ASR_BASE
Change-Id: Icf3719cc0afe3eeb3edc7fa80a2eb5199ca9dda1
diff --git a/marvell/uboot/lib/tpm.c b/marvell/uboot/lib/tpm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..967c8e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/marvell/uboot/lib/tpm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,914 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium OS Authors.
+ * Coypright (c) 2013 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+ */
+
+#include <common.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <sha1.h>
+#include <tpm.h>
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
+
+/* Internal error of TPM command library */
+#define TPM_LIB_ERROR ((uint32_t)~0u)
+
+/* Useful constants */
+enum {
+ COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE = 256,
+ TPM_PUBEK_SIZE = 256,
+ TPM_REQUEST_HEADER_LENGTH = 10,
+ TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH = 10,
+ PCR_DIGEST_LENGTH = 20,
+ DIGEST_LENGTH = 20,
+ TPM_REQUEST_AUTH_LENGTH = 45,
+ TPM_RESPONSE_AUTH_LENGTH = 41,
+ /* some max lengths, valid for RSA keys <= 2048 bits */
+ TPM_KEY12_MAX_LENGTH = 618,
+ TPM_PUBKEY_MAX_LENGTH = 288,
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_TPM_AUTH_SESSIONS
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_SHA1
+#error "TPM_AUTH_SESSIONS require SHA1 to be configured, too"
+#endif /* !CONFIG_SHA1 */
+
+struct session_data {
+ int valid;
+ uint32_t handle;
+ uint8_t nonce_even[DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ uint8_t nonce_odd[DIGEST_LENGTH];
+};
+
+static struct session_data oiap_session = {0, };
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_TPM_AUTH_SESSIONS */
+
+/**
+ * Pack data into a byte string. The data types are specified in
+ * the format string: 'b' means unsigned byte, 'w' unsigned word,
+ * 'd' unsigned double word, and 's' byte string. The data are a
+ * series of offsets and values (for type byte string there are also
+ * lengths). The data values are packed into the byte string
+ * sequentially, and so a latter value could over-write a former
+ * value.
+ *
+ * @param str output string
+ * @param size size of output string
+ * @param format format string
+ * @param ... data points
+ * @return 0 on success, non-0 on error
+ */
+int pack_byte_string(uint8_t *str, size_t size, const char *format, ...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+ size_t offset = 0, length = 0;
+ uint8_t *data = NULL;
+ uint32_t value = 0;
+
+ va_start(args, format);
+ for (; *format; format++) {
+ switch (*format) {
+ case 'b':
+ offset = va_arg(args, size_t);
+ value = va_arg(args, int);
+ length = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'w':
+ offset = va_arg(args, size_t);
+ value = va_arg(args, int);
+ length = 2;
+ break;
+ case 'd':
+ offset = va_arg(args, size_t);
+ value = va_arg(args, uint32_t);
+ length = 4;
+ break;
+ case 's':
+ offset = va_arg(args, size_t);
+ data = va_arg(args, uint8_t *);
+ length = va_arg(args, uint32_t);
+ break;
+ default:
+ debug("Couldn't recognize format string\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (offset + length > size)
+ return -1;
+
+ switch (*format) {
+ case 'b':
+ str[offset] = value;
+ break;
+ case 'w':
+ put_unaligned_be16(value, str + offset);
+ break;
+ case 'd':
+ put_unaligned_be32(value, str + offset);
+ break;
+ case 's':
+ memcpy(str + offset, data, length);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ va_end(args);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Unpack data from a byte string. The data types are specified in
+ * the format string: 'b' means unsigned byte, 'w' unsigned word,
+ * 'd' unsigned double word, and 's' byte string. The data are a
+ * series of offsets and pointers (for type byte string there are also
+ * lengths).
+ *
+ * @param str output string
+ * @param size size of output string
+ * @param format format string
+ * @param ... data points
+ * @return 0 on success, non-0 on error
+ */
+int unpack_byte_string(const uint8_t *str, size_t size, const char *format, ...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+ size_t offset = 0, length = 0;
+ uint8_t *ptr8 = NULL;
+ uint16_t *ptr16 = NULL;
+ uint32_t *ptr32 = NULL;
+
+ va_start(args, format);
+ for (; *format; format++) {
+ switch (*format) {
+ case 'b':
+ offset = va_arg(args, size_t);
+ ptr8 = va_arg(args, uint8_t *);
+ length = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'w':
+ offset = va_arg(args, size_t);
+ ptr16 = va_arg(args, uint16_t *);
+ length = 2;
+ break;
+ case 'd':
+ offset = va_arg(args, size_t);
+ ptr32 = va_arg(args, uint32_t *);
+ length = 4;
+ break;
+ case 's':
+ offset = va_arg(args, size_t);
+ ptr8 = va_arg(args, uint8_t *);
+ length = va_arg(args, uint32_t);
+ break;
+ default:
+ debug("Couldn't recognize format string\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (offset + length > size)
+ return -1;
+
+ switch (*format) {
+ case 'b':
+ *ptr8 = str[offset];
+ break;
+ case 'w':
+ *ptr16 = get_unaligned_be16(str + offset);
+ break;
+ case 'd':
+ *ptr32 = get_unaligned_be32(str + offset);
+ break;
+ case 's':
+ memcpy(ptr8, str + offset, length);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ va_end(args);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Get TPM command size.
+ *
+ * @param command byte string of TPM command
+ * @return command size of the TPM command
+ */
+static uint32_t tpm_command_size(const void *command)
+{
+ const size_t command_size_offset = 2;
+ return get_unaligned_be32(command + command_size_offset);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Get TPM response return code, which is one of TPM_RESULT values.
+ *
+ * @param response byte string of TPM response
+ * @return return code of the TPM response
+ */
+static uint32_t tpm_return_code(const void *response)
+{
+ const size_t return_code_offset = 6;
+ return get_unaligned_be32(response + return_code_offset);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Send a TPM command and return response's return code, and optionally
+ * return response to caller.
+ *
+ * @param command byte string of TPM command
+ * @param response output buffer for TPM response, or NULL if the
+ * caller does not care about it
+ * @param size_ptr output buffer size (input parameter) and TPM
+ * response length (output parameter); this parameter
+ * is a bidirectional
+ * @return return code of the TPM response
+ */
+static uint32_t tpm_sendrecv_command(const void *command,
+ void *response, size_t *size_ptr)
+{
+ uint8_t response_buffer[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
+ size_t response_length;
+ uint32_t err;
+
+ if (response) {
+ response_length = *size_ptr;
+ } else {
+ response = response_buffer;
+ response_length = sizeof(response_buffer);
+ }
+ err = tis_sendrecv(command, tpm_command_size(command),
+ response, &response_length);
+ if (err)
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ if (size_ptr)
+ *size_ptr = response_length;
+
+ return tpm_return_code(response);
+}
+
+uint32_t tpm_init(void)
+{
+ uint32_t err;
+
+ err = tis_init();
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ return tis_open();
+}
+
+uint32_t tpm_startup(enum tpm_startup_type mode)
+{
+ const uint8_t command[12] = {
+ 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xc, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x99, 0x0, 0x0,
+ };
+ const size_t mode_offset = 10;
+ uint8_t buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
+
+ if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sw",
+ 0, command, sizeof(command),
+ mode_offset, mode))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+
+ return tpm_sendrecv_command(buf, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+uint32_t tpm_self_test_full(void)
+{
+ const uint8_t command[10] = {
+ 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x50,
+ };
+ return tpm_sendrecv_command(command, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+uint32_t tpm_continue_self_test(void)
+{
+ const uint8_t command[10] = {
+ 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x53,
+ };
+ return tpm_sendrecv_command(command, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+uint32_t tpm_nv_define_space(uint32_t index, uint32_t perm, uint32_t size)
+{
+ const uint8_t command[101] = {
+ 0x0, 0xc1, /* TPM_TAG */
+ 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x65, /* parameter size */
+ 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xcc, /* TPM_COMMAND_CODE */
+ /* TPM_NV_DATA_PUBLIC->... */
+ 0x0, 0x18, /* ...->TPM_STRUCTURE_TAG */
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, /* ...->TPM_NV_INDEX */
+ /* TPM_NV_DATA_PUBLIC->TPM_PCR_INFO_SHORT */
+ 0x0, 0x3,
+ 0, 0, 0,
+ 0x1f,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ /* TPM_NV_DATA_PUBLIC->TPM_PCR_INFO_SHORT */
+ 0x0, 0x3,
+ 0, 0, 0,
+ 0x1f,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ /* TPM_NV_ATTRIBUTES->... */
+ 0x0, 0x17, /* ...->TPM_STRUCTURE_TAG */
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, /* ...->attributes */
+ /* End of TPM_NV_ATTRIBUTES */
+ 0, /* bReadSTClear */
+ 0, /* bWriteSTClear */
+ 0, /* bWriteDefine */
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, /* size */
+ };
+ const size_t index_offset = 12;
+ const size_t perm_offset = 70;
+ const size_t size_offset = 77;
+ uint8_t buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
+
+ if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sddd",
+ 0, command, sizeof(command),
+ index_offset, index,
+ perm_offset, perm,
+ size_offset, size))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+
+ return tpm_sendrecv_command(buf, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+uint32_t tpm_nv_read_value(uint32_t index, void *data, uint32_t count)
+{
+ const uint8_t command[22] = {
+ 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x16, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xcf,
+ };
+ const size_t index_offset = 10;
+ const size_t length_offset = 18;
+ const size_t data_size_offset = 10;
+ const size_t data_offset = 14;
+ uint8_t buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE], response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
+ size_t response_length = sizeof(response);
+ uint32_t data_size;
+ uint32_t err;
+
+ if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sdd",
+ 0, command, sizeof(command),
+ index_offset, index,
+ length_offset, count))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ err = tpm_sendrecv_command(buf, response, &response_length);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "d",
+ data_size_offset, &data_size))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ if (data_size > count)
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "s",
+ data_offset, data, data_size))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+uint32_t tpm_nv_write_value(uint32_t index, const void *data, uint32_t length)
+{
+ const uint8_t command[256] = {
+ 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xcd,
+ };
+ const size_t command_size_offset = 2;
+ const size_t index_offset = 10;
+ const size_t length_offset = 18;
+ const size_t data_offset = 22;
+ const size_t write_info_size = 12;
+ const uint32_t total_length =
+ TPM_REQUEST_HEADER_LENGTH + write_info_size + length;
+ uint8_t buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE], response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
+ size_t response_length = sizeof(response);
+ uint32_t err;
+
+ if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sddds",
+ 0, command, sizeof(command),
+ command_size_offset, total_length,
+ index_offset, index,
+ length_offset, length,
+ data_offset, data, length))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ err = tpm_sendrecv_command(buf, response, &response_length);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+uint32_t tpm_extend(uint32_t index, const void *in_digest, void *out_digest)
+{
+ const uint8_t command[34] = {
+ 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x22, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x14,
+ };
+ const size_t index_offset = 10;
+ const size_t in_digest_offset = 14;
+ const size_t out_digest_offset = 10;
+ uint8_t buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
+ uint8_t response[TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH + PCR_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ size_t response_length = sizeof(response);
+ uint32_t err;
+
+ if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sds",
+ 0, command, sizeof(command),
+ index_offset, index,
+ in_digest_offset, in_digest,
+ PCR_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ err = tpm_sendrecv_command(buf, response, &response_length);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "s",
+ out_digest_offset, out_digest,
+ PCR_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+uint32_t tpm_pcr_read(uint32_t index, void *data, size_t count)
+{
+ const uint8_t command[14] = {
+ 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xe, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x15,
+ };
+ const size_t index_offset = 10;
+ const size_t out_digest_offset = 10;
+ uint8_t buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE], response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
+ size_t response_length = sizeof(response);
+ uint32_t err;
+
+ if (count < PCR_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+
+ if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sd",
+ 0, command, sizeof(command),
+ index_offset, index))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ err = tpm_sendrecv_command(buf, response, &response_length);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "s",
+ out_digest_offset, data, PCR_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+uint32_t tpm_tsc_physical_presence(uint16_t presence)
+{
+ const uint8_t command[12] = {
+ 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xc, 0x40, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0,
+ };
+ const size_t presence_offset = 10;
+ uint8_t buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
+
+ if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sw",
+ 0, command, sizeof(command),
+ presence_offset, presence))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+
+ return tpm_sendrecv_command(buf, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+uint32_t tpm_read_pubek(void *data, size_t count)
+{
+ const uint8_t command[30] = {
+ 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x1e, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x7c,
+ };
+ const size_t response_size_offset = 2;
+ const size_t data_offset = 10;
+ const size_t header_and_checksum_size = TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH + 20;
+ uint8_t response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE + TPM_PUBEK_SIZE];
+ size_t response_length = sizeof(response);
+ uint32_t data_size;
+ uint32_t err;
+
+ err = tpm_sendrecv_command(command, response, &response_length);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "d",
+ response_size_offset, &data_size))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ if (data_size < header_and_checksum_size)
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ data_size -= header_and_checksum_size;
+ if (data_size > count)
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "s",
+ data_offset, data, data_size))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+uint32_t tpm_force_clear(void)
+{
+ const uint8_t command[10] = {
+ 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x5d,
+ };
+
+ return tpm_sendrecv_command(command, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+uint32_t tpm_physical_enable(void)
+{
+ const uint8_t command[10] = {
+ 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x6f,
+ };
+
+ return tpm_sendrecv_command(command, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+uint32_t tpm_physical_disable(void)
+{
+ const uint8_t command[10] = {
+ 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x70,
+ };
+
+ return tpm_sendrecv_command(command, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+uint32_t tpm_physical_set_deactivated(uint8_t state)
+{
+ const uint8_t command[11] = {
+ 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xb, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x72,
+ };
+ const size_t state_offset = 10;
+ uint8_t buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
+
+ if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sb",
+ 0, command, sizeof(command),
+ state_offset, state))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+
+ return tpm_sendrecv_command(buf, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+uint32_t tpm_get_capability(uint32_t cap_area, uint32_t sub_cap,
+ void *cap, size_t count)
+{
+ const uint8_t command[22] = {
+ 0x0, 0xc1, /* TPM_TAG */
+ 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x16, /* parameter size */
+ 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x65, /* TPM_COMMAND_CODE */
+ 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, /* TPM_CAPABILITY_AREA */
+ 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x4, /* subcap size */
+ 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, /* subcap value */
+ };
+ const size_t cap_area_offset = 10;
+ const size_t sub_cap_offset = 18;
+ const size_t cap_offset = 14;
+ const size_t cap_size_offset = 10;
+ uint8_t buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE], response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
+ size_t response_length = sizeof(response);
+ uint32_t cap_size;
+ uint32_t err;
+
+ if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sdd",
+ 0, command, sizeof(command),
+ cap_area_offset, cap_area,
+ sub_cap_offset, sub_cap))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ err = tpm_sendrecv_command(buf, response, &response_length);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "d",
+ cap_size_offset, &cap_size))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ if (cap_size > response_length || cap_size > count)
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "s",
+ cap_offset, cap, cap_size))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_TPM_AUTH_SESSIONS
+
+/**
+ * Fill an authentication block in a request.
+ * This func can create the first as well as the second auth block (for
+ * double authorized commands).
+ *
+ * @param request pointer to the request (w/ uninitialised auth data)
+ * @param request_len0 length of the request without auth data
+ * @param handles_len length of the handles area in request
+ * @param auth_session pointer to the (valid) auth session to be used
+ * @param request_auth pointer to the auth block of the request to be filled
+ * @param auth authentication data (HMAC key)
+ */
+static uint32_t create_request_auth(const void *request, size_t request_len0,
+ size_t handles_len,
+ struct session_data *auth_session,
+ void *request_auth, const void *auth)
+{
+ uint8_t hmac_data[DIGEST_LENGTH * 3 + 1];
+ sha1_context hash_ctx;
+ const size_t command_code_offset = 6;
+ const size_t auth_nonce_odd_offset = 4;
+ const size_t auth_continue_offset = 24;
+ const size_t auth_auth_offset = 25;
+
+ if (!auth_session || !auth_session->valid)
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+
+ sha1_starts(&hash_ctx);
+ sha1_update(&hash_ctx, request + command_code_offset, 4);
+ if (request_len0 > TPM_REQUEST_HEADER_LENGTH + handles_len)
+ sha1_update(&hash_ctx,
+ request + TPM_REQUEST_HEADER_LENGTH + handles_len,
+ request_len0 - TPM_REQUEST_HEADER_LENGTH
+ - handles_len);
+ sha1_finish(&hash_ctx, hmac_data);
+
+ sha1_starts(&hash_ctx);
+ sha1_update(&hash_ctx, auth_session->nonce_odd, DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ sha1_update(&hash_ctx, hmac_data, sizeof(hmac_data));
+ sha1_finish(&hash_ctx, auth_session->nonce_odd);
+
+ if (pack_byte_string(request_auth, TPM_REQUEST_AUTH_LENGTH, "dsb",
+ 0, auth_session->handle,
+ auth_nonce_odd_offset, auth_session->nonce_odd,
+ DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ auth_continue_offset, 1))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ if (pack_byte_string(hmac_data, sizeof(hmac_data), "ss",
+ DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ auth_session->nonce_even,
+ DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ 2 * DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ request_auth + auth_nonce_odd_offset,
+ DIGEST_LENGTH + 1))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ sha1_hmac(auth, DIGEST_LENGTH, hmac_data, sizeof(hmac_data),
+ request_auth + auth_auth_offset);
+
+ return TPM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verify an authentication block in a response.
+ * Since this func updates the nonce_even in the session data it has to be
+ * called when receiving a succesfull AUTH response.
+ * This func can verify the first as well as the second auth block (for
+ * double authorized commands).
+ *
+ * @param command_code command code of the request
+ * @param response pointer to the request (w/ uninitialised auth data)
+ * @param handles_len length of the handles area in response
+ * @param auth_session pointer to the (valid) auth session to be used
+ * @param response_auth pointer to the auth block of the response to be verified
+ * @param auth authentication data (HMAC key)
+ */
+static uint32_t verify_response_auth(uint32_t command_code,
+ const void *response, size_t response_len0,
+ size_t handles_len,
+ struct session_data *auth_session,
+ const void *response_auth, const void *auth)
+{
+ uint8_t hmac_data[DIGEST_LENGTH * 3 + 1];
+ uint8_t computed_auth[DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ sha1_context hash_ctx;
+ const size_t return_code_offset = 6;
+ const size_t auth_continue_offset = 20;
+ const size_t auth_auth_offset = 21;
+ uint8_t auth_continue;
+
+ if (!auth_session || !auth_session->valid)
+ return TPM_AUTHFAIL;
+ if (pack_byte_string(hmac_data, sizeof(hmac_data), "d",
+ 0, command_code))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ if (response_len0 < TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH)
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+
+ sha1_starts(&hash_ctx);
+ sha1_update(&hash_ctx, response + return_code_offset, 4);
+ sha1_update(&hash_ctx, hmac_data, 4);
+ if (response_len0 > TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH + handles_len)
+ sha1_update(&hash_ctx,
+ response + TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH + handles_len,
+ response_len0 - TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH
+ - handles_len);
+ sha1_finish(&hash_ctx, hmac_data);
+
+ memcpy(auth_session->nonce_even, response_auth, DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ auth_continue = ((uint8_t *)response_auth)[auth_continue_offset];
+ if (pack_byte_string(hmac_data, sizeof(hmac_data), "ssb",
+ DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ response_auth,
+ DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ 2 * DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ auth_session->nonce_odd,
+ DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ 3 * DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ auth_continue))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+
+ sha1_hmac(auth, DIGEST_LENGTH, hmac_data, sizeof(hmac_data),
+ computed_auth);
+
+ if (memcmp(computed_auth, response_auth + auth_auth_offset,
+ DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ return TPM_AUTHFAIL;
+
+ return TPM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+
+uint32_t tpm_terminate_auth_session(uint32_t auth_handle)
+{
+ const uint8_t command[18] = {
+ 0x00, 0xc1, /* TPM_TAG */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* parameter size */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xba, /* TPM_COMMAND_CODE */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* TPM_HANDLE */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, /* TPM_RESSOURCE_TYPE */
+ };
+ const size_t req_handle_offset = TPM_REQUEST_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ uint8_t request[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
+
+ if (pack_byte_string(request, sizeof(request), "sd",
+ 0, command, sizeof(command),
+ req_handle_offset, auth_handle))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ if (oiap_session.valid && oiap_session.handle == auth_handle)
+ oiap_session.valid = 0;
+
+ return tpm_sendrecv_command(request, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+uint32_t tpm_end_oiap(void)
+{
+ uint32_t err = TPM_SUCCESS;
+ if (oiap_session.valid)
+ err = tpm_terminate_auth_session(oiap_session.handle);
+ return err;
+}
+
+uint32_t tpm_oiap(uint32_t *auth_handle)
+{
+ const uint8_t command[10] = {
+ 0x00, 0xc1, /* TPM_TAG */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0a, /* parameter size */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0a, /* TPM_COMMAND_CODE */
+ };
+ const size_t res_auth_handle_offset = TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ const size_t res_nonce_even_offset = TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH + 4;
+ uint8_t response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
+ size_t response_length = sizeof(response);
+ uint32_t err;
+
+ if (oiap_session.valid)
+ tpm_terminate_auth_session(oiap_session.handle);
+
+ err = tpm_sendrecv_command(command, response, &response_length);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "ds",
+ res_auth_handle_offset, &oiap_session.handle,
+ res_nonce_even_offset, &oiap_session.nonce_even,
+ (uint32_t)DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ oiap_session.valid = 1;
+ if (auth_handle)
+ *auth_handle = oiap_session.handle;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+uint32_t tpm_load_key2_oiap(uint32_t parent_handle,
+ const void *key, size_t key_length,
+ const void *parent_key_usage_auth,
+ uint32_t *key_handle)
+{
+ const uint8_t command[14] = {
+ 0x00, 0xc2, /* TPM_TAG */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* parameter size */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x41, /* TPM_COMMAND_CODE */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* parent handle */
+ };
+ const size_t req_size_offset = 2;
+ const size_t req_parent_handle_offset = TPM_REQUEST_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ const size_t req_key_offset = TPM_REQUEST_HEADER_LENGTH + 4;
+ const size_t res_handle_offset = TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ uint8_t request[sizeof(command) + TPM_KEY12_MAX_LENGTH
+ + TPM_REQUEST_AUTH_LENGTH];
+ uint8_t response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
+ size_t response_length = sizeof(response);
+ uint32_t err;
+
+ if (!oiap_session.valid) {
+ err = tpm_oiap(NULL);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+ if (pack_byte_string(request, sizeof(request), "sdds",
+ 0, command, sizeof(command),
+ req_size_offset,
+ sizeof(command) + key_length
+ + TPM_REQUEST_AUTH_LENGTH,
+ req_parent_handle_offset, parent_handle,
+ req_key_offset, key, key_length
+ ))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+
+ err = create_request_auth(request, sizeof(command) + key_length, 4,
+ &oiap_session,
+ request + sizeof(command) + key_length,
+ parent_key_usage_auth);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ err = tpm_sendrecv_command(request, response, &response_length);
+ if (err) {
+ if (err == TPM_AUTHFAIL)
+ oiap_session.valid = 0;
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ err = verify_response_auth(0x00000041, response,
+ response_length - TPM_RESPONSE_AUTH_LENGTH,
+ 4, &oiap_session,
+ response + response_length - TPM_RESPONSE_AUTH_LENGTH,
+ parent_key_usage_auth);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ if (key_handle) {
+ if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "d",
+ res_handle_offset, key_handle))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+uint32_t tpm_get_pub_key_oiap(uint32_t key_handle, const void *usage_auth,
+ void *pubkey, size_t *pubkey_len)
+{
+ const uint8_t command[14] = {
+ 0x00, 0xc2, /* TPM_TAG */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* parameter size */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x21, /* TPM_COMMAND_CODE */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* key handle */
+ };
+ const size_t req_size_offset = 2;
+ const size_t req_key_handle_offset = TPM_REQUEST_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ const size_t res_pubkey_offset = TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ uint8_t request[sizeof(command) + TPM_REQUEST_AUTH_LENGTH];
+ uint8_t response[TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH + TPM_PUBKEY_MAX_LENGTH
+ + TPM_RESPONSE_AUTH_LENGTH];
+ size_t response_length = sizeof(response);
+ uint32_t err;
+
+ if (!oiap_session.valid) {
+ err = tpm_oiap(NULL);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+ if (pack_byte_string(request, sizeof(request), "sdd",
+ 0, command, sizeof(command),
+ req_size_offset,
+ (uint32_t)(sizeof(command)
+ + TPM_REQUEST_AUTH_LENGTH),
+ req_key_handle_offset, key_handle
+ ))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ err = create_request_auth(request, sizeof(command), 4, &oiap_session,
+ request + sizeof(command), usage_auth);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ err = tpm_sendrecv_command(request, response, &response_length);
+ if (err) {
+ if (err == TPM_AUTHFAIL)
+ oiap_session.valid = 0;
+ return err;
+ }
+ err = verify_response_auth(0x00000021, response,
+ response_length - TPM_RESPONSE_AUTH_LENGTH,
+ 0, &oiap_session,
+ response + response_length - TPM_RESPONSE_AUTH_LENGTH,
+ usage_auth);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ if (pubkey) {
+ if ((response_length - TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH
+ - TPM_RESPONSE_AUTH_LENGTH) > *pubkey_len)
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ *pubkey_len = response_length - TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH
+ - TPM_RESPONSE_AUTH_LENGTH;
+ memcpy(pubkey, response + res_pubkey_offset,
+ response_length - TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH
+ - TPM_RESPONSE_AUTH_LENGTH);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_TPM_AUTH_SESSIONS */