| ========================================== | 
 | Encrypted keys for the eCryptfs filesystem | 
 | ========================================== | 
 |  | 
 | ECryptfs is a stacked filesystem which transparently encrypts and decrypts each | 
 | file using a randomly generated File Encryption Key (FEK). | 
 |  | 
 | Each FEK is in turn encrypted with a File Encryption Key Encryption Key (FEFEK) | 
 | either in kernel space or in user space with a daemon called 'ecryptfsd'.  In | 
 | the former case the operation is performed directly by the kernel CryptoAPI | 
 | using a key, the FEFEK, derived from a user prompted passphrase;  in the latter | 
 | the FEK is encrypted by 'ecryptfsd' with the help of external libraries in order | 
 | to support other mechanisms like public key cryptography, PKCS#11 and TPM based | 
 | operations. | 
 |  | 
 | The data structure defined by eCryptfs to contain information required for the | 
 | FEK decryption is called authentication token and, currently, can be stored in a | 
 | kernel key of the 'user' type, inserted in the user's session specific keyring | 
 | by the userspace utility 'mount.ecryptfs' shipped with the package | 
 | 'ecryptfs-utils'. | 
 |  | 
 | The 'encrypted' key type has been extended with the introduction of the new | 
 | format 'ecryptfs' in order to be used in conjunction with the eCryptfs | 
 | filesystem.  Encrypted keys of the newly introduced format store an | 
 | authentication token in its payload with a FEFEK randomly generated by the | 
 | kernel and protected by the parent master key. | 
 |  | 
 | In order to avoid known-plaintext attacks, the datablob obtained through | 
 | commands 'keyctl print' or 'keyctl pipe' does not contain the overall | 
 | authentication token, which content is well known, but only the FEFEK in | 
 | encrypted form. | 
 |  | 
 | The eCryptfs filesystem may really benefit from using encrypted keys in that the | 
 | required key can be securely generated by an Administrator and provided at boot | 
 | time after the unsealing of a 'trusted' key in order to perform the mount in a | 
 | controlled environment.  Another advantage is that the key is not exposed to | 
 | threats of malicious software, because it is available in clear form only at | 
 | kernel level. | 
 |  | 
 | Usage:: | 
 |  | 
 |    keyctl add encrypted name "new ecryptfs key-type:master-key-name keylen" ring | 
 |    keyctl add encrypted name "load hex_blob" ring | 
 |    keyctl update keyid "update key-type:master-key-name" | 
 |  | 
 | Where:: | 
 |  | 
 | 	name:= '<16 hexadecimal characters>' | 
 | 	key-type:= 'trusted' | 'user' | 
 | 	keylen:= 64 | 
 |  | 
 |  | 
 | Example of encrypted key usage with the eCryptfs filesystem: | 
 |  | 
 | Create an encrypted key "1000100010001000" of length 64 bytes with format | 
 | 'ecryptfs' and save it using a previously loaded user key "test":: | 
 |  | 
 |     $ keyctl add encrypted 1000100010001000 "new ecryptfs user:test 64" @u | 
 |     19184530 | 
 |  | 
 |     $ keyctl print 19184530 | 
 |     ecryptfs user:test 64 490045d4bfe48c99f0d465fbbbb79e7500da954178e2de0697 | 
 |     dd85091f5450a0511219e9f7cd70dcd498038181466f78ac8d4c19504fcc72402bfc41c2 | 
 |     f253a41b7507ccaa4b2b03fff19a69d1cc0b16e71746473f023a95488b6edfd86f7fdd40 | 
 |     9d292e4bacded1258880122dd553a661 | 
 |  | 
 |     $ keyctl pipe 19184530 > ecryptfs.blob | 
 |  | 
 | Mount an eCryptfs filesystem using the created encrypted key "1000100010001000" | 
 | into the '/secret' directory:: | 
 |  | 
 |     $ mount -i -t ecryptfs -oecryptfs_sig=1000100010001000,\ | 
 |       ecryptfs_cipher=aes,ecryptfs_key_bytes=32 /secret /secret |