ASR_BASE
Change-Id: Icf3719cc0afe3eeb3edc7fa80a2eb5199ca9dda1
diff --git a/tools/patch/Makefile b/tools/patch/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f4cf588
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/patch/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+#
+# Copyright (C) 2013 OpenWrt.org
+#
+# This is free software, licensed under the GNU General Public License v2.
+# See /LICENSE for more information.
+#
+include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
+
+PKG_NAME:=patch
+PKG_VERSION:=2.7.6
+PKG_RELEASE:=7
+PKG_CPE_ID:=cpe:/a:gnu:patch
+
+PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.gz
+PKG_SOURCE_URL:=@GNU/patch
+PKG_HASH:=8cf86e00ad3aaa6d26aca30640e86b0e3e1f395ed99f189b06d4c9f74bc58a4e
+
+HOST_BUILD_PARALLEL := 1
+
+include $(INCLUDE_DIR)/host-build.mk
+
+HOSTCC := $(HOSTCC_NOCACHE)
+HOSTCXX := $(HOSTCXX_NOCACHE)
+
+define Host/Uninstall
+ -$(call Host/Compile/Default,uninstall)
+endef
+
+$(eval $(call HostBuild))
diff --git a/tools/patch/patches/010-CVE-2018-6951.patch b/tools/patch/patches/010-CVE-2018-6951.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..10dc568
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/patch/patches/010-CVE-2018-6951.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+From 1f7853c05f9949d81da9be7a02b90cc64284d1f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@gnu.org>
+Date: Mon, 12 Feb 2018 16:48:24 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix segfault with mangled rename patch
+
+http://savannah.gnu.org/bugs/?53132
+* src/pch.c (intuit_diff_type): Ensure that two filenames are specified
+for renames and copies (fix the existing check).
+---
+ src/pch.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/src/pch.c
++++ b/src/pch.c
+@@ -974,7 +974,8 @@ intuit_diff_type (bool need_header, mode
+ if ((pch_rename () || pch_copy ())
+ && ! inname
+ && ! ((i == OLD || i == NEW) &&
+- p_name[! reverse] &&
++ p_name[reverse] && p_name[! reverse] &&
++ name_is_valid (p_name[reverse]) &&
+ name_is_valid (p_name[! reverse])))
+ {
+ say ("Cannot %s file without two valid file names\n", pch_rename () ? "rename" : "copy");
diff --git a/tools/patch/patches/020-CVE-2018-1000156.patch b/tools/patch/patches/020-CVE-2018-1000156.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..99dfe54
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/patch/patches/020-CVE-2018-1000156.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+From b3a0ca3deed00334f9feece43f76776b6a168e47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@gnu.org>
+Date: Fri, 6 Apr 2018 12:14:49 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix arbitrary command execution in ed-style patches
+ (CVE-2018-1000156)
+
+* src/pch.c (do_ed_script): Write ed script to a temporary file instead
+of piping it to ed: this will cause ed to abort on invalid commands
+instead of rejecting them and carrying on.
+* tests/ed-style: New test case.
+* tests/Makefile.am (TESTS): Add test case.
+---
+ src/pch.c | 89 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
+ 1 file changed, 66 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/src/pch.c
++++ b/src/pch.c
+@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
+ # include <io.h>
+ #endif
+ #include <safe.h>
++#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+ #define INITHUNKMAX 125 /* initial dynamic allocation size */
+
+@@ -2389,22 +2390,28 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char c
+ static char const editor_program[] = EDITOR_PROGRAM;
+
+ file_offset beginning_of_this_line;
+- FILE *pipefp = 0;
+ size_t chars_read;
++ FILE *tmpfp = 0;
++ char const *tmpname;
++ int tmpfd;
++ pid_t pid;
++
++ if (! dry_run && ! skip_rest_of_patch)
++ {
++ /* Write ed script to a temporary file. This causes ed to abort on
++ invalid commands such as when line numbers or ranges exceed the
++ number of available lines. When ed reads from a pipe, it rejects
++ invalid commands and treats the next line as a new command, which
++ can lead to arbitrary command execution. */
++
++ tmpfd = make_tempfile (&tmpname, 'e', NULL, O_RDWR | O_BINARY, 0);
++ if (tmpfd == -1)
++ pfatal ("Can't create temporary file %s", quotearg (tmpname));
++ tmpfp = fdopen (tmpfd, "w+b");
++ if (! tmpfp)
++ pfatal ("Can't open stream for file %s", quotearg (tmpname));
++ }
+
+- if (! dry_run && ! skip_rest_of_patch) {
+- int exclusive = *outname_needs_removal ? 0 : O_EXCL;
+- assert (! inerrno);
+- *outname_needs_removal = true;
+- copy_file (inname, outname, 0, exclusive, instat.st_mode, true);
+- sprintf (buf, "%s %s%s", editor_program,
+- verbosity == VERBOSE ? "" : "- ",
+- outname);
+- fflush (stdout);
+- pipefp = popen(buf, binary_transput ? "wb" : "w");
+- if (!pipefp)
+- pfatal ("Can't open pipe to %s", quotearg (buf));
+- }
+ for (;;) {
+ char ed_command_letter;
+ beginning_of_this_line = file_tell (pfp);
+@@ -2415,14 +2422,14 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char c
+ }
+ ed_command_letter = get_ed_command_letter (buf);
+ if (ed_command_letter) {
+- if (pipefp)
+- if (! fwrite (buf, sizeof *buf, chars_read, pipefp))
++ if (tmpfp)
++ if (! fwrite (buf, sizeof *buf, chars_read, tmpfp))
+ write_fatal ();
+ if (ed_command_letter != 'd' && ed_command_letter != 's') {
+ p_pass_comments_through = true;
+ while ((chars_read = get_line ()) != 0) {
+- if (pipefp)
+- if (! fwrite (buf, sizeof *buf, chars_read, pipefp))
++ if (tmpfp)
++ if (! fwrite (buf, sizeof *buf, chars_read, tmpfp))
+ write_fatal ();
+ if (chars_read == 2 && strEQ (buf, ".\n"))
+ break;
+@@ -2435,13 +2442,49 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char c
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+- if (!pipefp)
++ if (!tmpfp)
+ return;
+- if (fwrite ("w\nq\n", sizeof (char), (size_t) 4, pipefp) == 0
+- || fflush (pipefp) != 0)
++ if (fwrite ("w\nq\n", sizeof (char), (size_t) 4, tmpfp) == 0
++ || fflush (tmpfp) != 0)
+ write_fatal ();
+- if (pclose (pipefp) != 0)
+- fatal ("%s FAILED", editor_program);
++
++ if (lseek (tmpfd, 0, SEEK_SET) == -1)
++ pfatal ("Can't rewind to the beginning of file %s", quotearg (tmpname));
++
++ if (! dry_run && ! skip_rest_of_patch) {
++ int exclusive = *outname_needs_removal ? 0 : O_EXCL;
++ *outname_needs_removal = true;
++ if (inerrno != ENOENT)
++ {
++ *outname_needs_removal = true;
++ copy_file (inname, outname, 0, exclusive, instat.st_mode, true);
++ }
++ sprintf (buf, "%s %s%s", editor_program,
++ verbosity == VERBOSE ? "" : "- ",
++ outname);
++ fflush (stdout);
++
++ pid = fork();
++ if (pid == -1)
++ pfatal ("Can't fork");
++ else if (pid == 0)
++ {
++ dup2 (tmpfd, 0);
++ execl ("/bin/sh", "sh", "-c", buf, (char *) 0);
++ _exit (2);
++ }
++ else
++ {
++ int wstatus;
++ if (waitpid (pid, &wstatus, 0) == -1
++ || ! WIFEXITED (wstatus)
++ || WEXITSTATUS (wstatus) != 0)
++ fatal ("%s FAILED", editor_program);
++ }
++ }
++
++ fclose (tmpfp);
++ safe_unlink (tmpname);
+
+ if (ofp)
+ {
diff --git a/tools/patch/patches/030-CVE-2018-6952.patch b/tools/patch/patches/030-CVE-2018-6952.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..36b58c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/patch/patches/030-CVE-2018-6952.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+From df40f2ea17254de269a3624319a12a93a4e395ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@gnu.org>
+Date: Fri, 17 Aug 2018 13:35:40 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix swapping fake lines in pch_swap
+
+* src/pch.c (pch_swap): Fix swapping p_bfake and p_efake when there is a
+blank line in the middle of a context-diff hunk: that empty line stays
+in the middle of the hunk and isn't swapped.
+
+Fixes: https://savannah.gnu.org/bugs/index.php?53133
+---
+ src/pch.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/src/pch.c
++++ b/src/pch.c
+@@ -2115,7 +2115,7 @@ pch_swap (void)
+ }
+ if (p_efake >= 0) { /* fix non-freeable ptr range */
+ if (p_efake <= i)
+- n = p_end - i + 1;
++ n = p_end - p_ptrn_lines;
+ else
+ n = -i;
+ p_efake += n;
diff --git a/tools/patch/patches/040-Fix-error-handling-with-git-style-patches.patch b/tools/patch/patches/040-Fix-error-handling-with-git-style-patches.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5cc958e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/patch/patches/040-Fix-error-handling-with-git-style-patches.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+From 424da221cec76ea200cff1fa9b08a6f3d94c28a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk>
+Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2018 16:39:13 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix error handling with git-style patches
+
+When an error is encountered in output_files(), the subsequent call to
+cleanup() calls back into output_files() resulting in an infinte recursion.
+This is trivially reproduced with a git-style patch (which utilizes
+output_file_later()) that tries to patch a nonexistent or unreadable
+file (see attached test case).
+
+* src/patch.c: (output_files) clear the files_to_output list before
+iterating it, so that recursive calls won't iterate the same files.
+---
+ src/patch.c | 12 ++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/src/patch.c
++++ b/src/patch.c
+@@ -1938,8 +1938,12 @@ output_files (struct stat const *st)
+ {
+ gl_list_iterator_t iter;
+ const void *elt;
++ gl_list_t files;
+
+- iter = gl_list_iterator (files_to_output);
++ files = files_to_output;
++ init_files_to_output ();
++
++ iter = gl_list_iterator (files);
+ while (gl_list_iterator_next (&iter, &elt, NULL))
+ {
+ const struct file_to_output *file_to_output = elt;
+@@ -1957,8 +1961,8 @@ output_files (struct stat const *st)
+ /* Free the list up to here. */
+ for (;;)
+ {
+- const void *elt2 = gl_list_get_at (files_to_output, 0);
+- gl_list_remove_at (files_to_output, 0);
++ const void *elt2 = gl_list_get_at (files, 0);
++ gl_list_remove_at (files, 0);
+ if (elt == elt2)
+ break;
+ }
+@@ -1967,7 +1971,7 @@ output_files (struct stat const *st)
+ }
+ }
+ gl_list_iterator_free (&iter);
+- gl_list_clear (files_to_output);
++ gl_list_clear (files);
+ }
+
+ /* Fatal exit with cleanup. */
diff --git a/tools/patch/patches/050-CVE-2019-13636.patch b/tools/patch/patches/050-CVE-2019-13636.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d819838
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/patch/patches/050-CVE-2019-13636.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+From dce4683cbbe107a95f1f0d45fabc304acfb5d71a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@gnu.org>
+Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2019 16:21:48 +0200
+Subject: Don't follow symlinks unless --follow-symlinks is given
+
+* src/inp.c (plan_a, plan_b), src/util.c (copy_to_fd, copy_file,
+append_to_file): Unless the --follow-symlinks option is given, open files with
+the O_NOFOLLOW flag to avoid following symlinks. So far, we were only doing
+that consistently for input files.
+* src/util.c (create_backup): When creating empty backup files, (re)create them
+with O_CREAT | O_EXCL to avoid following symlinks in that case as well.
+---
+ src/inp.c | 12 ++++++++++--
+ src/util.c | 14 +++++++++++---
+ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/src/inp.c
++++ b/src/inp.c
+@@ -238,8 +238,13 @@ plan_a (char const *filename)
+ {
+ if (S_ISREG (instat.st_mode))
+ {
+- int ifd = safe_open (filename, O_RDONLY|binary_transput, 0);
++ int flags = O_RDONLY | binary_transput;
+ size_t buffered = 0, n;
++ int ifd;
++
++ if (! follow_symlinks)
++ flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
++ ifd = safe_open (filename, flags, 0);
+ if (ifd < 0)
+ pfatal ("can't open file %s", quotearg (filename));
+
+@@ -340,6 +345,7 @@ plan_a (char const *filename)
+ static void
+ plan_b (char const *filename)
+ {
++ int flags = O_RDONLY | binary_transput;
+ int ifd;
+ FILE *ifp;
+ int c;
+@@ -353,7 +359,9 @@ plan_b (char const *filename)
+
+ if (instat.st_size == 0)
+ filename = NULL_DEVICE;
+- if ((ifd = safe_open (filename, O_RDONLY | binary_transput, 0)) < 0
++ if (! follow_symlinks)
++ flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
++ if ((ifd = safe_open (filename, flags, 0)) < 0
+ || ! (ifp = fdopen (ifd, binary_transput ? "rb" : "r")))
+ pfatal ("Can't open file %s", quotearg (filename));
+ if (TMPINNAME_needs_removal)
+--- a/src/util.c
++++ b/src/util.c
+@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ create_backup (char const *to, const str
+
+ try_makedirs_errno = ENOENT;
+ safe_unlink (bakname);
+- while ((fd = safe_open (bakname, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC, 0666)) < 0)
++ while ((fd = safe_open (bakname, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC, 0666)) < 0)
+ {
+ if (errno != try_makedirs_errno)
+ pfatal ("Can't create file %s", quotearg (bakname));
+@@ -579,10 +579,13 @@ create_file (char const *file, int open_
+ static void
+ copy_to_fd (const char *from, int tofd)
+ {
++ int from_flags = O_RDONLY | O_BINARY;
+ int fromfd;
+ ssize_t i;
+
+- if ((fromfd = safe_open (from, O_RDONLY | O_BINARY, 0)) < 0)
++ if (! follow_symlinks)
++ from_flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
++ if ((fromfd = safe_open (from, from_flags, 0)) < 0)
+ pfatal ("Can't reopen file %s", quotearg (from));
+ while ((i = read (fromfd, buf, bufsize)) != 0)
+ {
+@@ -625,6 +628,8 @@ copy_file (char const *from, char const
+ else
+ {
+ assert (S_ISREG (mode));
++ if (! follow_symlinks)
++ to_flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
+ tofd = create_file (to, O_WRONLY | O_BINARY | to_flags, mode,
+ to_dir_known_to_exist);
+ copy_to_fd (from, tofd);
+@@ -640,9 +645,12 @@ copy_file (char const *from, char const
+ void
+ append_to_file (char const *from, char const *to)
+ {
++ int to_flags = O_WRONLY | O_APPEND | O_BINARY;
+ int tofd;
+
+- if ((tofd = safe_open (to, O_WRONLY | O_BINARY | O_APPEND, 0)) < 0)
++ if (! follow_symlinks)
++ to_flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
++ if ((tofd = safe_open (to, to_flags, 0)) < 0)
+ pfatal ("Can't reopen file %s", quotearg (to));
+ copy_to_fd (from, tofd);
+ if (close (tofd) != 0)
diff --git a/tools/patch/patches/060-CVE-2019-13638.patch b/tools/patch/patches/060-CVE-2019-13638.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..590cf18
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/patch/patches/060-CVE-2019-13638.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From 3fcd042d26d70856e826a42b5f93dc4854d80bf0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@gnu.org>
+Date: Fri, 6 Apr 2018 19:36:15 +0200
+Subject: Invoke ed directly instead of using the shell
+
+* src/pch.c (do_ed_script): Invoke ed directly instead of using a shell
+command to avoid quoting vulnerabilities.
+---
+ src/pch.c | 6 ++----
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/src/pch.c
++++ b/src/pch.c
+@@ -2459,9 +2459,6 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char c
+ *outname_needs_removal = true;
+ copy_file (inname, outname, 0, exclusive, instat.st_mode, true);
+ }
+- sprintf (buf, "%s %s%s", editor_program,
+- verbosity == VERBOSE ? "" : "- ",
+- outname);
+ fflush (stdout);
+
+ pid = fork();
+@@ -2470,7 +2467,8 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char c
+ else if (pid == 0)
+ {
+ dup2 (tmpfd, 0);
+- execl ("/bin/sh", "sh", "-c", buf, (char *) 0);
++ assert (outname[0] != '!' && outname[0] != '-');
++ execlp (editor_program, editor_program, "-", outname, (char *) NULL);
+ _exit (2);
+ }
+ else
diff --git a/tools/patch/patches/070-don-t-fail-hard-on-EACCES-when-copying-xattrs.patch b/tools/patch/patches/070-don-t-fail-hard-on-EACCES-when-copying-xattrs.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e19a9c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/patch/patches/070-don-t-fail-hard-on-EACCES-when-copying-xattrs.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From f42cbe1a91a3a6f79d1eec594ce7c72aec79179b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Thomas=20Wei=C3=9Fschuh?= <thomas@t-8ch.de>
+Date: Wed, 9 Nov 2022 05:08:22 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] don't fail hard on EACCES when copying xattrs
+
+On btrfs the xattr "btrfs.compressed" requires privileges to set,
+otherwise EACCES is returned.
+When patch tries to do copy this attribute it receives the error and
+aborts.
+---
+ src/util.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/src/util.c
++++ b/src/util.c
+@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ copy_attr_error (struct error_context *c
+ int err = errno;
+ va_list ap;
+
+- if (err != ENOSYS && err != ENOTSUP && err != EPERM)
++ if (err != ENOSYS && err != ENOTSUP && err != EPERM && err != EACCES)
+ {
+ /* use verror module to print error message */
+ va_start (ap, fmt);
+@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ set_file_attributes (char const *to, enu
+ }
+ if (attr & FA_XATTRS)
+ if (copy_attr (from, to) != 0
+- && errno != ENOSYS && errno != ENOTSUP && errno != EPERM)
++ && errno != ENOSYS && errno != ENOTSUP && errno != EPERM && errno != EACCES)
+ fatal_exit (0);
+ if (attr & FA_MODE)
+ {