| /* Instantiate a public key crypto key from an X.509 Certificate | 
 |  * | 
 |  * Copyright (C) 2012, 2016 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. | 
 |  * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) | 
 |  * | 
 |  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or | 
 |  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence | 
 |  * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version | 
 |  * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. | 
 |  */ | 
 |  | 
 | #define pr_fmt(fmt) "ASYM: "fmt | 
 | #include <linux/module.h> | 
 | #include <linux/kernel.h> | 
 | #include <linux/err.h> | 
 | #include <crypto/public_key.h> | 
 | #include "asymmetric_keys.h" | 
 |  | 
 | static bool use_builtin_keys; | 
 | static struct asymmetric_key_id *ca_keyid; | 
 |  | 
 | #ifndef MODULE | 
 | static struct { | 
 | 	struct asymmetric_key_id id; | 
 | 	unsigned char data[10]; | 
 | } cakey; | 
 |  | 
 | static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str) | 
 | { | 
 | 	if (!str)		/* default system keyring */ | 
 | 		return 1; | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0) { | 
 | 		struct asymmetric_key_id *p = &cakey.id; | 
 | 		size_t hexlen = (strlen(str) - 3) / 2; | 
 | 		int ret; | 
 |  | 
 | 		if (hexlen == 0 || hexlen > sizeof(cakey.data)) { | 
 | 			pr_err("Missing or invalid ca_keys id\n"); | 
 | 			return 1; | 
 | 		} | 
 |  | 
 | 		ret = __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(str + 3, p, hexlen); | 
 | 		if (ret < 0) | 
 | 			pr_err("Unparsable ca_keys id hex string\n"); | 
 | 		else | 
 | 			ca_keyid = p;	/* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */ | 
 | 	} else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0) { | 
 | 		use_builtin_keys = true; | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	return 1; | 
 | } | 
 | __setup("ca_keys=", ca_keys_setup); | 
 | #endif | 
 |  | 
 | /** | 
 |  * restrict_link_by_signature - Restrict additions to a ring of public keys | 
 |  * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to. | 
 |  * @type: The type of key being added. | 
 |  * @payload: The payload of the new key. | 
 |  * @trust_keyring: A ring of keys that can be used to vouch for the new cert. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * Check the new certificate against the ones in the trust keyring.  If one of | 
 |  * those is the signing key and validates the new certificate, then mark the | 
 |  * new certificate as being trusted. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if we couldn't find a | 
 |  * matching parent certificate in the trusted list, -EKEYREJECTED if the | 
 |  * signature check fails or the key is blacklisted, -ENOPKG if the signature | 
 |  * uses unsupported crypto, or some other error if there is a matching | 
 |  * certificate but the signature check cannot be performed. | 
 |  */ | 
 | int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring, | 
 | 			       const struct key_type *type, | 
 | 			       const union key_payload *payload, | 
 | 			       struct key *trust_keyring) | 
 | { | 
 | 	const struct public_key_signature *sig; | 
 | 	struct key *key; | 
 | 	int ret; | 
 |  | 
 | 	pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (!trust_keyring) | 
 | 		return -ENOKEY; | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (type != &key_type_asymmetric) | 
 | 		return -EOPNOTSUPP; | 
 |  | 
 | 	sig = payload->data[asym_auth]; | 
 | 	if (!sig) | 
 | 		return -ENOPKG; | 
 | 	if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1]) | 
 | 		return -ENOKEY; | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_partial(sig->auth_ids[1], ca_keyid)) | 
 | 		return -EPERM; | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* See if we have a key that signed this one. */ | 
 | 	key = find_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, | 
 | 				  sig->auth_ids[0], sig->auth_ids[1], | 
 | 				  false); | 
 | 	if (IS_ERR(key)) | 
 | 		return -ENOKEY; | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (use_builtin_keys && !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key->flags)) | 
 | 		ret = -ENOKEY; | 
 | 	else | 
 | 		ret = verify_signature(key, sig); | 
 | 	key_put(key); | 
 | 	return ret; | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | static bool match_either_id(const struct asymmetric_key_ids *pair, | 
 | 			    const struct asymmetric_key_id *single) | 
 | { | 
 | 	return (asymmetric_key_id_same(pair->id[0], single) || | 
 | 		asymmetric_key_id_same(pair->id[1], single)); | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | static int key_or_keyring_common(struct key *dest_keyring, | 
 | 				 const struct key_type *type, | 
 | 				 const union key_payload *payload, | 
 | 				 struct key *trusted, bool check_dest) | 
 | { | 
 | 	const struct public_key_signature *sig; | 
 | 	struct key *key = NULL; | 
 | 	int ret; | 
 |  | 
 | 	pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (!dest_keyring) | 
 | 		return -ENOKEY; | 
 | 	else if (dest_keyring->type != &key_type_keyring) | 
 | 		return -EOPNOTSUPP; | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (!trusted && !check_dest) | 
 | 		return -ENOKEY; | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (type != &key_type_asymmetric) | 
 | 		return -EOPNOTSUPP; | 
 |  | 
 | 	sig = payload->data[asym_auth]; | 
 | 	if (!sig) | 
 | 		return -ENOPKG; | 
 | 	if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1]) | 
 | 		return -ENOKEY; | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (trusted) { | 
 | 		if (trusted->type == &key_type_keyring) { | 
 | 			/* See if we have a key that signed this one. */ | 
 | 			key = find_asymmetric_key(trusted, sig->auth_ids[0], | 
 | 						  sig->auth_ids[1], false); | 
 | 			if (IS_ERR(key)) | 
 | 				key = NULL; | 
 | 		} else if (trusted->type == &key_type_asymmetric) { | 
 | 			const struct asymmetric_key_ids *signer_ids; | 
 |  | 
 | 			signer_ids = asymmetric_key_ids(trusted); | 
 |  | 
 | 			/* | 
 | 			 * The auth_ids come from the candidate key (the | 
 | 			 * one that is being considered for addition to | 
 | 			 * dest_keyring) and identify the key that was | 
 | 			 * used to sign. | 
 | 			 * | 
 | 			 * The signer_ids are identifiers for the | 
 | 			 * signing key specified for dest_keyring. | 
 | 			 * | 
 | 			 * The first auth_id is the preferred id, and | 
 | 			 * the second is the fallback. If only one | 
 | 			 * auth_id is present, it may match against | 
 | 			 * either signer_id. If two auth_ids are | 
 | 			 * present, the first auth_id must match one | 
 | 			 * signer_id and the second auth_id must match | 
 | 			 * the second signer_id. | 
 | 			 */ | 
 | 			if (!sig->auth_ids[0] || !sig->auth_ids[1]) { | 
 | 				const struct asymmetric_key_id *auth_id; | 
 |  | 
 | 				auth_id = sig->auth_ids[0] ?: sig->auth_ids[1]; | 
 | 				if (match_either_id(signer_ids, auth_id)) | 
 | 					key = __key_get(trusted); | 
 |  | 
 | 			} else if (asymmetric_key_id_same(signer_ids->id[1], | 
 | 							  sig->auth_ids[1]) && | 
 | 				   match_either_id(signer_ids, | 
 | 						   sig->auth_ids[0])) { | 
 | 				key = __key_get(trusted); | 
 | 			} | 
 | 		} else { | 
 | 			return -EOPNOTSUPP; | 
 | 		} | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (check_dest && !key) { | 
 | 		/* See if the destination has a key that signed this one. */ | 
 | 		key = find_asymmetric_key(dest_keyring, sig->auth_ids[0], | 
 | 					  sig->auth_ids[1], false); | 
 | 		if (IS_ERR(key)) | 
 | 			key = NULL; | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (!key) | 
 | 		return -ENOKEY; | 
 |  | 
 | 	ret = key_validate(key); | 
 | 	if (ret == 0) | 
 | 		ret = verify_signature(key, sig); | 
 |  | 
 | 	key_put(key); | 
 | 	return ret; | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | /** | 
 |  * restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring - Restrict additions to a ring of public | 
 |  * keys using the restrict_key information stored in the ring. | 
 |  * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to. | 
 |  * @type: The type of key being added. | 
 |  * @payload: The payload of the new key. | 
 |  * @trusted: A key or ring of keys that can be used to vouch for the new cert. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * Check the new certificate only against the key or keys passed in the data | 
 |  * parameter. If one of those is the signing key and validates the new | 
 |  * certificate, then mark the new certificate as being ok to link. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if we | 
 |  * couldn't find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list, | 
 |  * -EKEYREJECTED if the signature check fails, -ENOPKG if the signature uses | 
 |  * unsupported crypto, or some other error if there is a matching certificate | 
 |  * but the signature check cannot be performed. | 
 |  */ | 
 | int restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring(struct key *dest_keyring, | 
 | 				    const struct key_type *type, | 
 | 				    const union key_payload *payload, | 
 | 				    struct key *trusted) | 
 | { | 
 | 	return key_or_keyring_common(dest_keyring, type, payload, trusted, | 
 | 				     false); | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | /** | 
 |  * restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chain - Restrict additions to a ring of | 
 |  * public keys using the restrict_key information stored in the ring. | 
 |  * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to. | 
 |  * @type: The type of key being added. | 
 |  * @payload: The payload of the new key. | 
 |  * @trusted: A key or ring of keys that can be used to vouch for the new cert. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * Check the new certificate only against the key or keys passed in the data | 
 |  * parameter. If one of those is the signing key and validates the new | 
 |  * certificate, then mark the new certificate as being ok to link. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if we | 
 |  * couldn't find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list, | 
 |  * -EKEYREJECTED if the signature check fails, -ENOPKG if the signature uses | 
 |  * unsupported crypto, or some other error if there is a matching certificate | 
 |  * but the signature check cannot be performed. | 
 |  */ | 
 | int restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chain(struct key *dest_keyring, | 
 | 					  const struct key_type *type, | 
 | 					  const union key_payload *payload, | 
 | 					  struct key *trusted) | 
 | { | 
 | 	return key_or_keyring_common(dest_keyring, type, payload, trusted, | 
 | 				     true); | 
 | } |