b.liu | e958203 | 2025-04-17 19:18:16 +0800 | [diff] [blame^] | 1 | /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ |
| 2 | /* |
| 3 | * GCC stack protector support. |
| 4 | * |
| 5 | * Stack protector works by putting predefined pattern at the start of |
| 6 | * the stack frame and verifying that it hasn't been overwritten when |
| 7 | * returning from the function. The pattern is called stack canary |
| 8 | * and unfortunately gcc requires it to be at a fixed offset from %gs. |
| 9 | * On x86_64, the offset is 40 bytes and on x86_32 20 bytes. x86_64 |
| 10 | * and x86_32 use segment registers differently and thus handles this |
| 11 | * requirement differently. |
| 12 | * |
| 13 | * On x86_64, %gs is shared by percpu area and stack canary. All |
| 14 | * percpu symbols are zero based and %gs points to the base of percpu |
| 15 | * area. The first occupant of the percpu area is always |
| 16 | * fixed_percpu_data which contains stack_canary at offset 40. Userland |
| 17 | * %gs is always saved and restored on kernel entry and exit using |
| 18 | * swapgs, so stack protector doesn't add any complexity there. |
| 19 | * |
| 20 | * On x86_32, it's slightly more complicated. As in x86_64, %gs is |
| 21 | * used for userland TLS. Unfortunately, some processors are much |
| 22 | * slower at loading segment registers with different value when |
| 23 | * entering and leaving the kernel, so the kernel uses %fs for percpu |
| 24 | * area and manages %gs lazily so that %gs is switched only when |
| 25 | * necessary, usually during task switch. |
| 26 | * |
| 27 | * As gcc requires the stack canary at %gs:20, %gs can't be managed |
| 28 | * lazily if stack protector is enabled, so the kernel saves and |
| 29 | * restores userland %gs on kernel entry and exit. This behavior is |
| 30 | * controlled by CONFIG_X86_32_LAZY_GS and accessors are defined in |
| 31 | * system.h to hide the details. |
| 32 | */ |
| 33 | |
| 34 | #ifndef _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H |
| 35 | #define _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H 1 |
| 36 | |
| 37 | #ifdef CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR |
| 38 | |
| 39 | #include <asm/tsc.h> |
| 40 | #include <asm/processor.h> |
| 41 | #include <asm/percpu.h> |
| 42 | #include <asm/desc.h> |
| 43 | |
| 44 | #include <linux/random.h> |
| 45 | #include <linux/sched.h> |
| 46 | |
| 47 | /* |
| 48 | * 24 byte read-only segment initializer for stack canary. Linker |
| 49 | * can't handle the address bit shifting. Address will be set in |
| 50 | * head_32 for boot CPU and setup_per_cpu_areas() for others. |
| 51 | */ |
| 52 | #define GDT_STACK_CANARY_INIT \ |
| 53 | [GDT_ENTRY_STACK_CANARY] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x4090, 0, 0x18), |
| 54 | |
| 55 | /* |
| 56 | * Initialize the stackprotector canary value. |
| 57 | * |
| 58 | * NOTE: this must only be called from functions that never return |
| 59 | * and it must always be inlined. |
| 60 | * |
| 61 | * In addition, it should be called from a compilation unit for which |
| 62 | * stack protector is disabled. Alternatively, the caller should not end |
| 63 | * with a function call which gets tail-call optimized as that would |
| 64 | * lead to checking a modified canary value. |
| 65 | */ |
| 66 | static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void) |
| 67 | { |
| 68 | u64 canary; |
| 69 | u64 tsc; |
| 70 | |
| 71 | #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 |
| 72 | BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct fixed_percpu_data, stack_canary) != 40); |
| 73 | #endif |
| 74 | /* |
| 75 | * We both use the random pool and the current TSC as a source |
| 76 | * of randomness. The TSC only matters for very early init, |
| 77 | * there it already has some randomness on most systems. Later |
| 78 | * on during the bootup the random pool has true entropy too. |
| 79 | */ |
| 80 | get_random_bytes(&canary, sizeof(canary)); |
| 81 | tsc = rdtsc(); |
| 82 | canary += tsc + (tsc << 32UL); |
| 83 | canary &= CANARY_MASK; |
| 84 | |
| 85 | current->stack_canary = canary; |
| 86 | #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 |
| 87 | this_cpu_write(fixed_percpu_data.stack_canary, canary); |
| 88 | #else |
| 89 | this_cpu_write(stack_canary.canary, canary); |
| 90 | #endif |
| 91 | } |
| 92 | |
| 93 | static inline void setup_stack_canary_segment(int cpu) |
| 94 | { |
| 95 | #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 |
| 96 | unsigned long canary = (unsigned long)&per_cpu(stack_canary, cpu); |
| 97 | struct desc_struct *gdt_table = get_cpu_gdt_rw(cpu); |
| 98 | struct desc_struct desc; |
| 99 | |
| 100 | desc = gdt_table[GDT_ENTRY_STACK_CANARY]; |
| 101 | set_desc_base(&desc, canary); |
| 102 | write_gdt_entry(gdt_table, GDT_ENTRY_STACK_CANARY, &desc, DESCTYPE_S); |
| 103 | #endif |
| 104 | } |
| 105 | |
| 106 | static inline void load_stack_canary_segment(void) |
| 107 | { |
| 108 | #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 |
| 109 | asm("mov %0, %%gs" : : "r" (__KERNEL_STACK_CANARY) : "memory"); |
| 110 | #endif |
| 111 | } |
| 112 | |
| 113 | #else /* STACKPROTECTOR */ |
| 114 | |
| 115 | #define GDT_STACK_CANARY_INIT |
| 116 | |
| 117 | /* dummy boot_init_stack_canary() is defined in linux/stackprotector.h */ |
| 118 | |
| 119 | static inline void setup_stack_canary_segment(int cpu) |
| 120 | { } |
| 121 | |
| 122 | static inline void load_stack_canary_segment(void) |
| 123 | { |
| 124 | #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 |
| 125 | asm volatile ("mov %0, %%gs" : : "r" (0)); |
| 126 | #endif |
| 127 | } |
| 128 | |
| 129 | #endif /* STACKPROTECTOR */ |
| 130 | #endif /* _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H */ |