypto_free_sync_skcipher(cipher);
+ return code;
+}
+s32
+krb5_make_seq_num(struct krb5_ctx *kctx,
+ struct crypto_sync_skcipher *key,
+ int direction,
+ u32 seqnum,
+ unsigned char *cksum, unsigned char *buf)
+{
+ unsigned char *plain;
+ s32 code;
+
+ if (kctx->enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC)
+ return krb5_make_rc4_seq_num(kctx, direction, seqnum,
+ cksum, buf);
+
+ plain = kmalloc(8, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!plain)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ plain[0] = (unsigned char) (seqnum & 0xff);
+ plain[1] = (unsigned char) ((seqnum >> 8) & 0xff);
+ plain[2] = (unsigned char) ((seqnum >> 16) & 0xff);
+ plain[3] = (unsigned char) ((seqnum >> 24) & 0xff);
+
+ plain[4] = direction;
+ plain[5] = direction;
+ plain[6] = direction;
+ plain[7] = direction;
+
+ code = krb5_encrypt(key, cksum, plain, buf, 8);
+ kfree(plain);
+ return code;
+}
+
+static s32
+krb5_get_rc4_seq_num(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, unsigned char *cksum,
+ unsigned char *buf, int *direction, s32 *seqnum)
+{
+ struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher;
+ unsigned char *plain;
+ s32 code;
+
+ dprintk("RPC: %s:\n", __func__);
+ cipher = crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher(kctx->gk5e->encrypt_name, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(cipher))
+ return PTR_ERR(cipher);
+
+ code = krb5_rc4_setup_seq_key(kctx, cipher, cksum);
+ if (code)
+ goto out;
+
+ plain = kmalloc(8, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!plain) {
+ code = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ code = krb5_decrypt(cipher, cksum, buf, plain, 8);
+ if (code)
+ goto out_plain;
+
+ if ((plain[4] != plain[5]) || (plain[4] != plain[6])
+ || (plain[4] != plain[7])) {
+ code = (s32)KG_BAD_SEQ;
+ goto out_plain;
+ }
+
+ *direction = plain[4];
+
+ *seqnum = ((plain[0] << 24) | (plain[1] << 16) |
+ (plain[2] << 8) | (plain[3]));
+out_plain:
+ kfree(plain);
+out:
+ crypto_free_sync_skcipher(cipher);
+ return code;
+}
+
+s32
+krb5_get_seq_num(struct krb5_ctx *kctx,
+ unsigned char *cksum,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ int *direction, u32 *seqnum)
+{
+ s32 code;
+ unsigned char *plain;
+ struct crypto_sync_skcipher *key = kctx->seq;
+
+ dprintk("RPC: krb5_get_seq_num:\n");
+
+ if (kctx->enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC)
+ return krb5_get_rc4_seq_num(kctx, cksum, buf,
+ direction, seqnum);
+ plain = kmalloc(8, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!plain)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if ((code = krb5_decrypt(key, cksum, buf, plain, 8)))
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((plain[4] != plain[5]) || (plain[4] != plain[6]) ||
+ (plain[4] != plain[7])) {
+ code = (s32)KG_BAD_SEQ;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ *direction = plain[4];
+
+ *seqnum = ((plain[0]) |
+ (plain[1] << 8) | (plain[2] << 16) | (plain[3] << 24));
+
+out:
+ kfree(plain);
+ return code;
+}
diff --git a/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c b/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aaab91c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c
@@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
+/*
+ * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_unseal.c
+ *
+ * Adapted from MIT Kerberos 5-1.2.1 lib/gssapi/krb5/k5unseal.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2008 The Regents of the University of Michigan.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Andy Adamson <andros@umich.edu>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright 1993 by OpenVision Technologies, Inc.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, distribute, and sell this software
+ * and its documentation for any purpose is hereby granted without fee,
+ * provided that the above copyright notice appears in all copies and
+ * that both that copyright notice and this permission notice appear in
+ * supporting documentation, and that the name of OpenVision not be used
+ * in advertising or publicity pertaining to distribution of the software
+ * without specific, written prior permission. OpenVision makes no
+ * representations about the suitability of this software for any
+ * purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied warranty.
+ *
+ * OPENVISION DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE,
+ * INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS, IN NO
+ * EVENT SHALL OPENVISION BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF
+ * USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR
+ * OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR
+ * PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 1998 by the FundsXpress, INC.
+ *
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Export of this software from the United States of America may require
+ * a specific license from the United States Government. It is the
+ * responsibility of any person or organization contemplating export to
+ * obtain such a license before exporting.
+ *
+ * WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and
+ * distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and
+ * without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright
+ * notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and
+ * this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that
+ * the name of FundsXpress. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining
+ * to distribution of the software without specific, written prior
+ * permission. FundsXpress makes no representations about the suitability of
+ * this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express
+ * or implied warranty.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/jiffies.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG)
+# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH
+#endif
+
+
+/* read_token is a mic token, and message_buffer is the data that the mic was
+ * supposedly taken over. */
+
+static u32
+gss_verify_mic_v1(struct krb5_ctx *ctx,
+ struct xdr_buf *message_buffer, struct xdr_netobj *read_token)
+{
+ int signalg;
+ int sealalg;
+ char cksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN];
+ struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = sizeof(cksumdata),
+ .data = cksumdata};
+ s32 now;
+ int direction;
+ u32 seqnum;
+ unsigned char *ptr = (unsigned char *)read_token->data;
+ int bodysize;
+ u8 *cksumkey;
+
+ dprintk("RPC: krb5_read_token\n");
+
+ if (g_verify_token_header(&ctx->mech_used, &bodysize, &ptr,
+ read_token->len))
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+
+ if ((ptr[0] != ((KG_TOK_MIC_MSG >> 8) & 0xff)) ||
+ (ptr[1] != (KG_TOK_MIC_MSG & 0xff)))
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+
+ /* XXX sanity-check bodysize?? */
+
+ signalg = ptr[2] + (ptr[3] << 8);
+ if (signalg != ctx->gk5e->signalg)
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+
+ sealalg = ptr[4] + (ptr[5] << 8);
+ if (sealalg != SEAL_ALG_NONE)
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+
+ if ((ptr[6] != 0xff) || (ptr[7] != 0xff))
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+
+ if (ctx->gk5e->keyed_cksum)
+ cksumkey = ctx->cksum;
+ else
+ cksumkey = NULL;
+
+ if (make_checksum(ctx, ptr, 8, message_buffer, 0,
+ cksumkey, KG_USAGE_SIGN, &md5cksum))
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+ if (memcmp(md5cksum.data, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN,
+ ctx->gk5e->cksumlength))
+ return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
+
+ /* it got through unscathed. Make sure the context is unexpired */
+
+ now = ktime_get_real_seconds();
+
+ if (now > ctx->endtime)
+ return GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED;
+
+ /* do sequencing checks */
+
+ if (krb5_get_seq_num(ctx, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, ptr + 8,
+ &direction, &seqnum))
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+ if ((ctx->initiate && direction != 0xff) ||
+ (!ctx->initiate && direction != 0))
+ return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
+
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+static u32
+gss_verify_mic_v2(struct krb5_ctx *ctx,
+ struct xdr_buf *message_buffer, struct xdr_netobj *read_token)
+{
+ char cksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN];
+ struct xdr_netobj cksumobj = {.len = sizeof(cksumdata),
+ .data = cksumdata};
+ time64_t now;
+ u8 *ptr = read_token->data;
+ u8 *cksumkey;
+ u8 flags;
+ int i;
+ unsigned int cksum_usage;
+ __be16 be16_ptr;
+
+ dprintk("RPC: %s\n", __func__);
+
+ memcpy(&be16_ptr, (char *) ptr, 2);
+ if (be16_to_cpu(be16_ptr) != KG2_TOK_MIC)
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+
+ flags = ptr[2];
+ if ((!ctx->initiate && (flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SENTBYACCEPTOR)) ||
+ (ctx->initiate && !(flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SENTBYACCEPTOR)))
+ return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
+
+ if (flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SEALED) {
+ dprintk("%s: token has unexpected sealed flag\n", __func__);
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 3; i < 8; i++)
+ if (ptr[i] != 0xff)
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+
+ if (ctx->initiate) {
+ cksumkey = ctx->acceptor_sign;
+ cksum_usage = KG_USAGE_ACCEPTOR_SIGN;
+ } else {
+ cksumkey = ctx->initiator_sign;
+ cksum_usage = KG_USAGE_INITIATOR_SIGN;
+ }
+
+ if (make_checksum_v2(ctx, ptr, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, message_buffer, 0,
+ cksumkey, cksum_usage, &cksumobj))
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+ if (memcmp(cksumobj.data, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN,
+ ctx->gk5e->cksumlength))
+ return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
+
+ /* it got through unscathed. Make sure the context is unexpired */
+ now = ktime_get_real_seconds();
+ if (now > ctx->endtime)
+ return GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED;
+
+ /*
+ * NOTE: the sequence number at ptr + 8 is skipped, rpcsec_gss
+ * doesn't want it checked; see page 6 of rfc 2203.
+ */
+
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+u32
+gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gss_ctx,
+ struct xdr_buf *message_buffer,
+ struct xdr_netobj *read_token)
+{
+ struct krb5_ctx *ctx = gss_ctx->internal_ctx_id;
+
+ switch (ctx->enctype) {
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW:
+ case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW:
+ case ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC:
+ return gss_verify_mic_v1(ctx, message_buffer, read_token);
+ case ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
+ case ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
+ return gss_verify_mic_v2(ctx, message_buffer, read_token);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c b/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..90b8329
--- /dev/null
+++ b/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c
@@ -0,0 +1,635 @@
+/*
+ * COPYRIGHT (c) 2008
+ * The Regents of the University of Michigan
+ * ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
+ *
+ * Permission is granted to use, copy, create derivative works
+ * and redistribute this software and such derivative works
+ * for any purpose, so long as the name of The University of
+ * Michigan is not used in any advertising or publicity
+ * pertaining to the use of distribution of this software
+ * without specific, written prior authorization. If the
+ * above copyright notice or any other identification of the
+ * University of Michigan is included in any copy of any
+ * portion of this software, then the disclaimer below must
+ * also be included.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED AS IS, WITHOUT REPRESENTATION
+ * FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AS TO ITS FITNESS FOR ANY
+ * PURPOSE, AND WITHOUT WARRANTY BY THE UNIVERSITY OF
+ * MICHIGAN OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
+ * WITHOUT LIMITATION THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE
+ * REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN SHALL NOT BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DAMAGES, INCLUDING SPECIAL, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, WITH RESPECT TO ANY CLAIM ARISING
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OF THE SOFTWARE, EVEN
+ * IF IT HAS BEEN OR IS HEREAFTER ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGES.
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/jiffies.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG)
+# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH
+#endif
+
+static inline int
+gss_krb5_padding(int blocksize, int length)
+{
+ return blocksize - (length % blocksize);
+}
+
+static inline void
+gss_krb5_add_padding(struct xdr_buf *buf, int offset, int blocksize)
+{
+ int padding = gss_krb5_padding(blocksize, buf->len - offset);
+ char *p;
+ struct kvec *iov;
+
+ if (buf->page_len || buf->tail[0].iov_len)
+ iov = &buf->tail[0];
+ else
+ iov = &buf->head[0];
+ p = iov->iov_base + iov->iov_len;
+ iov->iov_len += padding;
+ buf->len += padding;
+ memset(p, padding, padding);
+}
+
+static inline int
+gss_krb5_remove_padding(struct xdr_buf *buf, int blocksize)
+{
+ u8 *ptr;
+ u8 pad;
+ size_t len = buf->len;
+
+ if (len <= buf->head[0].iov_len) {
+ pad = *(u8 *)(buf->head[0].iov_base + len - 1);
+ if (pad > buf->head[0].iov_len)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ buf->head[0].iov_len -= pad;
+ goto out;
+ } else
+ len -= buf->head[0].iov_len;
+ if (len <= buf->page_len) {
+ unsigned int last = (buf->page_base + len - 1)
+ >>PAGE_SHIFT;
+ unsigned int offset = (buf->page_base + len - 1)
+ & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
+ ptr = kmap_atomic(buf->pages[last]);
+ pad = *(ptr + offset);
+ kunmap_atomic(ptr);
+ goto out;
+ } else
+ len -= buf->page_len;
+ BUG_ON(len > buf->tail[0].iov_len);
+ pad = *(u8 *)(buf->tail[0].iov_base + len - 1);
+out:
+ /* XXX: NOTE: we do not adjust the page lengths--they represent
+ * a range of data in the real filesystem page cache, and we need
+ * to know that range so the xdr code can properly place read data.
+ * However adjusting the head length, as we do above, is harmless.
+ * In the case of a request that fits into a single page, the server
+ * also uses length and head length together to determine the original
+ * start of the request to copy the request for deferal; so it's
+ * easier on the server if we adjust head and tail length in tandem.
+ * It's not really a problem that we don't fool with the page and
+ * tail lengths, though--at worst badly formed xdr might lead the
+ * server to attempt to parse the padding.
+ * XXX: Document all these weird requirements for gss mechanism
+ * wrap/unwrap functions. */
+ if (pad > blocksize)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (buf->len > pad)
+ buf->len -= pad;
+ else
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+gss_krb5_make_confounder(char *p, u32 conflen)
+{
+ static u64 i = 0;
+ u64 *q = (u64 *)p;
+
+ /* rfc1964 claims this should be "random". But all that's really
+ * necessary is that it be unique. And not even that is necessary in
+ * our case since our "gssapi" implementation exists only to support
+ * rpcsec_gss, so we know that the only buffers we will ever encrypt
+ * already begin with a unique sequence number. Just to hedge my bets
+ * I'll make a half-hearted attempt at something unique, but ensuring
+ * uniqueness would mean worrying about atomicity and rollover, and I
+ * don't care enough. */
+
+ /* initialize to random value */
+ if (i == 0) {
+ i = prandom_u32();
+ i = (i << 32) | prandom_u32();
+ }
+
+ switch (conflen) {
+ case 16:
+ *q++ = i++;
+ /* fall through */
+ case 8:
+ *q++ = i++;
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ }
+}
+
+/* Assumptions: the head and tail of inbuf are ours to play with.
+ * The pages, however, may be real pages in the page cache and we replace
+ * them with scratch pages from **pages before writing to them. */
+/* XXX: obviously the above should be documentation of wrap interface,
+ * and shouldn't be in this kerberos-specific file. */
+
+/* XXX factor out common code with seal/unseal. */
+
+static u32
+gss_wrap_kerberos_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset,
+ struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages)
+{
+ char cksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN];
+ struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = sizeof(cksumdata),
+ .data = cksumdata};
+ int blocksize = 0, plainlen;
+ unsigned char *ptr, *msg_start;
+ time64_t now;
+ int headlen;
+ struct page **tmp_pages;
+ u32 seq_send;
+ u8 *cksumkey;
+ u32 conflen = kctx->gk5e->conflen;
+
+ dprintk("RPC: %s\n", __func__);
+
+ now = ktime_get_real_seconds();
+
+ blocksize = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(kctx->enc);
+ gss_krb5_add_padding(buf, offset, blocksize);
+ BUG_ON((buf->len - offset) % blocksize);
+ plainlen = conflen + buf->len - offset;
+
+ headlen = g_token_size(&kctx->mech_used,
+ GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + kctx->gk5e->cksumlength + plainlen) -
+ (buf->len - offset);
+
+ ptr = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset;
+ /* shift data to make room for header. */
+ xdr_extend_head(buf, offset, headlen);
+
+ /* XXX Would be cleverer to encrypt while copying. */
+ BUG_ON((buf->len - offset - headlen) % blocksize);
+
+ g_make_token_header(&kctx->mech_used,
+ GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN +
+ kctx->gk5e->cksumlength + plainlen, &ptr);
+
+
+ /* ptr now at header described in rfc 1964, section 1.2.1: */
+ ptr[0] = (unsigned char) ((KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG >> 8) & 0xff);
+ ptr[1] = (unsigned char) (KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG & 0xff);
+
+ msg_start = ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + kctx->gk5e->cksumlength;
+
+ /*
+ * signalg and sealalg are stored as if they were converted from LE
+ * to host endian, even though they're opaque pairs of bytes according
+ * to the RFC.
+ */
+ *(__le16 *)(ptr + 2) = cpu_to_le16(kctx->gk5e->signalg);
+ *(__le16 *)(ptr + 4) = cpu_to_le16(kctx->gk5e->sealalg);
+ ptr[6] = 0xff;
+ ptr[7] = 0xff;
+
+ gss_krb5_make_confounder(msg_start, conflen);
+
+ if (kctx->gk5e->keyed_cksum)
+ cksumkey = kctx->cksum;
+ else
+ cksumkey = NULL;
+
+ /* XXXJBF: UGH!: */
+ tmp_pages = buf->pages;
+ buf->pages = pages;
+ if (make_checksum(kctx, ptr, 8, buf, offset + headlen - conflen,
+ cksumkey, KG_USAGE_SEAL, &md5cksum))
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ buf->pages = tmp_pages;
+
+ memcpy(ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len);
+
+ seq_send = atomic_fetch_inc(&kctx->seq_send);
+
+ /* XXX would probably be more efficient to compute checksum
+ * and encrypt at the same time: */
+ if ((krb5_make_seq_num(kctx, kctx->seq, kctx->initiate ? 0 : 0xff,
+ seq_send, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, ptr + 8)))
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+ if (kctx->enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
+ struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher;
+ int err;
+ cipher = crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher(kctx->gk5e->encrypt_name,
+ 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(cipher))
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+ krb5_rc4_setup_enc_key(kctx, cipher, seq_send);
+
+ err = gss_encrypt_xdr_buf(cipher, buf,
+ offset + headlen - conflen, pages);
+ crypto_free_sync_skcipher(cipher);
+ if (err)
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ } else {
+ if (gss_encrypt_xdr_buf(kctx->enc, buf,
+ offset + headlen - conflen, pages))
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ return (kctx->endtime < now) ? GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED : GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+static u32
+gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, int len,
+ struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int *slack,
+ unsigned int *align)
+{
+ int signalg;
+ int sealalg;
+ char cksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN];
+ struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = sizeof(cksumdata),
+ .data = cksumdata};
+ time64_t now;
+ int direction;
+ s32 seqnum;
+ unsigned char *ptr;
+ int bodysize;
+ void *data_start, *orig_start;
+ int data_len;
+ int blocksize;
+ u32 conflen = kctx->gk5e->conflen;
+ int crypt_offset;
+ u8 *cksumkey;
+ unsigned int saved_len = buf->len;
+
+ dprintk("RPC: gss_unwrap_kerberos\n");
+
+ ptr = (u8 *)buf->head[0].iov_base + offset;
+ if (g_verify_token_header(&kctx->mech_used, &bodysize, &ptr,
+ len - offset))
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+
+ if ((ptr[0] != ((KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG >> 8) & 0xff)) ||
+ (ptr[1] != (KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG & 0xff)))
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+
+ /* XXX sanity-check bodysize?? */
+
+ /* get the sign and seal algorithms */
+
+ signalg = ptr[2] + (ptr[3] << 8);
+ if (signalg != kctx->gk5e->signalg)
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+
+ sealalg = ptr[4] + (ptr[5] << 8);
+ if (sealalg != kctx->gk5e->sealalg)
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+
+ if ((ptr[6] != 0xff) || (ptr[7] != 0xff))
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+
+ /*
+ * Data starts after token header and checksum. ptr points
+ * to the beginning of the token header
+ */
+ crypt_offset = ptr + (GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) -
+ (unsigned char *)buf->head[0].iov_base;
+
+ /*
+ * Need plaintext seqnum to derive encryption key for arcfour-hmac
+ */
+ if (krb5_get_seq_num(kctx, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN,
+ ptr + 8, &direction, &seqnum))
+ return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
+
+ if ((kctx->initiate && direction != 0xff) ||
+ (!kctx->initiate && direction != 0))
+ return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
+
+ buf->len = len;
+ if (kctx->enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
+ struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher;
+ int err;
+
+ cipher = crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher(kctx->gk5e->encrypt_name,
+ 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(cipher))
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+ krb5_rc4_setup_enc_key(kctx, cipher, seqnum);
+
+ err = gss_decrypt_xdr_buf(cipher, buf, crypt_offset);
+ crypto_free_sync_skcipher(cipher);
+ if (err)
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ } else {
+ if (gss_decrypt_xdr_buf(kctx->enc, buf, crypt_offset))
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ }
+
+ if (kctx->gk5e->keyed_cksum)
+ cksumkey = kctx->cksum;
+ else
+ cksumkey = NULL;
+
+ if (make_checksum(kctx, ptr, 8, buf, crypt_offset,
+ cksumkey, KG_USAGE_SEAL, &md5cksum))
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+ if (memcmp(md5cksum.data, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN,
+ kctx->gk5e->cksumlength))
+ return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
+
+ /* it got through unscathed. Make sure the context is unexpired */
+
+ now = ktime_get_real_seconds();
+
+ if (now > kctx->endtime)
+ return GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED;
+
+ /* do sequencing checks */
+
+ /* Copy the data back to the right position. XXX: Would probably be
+ * better to copy and encrypt at the same time. */
+
+ blocksize = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(kctx->enc);
+ data_start = ptr + (GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) +
+ conflen;
+ orig_start = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset;
+ data_len = (buf->head[0].iov_base + buf->head[0].iov_len) - data_start;
+ memmove(orig_start, data_start, data_len);
+ buf->head[0].iov_len -= (data_start - orig_start);
+ buf->len = len - (data_start - orig_start);
+
+ if (gss_krb5_remove_padding(buf, blocksize))
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+
+ /* slack must include room for krb5 padding */
+ *slack = XDR_QUADLEN(saved_len - buf->len);
+ /* The GSS blob always precedes the RPC message payload */
+ *align = *slack;
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * We can shift data by up to LOCAL_BUF_LEN bytes in a pass. If we need
+ * to do more than that, we shift repeatedly. Kevin Coffman reports
+ * seeing 28 bytes as the value used by Microsoft clients and servers
+ * with AES, so this constant is chosen to allow handling 28 in one pass
+ * without using too much stack space.
+ *
+ * If that proves to a problem perhaps we could use a more clever
+ * algorithm.
+ */
+#define LOCAL_BUF_LEN 32u
+
+static void rotate_buf_a_little(struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int shift)
+{
+ char head[LOCAL_BUF_LEN];
+ char tmp[LOCAL_BUF_LEN];
+ unsigned int this_len, i;
+
+ BUG_ON(shift > LOCAL_BUF_LEN);
+
+ read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, 0, head, shift);
+ for (i = 0; i + shift < buf->len; i += LOCAL_BUF_LEN) {
+ this_len = min(LOCAL_BUF_LEN, buf->len - (i + shift));
+ read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, i+shift, tmp, this_len);
+ write_bytes_to_xdr_buf(buf, i, tmp, this_len);
+ }
+ write_bytes_to_xdr_buf(buf, buf->len - shift, head, shift);
+}
+
+static void _rotate_left(struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int shift)
+{
+ int shifted = 0;
+ int this_shift;
+
+ shift %= buf->len;
+ while (shifted < shift) {
+ this_shift = min(shift - shifted, LOCAL_BUF_LEN);
+ rotate_buf_a_little(buf, this_shift);
+ shifted += this_shift;
+ }
+}
+
+static void rotate_left(u32 base, struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int shift)
+{
+ struct xdr_buf subbuf;
+
+ xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, &subbuf, base, buf->len - base);
+ _rotate_left(&subbuf, shift);
+}
+
+static u32
+gss_wrap_kerberos_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset,
+ struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages)
+{
+ u8 *ptr, *plainhdr;
+ time64_t now;
+ u8 flags = 0x00;
+ __be16 *be16ptr;
+ __be64 *be64ptr;
+ u32 err;
+
+ dprintk("RPC: %s\n", __func__);
+
+ if (kctx->gk5e->encrypt_v2 == NULL)
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+ /* make room for gss token header */
+ if (xdr_extend_head(buf, offset, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN))
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+ /* construct gss token header */
+ ptr = plainhdr = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset;
+ *ptr++ = (unsigned char) ((KG2_TOK_WRAP>>8) & 0xff);
+ *ptr++ = (unsigned char) (KG2_TOK_WRAP & 0xff);
+
+ if ((kctx->flags & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_INITIATOR) == 0)
+ flags |= KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SENTBYACCEPTOR;
+ if ((kctx->flags & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY) != 0)
+ flags |= KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_ACCEPTORSUBKEY;
+ /* We always do confidentiality in wrap tokens */
+ flags |= KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SEALED;
+
+ *ptr++ = flags;
+ *ptr++ = 0xff;
+ be16ptr = (__be16 *)ptr;
+
+ *be16ptr++ = 0;
+ /* "inner" token header always uses 0 for RRC */
+ *be16ptr++ = 0;
+
+ be64ptr = (__be64 *)be16ptr;
+ *be64ptr = cpu_to_be64(atomic64_fetch_inc(&kctx->seq_send64));
+
+ err = (*kctx->gk5e->encrypt_v2)(kctx, offset, buf, pages);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ now = ktime_get_real_seconds();
+ return (kctx->endtime < now) ? GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED : GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+static u32
+gss_unwrap_kerberos_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, int len,
+ struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int *slack,
+ unsigned int *align)
+{
+ time64_t now;
+ u8 *ptr;
+ u8 flags = 0x00;
+ u16 ec, rrc;
+ int err;
+ u32 headskip, tailskip;
+ u8 decrypted_hdr[GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN];
+ unsigned int movelen;
+
+
+ dprintk("RPC: %s\n", __func__);
+
+ if (kctx->gk5e->decrypt_v2 == NULL)
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+ ptr = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset;
+
+ if (be16_to_cpu(*((__be16 *)ptr)) != KG2_TOK_WRAP)
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+
+ flags = ptr[2];
+ if ((!kctx->initiate && (flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SENTBYACCEPTOR)) ||
+ (kctx->initiate && !(flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SENTBYACCEPTOR)))
+ return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
+
+ if ((flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SEALED) == 0) {
+ dprintk("%s: token missing expected sealed flag\n", __func__);
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ }
+
+ if (ptr[3] != 0xff)
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+
+ ec = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)(ptr + 4));
+ rrc = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)(ptr + 6));
+
+ /*
+ * NOTE: the sequence number at ptr + 8 is skipped, rpcsec_gss
+ * doesn't want it checked; see page 6 of rfc 2203.
+ */
+
+ if (rrc != 0)
+ rotate_left(offset + 16, buf, rrc);
+
+ err = (*kctx->gk5e->decrypt_v2)(kctx, offset, len, buf,
+ &headskip, &tailskip);
+ if (err)
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+ /*
+ * Retrieve the decrypted gss token header and verify
+ * it against the original
+ */
+ err = read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf,
+ len - GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN - tailskip,
+ decrypted_hdr, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN);
+ if (err) {
+ dprintk("%s: error %u getting decrypted_hdr\n", __func__, err);
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+ if (memcmp(ptr, decrypted_hdr, 6)
+ || memcmp(ptr + 8, decrypted_hdr + 8, 8)) {
+ dprintk("%s: token hdr, plaintext hdr mismatch!\n", __func__);
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ /* do sequencing checks */
+
+ /* it got through unscathed. Make sure the context is unexpired */
+ now = ktime_get_real_seconds();
+ if (now > kctx->endtime)
+ return GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED;
+
+ /*
+ * Move the head data back to the right position in xdr_buf.
+ * We ignore any "ec" data since it might be in the head or
+ * the tail, and we really don't need to deal with it.
+ * Note that buf->head[0].iov_len may indicate the available
+ * head buffer space rather than that actually occupied.
+ */
+ movelen = min_t(unsigned int, buf->head[0].iov_len, len);
+ movelen -= offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip;
+ BUG_ON(offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip + movelen >
+ buf->head[0].iov_len);
+ memmove(ptr, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip, movelen);
+ buf->head[0].iov_len -= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip;
+ buf->len = len - (GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip);
+
+ /* Trim off the trailing "extra count" and checksum blob */
+ xdr_buf_trim(buf, ec + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + tailskip);
+
+ *align = XDR_QUADLEN(GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip);
+ *slack = *align + XDR_QUADLEN(ec + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + tailskip);
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+u32
+gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, int offset,
+ struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages)
+{
+ struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
+
+ switch (kctx->enctype) {
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW:
+ case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW:
+ case ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC:
+ return gss_wrap_kerberos_v1(kctx, offset, buf, pages);
+ case ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
+ case ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
+ return gss_wrap_kerberos_v2(kctx, offset, buf, pages);
+ }
+}
+
+u32
+gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, int offset,
+ int len, struct xdr_buf *buf)
+{
+ struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
+
+ switch (kctx->enctype) {
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW:
+ case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW:
+ case ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC:
+ return gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1(kctx, offset, len, buf,
+ &gctx->slack, &gctx->align);
+ case ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
+ case ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
+ return gss_unwrap_kerberos_v2(kctx, offset, len, buf,
+ &gctx->slack, &gctx->align);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_mech_switch.c b/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_mech_switch.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..95cebc9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_mech_switch.c
@@ -0,0 +1,475 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+/*
+ * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_mech_switch.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 The Regents of the University of Michigan.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * J. Bruce Fields <bfields@umich.edu>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/msg_prot.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_asn1.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/auth_gss.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/svcauth_gss.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_err.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_api.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/clnt.h>
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG)
+# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH
+#endif
+
+static LIST_HEAD(registered_mechs);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(registered_mechs_lock);
+
+static void
+gss_mech_free(struct gss_api_mech *gm)
+{
+ struct pf_desc *pf;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < gm->gm_pf_num; i++) {
+ pf = &gm->gm_pfs[i];
+ if (pf->domain)
+ auth_domain_put(pf->domain);
+ kfree(pf->auth_domain_name);
+ pf->auth_domain_name = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+static inline char *
+make_auth_domain_name(char *name)
+{
+ static char *prefix = "gss/";
+ char *new;
+
+ new = kmalloc(strlen(name) + strlen(prefix) + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (new) {
+ strcpy(new, prefix);
+ strcat(new, name);
+ }
+ return new;
+}
+
+static int
+gss_mech_svc_setup(struct gss_api_mech *gm)
+{
+ struct auth_domain *dom;
+ struct pf_desc *pf;
+ int i, status;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < gm->gm_pf_num; i++) {
+ pf = &gm->gm_pfs[i];
+ pf->auth_domain_name = make_auth_domain_name(pf->name);
+ status = -ENOMEM;
+ if (pf->auth_domain_name == NULL)
+ goto out;
+ dom = svcauth_gss_register_pseudoflavor(
+ pf->pseudoflavor, pf->auth_domain_name);
+ if (IS_ERR(dom)) {
+ status = PTR_ERR(dom);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ pf->domain = dom;
+ }
+ return 0;
+out:
+ gss_mech_free(gm);
+ return status;
+}
+
+/**
+ * gss_mech_register - register a GSS mechanism
+ * @gm: GSS mechanism handle
+ *
+ * Returns zero if successful, or a negative errno.
+ */
+int gss_mech_register(struct gss_api_mech *gm)
+{
+ int status;
+
+ status = gss_mech_svc_setup(gm);
+ if (status)
+ return status;
+ spin_lock(®istered_mechs_lock);
+ list_add_rcu(&gm->gm_list, ®istered_mechs);
+ spin_unlock(®istered_mechs_lock);
+ dprintk("RPC: registered gss mechanism %s\n", gm->gm_name);
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gss_mech_register);
+
+/**
+ * gss_mech_unregister - release a GSS mechanism
+ * @gm: GSS mechanism handle
+ *
+ */
+void gss_mech_unregister(struct gss_api_mech *gm)
+{
+ spin_lock(®istered_mechs_lock);
+ list_del_rcu(&gm->gm_list);
+ spin_unlock(®istered_mechs_lock);
+ dprintk("RPC: unregistered gss mechanism %s\n", gm->gm_name);
+ gss_mech_free(gm);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gss_mech_unregister);
+
+struct gss_api_mech *gss_mech_get(struct gss_api_mech *gm)
+{
+ __module_get(gm->gm_owner);
+ return gm;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gss_mech_get);
+
+static struct gss_api_mech *
+_gss_mech_get_by_name(const char *name)
+{
+ struct gss_api_mech *pos, *gm = NULL;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(pos, ®istered_mechs, gm_list) {
+ if (0 == strcmp(name, pos->gm_name)) {
+ if (try_module_get(pos->gm_owner))
+ gm = pos;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return gm;
+
+}
+
+struct gss_api_mech * gss_mech_get_by_name(const char *name)
+{
+ struct gss_api_mech *gm = NULL;
+
+ gm = _gss_mech_get_by_name(name);
+ if (!gm) {
+ request_module("rpc-auth-gss-%s", name);
+ gm = _gss_mech_get_by_name(name);
+ }
+ return gm;
+}
+
+struct gss_api_mech *gss_mech_get_by_OID(struct rpcsec_gss_oid *obj)
+{
+ struct gss_api_mech *pos, *gm = NULL;
+ char buf[32];
+
+ if (sprint_oid(obj->data, obj->len, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ dprintk("RPC: %s(%s)\n", __func__, buf);
+ request_module("rpc-auth-gss-%s", buf);
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(pos, ®istered_mechs, gm_list) {
+ if (obj->len == pos->gm_oid.len) {
+ if (0 == memcmp(obj->data, pos->gm_oid.data, obj->len)) {
+ if (try_module_get(pos->gm_owner))
+ gm = pos;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return gm;
+}
+
+static inline int
+mech_supports_pseudoflavor(struct gss_api_mech *gm, u32 pseudoflavor)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < gm->gm_pf_num; i++) {
+ if (gm->gm_pfs[i].pseudoflavor == pseudoflavor)
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct gss_api_mech *_gss_mech_get_by_pseudoflavor(u32 pseudoflavor)
+{
+ struct gss_api_mech *gm = NULL, *pos;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(pos, ®istered_mechs, gm_list) {
+ if (!mech_supports_pseudoflavor(pos, pseudoflavor))
+ continue;
+ if (try_module_get(pos->gm_owner))
+ gm = pos;
+ break;
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return gm;
+}
+
+struct gss_api_mech *
+gss_mech_get_by_pseudoflavor(u32 pseudoflavor)
+{
+ struct gss_api_mech *gm;
+
+ gm = _gss_mech_get_by_pseudoflavor(pseudoflavor);
+
+ if (!gm) {
+ request_module("rpc-auth-gss-%u", pseudoflavor);
+ gm = _gss_mech_get_by_pseudoflavor(pseudoflavor);
+ }
+ return gm;
+}
+
+/**
+ * gss_mech_list_pseudoflavors - Discover registered GSS pseudoflavors
+ * @array_ptr: array to fill in
+ * @size: size of "array"
+ *
+ * Returns the number of array items filled in, or a negative errno.
+ *
+ * The returned array is not sorted by any policy. Callers should not
+ * rely on the order of the items in the returned array.
+ */
+int gss_mech_list_pseudoflavors(rpc_authflavor_t *array_ptr, int size)
+{
+ struct gss_api_mech *pos = NULL;
+ int j, i = 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(pos, ®istered_mechs, gm_list) {
+ for (j = 0; j < pos->gm_pf_num; j++) {
+ if (i >= size) {
+ spin_unlock(®istered_mechs_lock);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ array_ptr[i++] = pos->gm_pfs[j].pseudoflavor;
+ }
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return i;
+}
+
+/**
+ * gss_svc_to_pseudoflavor - map a GSS service number to a pseudoflavor
+ * @gm: GSS mechanism handle
+ * @qop: GSS quality-of-protection value
+ * @service: GSS service value
+ *
+ * Returns a matching security flavor, or RPC_AUTH_MAXFLAVOR if none is found.
+ */
+rpc_authflavor_t gss_svc_to_pseudoflavor(struct gss_api_mech *gm, u32 qop,
+ u32 service)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < gm->gm_pf_num; i++) {
+ if (gm->gm_pfs[i].qop == qop &&
+ gm->gm_pfs[i].service == service) {
+ return gm->gm_pfs[i].pseudoflavor;
+ }
+ }
+ return RPC_AUTH_MAXFLAVOR;
+}
+
+/**
+ * gss_mech_info2flavor - look up a pseudoflavor given a GSS tuple
+ * @info: a GSS mech OID, quality of protection, and service value
+ *
+ * Returns a matching pseudoflavor, or RPC_AUTH_MAXFLAVOR if the tuple is
+ * not supported.
+ */
+rpc_authflavor_t gss_mech_info2flavor(struct rpcsec_gss_info *info)
+{
+ rpc_authflavor_t pseudoflavor;
+ struct gss_api_mech *gm;
+
+ gm = gss_mech_get_by_OID(&info->oid);
+ if (gm == NULL)
+ return RPC_AUTH_MAXFLAVOR;
+
+ pseudoflavor = gss_svc_to_pseudoflavor(gm, info->qop, info->service);
+
+ gss_mech_put(gm);
+ return pseudoflavor;
+}
+
+/**
+ * gss_mech_flavor2info - look up a GSS tuple for a given pseudoflavor
+ * @pseudoflavor: GSS pseudoflavor to match
+ * @info: rpcsec_gss_info structure to fill in
+ *
+ * Returns zero and fills in "info" if pseudoflavor matches a
+ * supported mechanism. Otherwise a negative errno is returned.
+ */
+int gss_mech_flavor2info(rpc_authflavor_t pseudoflavor,
+ struct rpcsec_gss_info *info)
+{
+ struct gss_api_mech *gm;
+ int i;
+
+ gm = gss_mech_get_by_pseudoflavor(pseudoflavor);
+ if (gm == NULL)
+ return -ENOENT;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < gm->gm_pf_num; i++) {
+ if (gm->gm_pfs[i].pseudoflavor == pseudoflavor) {
+ memcpy(info->oid.data, gm->gm_oid.data, gm->gm_oid.len);
+ info->oid.len = gm->gm_oid.len;
+ info->qop = gm->gm_pfs[i].qop;
+ info->service = gm->gm_pfs[i].service;
+ gss_mech_put(gm);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ gss_mech_put(gm);
+ return -ENOENT;
+}
+
+u32
+gss_pseudoflavor_to_service(struct gss_api_mech *gm, u32 pseudoflavor)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < gm->gm_pf_num; i++) {
+ if (gm->gm_pfs[i].pseudoflavor == pseudoflavor)
+ return gm->gm_pfs[i].service;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gss_pseudoflavor_to_service);
+
+bool
+gss_pseudoflavor_to_datatouch(struct gss_api_mech *gm, u32 pseudoflavor)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < gm->gm_pf_num; i++) {
+ if (gm->gm_pfs[i].pseudoflavor == pseudoflavor)
+ return gm->gm_pfs[i].datatouch;
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+char *
+gss_service_to_auth_domain_name(struct gss_api_mech *gm, u32 service)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < gm->gm_pf_num; i++) {
+ if (gm->gm_pfs[i].service == service)
+ return gm->gm_pfs[i].auth_domain_name;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+gss_mech_put(struct gss_api_mech * gm)
+{
+ if (gm)
+ module_put(gm->gm_owner);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gss_mech_put);
+
+/* The mech could probably be determined from the token instead, but it's just
+ * as easy for now to pass it in. */
+int
+gss_import_sec_context(const void *input_token, size_t bufsize,
+ struct gss_api_mech *mech,
+ struct gss_ctx **ctx_id,
+ time64_t *endtime,
+ gfp_t gfp_mask)
+{
+ if (!(*ctx_id = kzalloc(sizeof(**ctx_id), gfp_mask)))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ (*ctx_id)->mech_type = gss_mech_get(mech);
+
+ return mech->gm_ops->gss_import_sec_context(input_token, bufsize,
+ *ctx_id, endtime, gfp_mask);
+}
+
+/* gss_get_mic: compute a mic over message and return mic_token. */
+
+u32
+gss_get_mic(struct gss_ctx *context_handle,
+ struct xdr_buf *message,
+ struct xdr_netobj *mic_token)
+{
+ return context_handle->mech_type->gm_ops
+ ->gss_get_mic(context_handle,
+ message,
+ mic_token);
+}
+
+/* gss_verify_mic: check whether the provided mic_token verifies message. */
+
+u32
+gss_verify_mic(struct gss_ctx *context_handle,
+ struct xdr_buf *message,
+ struct xdr_netobj *mic_token)
+{
+ return context_handle->mech_type->gm_ops
+ ->gss_verify_mic(context_handle,
+ message,
+ mic_token);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function is called from both the client and server code.
+ * Each makes guarantees about how much "slack" space is available
+ * for the underlying function in "buf"'s head and tail while
+ * performing the wrap.
+ *
+ * The client and server code allocate RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE extra
+ * space in both the head and tail which is available for use by
+ * the wrap function.
+ *
+ * Underlying functions should verify they do not use more than
+ * RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE of extra space in either the head or tail
+ * when performing the wrap.
+ */
+u32
+gss_wrap(struct gss_ctx *ctx_id,
+ int offset,
+ struct xdr_buf *buf,
+ struct page **inpages)
+{
+ return ctx_id->mech_type->gm_ops
+ ->gss_wrap(ctx_id, offset, buf, inpages);
+}
+
+u32
+gss_unwrap(struct gss_ctx *ctx_id,
+ int offset,
+ int len,
+ struct xdr_buf *buf)
+{
+ return ctx_id->mech_type->gm_ops
+ ->gss_unwrap(ctx_id, offset, len, buf);
+}
+
+
+/* gss_delete_sec_context: free all resources associated with context_handle.
+ * Note this differs from the RFC 2744-specified prototype in that we don't
+ * bother returning an output token, since it would never be used anyway. */
+
+u32
+gss_delete_sec_context(struct gss_ctx **context_handle)
+{
+ dprintk("RPC: gss_delete_sec_context deleting %p\n",
+ *context_handle);
+
+ if (!*context_handle)
+ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
+ if ((*context_handle)->internal_ctx_id)
+ (*context_handle)->mech_type->gm_ops
+ ->gss_delete_sec_context((*context_handle)
+ ->internal_ctx_id);
+ gss_mech_put((*context_handle)->mech_type);
+ kfree(*context_handle);
+ *context_handle=NULL;
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
diff --git a/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c b/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0349f45
--- /dev/null
+++ b/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c
@@ -0,0 +1,397 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_rpc_upcall.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/un.h>
+
+#include <linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h>
+#include "gss_rpc_upcall.h"
+
+#define GSSPROXY_SOCK_PATHNAME "/var/run/gssproxy.sock"
+
+#define GSSPROXY_PROGRAM (400112u)
+#define GSSPROXY_VERS_1 (1u)
+
+/*
+ * Encoding/Decoding functions
+ */
+
+enum {
+ GSSX_NULL = 0, /* Unused */
+ GSSX_INDICATE_MECHS = 1,
+ GSSX_GET_CALL_CONTEXT = 2,
+ GSSX_IMPORT_AND_CANON_NAME = 3,
+ GSSX_EXPORT_CRED = 4,
+ GSSX_IMPORT_CRED = 5,
+ GSSX_ACQUIRE_CRED = 6,
+ GSSX_STORE_CRED = 7,
+ GSSX_INIT_SEC_CONTEXT = 8,
+ GSSX_ACCEPT_SEC_CONTEXT = 9,
+ GSSX_RELEASE_HANDLE = 10,
+ GSSX_GET_MIC = 11,
+ GSSX_VERIFY = 12,
+ GSSX_WRAP = 13,
+ GSSX_UNWRAP = 14,
+ GSSX_WRAP_SIZE_LIMIT = 15,
+};
+
+#define PROC(proc, name) \
+[GSSX_##proc] = { \
+ .p_proc = GSSX_##proc, \
+ .p_encode = gssx_enc_##name, \
+ .p_decode = gssx_dec_##name, \
+ .p_arglen = GSSX_ARG_##name##_sz, \
+ .p_replen = GSSX_RES_##name##_sz, \
+ .p_statidx = GSSX_##proc, \
+ .p_name = #proc, \
+}
+
+static const struct rpc_procinfo gssp_procedures[] = {
+ PROC(INDICATE_MECHS, indicate_mechs),
+ PROC(GET_CALL_CONTEXT, get_call_context),
+ PROC(IMPORT_AND_CANON_NAME, import_and_canon_name),
+ PROC(EXPORT_CRED, export_cred),
+ PROC(IMPORT_CRED, import_cred),
+ PROC(ACQUIRE_CRED, acquire_cred),
+ PROC(STORE_CRED, store_cred),
+ PROC(INIT_SEC_CONTEXT, init_sec_context),
+ PROC(ACCEPT_SEC_CONTEXT, accept_sec_context),
+ PROC(RELEASE_HANDLE, release_handle),
+ PROC(GET_MIC, get_mic),
+ PROC(VERIFY, verify),
+ PROC(WRAP, wrap),
+ PROC(UNWRAP, unwrap),
+ PROC(WRAP_SIZE_LIMIT, wrap_size_limit),
+};
+
+
+
+/*
+ * Common transport functions
+ */
+
+static const struct rpc_program gssp_program;
+
+static int gssp_rpc_create(struct net *net, struct rpc_clnt **_clnt)
+{
+ static const struct sockaddr_un gssp_localaddr = {
+ .sun_family = AF_LOCAL,
+ .sun_path = GSSPROXY_SOCK_PATHNAME,
+ };
+ struct rpc_create_args args = {
+ .net = net,
+ .protocol = XPRT_TRANSPORT_LOCAL,
+ .address = (struct sockaddr *)&gssp_localaddr,
+ .addrsize = sizeof(gssp_localaddr),
+ .servername = "localhost",
+ .program = &gssp_program,
+ .version = GSSPROXY_VERS_1,
+ .authflavor = RPC_AUTH_NULL,
+ /*
+ * Note we want connection to be done in the caller's
+ * filesystem namespace. We therefore turn off the idle
+ * timeout, which would result in reconnections being
+ * done without the correct namespace:
+ */
+ .flags = RPC_CLNT_CREATE_NOPING |
+ RPC_CLNT_CREATE_NO_IDLE_TIMEOUT
+ };
+ struct rpc_clnt *clnt;
+ int result = 0;
+
+ clnt = rpc_create(&args);
+ if (IS_ERR(clnt)) {
+ dprintk("RPC: failed to create AF_LOCAL gssproxy "
+ "client (errno %ld).\n", PTR_ERR(clnt));
+ result = PTR_ERR(clnt);
+ *_clnt = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ dprintk("RPC: created new gssp local client (gssp_local_clnt: "
+ "%p)\n", clnt);
+ *_clnt = clnt;
+
+out:
+ return result;
+}
+
+void init_gssp_clnt(struct sunrpc_net *sn)
+{
+ mutex_init(&sn->gssp_lock);
+ sn->gssp_clnt = NULL;
+}
+
+int set_gssp_clnt(struct net *net)
+{
+ struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+ struct rpc_clnt *clnt;
+ int ret;
+
+ mutex_lock(&sn->gssp_lock);
+ ret = gssp_rpc_create(net, &clnt);
+ if (!ret) {
+ if (sn->gssp_clnt)
+ rpc_shutdown_client(sn->gssp_clnt);
+ sn->gssp_clnt = clnt;
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&sn->gssp_lock);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void clear_gssp_clnt(struct sunrpc_net *sn)
+{
+ mutex_lock(&sn->gssp_lock);
+ if (sn->gssp_clnt) {
+ rpc_shutdown_client(sn->gssp_clnt);
+ sn->gssp_clnt = NULL;
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&sn->gssp_lock);
+}
+
+static struct rpc_clnt *get_gssp_clnt(struct sunrpc_net *sn)
+{
+ struct rpc_clnt *clnt;
+
+ mutex_lock(&sn->gssp_lock);
+ clnt = sn->gssp_clnt;
+ if (clnt)
+ atomic_inc(&clnt->cl_count);
+ mutex_unlock(&sn->gssp_lock);
+ return clnt;
+}
+
+static int gssp_call(struct net *net, struct rpc_message *msg)
+{
+ struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+ struct rpc_clnt *clnt;
+ int status;
+
+ clnt = get_gssp_clnt(sn);
+ if (!clnt)
+ return -EIO;
+ status = rpc_call_sync(clnt, msg, 0);
+ if (status < 0) {
+ dprintk("gssp: rpc_call returned error %d\n", -status);
+ switch (status) {
+ case -EPROTONOSUPPORT:
+ status = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case -ECONNREFUSED:
+ case -ETIMEDOUT:
+ case -ENOTCONN:
+ status = -EAGAIN;
+ break;
+ case -ERESTARTSYS:
+ if (signalled ())
+ status = -EINTR;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ rpc_release_client(clnt);
+ return status;
+}
+
+static void gssp_free_receive_pages(struct gssx_arg_accept_sec_context *arg)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < arg->npages && arg->pages[i]; i++)
+ __free_page(arg->pages[i]);
+
+ kfree(arg->pages);
+}
+
+static int gssp_alloc_receive_pages(struct gssx_arg_accept_sec_context *arg)
+{
+ arg->npages = DIV_ROUND_UP(NGROUPS_MAX * 4, PAGE_SIZE);
+ arg->pages = kcalloc(arg->npages, sizeof(struct page *), GFP_KERNEL);
+ /*
+ * XXX: actual pages are allocated by xdr layer in
+ * xdr_partial_copy_from_skb.
+ */
+ if (!arg->pages)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static char *gssp_stringify(struct xdr_netobj *netobj)
+{
+ return kstrndup(netobj->data, netobj->len, GFP_KERNEL);
+}
+
+static void gssp_hostbased_service(char **principal)
+{
+ char *c;
+
+ if (!*principal)
+ return;
+
+ /* terminate and remove realm part */
+ c = strchr(*principal, '@');
+ if (c) {
+ *c = '\0';
+
+ /* change service-hostname delimiter */
+ c = strchr(*principal, '/');
+ if (c)
+ *c = '@';
+ }
+ if (!c) {
+ /* not a service principal */
+ kfree(*principal);
+ *principal = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Public functions
+ */
+
+/* numbers somewhat arbitrary but large enough for current needs */
+#define GSSX_MAX_OUT_HANDLE 128
+#define GSSX_MAX_SRC_PRINC 256
+#define GSSX_KMEMBUF (GSSX_max_output_handle_sz + \
+ GSSX_max_oid_sz + \
+ GSSX_max_princ_sz + \
+ sizeof(struct svc_cred))
+
+int gssp_accept_sec_context_upcall(struct net *net,
+ struct gssp_upcall_data *data)
+{
+ struct gssx_ctx ctxh = {
+ .state = data->in_handle
+ };
+ struct gssx_arg_accept_sec_context arg = {
+ .input_token = data->in_token,
+ };
+ struct gssx_ctx rctxh = {
+ /*
+ * pass in the max length we expect for each of these
+ * buffers but let the xdr code kmalloc them:
+ */
+ .exported_context_token.len = GSSX_max_output_handle_sz,
+ .mech.len = GSS_OID_MAX_LEN,
+ .targ_name.display_name.len = GSSX_max_princ_sz,
+ .src_name.display_name.len = GSSX_max_princ_sz
+ };
+ struct gssx_res_accept_sec_context res = {
+ .context_handle = &rctxh,
+ .output_token = &data->out_token
+ };
+ struct rpc_message msg = {
+ .rpc_proc = &gssp_procedures[GSSX_ACCEPT_SEC_CONTEXT],
+ .rpc_argp = &arg,
+ .rpc_resp = &res,
+ .rpc_cred = NULL, /* FIXME ? */
+ };
+ struct xdr_netobj client_name = { 0 , NULL };
+ struct xdr_netobj target_name = { 0, NULL };
+ int ret;
+
+ if (data->in_handle.len != 0)
+ arg.context_handle = &ctxh;
+ res.output_token->len = GSSX_max_output_token_sz;
+
+ ret = gssp_alloc_receive_pages(&arg);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = gssp_call(net, &msg);
+
+ gssp_free_receive_pages(&arg);
+
+ /* we need to fetch all data even in case of error so
+ * that we can free special strctures is they have been allocated */
+ data->major_status = res.status.major_status;
+ data->minor_status = res.status.minor_status;
+ if (res.context_handle) {
+ data->out_handle = rctxh.exported_context_token;
+ data->mech_oid.len = rctxh.mech.len;
+ if (rctxh.mech.data) {
+ memcpy(data->mech_oid.data, rctxh.mech.data,
+ data->mech_oid.len);
+ kfree(rctxh.mech.data);
+ }
+ client_name = rctxh.src_name.display_name;
+ target_name = rctxh.targ_name.display_name;
+ }
+
+ if (res.options.count == 1) {
+ gssx_buffer *value = &res.options.data[0].value;
+ /* Currently we only decode CREDS_VALUE, if we add
+ * anything else we'll have to loop and match on the
+ * option name */
+ if (value->len == 1) {
+ /* steal group info from struct svc_cred */
+ data->creds = *(struct svc_cred *)value->data;
+ data->found_creds = 1;
+ }
+ /* whether we use it or not, free data */
+ kfree(value->data);
+ }
+
+ if (res.options.count != 0) {
+ kfree(res.options.data);
+ }
+
+ /* convert to GSS_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE form and set into creds */
+ if (data->found_creds) {
+ if (client_name.data) {
+ data->creds.cr_raw_principal =
+ gssp_stringify(&client_name);
+ data->creds.cr_principal =
+ gssp_stringify(&client_name);
+ gssp_hostbased_service(&data->creds.cr_principal);
+ }
+ if (target_name.data) {
+ data->creds.cr_targ_princ =
+ gssp_stringify(&target_name);
+ gssp_hostbased_service(&data->creds.cr_targ_princ);
+ }
+ }
+ kfree(client_name.data);
+ kfree(target_name.data);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void gssp_free_upcall_data(struct gssp_upcall_data *data)
+{
+ kfree(data->in_handle.data);
+ kfree(data->out_handle.data);
+ kfree(data->out_token.data);
+ free_svc_cred(&data->creds);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialization stuff
+ */
+static unsigned int gssp_version1_counts[ARRAY_SIZE(gssp_procedures)];
+static const struct rpc_version gssp_version1 = {
+ .number = GSSPROXY_VERS_1,
+ .nrprocs = ARRAY_SIZE(gssp_procedures),
+ .procs = gssp_procedures,
+ .counts = gssp_version1_counts,
+};
+
+static const struct rpc_version *gssp_version[] = {
+ NULL,
+ &gssp_version1,
+};
+
+static struct rpc_stat gssp_stats;
+
+static const struct rpc_program gssp_program = {
+ .name = "gssproxy",
+ .number = GSSPROXY_PROGRAM,
+ .nrvers = ARRAY_SIZE(gssp_version),
+ .version = gssp_version,
+ .stats = &gssp_stats,
+};
diff --git a/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.h b/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..31e9634
--- /dev/null
+++ b/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.h
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */
+/*
+ * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_rpc_upcall.h
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
+ */
+
+#ifndef _GSS_RPC_UPCALL_H
+#define _GSS_RPC_UPCALL_H
+
+#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_api.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/auth_gss.h>
+#include "gss_rpc_xdr.h"
+#include "../netns.h"
+
+struct gssp_upcall_data {
+ struct xdr_netobj in_handle;
+ struct gssp_in_token in_token;
+ struct xdr_netobj out_handle;
+ struct xdr_netobj out_token;
+ struct rpcsec_gss_oid mech_oid;
+ struct svc_cred creds;
+ int found_creds;
+ int major_status;
+ int minor_status;
+};
+
+int gssp_accept_sec_context_upcall(struct net *net,
+ struct gssp_upcall_data *data);
+void gssp_free_upcall_data(struct gssp_upcall_data *data);
+
+void init_gssp_clnt(struct sunrpc_net *);
+int set_gssp_clnt(struct net *);
+void clear_gssp_clnt(struct sunrpc_net *);
+
+#endif /* _GSS_RPC_UPCALL_H */
diff --git a/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_xdr.c b/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_xdr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e265b8d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_xdr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,850 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * GSS Proxy upcall module
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h>
+#include "gss_rpc_xdr.h"
+
+static int gssx_enc_bool(struct xdr_stream *xdr, int v)
+{
+ __be32 *p;
+
+ p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
+ if (unlikely(p == NULL))
+ return -ENOSPC;
+ *p = v ? xdr_one : xdr_zero;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int gssx_dec_bool(struct xdr_stream *xdr, u32 *v)
+{
+ __be32 *p;
+
+ p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 4);
+ if (unlikely(p == NULL))
+ return -ENOSPC;
+ *v = be32_to_cpu(*p);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int gssx_enc_buffer(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+ const gssx_buffer *buf)
+{
+ __be32 *p;
+
+ p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, sizeof(u32) + buf->len);
+ if (!p)
+ return -ENOSPC;
+ xdr_encode_opaque(p, buf->data, buf->len);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int gssx_enc_in_token(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+ const struct gssp_in_token *in)
+{
+ __be32 *p;
+
+ p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
+ if (!p)
+ return -ENOSPC;
+ *p = cpu_to_be32(in->page_len);
+
+ /* all we need to do is to write pages */
+ xdr_write_pages(xdr, in->pages, in->page_base, in->page_len);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int gssx_dec_buffer(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+ gssx_buffer *buf)
+{
+ u32 length;
+ __be32 *p;
+
+ p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 4);
+ if (unlikely(p == NULL))
+ return -ENOSPC;
+
+ length = be32_to_cpup(p);
+ p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, length);
+ if (unlikely(p == NULL))
+ return -ENOSPC;
+
+ if (buf->len == 0) {
+ /* we intentionally are not interested in this buffer */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (length > buf->len)
+ return -ENOSPC;
+
+ if (!buf->data) {
+ buf->data = kmemdup(p, length, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf->data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ } else {
+ memcpy(buf->data, p, length);
+ }
+ buf->len = length;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int gssx_enc_option(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+ struct gssx_option *opt)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ err = gssx_enc_buffer(xdr, &opt->option);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ err = gssx_enc_buffer(xdr, &opt->value);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int gssx_dec_option(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+ struct gssx_option *opt)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ err = gssx_dec_buffer(xdr, &opt->option);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ err = gssx_dec_buffer(xdr, &opt->value);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int dummy_enc_opt_array(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+ const struct gssx_option_array *oa)
+{
+ __be32 *p;
+
+ if (oa->count != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
+ if (!p)
+ return -ENOSPC;
+ *p = 0;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int dummy_dec_opt_array(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+ struct gssx_option_array *oa)
+{
+ struct gssx_option dummy;
+ u32 count, i;
+ __be32 *p;
+
+ p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 4);
+ if (unlikely(p == NULL))
+ return -ENOSPC;
+ count = be32_to_cpup(p++);
+ memset(&dummy, 0, sizeof(dummy));
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ gssx_dec_option(xdr, &dummy);
+ }
+
+ oa->count = 0;
+ oa->data = NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int get_host_u32(struct xdr_stream *xdr, u32 *res)
+{
+ __be32 *p;
+
+ p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 4);
+ if (!p)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ /* Contents of linux creds are all host-endian: */
+ memcpy(res, p, sizeof(u32));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int gssx_dec_linux_creds(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+ struct svc_cred *creds)
+{
+ u32 length;
+ __be32 *p;
+ u32 tmp;
+ u32 N;
+ int i, err;
+
+ p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 4);
+ if (unlikely(p == NULL))
+ return -ENOSPC;
+
+ length = be32_to_cpup(p);
+
+ if (length > (3 + NGROUPS_MAX) * sizeof(u32))
+ return -ENOSPC;
+
+ /* uid */
+ err = get_host_u32(xdr, &tmp);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ creds->cr_uid = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, tmp);
+
+ /* gid */
+ err = get_host_u32(xdr, &tmp);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ creds->cr_gid = make_kgid(&init_user_ns, tmp);
+
+ /* number of additional gid's */
+ err = get_host_u32(xdr, &tmp);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ N = tmp;
+ if ((3 + N) * sizeof(u32) != length)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ creds->cr_group_info = groups_alloc(N);
+ if (creds->cr_group_info == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* gid's */
+ for (i = 0; i < N; i++) {
+ kgid_t kgid;
+ err = get_host_u32(xdr, &tmp);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_free_groups;
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ kgid = make_kgid(&init_user_ns, tmp);
+ if (!gid_valid(kgid))
+ goto out_free_groups;
+ creds->cr_group_info->gid[i] = kgid;
+ }
+ groups_sort(creds->cr_group_info);
+
+ return 0;
+out_free_groups:
+ groups_free(creds->cr_group_info);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int gssx_dec_option_array(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+ struct gssx_option_array *oa)
+{
+ struct svc_cred *creds;
+ u32 count, i;
+ __be32 *p;
+ int err;
+
+ p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 4);
+ if (unlikely(p == NULL))
+ return -ENOSPC;
+ count = be32_to_cpup(p++);
+ if (!count)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* we recognize only 1 currently: CREDS_VALUE */
+ oa->count = 1;
+
+ oa->data = kmalloc(sizeof(struct gssx_option), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!oa->data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ creds = kzalloc(sizeof(struct svc_cred), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!creds) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto free_oa;
+ }
+
+ oa->data[0].option.data = CREDS_VALUE;
+ oa->data[0].option.len = sizeof(CREDS_VALUE);
+ oa->data[0].value.data = (void *)creds;
+ oa->data[0].value.len = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ gssx_buffer dummy = { 0, NULL };
+ u32 length;
+
+ /* option buffer */
+ p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 4);
+ if (unlikely(p == NULL)) {
+ err = -ENOSPC;
+ goto free_creds;
+ }
+
+ length = be32_to_cpup(p);
+ p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, length);
+ if (unlikely(p == NULL)) {
+ err = -ENOSPC;
+ goto free_creds;
+ }
+
+ if (length == sizeof(CREDS_VALUE) &&
+ memcmp(p, CREDS_VALUE, sizeof(CREDS_VALUE)) == 0) {
+ /* We have creds here. parse them */
+ err = gssx_dec_linux_creds(xdr, creds);
+ if (err)
+ goto free_creds;
+ oa->data[0].value.len = 1; /* presence */
+ } else {
+ /* consume uninteresting buffer */
+ err = gssx_dec_buffer(xdr, &dummy);
+ if (err)
+ goto free_creds;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+free_creds:
+ kfree(creds);
+free_oa:
+ kfree(oa->data);
+ oa->data = NULL;
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int gssx_dec_status(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+ struct gssx_status *status)
+{
+ __be32 *p;
+ int err;
+
+ /* status->major_status */
+ p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 8);
+ if (unlikely(p == NULL))
+ return -ENOSPC;
+ p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &status->major_status);
+
+ /* status->mech */
+ err = gssx_dec_buffer(xdr, &status->mech);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* status->minor_status */
+ p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 8);
+ if (unlikely(p == NULL))
+ return -ENOSPC;
+ p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &status->minor_status);
+
+ /* status->major_status_string */
+ err = gssx_dec_buffer(xdr, &status->major_status_string);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* status->minor_status_string */
+ err = gssx_dec_buffer(xdr, &status->minor_status_string);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* status->server_ctx */
+ err = gssx_dec_buffer(xdr, &status->server_ctx);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* we assume we have no options for now, so simply consume them */
+ /* status->options */
+ err = dummy_dec_opt_array(xdr, &status->options);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int gssx_enc_call_ctx(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+ const struct gssx_call_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ struct gssx_option opt;
+ __be32 *p;
+ int err;
+
+ /* ctx->locale */
+ err = gssx_enc_buffer(xdr, &ctx->locale);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* ctx->server_ctx */
+ err = gssx_enc_buffer(xdr, &ctx->server_ctx);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* we always want to ask for lucid contexts */
+ /* ctx->options */
+ p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
+ *p = cpu_to_be32(2);
+
+ /* we want a lucid_v1 context */
+ opt.option.data = LUCID_OPTION;
+ opt.option.len = sizeof(LUCID_OPTION);
+ opt.value.data = LUCID_VALUE;
+ opt.value.len = sizeof(LUCID_VALUE);
+ err = gssx_enc_option(xdr, &opt);
+
+ /* ..and user creds */
+ opt.option.data = CREDS_OPTION;
+ opt.option.len = sizeof(CREDS_OPTION);
+ opt.value.data = CREDS_VALUE;
+ opt.value.len = sizeof(CREDS_VALUE);
+ err = gssx_enc_option(xdr, &opt);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int gssx_dec_name_attr(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+ struct gssx_name_attr *attr)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ /* attr->attr */
+ err = gssx_dec_buffer(xdr, &attr->attr);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* attr->value */
+ err = gssx_dec_buffer(xdr, &attr->value);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* attr->extensions */
+ err = dummy_dec_opt_array(xdr, &attr->extensions);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int dummy_enc_nameattr_array(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+ struct gssx_name_attr_array *naa)
+{
+ __be32 *p;
+
+ if (naa->count != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
+ if (!p)
+ return -ENOSPC;
+ *p = 0;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int dummy_dec_nameattr_array(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+ struct gssx_name_attr_array *naa)
+{
+ struct gssx_name_attr dummy = { .attr = {.len = 0} };
+ u32 count, i;
+ __be32 *p;
+
+ p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 4);
+ if (unlikely(p == NULL))
+ return -ENOSPC;
+ count = be32_to_cpup(p++);
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ gssx_dec_name_attr(xdr, &dummy);
+ }
+
+ naa->count = 0;
+ naa->data = NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct xdr_netobj zero_netobj = {};
+
+static struct gssx_name_attr_array zero_name_attr_array = {};
+
+static struct gssx_option_array zero_option_array = {};
+
+static int gssx_enc_name(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+ struct gssx_name *name)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ /* name->display_name */
+ err = gssx_enc_buffer(xdr, &name->display_name);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* name->name_type */
+ err = gssx_enc_buffer(xdr, &zero_netobj);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* name->exported_name */
+ err = gssx_enc_buffer(xdr, &zero_netobj);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* name->exported_composite_name */
+ err = gssx_enc_buffer(xdr, &zero_netobj);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* leave name_attributes empty for now, will add once we have any
+ * to pass up at all */
+ /* name->name_attributes */
+ err = dummy_enc_nameattr_array(xdr, &zero_name_attr_array);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* leave options empty for now, will add once we have any options
+ * to pass up at all */
+ /* name->extensions */
+ err = dummy_enc_opt_array(xdr, &zero_option_array);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+
+static int gssx_dec_name(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+ struct gssx_name *name)
+{
+ struct xdr_netobj dummy_netobj = { .len = 0 };
+ struct gssx_name_attr_array dummy_name_attr_array = { .count = 0 };
+ struct gssx_option_array dummy_option_array = { .count = 0 };
+ int err;
+
+ /* name->display_name */
+ err = gssx_dec_buffer(xdr, &name->display_name);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* name->name_type */
+ err = gssx_dec_buffer(xdr, &dummy_netobj);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* name->exported_name */
+ err = gssx_dec_buffer(xdr, &dummy_netobj);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* name->exported_composite_name */
+ err = gssx_dec_buffer(xdr, &dummy_netobj);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* we assume we have no attributes for now, so simply consume them */
+ /* name->name_attributes */
+ err = dummy_dec_nameattr_array(xdr, &dummy_name_attr_array);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* we assume we have no options for now, so simply consume them */
+ /* name->extensions */
+ err = dummy_dec_opt_array(xdr, &dummy_option_array);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int dummy_enc_credel_array(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+ struct gssx_cred_element_array *cea)
+{
+ __be32 *p;
+
+ if (cea->count != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
+ if (!p)
+ return -ENOSPC;
+ *p = 0;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int gssx_enc_cred(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+ struct gssx_cred *cred)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ /* cred->desired_name */
+ err = gssx_enc_name(xdr, &cred->desired_name);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* cred->elements */
+ err = dummy_enc_credel_array(xdr, &cred->elements);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* cred->cred_handle_reference */
+ err = gssx_enc_buffer(xdr, &cred->cred_handle_reference);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* cred->needs_release */
+ err = gssx_enc_bool(xdr, cred->needs_release);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int gssx_enc_ctx(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+ struct gssx_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ __be32 *p;
+ int err;
+
+ /* ctx->exported_context_token */
+ err = gssx_enc_buffer(xdr, &ctx->exported_context_token);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* ctx->state */
+ err = gssx_enc_buffer(xdr, &ctx->state);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* ctx->need_release */
+ err = gssx_enc_bool(xdr, ctx->need_release);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* ctx->mech */
+ err = gssx_enc_buffer(xdr, &ctx->mech);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* ctx->src_name */
+ err = gssx_enc_name(xdr, &ctx->src_name);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* ctx->targ_name */
+ err = gssx_enc_name(xdr, &ctx->targ_name);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* ctx->lifetime */
+ p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 8+8);
+ if (!p)
+ return -ENOSPC;
+ p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, ctx->lifetime);
+
+ /* ctx->ctx_flags */
+ p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, ctx->ctx_flags);
+
+ /* ctx->locally_initiated */
+ err = gssx_enc_bool(xdr, ctx->locally_initiated);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* ctx->open */
+ err = gssx_enc_bool(xdr, ctx->open);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* leave options empty for now, will add once we have any options
+ * to pass up at all */
+ /* ctx->options */
+ err = dummy_enc_opt_array(xdr, &ctx->options);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int gssx_dec_ctx(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+ struct gssx_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ __be32 *p;
+ int err;
+
+ /* ctx->exported_context_token */
+ err = gssx_dec_buffer(xdr, &ctx->exported_context_token);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* ctx->state */
+ err = gssx_dec_buffer(xdr, &ctx->state);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* ctx->need_release */
+ err = gssx_dec_bool(xdr, &ctx->need_release);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* ctx->mech */
+ err = gssx_dec_buffer(xdr, &ctx->mech);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* ctx->src_name */
+ err = gssx_dec_name(xdr, &ctx->src_name);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* ctx->targ_name */
+ err = gssx_dec_name(xdr, &ctx->targ_name);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* ctx->lifetime */
+ p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 8+8);
+ if (unlikely(p == NULL))
+ return -ENOSPC;
+ p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &ctx->lifetime);
+
+ /* ctx->ctx_flags */
+ p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &ctx->ctx_flags);
+
+ /* ctx->locally_initiated */
+ err = gssx_dec_bool(xdr, &ctx->locally_initiated);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* ctx->open */
+ err = gssx_dec_bool(xdr, &ctx->open);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* we assume we have no options for now, so simply consume them */
+ /* ctx->options */
+ err = dummy_dec_opt_array(xdr, &ctx->options);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int gssx_enc_cb(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct gssx_cb *cb)
+{
+ __be32 *p;
+ int err;
+
+ /* cb->initiator_addrtype */
+ p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 8);
+ if (!p)
+ return -ENOSPC;
+ p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, cb->initiator_addrtype);
+
+ /* cb->initiator_address */
+ err = gssx_enc_buffer(xdr, &cb->initiator_address);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* cb->acceptor_addrtype */
+ p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 8);
+ if (!p)
+ return -ENOSPC;
+ p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, cb->acceptor_addrtype);
+
+ /* cb->acceptor_address */
+ err = gssx_enc_buffer(xdr, &cb->acceptor_address);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* cb->application_data */
+ err = gssx_enc_buffer(xdr, &cb->application_data);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+void gssx_enc_accept_sec_context(struct rpc_rqst *req,
+ struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+ const void *data)
+{
+ const struct gssx_arg_accept_sec_context *arg = data;
+ int err;
+
+ err = gssx_enc_call_ctx(xdr, &arg->call_ctx);
+ if (err)
+ goto done;
+
+ /* arg->context_handle */
+ if (arg->context_handle)
+ err = gssx_enc_ctx(xdr, arg->context_handle);
+ else
+ err = gssx_enc_bool(xdr, 0);
+ if (err)
+ goto done;
+
+ /* arg->cred_handle */
+ if (arg->cred_handle)
+ err = gssx_enc_cred(xdr, arg->cred_handle);
+ else
+ err = gssx_enc_bool(xdr, 0);
+ if (err)
+ goto done;
+
+ /* arg->input_token */
+ err = gssx_enc_in_token(xdr, &arg->input_token);
+ if (err)
+ goto done;
+
+ /* arg->input_cb */
+ if (arg->input_cb)
+ err = gssx_enc_cb(xdr, arg->input_cb);
+ else
+ err = gssx_enc_bool(xdr, 0);
+ if (err)
+ goto done;
+
+ err = gssx_enc_bool(xdr, arg->ret_deleg_cred);
+ if (err)
+ goto done;
+
+ /* leave options empty for now, will add once we have any options
+ * to pass up at all */
+ /* arg->options */
+ err = dummy_enc_opt_array(xdr, &arg->options);
+
+ xdr_inline_pages(&req->rq_rcv_buf,
+ PAGE_SIZE/2 /* pretty arbitrary */,
+ arg->pages, 0 /* page base */, arg->npages * PAGE_SIZE);
+ req->rq_rcv_buf.flags |= XDRBUF_SPARSE_PAGES;
+done:
+ if (err)
+ dprintk("RPC: gssx_enc_accept_sec_context: %d\n", err);
+}
+
+int gssx_dec_accept_sec_context(struct rpc_rqst *rqstp,
+ struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+ void *data)
+{
+ struct gssx_res_accept_sec_context *res = data;
+ u32 value_follows;
+ int err;
+ struct page *scratch;
+
+ scratch = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!scratch)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ xdr_set_scratch_buffer(xdr, page_address(scratch), PAGE_SIZE);
+
+ /* res->status */
+ err = gssx_dec_status(xdr, &res->status);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_free;
+
+ /* res->context_handle */
+ err = gssx_dec_bool(xdr, &value_follows);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_free;
+ if (value_follows) {
+ err = gssx_dec_ctx(xdr, res->context_handle);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_free;
+ } else {
+ res->context_handle = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* res->output_token */
+ err = gssx_dec_bool(xdr, &value_follows);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_free;
+ if (value_follows) {
+ err = gssx_dec_buffer(xdr, res->output_token);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_free;
+ } else {
+ res->output_token = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* res->delegated_cred_handle */
+ err = gssx_dec_bool(xdr, &value_follows);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_free;
+ if (value_follows) {
+ /* we do not support upcall servers sending this data. */
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+
+ /* res->options */
+ err = gssx_dec_option_array(xdr, &res->options);
+
+out_free:
+ __free_page(scratch);
+ return err;
+}
diff --git a/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_xdr.h b/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_xdr.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3f17411
--- /dev/null
+++ b/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_xdr.h
@@ -0,0 +1,252 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */
+/*
+ * GSS Proxy upcall module
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
+ */
+
+#ifndef _LINUX_GSS_RPC_XDR_H
+#define _LINUX_GSS_RPC_XDR_H
+
+#include <linux/sunrpc/xdr.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/clnt.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/xprtsock.h>
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG)
+# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH
+#endif
+
+#define LUCID_OPTION "exported_context_type"
+#define LUCID_VALUE "linux_lucid_v1"
+#define CREDS_OPTION "exported_creds_type"
+#define CREDS_VALUE "linux_creds_v1"
+
+typedef struct xdr_netobj gssx_buffer;
+typedef struct xdr_netobj utf8string;
+typedef struct xdr_netobj gssx_OID;
+
+enum gssx_cred_usage {
+ GSSX_C_INITIATE = 1,
+ GSSX_C_ACCEPT = 2,
+ GSSX_C_BOTH = 3,
+};
+
+struct gssx_option {
+ gssx_buffer option;
+ gssx_buffer value;
+};
+
+struct gssx_option_array {
+ u32 count;
+ struct gssx_option *data;
+};
+
+struct gssx_status {
+ u64 major_status;
+ gssx_OID mech;
+ u64 minor_status;
+ utf8string major_status_string;
+ utf8string minor_status_string;
+ gssx_buffer server_ctx;
+ struct gssx_option_array options;
+};
+
+struct gssx_call_ctx {
+ utf8string locale;
+ gssx_buffer server_ctx;
+ struct gssx_option_array options;
+};
+
+struct gssx_name_attr {
+ gssx_buffer attr;
+ gssx_buffer value;
+ struct gssx_option_array extensions;
+};
+
+struct gssx_name_attr_array {
+ u32 count;
+ struct gssx_name_attr *data;
+};
+
+struct gssx_name {
+ gssx_buffer display_name;
+};
+typedef struct gssx_name gssx_name;
+
+struct gssx_cred_element {
+ gssx_name MN;
+ gssx_OID mech;
+ u32 cred_usage;
+ u64 initiator_time_rec;
+ u64 acceptor_time_rec;
+ struct gssx_option_array options;
+};
+
+struct gssx_cred_element_array {
+ u32 count;
+ struct gssx_cred_element *data;
+};
+
+struct gssx_cred {
+ gssx_name desired_name;
+ struct gssx_cred_element_array elements;
+ gssx_buffer cred_handle_reference;
+ u32 needs_release;
+};
+
+struct gssx_ctx {
+ gssx_buffer exported_context_token;
+ gssx_buffer state;
+ u32 need_release;
+ gssx_OID mech;
+ gssx_name src_name;
+ gssx_name targ_name;
+ u64 lifetime;
+ u64 ctx_flags;
+ u32 locally_initiated;
+ u32 open;
+ struct gssx_option_array options;
+};
+
+struct gssx_cb {
+ u64 initiator_addrtype;
+ gssx_buffer initiator_address;
+ u64 acceptor_addrtype;
+ gssx_buffer acceptor_address;
+ gssx_buffer application_data;
+};
+
+
+/* This structure is not defined in the protocol.
+ * It is used in the kernel to carry around a big buffer
+ * as a set of pages */
+struct gssp_in_token {
+ struct page **pages; /* Array of contiguous pages */
+ unsigned int page_base; /* Start of page data */
+ unsigned int page_len; /* Length of page data */
+};
+
+struct gssx_arg_accept_sec_context {
+ struct gssx_call_ctx call_ctx;
+ struct gssx_ctx *context_handle;
+ struct gssx_cred *cred_handle;
+ struct gssp_in_token input_token;
+ struct gssx_cb *input_cb;
+ u32 ret_deleg_cred;
+ struct gssx_option_array options;
+ struct page **pages;
+ unsigned int npages;
+};
+
+struct gssx_res_accept_sec_context {
+ struct gssx_status status;
+ struct gssx_ctx *context_handle;
+ gssx_buffer *output_token;
+ /* struct gssx_cred *delegated_cred_handle; not used in kernel */
+ struct gssx_option_array options;
+};
+
+
+
+#define gssx_enc_indicate_mechs NULL
+#define gssx_dec_indicate_mechs NULL
+#define gssx_enc_get_call_context NULL
+#define gssx_dec_get_call_context NULL
+#define gssx_enc_import_and_canon_name NULL
+#define gssx_dec_import_and_canon_name NULL
+#define gssx_enc_export_cred NULL
+#define gssx_dec_export_cred NULL
+#define gssx_enc_import_cred NULL
+#define gssx_dec_import_cred NULL
+#define gssx_enc_acquire_cred NULL
+#define gssx_dec_acquire_cred NULL
+#define gssx_enc_store_cred NULL
+#define gssx_dec_store_cred NULL
+#define gssx_enc_init_sec_context NULL
+#define gssx_dec_init_sec_context NULL
+void gssx_enc_accept_sec_context(struct rpc_rqst *req,
+ struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+ const void *data);
+int gssx_dec_accept_sec_context(struct rpc_rqst *rqstp,
+ struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+ void *data);
+#define gssx_enc_release_handle NULL
+#define gssx_dec_release_handle NULL
+#define gssx_enc_get_mic NULL
+#define gssx_dec_get_mic NULL
+#define gssx_enc_verify NULL
+#define gssx_dec_verify NULL
+#define gssx_enc_wrap NULL
+#define gssx_dec_wrap NULL
+#define gssx_enc_unwrap NULL
+#define gssx_dec_unwrap NULL
+#define gssx_enc_wrap_size_limit NULL
+#define gssx_dec_wrap_size_limit NULL
+
+/* non implemented calls are set to 0 size */
+#define GSSX_ARG_indicate_mechs_sz 0
+#define GSSX_RES_indicate_mechs_sz 0
+#define GSSX_ARG_get_call_context_sz 0
+#define GSSX_RES_get_call_context_sz 0
+#define GSSX_ARG_import_and_canon_name_sz 0
+#define GSSX_RES_import_and_canon_name_sz 0
+#define GSSX_ARG_export_cred_sz 0
+#define GSSX_RES_export_cred_sz 0
+#define GSSX_ARG_import_cred_sz 0
+#define GSSX_RES_import_cred_sz 0
+#define GSSX_ARG_acquire_cred_sz 0
+#define GSSX_RES_acquire_cred_sz 0
+#define GSSX_ARG_store_cred_sz 0
+#define GSSX_RES_store_cred_sz 0
+#define GSSX_ARG_init_sec_context_sz 0
+#define GSSX_RES_init_sec_context_sz 0
+
+#define GSSX_default_in_call_ctx_sz (4 + 4 + 4 + \
+ 8 + sizeof(LUCID_OPTION) + sizeof(LUCID_VALUE) + \
+ 8 + sizeof(CREDS_OPTION) + sizeof(CREDS_VALUE))
+#define GSSX_default_in_ctx_hndl_sz (4 + 4+8 + 4 + 4 + 6*4 + 6*4 + 8 + 8 + \
+ 4 + 4 + 4)
+#define GSSX_default_in_cred_sz 4 /* we send in no cred_handle */
+#define GSSX_default_in_token_sz 4 /* does *not* include token data */
+#define GSSX_default_in_cb_sz 4 /* we do not use channel bindings */
+#define GSSX_ARG_accept_sec_context_sz (GSSX_default_in_call_ctx_sz + \
+ GSSX_default_in_ctx_hndl_sz + \
+ GSSX_default_in_cred_sz + \
+ GSSX_default_in_token_sz + \
+ GSSX_default_in_cb_sz + \
+ 4 /* no deleg creds boolean */ + \
+ 4) /* empty options */
+
+/* somewhat arbitrary numbers but large enough (we ignore some of the data
+ * sent down, but it is part of the protocol so we need enough space to take
+ * it in) */
+#define GSSX_default_status_sz 8 + 24 + 8 + 256 + 256 + 16 + 4
+#define GSSX_max_output_handle_sz 128
+#define GSSX_max_oid_sz 16
+#define GSSX_max_princ_sz 256
+#define GSSX_default_ctx_sz (GSSX_max_output_handle_sz + \
+ 16 + 4 + GSSX_max_oid_sz + \
+ 2 * GSSX_max_princ_sz + \
+ 8 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 4)
+#define GSSX_max_output_token_sz 1024
+/* grouplist not included; we allocate separate pages for that: */
+#define GSSX_max_creds_sz (4 + 4 + 4 /* + NGROUPS_MAX*4 */)
+#define GSSX_RES_accept_sec_context_sz (GSSX_default_status_sz + \
+ GSSX_default_ctx_sz + \
+ GSSX_max_output_token_sz + \
+ 4 + GSSX_max_creds_sz)
+
+#define GSSX_ARG_release_handle_sz 0
+#define GSSX_RES_release_handle_sz 0
+#define GSSX_ARG_get_mic_sz 0
+#define GSSX_RES_get_mic_sz 0
+#define GSSX_ARG_verify_sz 0
+#define GSSX_RES_verify_sz 0
+#define GSSX_ARG_wrap_sz 0
+#define GSSX_RES_wrap_sz 0
+#define GSSX_ARG_unwrap_sz 0
+#define GSSX_RES_unwrap_sz 0
+#define GSSX_ARG_wrap_size_limit_sz 0
+#define GSSX_RES_wrap_size_limit_sz 0
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_GSS_RPC_XDR_H */
diff --git a/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c b/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ed9fc8e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1963 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Neil Brown <neilb@cse.unsw.edu.au>
+ * J. Bruce Fields <bfields@umich.edu>
+ * Andy Adamson <andros@umich.edu>
+ * Dug Song <dugsong@monkey.org>
+ *
+ * RPCSEC_GSS server authentication.
+ * This implements RPCSEC_GSS as defined in rfc2203 (rpcsec_gss) and rfc2078
+ * (gssapi)
+ *
+ * The RPCSEC_GSS involves three stages:
+ * 1/ context creation
+ * 2/ data exchange
+ * 3/ context destruction
+ *
+ * Context creation is handled largely by upcalls to user-space.
+ * In particular, GSS_Accept_sec_context is handled by an upcall
+ * Data exchange is handled entirely within the kernel
+ * In particular, GSS_GetMIC, GSS_VerifyMIC, GSS_Seal, GSS_Unseal are in-kernel.
+ * Context destruction is handled in-kernel
+ * GSS_Delete_sec_context is in-kernel
+ *
+ * Context creation is initiated by a RPCSEC_GSS_INIT request arriving.
+ * The context handle and gss_token are used as a key into the rpcsec_init cache.
+ * The content of this cache includes some of the outputs of GSS_Accept_sec_context,
+ * being major_status, minor_status, context_handle, reply_token.
+ * These are sent back to the client.
+ * Sequence window management is handled by the kernel. The window size if currently
+ * a compile time constant.
+ *
+ * When user-space is happy that a context is established, it places an entry
+ * in the rpcsec_context cache. The key for this cache is the context_handle.
+ * The content includes:
+ * uid/gidlist - for determining access rights
+ * mechanism type
+ * mechanism specific information, such as a key
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+
+#include <linux/sunrpc/auth_gss.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_err.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/svcauth_gss.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/cache.h>
+#include "gss_rpc_upcall.h"
+
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG)
+# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH
+#endif
+
+/* The rpcsec_init cache is used for mapping RPCSEC_GSS_{,CONT_}INIT requests
+ * into replies.
+ *
+ * Key is context handle (\x if empty) and gss_token.
+ * Content is major_status minor_status (integers) context_handle, reply_token.
+ *
+ */
+
+static int netobj_equal(struct xdr_netobj *a, struct xdr_netobj *b)
+{
+ return a->len == b->len && 0 == memcmp(a->data, b->data, a->len);
+}
+
+#define RSI_HASHBITS 6
+#define RSI_HASHMAX (1<<RSI_HASHBITS)
+
+struct rsi {
+ struct cache_head h;
+ struct xdr_netobj in_handle, in_token;
+ struct xdr_netobj out_handle, out_token;
+ int major_status, minor_status;
+ struct rcu_head rcu_head;
+};
+
+static struct rsi *rsi_update(struct cache_detail *cd, struct rsi *new, struct rsi *old);
+static struct rsi *rsi_lookup(struct cache_detail *cd, struct rsi *item);
+
+static void rsi_free(struct rsi *rsii)
+{
+ kfree(rsii->in_handle.data);
+ kfree(rsii->in_token.data);
+ kfree(rsii->out_handle.data);
+ kfree(rsii->out_token.data);
+}
+
+static void rsi_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+ struct rsi *rsii = container_of(head, struct rsi, rcu_head);
+
+ rsi_free(rsii);
+ kfree(rsii);
+}
+
+static void rsi_put(struct kref *ref)
+{
+ struct rsi *rsii = container_of(ref, struct rsi, h.ref);
+
+ call_rcu(&rsii->rcu_head, rsi_free_rcu);
+}
+
+static inline int rsi_hash(struct rsi *item)
+{
+ return hash_mem(item->in_handle.data, item->in_handle.len, RSI_HASHBITS)
+ ^ hash_mem(item->in_token.data, item->in_token.len, RSI_HASHBITS);
+}
+
+static int rsi_match(struct cache_head *a, struct cache_head *b)
+{
+ struct rsi *item = container_of(a, struct rsi, h);
+ struct rsi *tmp = container_of(b, struct rsi, h);
+ return netobj_equal(&item->in_handle, &tmp->in_handle) &&
+ netobj_equal(&item->in_token, &tmp->in_token);
+}
+
+static int dup_to_netobj(struct xdr_netobj *dst, char *src, int len)
+{
+ dst->len = len;
+ dst->data = (len ? kmemdup(src, len, GFP_KERNEL) : NULL);
+ if (len && !dst->data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int dup_netobj(struct xdr_netobj *dst, struct xdr_netobj *src)
+{
+ return dup_to_netobj(dst, src->data, src->len);
+}
+
+static void rsi_init(struct cache_head *cnew, struct cache_head *citem)
+{
+ struct rsi *new = container_of(cnew, struct rsi, h);
+ struct rsi *item = container_of(citem, struct rsi, h);
+
+ new->out_handle.data = NULL;
+ new->out_handle.len = 0;
+ new->out_token.data = NULL;
+ new->out_token.len = 0;
+ new->in_handle.len = item->in_handle.len;
+ item->in_handle.len = 0;
+ new->in_token.len = item->in_token.len;
+ item->in_token.len = 0;
+ new->in_handle.data = item->in_handle.data;
+ item->in_handle.data = NULL;
+ new->in_token.data = item->in_token.data;
+ item->in_token.data = NULL;
+}
+
+static void update_rsi(struct cache_head *cnew, struct cache_head *citem)
+{
+ struct rsi *new = container_of(cnew, struct rsi, h);
+ struct rsi *item = container_of(citem, struct rsi, h);
+
+ BUG_ON(new->out_handle.data || new->out_token.data);
+ new->out_handle.len = item->out_handle.len;
+ item->out_handle.len = 0;
+ new->out_token.len = item->out_token.len;
+ item->out_token.len = 0;
+ new->out_handle.data = item->out_handle.data;
+ item->out_handle.data = NULL;
+ new->out_token.data = item->out_token.data;
+ item->out_token.data = NULL;
+
+ new->major_status = item->major_status;
+ new->minor_status = item->minor_status;
+}
+
+static struct cache_head *rsi_alloc(void)
+{
+ struct rsi *rsii = kmalloc(sizeof(*rsii), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (rsii)
+ return &rsii->h;
+ else
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void rsi_request(struct cache_detail *cd,
+ struct cache_head *h,
+ char **bpp, int *blen)
+{
+ struct rsi *rsii = container_of(h, struct rsi, h);
+
+ qword_addhex(bpp, blen, rsii->in_handle.data, rsii->in_handle.len);
+ qword_addhex(bpp, blen, rsii->in_token.data, rsii->in_token.len);
+ (*bpp)[-1] = '\n';
+}
+
+static int rsi_parse(struct cache_detail *cd,
+ char *mesg, int mlen)
+{
+ /* context token expiry major minor context token */
+ char *buf = mesg;
+ char *ep;
+ int len;
+ struct rsi rsii, *rsip = NULL;
+ time64_t expiry;
+ int status = -EINVAL;
+
+ memset(&rsii, 0, sizeof(rsii));
+ /* handle */
+ len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
+ if (len < 0)
+ goto out;
+ status = -ENOMEM;
+ if (dup_to_netobj(&rsii.in_handle, buf, len))
+ goto out;
+
+ /* token */
+ len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
+ status = -EINVAL;
+ if (len < 0)
+ goto out;
+ status = -ENOMEM;
+ if (dup_to_netobj(&rsii.in_token, buf, len))
+ goto out;
+
+ rsip = rsi_lookup(cd, &rsii);
+ if (!rsip)
+ goto out;
+
+ rsii.h.flags = 0;
+ /* expiry */
+ expiry = get_expiry(&mesg);
+ status = -EINVAL;
+ if (expiry == 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* major/minor */
+ len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
+ if (len <= 0)
+ goto out;
+ rsii.major_status = simple_strtoul(buf, &ep, 10);
+ if (*ep)
+ goto out;
+ len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
+ if (len <= 0)
+ goto out;
+ rsii.minor_status = simple_strtoul(buf, &ep, 10);
+ if (*ep)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* out_handle */
+ len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
+ if (len < 0)
+ goto out;
+ status = -ENOMEM;
+ if (dup_to_netobj(&rsii.out_handle, buf, len))
+ goto out;
+
+ /* out_token */
+ len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
+ status = -EINVAL;
+ if (len < 0)
+ goto out;
+ status = -ENOMEM;
+ if (dup_to_netobj(&rsii.out_token, buf, len))
+ goto out;
+ rsii.h.expiry_time = expiry;
+ rsip = rsi_update(cd, &rsii, rsip);
+ status = 0;
+out:
+ rsi_free(&rsii);
+ if (rsip)
+ cache_put(&rsip->h, cd);
+ else
+ status = -ENOMEM;
+ return status;
+}
+
+static const struct cache_detail rsi_cache_template = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .hash_size = RSI_HASHMAX,
+ .name = "auth.rpcsec.init",
+ .cache_put = rsi_put,
+ .cache_request = rsi_request,
+ .cache_parse = rsi_parse,
+ .match = rsi_match,
+ .init = rsi_init,
+ .update = update_rsi,
+ .alloc = rsi_alloc,
+};
+
+static struct rsi *rsi_lookup(struct cache_detail *cd, struct rsi *item)
+{
+ struct cache_head *ch;
+ int hash = rsi_hash(item);
+
+ ch = sunrpc_cache_lookup_rcu(cd, &item->h, hash);
+ if (ch)
+ return container_of(ch, struct rsi, h);
+ else
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static struct rsi *rsi_update(struct cache_detail *cd, struct rsi *new, struct rsi *old)
+{
+ struct cache_head *ch;
+ int hash = rsi_hash(new);
+
+ ch = sunrpc_cache_update(cd, &new->h,
+ &old->h, hash);
+ if (ch)
+ return container_of(ch, struct rsi, h);
+ else
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * The rpcsec_context cache is used to store a context that is
+ * used in data exchange.
+ * The key is a context handle. The content is:
+ * uid, gidlist, mechanism, service-set, mech-specific-data
+ */
+
+#define RSC_HASHBITS 10
+#define RSC_HASHMAX (1<<RSC_HASHBITS)
+
+#define GSS_SEQ_WIN 128
+
+struct gss_svc_seq_data {
+ /* highest seq number seen so far: */
+ int sd_max;
+ /* for i such that sd_max-GSS_SEQ_WIN < i <= sd_max, the i-th bit of
+ * sd_win is nonzero iff sequence number i has been seen already: */
+ unsigned long sd_win[GSS_SEQ_WIN/BITS_PER_LONG];
+ spinlock_t sd_lock;
+};
+
+struct rsc {
+ struct cache_head h;
+ struct xdr_netobj handle;
+ struct svc_cred cred;
+ struct gss_svc_seq_data seqdata;
+ struct gss_ctx *mechctx;
+ struct rcu_head rcu_head;
+};
+
+static struct rsc *rsc_update(struct cache_detail *cd, struct rsc *new, struct rsc *old);
+static struct rsc *rsc_lookup(struct cache_detail *cd, struct rsc *item);
+
+static void rsc_free(struct rsc *rsci)
+{
+ kfree(rsci->handle.data);
+ if (rsci->mechctx)
+ gss_delete_sec_context(&rsci->mechctx);
+ free_svc_cred(&rsci->cred);
+}
+
+static void rsc_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+ struct rsc *rsci = container_of(head, struct rsc, rcu_head);
+
+ kfree(rsci->handle.data);
+ kfree(rsci);
+}
+
+static void rsc_put(struct kref *ref)
+{
+ struct rsc *rsci = container_of(ref, struct rsc, h.ref);
+
+ if (rsci->mechctx)
+ gss_delete_sec_context(&rsci->mechctx);
+ free_svc_cred(&rsci->cred);
+ call_rcu(&rsci->rcu_head, rsc_free_rcu);
+}
+
+static inline int
+rsc_hash(struct rsc *rsci)
+{
+ return hash_mem(rsci->handle.data, rsci->handle.len, RSC_HASHBITS);
+}
+
+static int
+rsc_match(struct cache_head *a, struct cache_head *b)
+{
+ struct rsc *new = container_of(a, struct rsc, h);
+ struct rsc *tmp = container_of(b, struct rsc, h);
+
+ return netobj_equal(&new->handle, &tmp->handle);
+}
+
+static void
+rsc_init(struct cache_head *cnew, struct cache_head *ctmp)
+{
+ struct rsc *new = container_of(cnew, struct rsc, h);
+ struct rsc *tmp = container_of(ctmp, struct rsc, h);
+
+ new->handle.len = tmp->handle.len;
+ tmp->handle.len = 0;
+ new->handle.data = tmp->handle.data;
+ tmp->handle.data = NULL;
+ new->mechctx = NULL;
+ init_svc_cred(&new->cred);
+}
+
+static void
+update_rsc(struct cache_head *cnew, struct cache_head *ctmp)
+{
+ struct rsc *new = container_of(cnew, struct rsc, h);
+ struct rsc *tmp = container_of(ctmp, struct rsc, h);
+
+ new->mechctx = tmp->mechctx;
+ tmp->mechctx = NULL;
+ memset(&new->seqdata, 0, sizeof(new->seqdata));
+ spin_lock_init(&new->seqdata.sd_lock);
+ new->cred = tmp->cred;
+ init_svc_cred(&tmp->cred);
+}
+
+static struct cache_head *
+rsc_alloc(void)
+{
+ struct rsc *rsci = kmalloc(sizeof(*rsci), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (rsci)
+ return &rsci->h;
+ else
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int rsc_parse(struct cache_detail *cd,
+ char *mesg, int mlen)
+{
+ /* contexthandle expiry [ uid gid N <n gids> mechname ...mechdata... ] */
+ char *buf = mesg;
+ int id;
+ int len, rv;
+ struct rsc rsci, *rscp = NULL;
+ time64_t expiry;
+ int status = -EINVAL;
+ struct gss_api_mech *gm = NULL;
+
+ memset(&rsci, 0, sizeof(rsci));
+ /* context handle */
+ len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
+ if (len < 0) goto out;
+ status = -ENOMEM;
+ if (dup_to_netobj(&rsci.handle, buf, len))
+ goto out;
+
+ rsci.h.flags = 0;
+ /* expiry */
+ expiry = get_expiry(&mesg);
+ status = -EINVAL;
+ if (expiry == 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ rscp = rsc_lookup(cd, &rsci);
+ if (!rscp)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* uid, or NEGATIVE */
+ rv = get_int(&mesg, &id);
+ if (rv == -EINVAL)
+ goto out;
+ if (rv == -ENOENT)
+ set_bit(CACHE_NEGATIVE, &rsci.h.flags);
+ else {
+ int N, i;
+
+ /*
+ * NOTE: we skip uid_valid()/gid_valid() checks here:
+ * instead, * -1 id's are later mapped to the
+ * (export-specific) anonymous id by nfsd_setuser.
+ *
+ * (But supplementary gid's get no such special
+ * treatment so are checked for validity here.)
+ */
+ /* uid */
+ rsci.cred.cr_uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), id);
+
+ /* gid */
+ if (get_int(&mesg, &id))
+ goto out;
+ rsci.cred.cr_gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), id);
+
+ /* number of additional gid's */
+ if (get_int(&mesg, &N))
+ goto out;
+ if (N < 0 || N > NGROUPS_MAX)
+ goto out;
+ status = -ENOMEM;
+ rsci.cred.cr_group_info = groups_alloc(N);
+ if (rsci.cred.cr_group_info == NULL)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* gid's */
+ status = -EINVAL;
+ for (i=0; i<N; i++) {
+ kgid_t kgid;
+ if (get_int(&mesg, &id))
+ goto out;
+ kgid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), id);
+ if (!gid_valid(kgid))
+ goto out;
+ rsci.cred.cr_group_info->gid[i] = kgid;
+ }
+ groups_sort(rsci.cred.cr_group_info);
+
+ /* mech name */
+ len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
+ if (len < 0)
+ goto out;
+ gm = rsci.cred.cr_gss_mech = gss_mech_get_by_name(buf);
+ status = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ if (!gm)
+ goto out;
+
+ status = -EINVAL;
+ /* mech-specific data: */
+ len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
+ if (len < 0)
+ goto out;
+ status = gss_import_sec_context(buf, len, gm, &rsci.mechctx,
+ NULL, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (status)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* get client name */
+ len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
+ if (len > 0) {
+ rsci.cred.cr_principal = kstrdup(buf, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!rsci.cred.cr_principal) {
+ status = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ }
+ rsci.h.expiry_time = expiry;
+ rscp = rsc_update(cd, &rsci, rscp);
+ status = 0;
+out:
+ rsc_free(&rsci);
+ if (rscp)
+ cache_put(&rscp->h, cd);
+ else
+ status = -ENOMEM;
+ return status;
+}
+
+static const struct cache_detail rsc_cache_template = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .hash_size = RSC_HASHMAX,
+ .name = "auth.rpcsec.context",
+ .cache_put = rsc_put,
+ .cache_parse = rsc_parse,
+ .match = rsc_match,
+ .init = rsc_init,
+ .update = update_rsc,
+ .alloc = rsc_alloc,
+};
+
+static struct rsc *rsc_lookup(struct cache_detail *cd, struct rsc *item)
+{
+ struct cache_head *ch;
+ int hash = rsc_hash(item);
+
+ ch = sunrpc_cache_lookup_rcu(cd, &item->h, hash);
+ if (ch)
+ return container_of(ch, struct rsc, h);
+ else
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static struct rsc *rsc_update(struct cache_detail *cd, struct rsc *new, struct rsc *old)
+{
+ struct cache_head *ch;
+ int hash = rsc_hash(new);
+
+ ch = sunrpc_cache_update(cd, &new->h,
+ &old->h, hash);
+ if (ch)
+ return container_of(ch, struct rsc, h);
+ else
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+
+static struct rsc *
+gss_svc_searchbyctx(struct cache_detail *cd, struct xdr_netobj *handle)
+{
+ struct rsc rsci;
+ struct rsc *found;
+
+ memset(&rsci, 0, sizeof(rsci));
+ if (dup_to_netobj(&rsci.handle, handle->data, handle->len))
+ return NULL;
+ found = rsc_lookup(cd, &rsci);
+ rsc_free(&rsci);
+ if (!found)
+ return NULL;
+ if (cache_check(cd, &found->h, NULL))
+ return NULL;
+ return found;
+}
+
+/* Implements sequence number algorithm as specified in RFC 2203. */
+static int
+gss_check_seq_num(struct rsc *rsci, int seq_num)
+{
+ struct gss_svc_seq_data *sd = &rsci->seqdata;
+
+ spin_lock(&sd->sd_lock);
+ if (seq_num > sd->sd_max) {
+ if (seq_num >= sd->sd_max + GSS_SEQ_WIN) {
+ memset(sd->sd_win,0,sizeof(sd->sd_win));
+ sd->sd_max = seq_num;
+ } else while (sd->sd_max < seq_num) {
+ sd->sd_max++;
+ __clear_bit(sd->sd_max % GSS_SEQ_WIN, sd->sd_win);
+ }
+ __set_bit(seq_num % GSS_SEQ_WIN, sd->sd_win);
+ goto ok;
+ } else if (seq_num <= sd->sd_max - GSS_SEQ_WIN) {
+ goto drop;
+ }
+ /* sd_max - GSS_SEQ_WIN < seq_num <= sd_max */
+ if (__test_and_set_bit(seq_num % GSS_SEQ_WIN, sd->sd_win))
+ goto drop;
+ok:
+ spin_unlock(&sd->sd_lock);
+ return 1;
+drop:
+ spin_unlock(&sd->sd_lock);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline u32 round_up_to_quad(u32 i)
+{
+ return (i + 3 ) & ~3;
+}
+
+static inline int
+svc_safe_getnetobj(struct kvec *argv, struct xdr_netobj *o)
+{
+ int l;
+
+ if (argv->iov_len < 4)
+ return -1;
+ o->len = svc_getnl(argv);
+ l = round_up_to_quad(o->len);
+ if (argv->iov_len < l)
+ return -1;
+ o->data = argv->iov_base;
+ argv->iov_base += l;
+ argv->iov_len -= l;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int
+svc_safe_putnetobj(struct kvec *resv, struct xdr_netobj *o)
+{
+ u8 *p;
+
+ if (resv->iov_len + 4 > PAGE_SIZE)
+ return -1;
+ svc_putnl(resv, o->len);
+ p = resv->iov_base + resv->iov_len;
+ resv->iov_len += round_up_to_quad(o->len);
+ if (resv->iov_len > PAGE_SIZE)
+ return -1;
+ memcpy(p, o->data, o->len);
+ memset(p + o->len, 0, round_up_to_quad(o->len) - o->len);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify the checksum on the header and return SVC_OK on success.
+ * Otherwise, return SVC_DROP (in the case of a bad sequence number)
+ * or return SVC_DENIED and indicate error in authp.
+ */
+static int
+gss_verify_header(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct rsc *rsci,
+ __be32 *rpcstart, struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc, __be32 *authp)
+{
+ struct gss_ctx *ctx_id = rsci->mechctx;
+ struct xdr_buf rpchdr;
+ struct xdr_netobj checksum;
+ u32 flavor = 0;
+ struct kvec *argv = &rqstp->rq_arg.head[0];
+ struct kvec iov;
+
+ /* data to compute the checksum over: */
+ iov.iov_base = rpcstart;
+ iov.iov_len = (u8 *)argv->iov_base - (u8 *)rpcstart;
+ xdr_buf_from_iov(&iov, &rpchdr);
+
+ *authp = rpc_autherr_badverf;
+ if (argv->iov_len < 4)
+ return SVC_DENIED;
+ flavor = svc_getnl(argv);
+ if (flavor != RPC_AUTH_GSS)
+ return SVC_DENIED;
+ if (svc_safe_getnetobj(argv, &checksum))
+ return SVC_DENIED;
+
+ if (rqstp->rq_deferred) /* skip verification of revisited request */
+ return SVC_OK;
+ if (gss_verify_mic(ctx_id, &rpchdr, &checksum) != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ *authp = rpcsec_gsserr_credproblem;
+ return SVC_DENIED;
+ }
+
+ if (gc->gc_seq > MAXSEQ) {
+ dprintk("RPC: svcauth_gss: discarding request with "
+ "large sequence number %d\n", gc->gc_seq);
+ *authp = rpcsec_gsserr_ctxproblem;
+ return SVC_DENIED;
+ }
+ if (!gss_check_seq_num(rsci, gc->gc_seq)) {
+ dprintk("RPC: svcauth_gss: discarding request with "
+ "old sequence number %d\n", gc->gc_seq);
+ return SVC_DROP;
+ }
+ return SVC_OK;
+}
+
+static int
+gss_write_null_verf(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
+{
+ __be32 *p;
+
+ svc_putnl(rqstp->rq_res.head, RPC_AUTH_NULL);
+ p = rqstp->rq_res.head->iov_base + rqstp->rq_res.head->iov_len;
+ /* don't really need to check if head->iov_len > PAGE_SIZE ... */
+ *p++ = 0;
+ if (!xdr_ressize_check(rqstp, p))
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+gss_write_verf(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct gss_ctx *ctx_id, u32 seq)
+{
+ __be32 *xdr_seq;
+ u32 maj_stat;
+ struct xdr_buf verf_data;
+ struct xdr_netobj mic;
+ __be32 *p;
+ struct kvec iov;
+ int err = -1;
+
+ svc_putnl(rqstp->rq_res.head, RPC_AUTH_GSS);
+ xdr_seq = kmalloc(4, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!xdr_seq)
+ return -1;
+ *xdr_seq = htonl(seq);
+
+ iov.iov_base = xdr_seq;
+ iov.iov_len = 4;
+ xdr_buf_from_iov(&iov, &verf_data);
+ p = rqstp->rq_res.head->iov_base + rqstp->rq_res.head->iov_len;
+ mic.data = (u8 *)(p + 1);
+ maj_stat = gss_get_mic(ctx_id, &verf_data, &mic);
+ if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ goto out;
+ *p++ = htonl(mic.len);
+ memset((u8 *)p + mic.len, 0, round_up_to_quad(mic.len) - mic.len);
+ p += XDR_QUADLEN(mic.len);
+ if (!xdr_ressize_check(rqstp, p))
+ goto out;
+ err = 0;
+out:
+ kfree(xdr_seq);
+ return err;
+}
+
+struct gss_domain {
+ struct auth_domain h;
+ u32 pseudoflavor;
+};
+
+static struct auth_domain *
+find_gss_auth_domain(struct gss_ctx *ctx, u32 svc)
+{
+ char *name;
+
+ name = gss_service_to_auth_domain_name(ctx->mech_type, svc);
+ if (!name)
+ return NULL;
+ return auth_domain_find(name);
+}
+
+static struct auth_ops svcauthops_gss;
+
+u32 svcauth_gss_flavor(struct auth_domain *dom)
+{
+ struct gss_domain *gd = container_of(dom, struct gss_domain, h);
+
+ return gd->pseudoflavor;
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(svcauth_gss_flavor);
+
+struct auth_domain *
+svcauth_gss_register_pseudoflavor(u32 pseudoflavor, char * name)
+{
+ struct gss_domain *new;
+ struct auth_domain *test;
+ int stat = -ENOMEM;
+
+ new = kmalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!new)
+ goto out;
+ kref_init(&new->h.ref);
+ new->h.name = kstrdup(name, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!new->h.name)
+ goto out_free_dom;
+ new->h.flavour = &svcauthops_gss;
+ new->pseudoflavor = pseudoflavor;
+
+ test = auth_domain_lookup(name, &new->h);
+ if (test != &new->h) {
+ pr_warn("svc: duplicate registration of gss pseudo flavour %s.\n",
+ name);
+ stat = -EADDRINUSE;
+ auth_domain_put(test);
+ goto out_free_name;
+ }
+ return test;
+
+out_free_name:
+ kfree(new->h.name);
+out_free_dom:
+ kfree(new);
+out:
+ return ERR_PTR(stat);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(svcauth_gss_register_pseudoflavor);
+
+static inline int
+read_u32_from_xdr_buf(struct xdr_buf *buf, int base, u32 *obj)
+{
+ __be32 raw;
+ int status;
+
+ status = read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, base, &raw, sizeof(*obj));
+ if (status)
+ return status;
+ *obj = ntohl(raw);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* It would be nice if this bit of code could be shared with the client.
+ * Obstacles:
+ * The client shouldn't malloc(), would have to pass in own memory.
+ * The server uses base of head iovec as read pointer, while the
+ * client uses separate pointer. */
+static int
+unwrap_integ_data(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 seq, struct gss_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ int stat = -EINVAL;
+ u32 integ_len, maj_stat;
+ struct xdr_netobj mic;
+ struct xdr_buf integ_buf;
+
+ /* NFS READ normally uses splice to send data in-place. However
+ * the data in cache can change after the reply's MIC is computed
+ * but before the RPC reply is sent. To prevent the client from
+ * rejecting the server-computed MIC in this somewhat rare case,
+ * do not use splice with the GSS integrity service.
+ */
+ clear_bit(RQ_SPLICE_OK, &rqstp->rq_flags);
+
+ /* Did we already verify the signature on the original pass through? */
+ if (rqstp->rq_deferred)
+ return 0;
+
+ integ_len = svc_getnl(&buf->head[0]);
+ if (integ_len & 3)
+ return stat;
+ if (integ_len > buf->len)
+ return stat;
+ if (xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, &integ_buf, 0, integ_len)) {
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+ return stat;
+ }
+ /* copy out mic... */
+ if (read_u32_from_xdr_buf(buf, integ_len, &mic.len))
+ return stat;
+ if (mic.len > RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE)
+ return stat;
+ mic.data = kmalloc(mic.len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!mic.data)
+ return stat;
+ if (read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, integ_len + 4, mic.data, mic.len))
+ goto out;
+ maj_stat = gss_verify_mic(ctx, &integ_buf, &mic);
+ if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ goto out;
+ if (svc_getnl(&buf->head[0]) != seq)
+ goto out;
+ /* trim off the mic and padding at the end before returning */
+ xdr_buf_trim(buf, round_up_to_quad(mic.len) + 4);
+ stat = 0;
+out:
+ kfree(mic.data);
+ return stat;
+}
+
+static inline int
+total_buf_len(struct xdr_buf *buf)
+{
+ return buf->head[0].iov_len + buf->page_len + buf->tail[0].iov_len;
+}
+
+static void
+fix_priv_head(struct xdr_buf *buf, int pad)
+{
+ if (buf->page_len == 0) {
+ /* We need to adjust head and buf->len in tandem in this
+ * case to make svc_defer() work--it finds the original
+ * buffer start using buf->len - buf->head[0].iov_len. */
+ buf->head[0].iov_len -= pad;
+ }
+}
+
+static int
+unwrap_priv_data(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 seq, struct gss_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ u32 priv_len, maj_stat;
+ int pad, remaining_len, offset;
+
+ clear_bit(RQ_SPLICE_OK, &rqstp->rq_flags);
+
+ priv_len = svc_getnl(&buf->head[0]);
+ if (rqstp->rq_deferred) {
+ /* Already decrypted last time through! The sequence number
+ * check at out_seq is unnecessary but harmless: */
+ goto out_seq;
+ }
+ /* buf->len is the number of bytes from the original start of the
+ * request to the end, where head[0].iov_len is just the bytes
+ * not yet read from the head, so these two values are different: */
+ remaining_len = total_buf_len(buf);
+ if (priv_len > remaining_len)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ pad = remaining_len - priv_len;
+ buf->len -= pad;
+ fix_priv_head(buf, pad);
+
+ maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx, 0, priv_len, buf);
+ pad = priv_len - buf->len;
+ /* The upper layers assume the buffer is aligned on 4-byte boundaries.
+ * In the krb5p case, at least, the data ends up offset, so we need to
+ * move it around. */
+ /* XXX: This is very inefficient. It would be better to either do
+ * this while we encrypt, or maybe in the receive code, if we can peak
+ * ahead and work out the service and mechanism there. */
+ offset = buf->head[0].iov_len % 4;
+ if (offset) {
+ buf->buflen = RPCSVC_MAXPAYLOAD;
+ xdr_shift_buf(buf, offset);
+ fix_priv_head(buf, pad);
+ }
+ if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+out_seq:
+ if (svc_getnl(&buf->head[0]) != seq)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+struct gss_svc_data {
+ /* decoded gss client cred: */
+ struct rpc_gss_wire_cred clcred;
+ /* save a pointer to the beginning of the encoded verifier,
+ * for use in encryption/checksumming in svcauth_gss_release: */
+ __be32 *verf_start;
+ struct rsc *rsci;
+};
+
+static int
+svcauth_gss_set_client(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
+{
+ struct gss_svc_data *svcdata = rqstp->rq_auth_data;
+ struct rsc *rsci = svcdata->rsci;
+ struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc = &svcdata->clcred;
+ int stat;
+
+ /*
+ * A gss export can be specified either by:
+ * export *(sec=krb5,rw)
+ * or by
+ * export gss/krb5(rw)
+ * The latter is deprecated; but for backwards compatibility reasons
+ * the nfsd code will still fall back on trying it if the former
+ * doesn't work; so we try to make both available to nfsd, below.
+ */
+ rqstp->rq_gssclient = find_gss_auth_domain(rsci->mechctx, gc->gc_svc);
+ if (rqstp->rq_gssclient == NULL)
+ return SVC_DENIED;
+ stat = svcauth_unix_set_client(rqstp);
+ if (stat == SVC_DROP || stat == SVC_CLOSE)
+ return stat;
+ return SVC_OK;
+}
+
+static inline int
+gss_write_init_verf(struct cache_detail *cd, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
+ struct xdr_netobj *out_handle, int *major_status)
+{
+ struct rsc *rsci;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (*major_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ return gss_write_null_verf(rqstp);
+ rsci = gss_svc_searchbyctx(cd, out_handle);
+ if (rsci == NULL) {
+ *major_status = GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
+ return gss_write_null_verf(rqstp);
+ }
+ rc = gss_write_verf(rqstp, rsci->mechctx, GSS_SEQ_WIN);
+ cache_put(&rsci->h, cd);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static inline int
+gss_read_common_verf(struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc,
+ struct kvec *argv, __be32 *authp,
+ struct xdr_netobj *in_handle)
+{
+ /* Read the verifier; should be NULL: */
+ *authp = rpc_autherr_badverf;
+ if (argv->iov_len < 2 * 4)
+ return SVC_DENIED;
+ if (svc_getnl(argv) != RPC_AUTH_NULL)
+ return SVC_DENIED;
+ if (svc_getnl(argv) != 0)
+ return SVC_DENIED;
+ /* Martial context handle and token for upcall: */
+ *authp = rpc_autherr_badcred;
+ if (gc->gc_proc == RPC_GSS_PROC_INIT && gc->gc_ctx.len != 0)
+ return SVC_DENIED;
+ if (dup_netobj(in_handle, &gc->gc_ctx))
+ return SVC_CLOSE;
+ *authp = rpc_autherr_badverf;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int
+gss_read_verf(struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc,
+ struct kvec *argv, __be32 *authp,
+ struct xdr_netobj *in_handle,
+ struct xdr_netobj *in_token)
+{
+ struct xdr_netobj tmpobj;
+ int res;
+
+ res = gss_read_common_verf(gc, argv, authp, in_handle);
+ if (res)
+ return res;
+
+ if (svc_safe_getnetobj(argv, &tmpobj)) {
+ kfree(in_handle->data);
+ return SVC_DENIED;
+ }
+ if (dup_netobj(in_token, &tmpobj)) {
+ kfree(in_handle->data);
+ return SVC_CLOSE;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void gss_free_in_token_pages(struct gssp_in_token *in_token)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ i = 0;
+ while (in_token->pages[i])
+ put_page(in_token->pages[i++]);
+ kfree(in_token->pages);
+ in_token->pages = NULL;
+}
+
+static int gss_read_proxy_verf(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
+ struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc, __be32 *authp,
+ struct xdr_netobj *in_handle,
+ struct gssp_in_token *in_token)
+{
+ struct kvec *argv = &rqstp->rq_arg.head[0];
+ unsigned int length, pgto_offs, pgfrom_offs;
+ int pages, i, res, pgto, pgfrom;
+ size_t inlen, to_offs, from_offs;
+
+ res = gss_read_common_verf(gc, argv, authp, in_handle);
+ if (res)
+ return res;
+
+ inlen = svc_getnl(argv);
+ if (inlen > (argv->iov_len + rqstp->rq_arg.page_len)) {
+ kfree(in_handle->data);
+ return SVC_DENIED;
+ }
+
+ pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(inlen, PAGE_SIZE);
+ in_token->pages = kcalloc(pages + 1, sizeof(struct page *), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!in_token->pages) {
+ kfree(in_handle->data);
+ return SVC_DENIED;
+ }
+ in_token->page_base = 0;
+ in_token->page_len = inlen;
+ for (i = 0; i < pages; i++) {
+ in_token->pages[i] = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!in_token->pages[i]) {
+ kfree(in_handle->data);
+ gss_free_in_token_pages(in_token);
+ return SVC_DENIED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ length = min_t(unsigned int, inlen, argv->iov_len);
+ memcpy(page_address(in_token->pages[0]), argv->iov_base, length);
+ inlen -= length;
+
+ to_offs = length;
+ from_offs = rqstp->rq_arg.page_base;
+ while (inlen) {
+ pgto = to_offs >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ pgfrom = from_offs >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ pgto_offs = to_offs & ~PAGE_MASK;
+ pgfrom_offs = from_offs & ~PAGE_MASK;
+
+ length = min_t(unsigned int, inlen,
+ min_t(unsigned int, PAGE_SIZE - pgto_offs,
+ PAGE_SIZE - pgfrom_offs));
+ memcpy(page_address(in_token->pages[pgto]) + pgto_offs,
+ page_address(rqstp->rq_arg.pages[pgfrom]) + pgfrom_offs,
+ length);
+
+ to_offs += length;
+ from_offs += length;
+ inlen -= length;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int
+gss_write_resv(struct kvec *resv, size_t size_limit,
+ struct xdr_netobj *out_handle, struct xdr_netobj *out_token,
+ int major_status, int minor_status)
+{
+ if (resv->iov_len + 4 > size_limit)
+ return -1;
+ svc_putnl(resv, RPC_SUCCESS);
+ if (svc_safe_putnetobj(resv, out_handle))
+ return -1;
+ if (resv->iov_len + 3 * 4 > size_limit)
+ return -1;
+ svc_putnl(resv, major_status);
+ svc_putnl(resv, minor_status);
+ svc_putnl(resv, GSS_SEQ_WIN);
+ if (svc_safe_putnetobj(resv, out_token))
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Having read the cred already and found we're in the context
+ * initiation case, read the verifier and initiate (or check the results
+ * of) upcalls to userspace for help with context initiation. If
+ * the upcall results are available, write the verifier and result.
+ * Otherwise, drop the request pending an answer to the upcall.
+ */
+static int svcauth_gss_legacy_init(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
+ struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc, __be32 *authp)
+{
+ struct kvec *argv = &rqstp->rq_arg.head[0];
+ struct kvec *resv = &rqstp->rq_res.head[0];
+ struct rsi *rsip, rsikey;
+ int ret;
+ struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(SVC_NET(rqstp), sunrpc_net_id);
+
+ memset(&rsikey, 0, sizeof(rsikey));
+ ret = gss_read_verf(gc, argv, authp,
+ &rsikey.in_handle, &rsikey.in_token);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ /* Perform upcall, or find upcall result: */
+ rsip = rsi_lookup(sn->rsi_cache, &rsikey);
+ rsi_free(&rsikey);
+ if (!rsip)
+ return SVC_CLOSE;
+ if (cache_check(sn->rsi_cache, &rsip->h, &rqstp->rq_chandle) < 0)
+ /* No upcall result: */
+ return SVC_CLOSE;
+
+ ret = SVC_CLOSE;
+ /* Got an answer to the upcall; use it: */
+ if (gss_write_init_verf(sn->rsc_cache, rqstp,
+ &rsip->out_handle, &rsip->major_status))
+ goto out;
+ if (gss_write_resv(resv, PAGE_SIZE,
+ &rsip->out_handle, &rsip->out_token,
+ rsip->major_status, rsip->minor_status))
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = SVC_COMPLETE;
+out:
+ cache_put(&rsip->h, sn->rsi_cache);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int gss_proxy_save_rsc(struct cache_detail *cd,
+ struct gssp_upcall_data *ud,
+ uint64_t *handle)
+{
+ struct rsc rsci, *rscp = NULL;
+ static atomic64_t ctxhctr;
+ long long ctxh;
+ struct gss_api_mech *gm = NULL;
+ time64_t expiry;
+ int status = -EINVAL;
+
+ memset(&rsci, 0, sizeof(rsci));
+ /* context handle */
+ status = -ENOMEM;
+ /* the handle needs to be just a unique id,
+ * use a static counter */
+ ctxh = atomic64_inc_return(&ctxhctr);
+
+ /* make a copy for the caller */
+ *handle = ctxh;
+
+ /* make a copy for the rsc cache */
+ if (dup_to_netobj(&rsci.handle, (char *)handle, sizeof(uint64_t)))
+ goto out;
+ rscp = rsc_lookup(cd, &rsci);
+ if (!rscp)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* creds */
+ if (!ud->found_creds) {
+ /* userspace seem buggy, we should always get at least a
+ * mapping to nobody */
+ dprintk("RPC: No creds found!\n");
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ struct timespec64 boot;
+
+ /* steal creds */
+ rsci.cred = ud->creds;
+ memset(&ud->creds, 0, sizeof(struct svc_cred));
+
+ status = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ /* get mech handle from OID */
+ gm = gss_mech_get_by_OID(&ud->mech_oid);
+ if (!gm)
+ goto out;
+ rsci.cred.cr_gss_mech = gm;
+
+ status = -EINVAL;
+ /* mech-specific data: */
+ status = gss_import_sec_context(ud->out_handle.data,
+ ud->out_handle.len,
+ gm, &rsci.mechctx,
+ &expiry, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (status)
+ goto out;
+
+ getboottime64(&boot);
+ expiry -= boot.tv_sec;
+ }
+
+ rsci.h.expiry_time = expiry;
+ rscp = rsc_update(cd, &rsci, rscp);
+ status = 0;
+out:
+ rsc_free(&rsci);
+ if (rscp)
+ cache_put(&rscp->h, cd);
+ else
+ status = -ENOMEM;
+ return status;
+}
+
+static int svcauth_gss_proxy_init(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
+ struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc, __be32 *authp)
+{
+ struct kvec *resv = &rqstp->rq_res.head[0];
+ struct xdr_netobj cli_handle;
+ struct gssp_upcall_data ud;
+ uint64_t handle;
+ int status;
+ int ret;
+ struct net *net = SVC_NET(rqstp);
+ struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+
+ memset(&ud, 0, sizeof(ud));
+ ret = gss_read_proxy_verf(rqstp, gc, authp,
+ &ud.in_handle, &ud.in_token);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = SVC_CLOSE;
+
+ /* Perform synchronous upcall to gss-proxy */
+ status = gssp_accept_sec_context_upcall(net, &ud);
+ if (status)
+ goto out;
+
+ dprintk("RPC: svcauth_gss: gss major status = %d "
+ "minor status = %d\n",
+ ud.major_status, ud.minor_status);
+
+ switch (ud.major_status) {
+ case GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED:
+ cli_handle = ud.out_handle;
+ break;
+ case GSS_S_COMPLETE:
+ status = gss_proxy_save_rsc(sn->rsc_cache, &ud, &handle);
+ if (status) {
+ pr_info("%s: gss_proxy_save_rsc failed (%d)\n",
+ __func__, status);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ cli_handle.data = (u8 *)&handle;
+ cli_handle.len = sizeof(handle);
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = SVC_CLOSE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Got an answer to the upcall; use it: */
+ if (gss_write_init_verf(sn->rsc_cache, rqstp,
+ &cli_handle, &ud.major_status)) {
+ pr_info("%s: gss_write_init_verf failed\n", __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (gss_write_resv(resv, PAGE_SIZE,
+ &cli_handle, &ud.out_token,
+ ud.major_status, ud.minor_status)) {
+ pr_info("%s: gss_write_resv failed\n", __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = SVC_COMPLETE;
+out:
+ gss_free_in_token_pages(&ud.in_token);
+ gssp_free_upcall_data(&ud);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Try to set the sn->use_gss_proxy variable to a new value. We only allow
+ * it to be changed if it's currently undefined (-1). If it's any other value
+ * then return -EBUSY unless the type wouldn't have changed anyway.
+ */
+static int set_gss_proxy(struct net *net, int type)
+{
+ struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+ int ret;
+
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(type != 0 && type != 1);
+ ret = cmpxchg(&sn->use_gss_proxy, -1, type);
+ if (ret != -1 && ret != type)
+ return -EBUSY;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static bool use_gss_proxy(struct net *net)
+{
+ struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+
+ /* If use_gss_proxy is still undefined, then try to disable it */
+ if (sn->use_gss_proxy == -1)
+ set_gss_proxy(net, 0);
+ return sn->use_gss_proxy;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
+
+static ssize_t write_gssp(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct net *net = PDE_DATA(file_inode(file));
+ char tbuf[20];
+ unsigned long i;
+ int res;
+
+ if (*ppos || count > sizeof(tbuf)-1)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (copy_from_user(tbuf, buf, count))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ tbuf[count] = 0;
+ res = kstrtoul(tbuf, 0, &i);
+ if (res)
+ return res;
+ if (i != 1)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ res = set_gssp_clnt(net);
+ if (res)
+ return res;
+ res = set_gss_proxy(net, 1);
+ if (res)
+ return res;
+ return count;
+}
+
+static ssize_t read_gssp(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct net *net = PDE_DATA(file_inode(file));
+ struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+ unsigned long p = *ppos;
+ char tbuf[10];
+ size_t len;
+
+ snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d\n", sn->use_gss_proxy);
+ len = strlen(tbuf);
+ if (p >= len)
+ return 0;
+ len -= p;
+ if (len > count)
+ len = count;
+ if (copy_to_user(buf, (void *)(tbuf+p), len))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ *ppos += len;
+ return len;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations use_gss_proxy_ops = {
+ .open = nonseekable_open,
+ .write = write_gssp,
+ .read = read_gssp,
+};
+
+static int create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(struct net *net)
+{
+ struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+ struct proc_dir_entry **p = &sn->use_gssp_proc;
+
+ sn->use_gss_proxy = -1;
+ *p = proc_create_data("use-gss-proxy", S_IFREG | 0600,
+ sn->proc_net_rpc,
+ &use_gss_proxy_ops, net);
+ if (!*p)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ init_gssp_clnt(sn);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void destroy_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(struct net *net)
+{
+ struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+
+ if (sn->use_gssp_proc) {
+ remove_proc_entry("use-gss-proxy", sn->proc_net_rpc);
+ clear_gssp_clnt(sn);
+ }
+}
+#else /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */
+
+static int create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(struct net *net)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void destroy_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(struct net *net) {}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */
+
+/*
+ * Accept an rpcsec packet.
+ * If context establishment, punt to user space
+ * If data exchange, verify/decrypt
+ * If context destruction, handle here
+ * In the context establishment and destruction case we encode
+ * response here and return SVC_COMPLETE.
+ */
+static int
+svcauth_gss_accept(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *authp)
+{
+ struct kvec *argv = &rqstp->rq_arg.head[0];
+ struct kvec *resv = &rqstp->rq_res.head[0];
+ u32 crlen;
+ struct gss_svc_data *svcdata = rqstp->rq_auth_data;
+ struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc;
+ struct rsc *rsci = NULL;
+ __be32 *rpcstart;
+ __be32 *reject_stat = resv->iov_base + resv->iov_len;
+ int ret;
+ struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(SVC_NET(rqstp), sunrpc_net_id);
+
+ dprintk("RPC: svcauth_gss: argv->iov_len = %zd\n",
+ argv->iov_len);
+
+ *authp = rpc_autherr_badcred;
+ if (!svcdata)
+ svcdata = kmalloc(sizeof(*svcdata), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!svcdata)
+ goto auth_err;
+ rqstp->rq_auth_data = svcdata;
+ svcdata->verf_start = NULL;
+ svcdata->rsci = NULL;
+ gc = &svcdata->clcred;
+
+ /* start of rpc packet is 7 u32's back from here:
+ * xid direction rpcversion prog vers proc flavour
+ */
+ rpcstart = argv->iov_base;
+ rpcstart -= 7;
+
+ /* credential is:
+ * version(==1), proc(0,1,2,3), seq, service (1,2,3), handle
+ * at least 5 u32s, and is preceded by length, so that makes 6.
+ */
+
+ if (argv->iov_len < 5 * 4)
+ goto auth_err;
+ crlen = svc_getnl(argv);
+ if (svc_getnl(argv) != RPC_GSS_VERSION)
+ goto auth_err;
+ gc->gc_proc = svc_getnl(argv);
+ gc->gc_seq = svc_getnl(argv);
+ gc->gc_svc = svc_getnl(argv);
+ if (svc_safe_getnetobj(argv, &gc->gc_ctx))
+ goto auth_err;
+ if (crlen != round_up_to_quad(gc->gc_ctx.len) + 5 * 4)
+ goto auth_err;
+
+ if ((gc->gc_proc != RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA) && (rqstp->rq_proc != 0))
+ goto auth_err;
+
+ *authp = rpc_autherr_badverf;
+ switch (gc->gc_proc) {
+ case RPC_GSS_PROC_INIT:
+ case RPC_GSS_PROC_CONTINUE_INIT:
+ if (use_gss_proxy(SVC_NET(rqstp)))
+ return svcauth_gss_proxy_init(rqstp, gc, authp);
+ else
+ return svcauth_gss_legacy_init(rqstp, gc, authp);
+ case RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA:
+ case RPC_GSS_PROC_DESTROY:
+ /* Look up the context, and check the verifier: */
+ *authp = rpcsec_gsserr_credproblem;
+ rsci = gss_svc_searchbyctx(sn->rsc_cache, &gc->gc_ctx);
+ if (!rsci)
+ goto auth_err;
+ switch (gss_verify_header(rqstp, rsci, rpcstart, gc, authp)) {
+ case SVC_OK:
+ break;
+ case SVC_DENIED:
+ goto auth_err;
+ case SVC_DROP:
+ goto drop;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ *authp = rpc_autherr_rejectedcred;
+ goto auth_err;
+ }
+
+ /* now act upon the command: */
+ switch (gc->gc_proc) {
+ case RPC_GSS_PROC_DESTROY:
+ if (gss_write_verf(rqstp, rsci->mechctx, gc->gc_seq))
+ goto auth_err;
+ /* Delete the entry from the cache_list and call cache_put */
+ sunrpc_cache_unhash(sn->rsc_cache, &rsci->h);
+ if (resv->iov_len + 4 > PAGE_SIZE)
+ goto drop;
+ svc_putnl(resv, RPC_SUCCESS);
+ goto complete;
+ case RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA:
+ *authp = rpcsec_gsserr_ctxproblem;
+ svcdata->verf_start = resv->iov_base + resv->iov_len;
+ if (gss_write_verf(rqstp, rsci->mechctx, gc->gc_seq))
+ goto auth_err;
+ rqstp->rq_cred = rsci->cred;
+ get_group_info(rsci->cred.cr_group_info);
+ *authp = rpc_autherr_badcred;
+ switch (gc->gc_svc) {
+ case RPC_GSS_SVC_NONE:
+ break;
+ case RPC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY:
+ /* placeholders for length and seq. number: */
+ svc_putnl(resv, 0);
+ svc_putnl(resv, 0);
+ if (unwrap_integ_data(rqstp, &rqstp->rq_arg,
+ gc->gc_seq, rsci->mechctx))
+ goto garbage_args;
+ rqstp->rq_auth_slack = RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE;
+ break;
+ case RPC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY:
+ /* placeholders for length and seq. number: */
+ svc_putnl(resv, 0);
+ svc_putnl(resv, 0);
+ if (unwrap_priv_data(rqstp, &rqstp->rq_arg,
+ gc->gc_seq, rsci->mechctx))
+ goto garbage_args;
+ rqstp->rq_auth_slack = RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE * 2;
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto auth_err;
+ }
+ svcdata->rsci = rsci;
+ cache_get(&rsci->h);
+ rqstp->rq_cred.cr_flavor = gss_svc_to_pseudoflavor(
+ rsci->mechctx->mech_type,
+ GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT,
+ gc->gc_svc);
+ ret = SVC_OK;
+ goto out;
+ }
+garbage_args:
+ ret = SVC_GARBAGE;
+ goto out;
+auth_err:
+ /* Restore write pointer to its original value: */
+ xdr_ressize_check(rqstp, reject_stat);
+ ret = SVC_DENIED;
+ goto out;
+complete:
+ ret = SVC_COMPLETE;
+ goto out;
+drop:
+ ret = SVC_CLOSE;
+out:
+ if (rsci)
+ cache_put(&rsci->h, sn->rsc_cache);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static __be32 *
+svcauth_gss_prepare_to_wrap(struct xdr_buf *resbuf, struct gss_svc_data *gsd)
+{
+ __be32 *p;
+ u32 verf_len;
+
+ p = gsd->verf_start;
+ gsd->verf_start = NULL;
+
+ /* If the reply stat is nonzero, don't wrap: */
+ if (*(p-1) != rpc_success)
+ return NULL;
+ /* Skip the verifier: */
+ p += 1;
+ verf_len = ntohl(*p++);
+ p += XDR_QUADLEN(verf_len);
+ /* move accept_stat to right place: */
+ memcpy(p, p + 2, 4);
+ /* Also don't wrap if the accept stat is nonzero: */
+ if (*p != rpc_success) {
+ resbuf->head[0].iov_len -= 2 * 4;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ p++;
+ return p;
+}
+
+static inline int
+svcauth_gss_wrap_resp_integ(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
+{
+ struct gss_svc_data *gsd = (struct gss_svc_data *)rqstp->rq_auth_data;
+ struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc = &gsd->clcred;
+ struct xdr_buf *resbuf = &rqstp->rq_res;
+ struct xdr_buf integ_buf;
+ struct xdr_netobj mic;
+ struct kvec *resv;
+ __be32 *p;
+ int integ_offset, integ_len;
+ int stat = -EINVAL;
+
+ p = svcauth_gss_prepare_to_wrap(resbuf, gsd);
+ if (p == NULL)
+ goto out;
+ integ_offset = (u8 *)(p + 1) - (u8 *)resbuf->head[0].iov_base;
+ integ_len = resbuf->len - integ_offset;
+ BUG_ON(integ_len % 4);
+ *p++ = htonl(integ_len);
+ *p++ = htonl(gc->gc_seq);
+ if (xdr_buf_subsegment(resbuf, &integ_buf, integ_offset, integ_len)) {
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+ if (resbuf->tail[0].iov_base == NULL) {
+ if (resbuf->head[0].iov_len + RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE)
+ goto out_err;
+ resbuf->tail[0].iov_base = resbuf->head[0].iov_base
+ + resbuf->head[0].iov_len;
+ resbuf->tail[0].iov_len = 0;
+ }
+ resv = &resbuf->tail[0];
+ mic.data = (u8 *)resv->iov_base + resv->iov_len + 4;
+ if (gss_get_mic(gsd->rsci->mechctx, &integ_buf, &mic))
+ goto out_err;
+ svc_putnl(resv, mic.len);
+ memset(mic.data + mic.len, 0,
+ round_up_to_quad(mic.len) - mic.len);
+ resv->iov_len += XDR_QUADLEN(mic.len) << 2;
+ /* not strictly required: */
+ resbuf->len += XDR_QUADLEN(mic.len) << 2;
+ BUG_ON(resv->iov_len > PAGE_SIZE);
+out:
+ stat = 0;
+out_err:
+ return stat;
+}
+
+static inline int
+svcauth_gss_wrap_resp_priv(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
+{
+ struct gss_svc_data *gsd = (struct gss_svc_data *)rqstp->rq_auth_data;
+ struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc = &gsd->clcred;
+ struct xdr_buf *resbuf = &rqstp->rq_res;
+ struct page **inpages = NULL;
+ __be32 *p, *len;
+ int offset;
+ int pad;
+
+ p = svcauth_gss_prepare_to_wrap(resbuf, gsd);
+ if (p == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ len = p++;
+ offset = (u8 *)p - (u8 *)resbuf->head[0].iov_base;
+ *p++ = htonl(gc->gc_seq);
+ inpages = resbuf->pages;
+ /* XXX: Would be better to write some xdr helper functions for
+ * nfs{2,3,4}xdr.c that place the data right, instead of copying: */
+
+ /*
+ * If there is currently tail data, make sure there is
+ * room for the head, tail, and 2 * RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE in
+ * the page, and move the current tail data such that
+ * there is RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE slack space available in
+ * both the head and tail.
+ */
+ if (resbuf->tail[0].iov_base) {
+ BUG_ON(resbuf->tail[0].iov_base >= resbuf->head[0].iov_base
+ + PAGE_SIZE);
+ BUG_ON(resbuf->tail[0].iov_base < resbuf->head[0].iov_base);
+ if (resbuf->tail[0].iov_len + resbuf->head[0].iov_len
+ + 2 * RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ memmove(resbuf->tail[0].iov_base + RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE,
+ resbuf->tail[0].iov_base,
+ resbuf->tail[0].iov_len);
+ resbuf->tail[0].iov_base += RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If there is no current tail data, make sure there is
+ * room for the head data, and 2 * RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE in the
+ * allotted page, and set up tail information such that there
+ * is RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE slack space available in both the
+ * head and tail.
+ */
+ if (resbuf->tail[0].iov_base == NULL) {
+ if (resbuf->head[0].iov_len + 2*RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ resbuf->tail[0].iov_base = resbuf->head[0].iov_base
+ + resbuf->head[0].iov_len + RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE;
+ resbuf->tail[0].iov_len = 0;
+ }
+ if (gss_wrap(gsd->rsci->mechctx, offset, resbuf, inpages))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ *len = htonl(resbuf->len - offset);
+ pad = 3 - ((resbuf->len - offset - 1)&3);
+ p = (__be32 *)(resbuf->tail[0].iov_base + resbuf->tail[0].iov_len);
+ memset(p, 0, pad);
+ resbuf->tail[0].iov_len += pad;
+ resbuf->len += pad;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+svcauth_gss_release(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
+{
+ struct gss_svc_data *gsd = (struct gss_svc_data *)rqstp->rq_auth_data;
+ struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc;
+ struct xdr_buf *resbuf = &rqstp->rq_res;
+ int stat = -EINVAL;
+ struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(SVC_NET(rqstp), sunrpc_net_id);
+
+ if (!gsd)
+ goto out;
+ gc = &gsd->clcred;
+ if (gc->gc_proc != RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA)
+ goto out;
+ /* Release can be called twice, but we only wrap once. */
+ if (gsd->verf_start == NULL)
+ goto out;
+ /* normally not set till svc_send, but we need it here: */
+ /* XXX: what for? Do we mess it up the moment we call svc_putu32
+ * or whatever? */
+ resbuf->len = total_buf_len(resbuf);
+ switch (gc->gc_svc) {
+ case RPC_GSS_SVC_NONE:
+ break;
+ case RPC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY:
+ stat = svcauth_gss_wrap_resp_integ(rqstp);
+ if (stat)
+ goto out_err;
+ break;
+ case RPC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY:
+ stat = svcauth_gss_wrap_resp_priv(rqstp);
+ if (stat)
+ goto out_err;
+ break;
+ /*
+ * For any other gc_svc value, svcauth_gss_accept() already set
+ * the auth_error appropriately; just fall through:
+ */
+ }
+
+out:
+ stat = 0;
+out_err:
+ if (rqstp->rq_client)
+ auth_domain_put(rqstp->rq_client);
+ rqstp->rq_client = NULL;
+ if (rqstp->rq_gssclient)
+ auth_domain_put(rqstp->rq_gssclient);
+ rqstp->rq_gssclient = NULL;
+ if (rqstp->rq_cred.cr_group_info)
+ put_group_info(rqstp->rq_cred.cr_group_info);
+ rqstp->rq_cred.cr_group_info = NULL;
+ if (gsd && gsd->rsci) {
+ cache_put(&gsd->rsci->h, sn->rsc_cache);
+ gsd->rsci = NULL;
+ }
+ return stat;
+}
+
+static void
+svcauth_gss_domain_release_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+ struct auth_domain *dom = container_of(head, struct auth_domain, rcu_head);
+ struct gss_domain *gd = container_of(dom, struct gss_domain, h);
+
+ kfree(dom->name);
+ kfree(gd);
+}
+
+static void
+svcauth_gss_domain_release(struct auth_domain *dom)
+{
+ call_rcu(&dom->rcu_head, svcauth_gss_domain_release_rcu);
+}
+
+static struct auth_ops svcauthops_gss = {
+ .name = "rpcsec_gss",
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .flavour = RPC_AUTH_GSS,
+ .accept = svcauth_gss_accept,
+ .release = svcauth_gss_release,
+ .domain_release = svcauth_gss_domain_release,
+ .set_client = svcauth_gss_set_client,
+};
+
+static int rsi_cache_create_net(struct net *net)
+{
+ struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+ struct cache_detail *cd;
+ int err;
+
+ cd = cache_create_net(&rsi_cache_template, net);
+ if (IS_ERR(cd))
+ return PTR_ERR(cd);
+ err = cache_register_net(cd, net);
+ if (err) {
+ cache_destroy_net(cd, net);
+ return err;
+ }
+ sn->rsi_cache = cd;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void rsi_cache_destroy_net(struct net *net)
+{
+ struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+ struct cache_detail *cd = sn->rsi_cache;
+
+ sn->rsi_cache = NULL;
+ cache_purge(cd);
+ cache_unregister_net(cd, net);
+ cache_destroy_net(cd, net);
+}
+
+static int rsc_cache_create_net(struct net *net)
+{
+ struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+ struct cache_detail *cd;
+ int err;
+
+ cd = cache_create_net(&rsc_cache_template, net);
+ if (IS_ERR(cd))
+ return PTR_ERR(cd);
+ err = cache_register_net(cd, net);
+ if (err) {
+ cache_destroy_net(cd, net);
+ return err;
+ }
+ sn->rsc_cache = cd;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void rsc_cache_destroy_net(struct net *net)
+{
+ struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+ struct cache_detail *cd = sn->rsc_cache;
+
+ sn->rsc_cache = NULL;
+ cache_purge(cd);
+ cache_unregister_net(cd, net);
+ cache_destroy_net(cd, net);
+}
+
+int
+gss_svc_init_net(struct net *net)
+{
+ int rv;
+
+ rv = rsc_cache_create_net(net);
+ if (rv)
+ return rv;
+ rv = rsi_cache_create_net(net);
+ if (rv)
+ goto out1;
+ rv = create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(net);
+ if (rv)
+ goto out2;
+ return 0;
+out2:
+ rsi_cache_destroy_net(net);
+out1:
+ rsc_cache_destroy_net(net);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+void
+gss_svc_shutdown_net(struct net *net)
+{
+ destroy_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(net);
+ rsi_cache_destroy_net(net);
+ rsc_cache_destroy_net(net);
+}
+
+int
+gss_svc_init(void)
+{
+ return svc_auth_register(RPC_AUTH_GSS, &svcauthops_gss);
+}
+
+void
+gss_svc_shutdown(void)
+{
+ svc_auth_unregister(RPC_AUTH_GSS);
+}
diff --git a/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/trace.c b/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/trace.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5576f1e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/marvell/linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/trace.c
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018, 2019 Oracle. All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/sunrpc/clnt.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_err.h>
+
+#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
+#include <trace/events/rpcgss.h>